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View Full Version : They still reelected him...lol.



Jewboo
18th February 2014, 08:25 AM
http://i.imgur.com/HfZUis8.png

hoarder
18th February 2014, 09:03 AM
The key word being "they".

http://thisiszionism.blogspot.com/2007/11/who-runs-electronic-voting-machines.html

mick silver
24th February 2014, 04:29 PM
How A Private Company
Counted Our Votes
By Christopher Bollyn
American Free Press
11-5-3

(When the polls closed in Chicago, American Free Press was at the Cook County clerk's office to see how the secretive private company that operates the voting machines in America's third largest city actually controls the counting of the votes.) CHICAGO - The morning after Election Day, the Democratic vice presidential candidate John Edwardspromised the nation that the Democrats would "make sure that every vote counts, and that every vote is counted." Later in the day, as the Democratic presidentialcandidate, Sen. John Kerry, conceded defeat to George W. Bush, his 9th cousin and fellow "Bonesman from Yale's elite secret society, The Order of the Skull & Bones, he said: "In America, it is vital that every vote count. Kerry and Edwards, however, conceded defeat before some 170,000 to 250,000 provisional ballots from the state of Ohio, which could have changed the outcome of the election, had been counted. As the public has been led to believe, the final tally came down to a near 50-50 split and it was the "swing state of Ohio that made the difference. But how were the votes actually counted across the nation on November 2? VOTING IN CHICAGO On Election Day, voters in Cook County (Ill.) were among the 60 million Americans who voted with machines made by Election Systems & Software, a secretive and private company based in Omaha. ES&S, as its known, calls itself "the world's largest and most experienced provider of total election managementsolutions. According to the company's own figures, 42 percent of all registeredvoters in the United States voted on ES&S equipment on Election Day. ES&S sells its "end-to-end election management suite of solutions to replace traditional voting methods -- and election officials -- with what it calls "one-stop-shop full service election coordination from start to finish. What this means on Election Day is that ES&S, aprivate company, manages everything about the voting, from voter registration, the printing of ballots, the programming of the voting machines, thecounting and tabulation of the votes, and the final reporting of the results for 60 million Americans in 47 states. Four years after first revealing the flaws inherent in the insecure ES&S electronic voting machines used in Cook County,American Free Press went to the county clerk's office to observe how ES&Scontrols the counting of the votes for America's third largest city, Chicago, and the suburban area around it. Scott Burnham, spokesman for the county clerk, hadinformed me that the vote count is open to the public and that press credentials would not be required. Shortly after arriving, I ran into Burnham and David Orr, the county clerk, in the hallway. Although I had arrived just shortly before the polls closed at 7 p.m., I was the only member of the public or the press around except for a couple Associated Press (AP) reporters in the far corner of the room. They were busy setting up their laptop to the ES&S computer in the backroom, which provided them with "direct feed of theresults. I was surprised to see so few people attending such an important event. In France, scores of citizens watch the vote count in each polling station. While the results were coming in, the AP "reporter read a novel while her laptop did the communicating. When I went to talk to the AP reporter, Burnham quickly appeared and told me to leave. "You should talk to AP, hesaid. "She is AP, I replied. "She just works for AP, he said. Clearly the subject of AP having direct data feed from the mainframe computer was something Burnham did not want me todiscuss. Dane Placko, a local reporter for the Fox News network, told AFP that, "Fox gets direct feed. Any actual counting of the votes by citizens is very rare in the United States except for a few counties in Montana and other states where paper ballots are still hand-counted. In most counties the ballots are treated as input data to be processed through computer systems controlled by private companies like ES&S. In Cook County the ballot is inevitably a cluttered punch card with nearly 100 votes. After voting for the president andvice-president, a senator, and a Congressman, the voter has to wade through pages ofchoices to vote for some 80 local officials from the sanitation board to thestate's general assembly. Every voter had to vote on nearly 80 judges. As I voted, every ballot that was fed into the ES&S machine registered as an "undervote, as did mine. Rather than holding separate elections for national and local officials, as is done in most countries, the Cook County ballot is extremely long and complicated. Officials who support electronic voting systems give the complexity of the ballot as the main reason why voting machines are necessary -- because it would take too much time to count the votes manually. After calling and personally visiting ES&Sheadquarters in Omaha and Chicago, I can say it is the most secretive company I have ever come across. In August, I visited ES&S company headquarters on John Galt Blvd. in Omaha. Although the company says it is the largest votingmachine company in the United States, they were unable to provide any information about their company or their products. The ownership of the company is a closely-guarded secret. I asked to meet with Todd Urosevich, one of the two brothers that founded the company. Bob and Todd Urosevich started ES&S as a company called Data Mark in the early 1980s. Today, Bob Urosevich heads Ohio-based Diebold Election Systems, a competitor of ES&S and the second largest U.S. manufacturer of electronic voting machines. Together, the computerized ballot scanners andtouch-screen voting machines systems made by ES&S and Diebold recorded some 80percent of all votes cast in the recent U.S. presidential election. As ES&S had no media relations person available and Todd Urosevich was not willing to be interviewed, the company's chieffinancial officer Tom O,Brien finally appeared. O,Brien, clearly displeased with my visit and questions, refused to provide any information about thecompany. Although I was ill on Election Day, I knew I had to go to the county clerk's office to observe "counting of the vote. It is, after all, the only "counting open to the public. What I saw in Chicago, however, only made me more nauseous. The only "vote count the press or public can observe in Chicago is what is projected on screens. The opening screen read:ES&S Automatic Election Returns, Release 35, Under License to the City ofChicago, Serial No. 0004, Copyright 1987. Carl Zimmerman, technical supervisor for the clerk's office, said that the computer that ran the system was in the back,"in the ES&S room, he said. At 7 p.m., Jonathan Lin, a worker on the county clerk's computer staff, came out and turned on the monitors on the 6th floor, where the City of Chicago votes were tallied and displayed. Behind him was Rick Thurman, an ES&S technician, checking the first results. Thurman seemed surprised when I asked him if he worked for ES&S. He said that the company had about 6 engineers running the computer in the back room. He then checked himself, saying he had said too much. Later I asked Lin who was actually operating the computer that was generating the results being shown on the monitors. "ES&S is running the mainframe for all of this, Lin said pointing to thetelevision displays. In the press room in the back I noticed stacks of boxes containing "Votamatic voting machines and "pre-punched ballots printed by ES&S of Addison, Texas, for the different precincts in Cook County. In the rear hallway behind the press room was the ES&S room. Only ES&S personnel were allowed into the room. When I poked around in the hallway and peeked into the ES&S room an armed marshal and ES&S employee quickly appeared. In no condition for a confrontation, I made myself scarce. I met a couple reporters from CLTV, a local cable channel of WGN. One of the reporters asked about my interest in the Chicagotallies. I said I was interested to see how a private company runs the elections in Chicago. Seemingly unaware of how ES&S operates elections in Cook County, I explained the basics. "I've observed elections across Europe, I added, "from France and Germany to Serbia andHolland. Everywhere in Europe voting is done on paper ballots that are counted by the citizens -- except Holland. Obviously uncomfortable with this discussion the reporter responded, "I'm glad I'm not in Serbia. I don't mind if a machine counts the votes.

