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JohnQPublic

27th January 2011, 01:18 PM

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIVIL DIVISION (http://www.nativeborncitizen.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/23052093-dc-sup-ct-2009-ca-005391-11-04-dismissed.pdf)
RODNEY DALE,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.

Case No. 2009 CA 5391 B Calendar 6
Judge Brian F. Holeman

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion to Have the Clerk of the Court to Enter a Default Against the United States. Upon review of the record and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs Motion is denied and this matter is dismissed.

I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default

In his Motion, Plaintiff seeks an entry of default against Defendant under the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55, due to Defendant’s failure to plead or otherwise defend. However, upon review of the record, the Court is unable to find proof of Plaintiff having complied with Rule 4(i)(1), which governs service upon the United States. I Rule 4(m) provides a 60-day window from the filing of the Complaint to filing proof of service and further establishes that “[f]ailure to comply with the requirements of this Rule shall result in the dismissal without prejudice of the [C]omplaint.” (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs Complaint was filed on July 29, 2009, more than 60 days have passed and Plaintiff has not filed proof of service in compliance with Rule 4. As such, the Rules require dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint.

1 As explained in more detail in the discussion of its lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court finds that Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant, the United States, is to be treated as a corporation for the purpose of this litigation is entirely without merit. Accordingly, the Court applies the Rule for service upon the United States rather than the Rule for service upon a corporation.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Dismissal of this case is further and independently warranted due to this Court’s lack of jurisdiction. Rule 12(h)(3) states that “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the Court shall dismiss the action.”

It should be noted that Plaintiffs initial filing of July 29, 2009, consisting of22 hand-numbered pages is, in substantial part, grammatically, logically, and legally incomprehensible.

In its review of this filing, the Court has attempted to give the Plaintiff the benefit of its interpretive efforts, construing the pleading “so as to do substantial justice” and with a view toward establishing sufficiency. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8; see also Grayson v. AT&T Corp., No. 07-CV-1264,2009 D.C. App. LEXIS 460, at *18 (Sept. 17,2009).

First, Plaintiff appears to assert that the United States maintains a corporate capacity in which it might be sued. Plaintiff s assertion is derived from the definition of “United States” in 28 U.S.C.S. § 3002 (LexisNexis 2009). That Section provides that “[A]s used in this chapter [Federal Debt Collection Procedure]: “United States” means-(A) a Federal corporation; (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or (C) an instrumentality of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.S. § 3002(15). The Federal Debt Collectionchapter of the United States Code “provides the exclusive civil procedures/or the United
States-(1) to recover a judgment on a debt; or (2) to obtain, before judgment on a claim for a debt, a remedy in connection with such a claim.” 28 U.S.C.S. § 3001(a) (emphasis added). In reading the definition in context, it is clear that this statutory provision in no way authorizes civil suit against the United States as a corporation, rather provides civil procedures for the United States and its various entities and instrumentalities to collect on debts.

Absent the purported corporate construct attempted here, the United States is immune from suit. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,538 (1980) (“It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued[.]“) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover,

Jurisdiction over any suit against the Government requires a clear statmentnt from the United States waiving sovereign immunity. together with a claim falling within the terms of the waver[.] The terms of consent to be sued may not be inferred, but must be unequivocally expressed, in order to define a court’s jurisdiction[.]

United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465,472 (2003) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Still further, “a waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Peha, 518 U.S. 187,192 (1996).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff quotes various statutes and other materials in alleging violations of the following sections of the United States Code: Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), 50 U.S.C.S. app. §§ 1-44 (LexisNexis 2009); crimes of racketeering, 18 U.S.C.S . §2340 (LexiaNexis 2009), and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (R.I.C.O.), USCS §§ 1961-1968 (:exisNexis 2009); war crimes 18 USCS app. §3A1.1 (Lexis 2009) torture, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340 (LexisNexis 2009); domestic terrorism, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2331 (LexisNexis 2009); hate crimes, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 3Al.1 (LexisNexis 2009); and genocide.’ Upon review of the statutory material, the Court finds that none of these statutes contain a waiver of sovereign immunity, unequivocal or otherwise, that would provide this Court
with jurisdiction over the United States.

2 The heading of Plaintiffs Complaint also states “Violation of the District of Columbia Constitution,” but the Court is unable to find the specification of this alleged violation in the body of the Complaint.

The TWEA only confers jurisdiction upon the United States Court of Federal Claims “to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claims against the United States for the proceeds received by the United States from the sale of the property vested under the provisions” of that Act. 50 U.S.C.S. app. § 42. The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims consists of various references to federal criminal law, which enables the United States to prosecute certain behaviors and actions and significantly, do not establish a waiver of sovereign immunity against civil liability.

In light of Defendant’s sovereign immunity and there being no waiver, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Norris v. United States, 927 A.2d 1034, 1039 (D.C.2007) (acknowledging that sovereign immunity of the United States Parole Commission woulddeprive the Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiffs claim against theCommission). As such, the entire matter must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(h)(3).

III. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

The Court further finds that, if it were to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this case, Plaintiffs Complaint would warrant dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b )(6). The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed his Complaint pro se and that:

[T]he allegations of such a complaint, however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.

Norris, supra, 927 A.2d at 1039 n.8 (emphasis added); see also Grayson, supra, 2009 D.C. App. LEXIS 460, at * 18 (“[W]e construe pleadings as to do substantial justice.”) (internal quotationomitted).

Further, while “[a] complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the court doubts that the plaintiff will prevail in the action[,]” McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 203 (D.C. 1979), a court might sua sponte summarily dispose of a case “where the facts material to a cause of action are shown to be undisputed, and those facts so established indicate an unequivocal right to judgment favoring a party[.]” Id. (warning that the procedure should be used very infrequently and with an abundance of caution”).

In describing a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has stated:

[A] plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Although for the purposes of a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss we must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Moreover, factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.] A complaint will not suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.

Grayson. supra, 2009 D.C. App. LEXIS 460, at * 17-* 18 (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).

Here, to the extent that Plaintiff s Complaint may be comprehensible, the Court is hindered in finding a cognizable cause of action upon which relief might be granted. Even factoring in the Court of Appeals’ caveats concerning pro se complaints and sua sponte dismissals, the Court finds that if, arguendo, it were to find subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs Complaint, in its most favorable light and assuming the truth of its averments, does not suffice due to the absence of factual predicate and cognizable causes of action. As such, the Court finds independent grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

WHEREFORE, it is this 4th day of November 2009, hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (http://www.lectlaw.com/def/d061.htm); and it is further
ORDERED, that the Initial Scheduling Conference currently set for November 6, 2009 is
VACATED.

BRIAN F. HOLEMAN JUDGE

Copy mailed to:

Rodney Dale P.O. Box 435
High Shoals, NC 28077