MNeagle
27th May 2010, 03:00 PM
KENNER, La.—More details emerged Wednesday about a disagreement between employees of rig operator Transocean Ltd. and oil giant BP PLC over how to begin shutting down the well just hours before it exploded in the Gulf of Mexico last month.
Testimony on Wednesday about the disagreement, in a hearing held by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service, which jointly regulate offshore drilling, was likely to bring increased scrutiny to the decisions BP made aboard the rig the day of the explosion, April 20.
There was also likely to be more focus on whether Transocean should have done more to ensure proper procedures were carried out.
Douglas H. Brown, Transocean's chief mechanic on the Deepwater Horizon rig, said key representatives from both companies had a "skirmish" during an 11 a.m. meeting on April 20. Less than 11 hours later, the well had a blowout, an uncontrolled release of oil and gas, killing 11 workers.
Mr. Brown said Transocean's crew leaders—including the rig operator's top manager, Jimmy W. Harrell—strongly objected to a decision by BP's top representative, or "company man," over how to start removing heavy drilling fluid and replacing it with lighter seawater from a riser pipe connected to the well head. Such pipes act as conduits between the rig and the wellhead at the ocean floor, and carry drilling fluid in and out of the well.
Removing heavy drilling fluid prior to temporarily sealing up a well and abandoning it is normal, but questions have emerged about whether the crew started the process without taking other precautionary measures against gas rising into the pipe.
It wasn't clear what Mr. Harrell objected to specifically about BP's instructions, but the rig's primary driller, Dewey Revette, and tool pusher, Miles Randall Ezell, both of Transocean, also disagreed with BP, Mr. Brown said. However, BP was in charge of the operation and the BP representative prevailed, Mr. Brown said.
"The company man was basically saying, 'This is how it's gonna be,' " said Mr. Brown, who didn't recall the name of the BP representative in question.
Mr. Brown said he didn't normally pay close attention to drilling discussions during the 11 a.m. meetings, which detailed all events on the rig that day. But he said he recalled the dispute, and the cynical reaction of Mr. Harrell as he walked away afterward, in light of the April 20 accident.
Mr. Harrell "pretty much grumbled in his manner, 'I guess that is what we have those pinchers for,' " Mr. Brown testified. He said it was a reference to the shear rams on the drilling operation's blowout preventer, which are supposed to sever the main pipe in case of a disaster.
The blowout preventer failed to stop gas from rising to the surface, causing the explosion, BP has said.
Mr. Harrell hasn't testified and declined repeated requests for comment. Donald Vidrine, listed on Transocean's documents as BP's "company man" on April 20, couldn't be reached. Mr. Revette was among the 11 workers who were killed.
Mr. Vidrine was supposed to testify Thursday but dropped out, citing an undisclosed medical issue, according to a Coast Guard spokeswoman. Another top BP official who was scheduled to testify Thursday, Robert Kaluza, declined to do so, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Coast Guard spokeswoman said.
Mr. Kaluza's lawyers, in a statement, said: "Bob did no wrong on the Deepwater Horizon, and we will make ... sure that this comes out at the appropriate time."
BP declined to comment on the testimony.
A Transocean spokesman said in a written statement: "The testimony certainly seems to suggest that [Mr. Harrell] disagreed with the operator's instructions, but what those were and why he disagreed are matters that will ultimately be determined during the course of investigations."
Mr. Brown, who suffered head injuries during the accident and had to be airlifted to a hospital in Mobile, Ala., also described his own version of the fear and disorder that overtook the rig after the explosion. The blast knocked him into a hole and left him dazed, he said.
When Mr. Brown traveled to the bridge to notify top officials about an injured co-worker, he said, the room was in chaos. When he went to the lifeboats, the man taking roll of the crew under the light of the flames consuming part of the deck appeared to be in shock. "This was a man who had known me nine years and was having trouble remembering my name," Mr. Brown said.
Rig workers regularly conducted safety drills, and sometimes lowered empty lifeboats to the water for practice, but the tests almost always occurred at the same time, Sunday mornings, and never at night, Mr. Brown said.