mick silver
24th February 2014, 04:31 PM
Premier Election Solutions, Inc. is currently run by David Byrd.[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-3) Previously, DESI was run by Bob Urosevich (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Urosevich), who worked in the election systems industry since 1976. In 1979, Mr. Urosevich founded American Information Systems. He served as the President of AIS now known as Election Systems & Software, Inc. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_Systems_%26_Software) (ES&S) from 1979 through 1992. Bob's brother, Todd Urosevich, is Vice President, Aftermarket Sales with ES&S, DESI's chief competitor. In 1995, Bob Urosevich started I-Mark Systems, whose product was a touch screen voting system utilizing a smart card and biometric encryption authorization technology. Global Election Systems, Inc. (GES) acquired I-Mark in 1997, and on July 31, 2000 Mr. Urosevich was promoted from Vice President of Sales and Marketing and New Business Development to President and Chief Operating Officer. On January 22, 2002, Diebold (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diebold) announced the acquisition of GES, then a manufacturer and supplier of electronic voting (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting) terminals and solutions. The total purchase price, in stock and cash, was $24.7 million. Global Election Systems subsequently changed its name to Diebold Election Systems, Inc.
In 2006, Diebold decided to remove its name from the front of the voting machines for strategic reasons. CEO Thomas Swidarski announced he would decide in the beginning of 2007 if Diebold stays in the election business.[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-gimbel-4) In August 2007 the company changed its name to "Premier Election Solutions".
ControversyO'Dell's fundraisingIn August 2003, Walden O'Dell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walden_O%27Dell), chief executive of Diebold, announced that he had been a top fund-raiser for President (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States) George W. Bush (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush) and had sent a get-out-the-funds letter to Ohio (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio) Republicans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Republican_Party). In the letters he says he is "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year."[5] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-5) Although he clarified his statement as merely a poor choice of words, critics of Diebold and/or the Republican party interpreted this as at minimum an indication of a conflict of interest (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_of_interest), at worst implying a risk to the fair counting of ballots. He responded to the critics by pointing out that the company's election machines division is run out of Texas (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas) by a registered Democrat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Democratic_Party). Nonetheless, O'Dell vowed to lower his political profile lest his personal actions harm the company. O'Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on 12 December 2005 following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[6] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-CB1-6) ...
Security and concealment issuesFor more information in the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States presidential election: Specific issues relating to Diebold machines and practices (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_United_States_presidential_election_controver sy,_voting_machines#Specific_issues_relating_to_Di ebold_machines_and_practices)Avi Rubin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avi_Rubin), Professor of Computer Science at Johns Hopkins University (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johns_Hopkins_University) and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Security_Institute) has analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reports "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[7] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-7) Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Maryland) hired Science Applications International Corporation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_Applications_International_Corporation) (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded “[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise.”[8] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-8)
The company RABA did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote in January 2004 confirming many of the problems found by Avi Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[9] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-9)
In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bev_Harris), hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Department of State said that, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[10] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-10)
In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[11] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-11) on page 2 the California report states that:
"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti's attack does work: Mr. Hursti's attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."
A new vulnerability, this time with the TSx DRE machines, was reported in May 2006. According to Professor Rubin, the machines are "much, much easier to attack than anything we've previously said... On a scale of one to 10, if the problems we found before were a six, this is a 10. It's a totally different ballgame." According to Rubin, the system is intentionally designed so that anyone with access can update the machine software, without a pass code or other security protocol. Diebold officials said that although any problem can be avoided by keeping a close watch on the machines, they are developing a fix.[12] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-12)