He said some people were unaccounted for, and he wasn't sure anyone went to look for them.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704717004575268302434395796.html?m od=WSJ_hp_mostpop_read
Testimony on Wednesday about the disagreement, in a hearing held by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service, which jointly regulate offshore drilling, was likely to bring increased scrutiny to the decisions BP made aboard the rig the day of the explosion, April 20.
There was also likely to be more focus on whether Transocean should have done more to ensure proper procedures were carried out.
Douglas H. Brown, Transocean's chief mechanic on the Deepwater Horizon rig, said key representatives from both companies had a "skirmish" during an 11 a.m. meeting on April 20. Less than 11 hours later, the well had a blowout, an uncontrolled release of oil and gas, killing 11 workers.
Mr. Brown said Transocean's crew leaders—including the rig operator's top manager, Jimmy W. Harrell—strongly objected to a decision by BP's top representative, or "company man," over how to start removing heavy drilling fluid and replacing it with lighter seawater from a riser pipe connected to the well head. Such pipes act as conduits between the rig and the wellhead at the ocean floor, and carry drilling fluid in and out of the well.
Removing heavy drilling fluid prior to temporarily sealing up a well and abandoning it is normal, but questions have emerged about whether the crew started the process without taking other precautionary measures against gas rising into the pipe.
It wasn't clear what Mr. Harrell objected to specifically about BP's instructions, but the rig's primary driller, Dewey Revette, and tool pusher, Miles Randall Ezell, both of Transocean, also disagreed with BP, Mr. Brown said. However, BP was in charge of the operation and the BP representative prevailed, Mr. Brown said.
"The company man was basically saying, 'This is how it's gonna be,' " said Mr. Brown, who didn't recall the name of the BP representative in question.
Mr. Brown said he didn't normally pay close attention to drilling discussions during the 11 a.m. meetings, which detailed all events on the rig that day. But he said he recalled the dispute, and the cynical reaction of Mr. Harrell as he walked away afterward, in light of the April 20 accident.
Mr. Harrell "pretty much grumbled in his manner, 'I guess that is what we have those pinchers for,' " Mr. Brown testified. He said it was a reference to the shear rams on the drilling operation's blowout preventer, which are supposed to sever the main pipe in case of a disaster.
The blowout preventer failed to stop gas from rising to the surface, causing the explosion, BP has said.
Mr. Harrell hasn't testified and declined repeated requests for comment. Donald Vidrine, listed on Transocean's documents as BP's "company man" on April 20, couldn't be reached. Mr. Revette was among the 11 workers who were killed.
Mr. Vidrine was supposed to testify Thursday but dropped out, citing an undisclosed medical issue, according to a Coast Guard spokeswoman. Another top BP official who was scheduled to testify Thursday, Robert Kaluza, declined to do so, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Coast Guard spokeswoman said.
Mr. Kaluza's lawyers, in a statement, said: "Bob did no wrong on the Deepwater Horizon, and we will make ... sure that this comes out at the appropriate time."
BP declined to comment on the testimony.
A Transocean spokesman said in a written statement: "The testimony certainly seems to suggest that [Mr. Harrell] disagreed with the operator's instructions, but what those were and why he disagreed are matters that will ultimately be determined during the course of investigations."
Mr. Brown, who suffered head injuries during the accident and had to be airlifted to a hospital in Mobile, Ala., also described his own version of the fear and disorder that overtook the rig after the explosion. The blast knocked him into a hole and left him dazed, he said.
When Mr. Brown traveled to the bridge to notify top officials about an injured co-worker, he said, the room was in chaos. When he went to the lifeboats, the man taking roll of the crew under the light of the flames consuming part of the deck appeared to be in shock. "This was a man who had known me nine years and was having trouble remembering my name," Mr. Brown said.
Rig workers regularly conducted safety drills, and sometimes lowered empty lifeboats to the water for practice, but the tests almost always occurred at the same time, Sunday mornings, and never at night, Mr. Brown said.
He said some people were unaccounted for, and he wasn't sure anyone went to look for them.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704717004575268302434395796.html?m od=WSJ_hp_mostpop_read