Michael I. Shamos (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Shamos), a professor of computer science at Carnegie Mellon University (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnegie_Mellon_University) who is a proponent of electronic voting and the examiner of electronic voting systems for Pennsylvania, stated "It's the most severe security flaw ever discovered in a voting system." Douglas W. Jones (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_W._Jones), a professor of computer science at the University of Iowa (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Iowa), stated "This is the barn door being wide open, while people were arguing over the lock on the front door." Diebold spokesman David Bear (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=David_Bear&action=edit&redlink=1) played down the seriousness of the situation, asserting that "For there to be a problem here, you're basically assuming a premise where you have some evil and nefarious election officials who would sneak in and introduce a piece of software. I don't believe these evil elections people exist."[13] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-13)
On 30 October 2006, researchers from the University of Connecticut (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Connecticut) demonstrated new vulnerabilities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulnerability_%28computing%29) in Diebold AccuVote-OS optical scan voting terminal. The system can be compromised even if its removable memory card is sealed in place.[14] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-14)
On 2 November 2006, HBO (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HBO) premiered a documentary entitled "Hacking Democracy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacking_Democracy)", concerning the vulnerability of electronic voting machines (primarily Diebold) to hacking and inaccurate vote totals. The company argued that the film was factually inaccurate and urged HBO to air a disclaimer explaining that it had not verified any of the claims.[15] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-15)[16] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-16)[17] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-17) However, corroboration and validation for the exploits shown in Hacking Democracy was published in a report for the state of California (see above).
In January 2007, a photo of the key used to open Diebold voting machines was posted in the company's website. It was found possible to duplicate the key based on the photo. The key unlocks a compartment which contains a removable memory card (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_card), leaving the machine vulnerable to tampering.[18] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-18)
A report commissioned by Ohio’s top elections official on December 15, 2007 has found that all five voting systems used in Ohio (made by Elections Systems and Software; Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems); and Hart InterCivic) have critical flaws that could undermine the integrity of the 2008 general election.[19] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-19)
On 17 July 2008, Stephen Spoonamore (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stephen_Spoonamore&action=edit&redlink=1) made the claim that had "fresh evidence regarding election fraud on Diebold electronic voting machines during the 2002 Georgia gubernatorial and senatorial elections." Spoonamore is "the founder and until recently the CEO of Cybrinth LLC, an information technology policy and security firm that serves Fortune 100 companies." He claims that Diebold Election Systems Inc. COO Bob Urosevich (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Urosevich) personally installed a computer patch on voting machines in two counties in Georgia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_%28U.S._state%29), and that the patch did not fix the problem it was supposed to fix.[20] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-20) Reports have indicated that then Georgia Secretary of State (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_Secretary_of_State) Cathy Cox (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathy_Cox) did not know the patch was installed until after the election.[21] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-21)
States rejecting DieboldIn 2004, after an initial investigation into the company's practices, Secretary of State of California (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_of_State_of_California) Kevin Shelley (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kevin_Shelley) issued a ban on one model of Diebold voting machines in that state. California Attorney General (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Attorney_General) Bill Lockyer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Lockyer), joined the state of California into a false claims suit filed in November 2003 by Bev Harris and Alameda County citizen Jim March. Here is a copy of the original lawsuit [22] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-22) and here is the article showing it became the California false claims suit:[23] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-23)
The suit charged that Diebold had given false information about the security and reliability of Diebold Election Systems machines that were sold to the state. To settle the case, Diebold agreed to pay $2.6 million and to implement certain reforms.[24] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-24) On August 3, 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debra_Bowen) decertified Diebold and three other electronic voting systems (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting) after a "top-to-bottom review of the voting machines certified for use in California in March 2007."[25] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-25)
In April 2007 the Maryland General Assembly (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maryland_General_Assembly) voted to replace paperless touchscreen voting machines with paper ballots counted by optical scanners, effective in time for the 2010 general (November) elections. The law, signed by the Governor in May 2007, was made contingent on the provision of funding by no later than April 2008. The Governor included such funding in his proposed budget in January 2008,[26] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-26) but the funding was defeated by the state House in July 2008.[27] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-27)
In March 2009, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen decertified Diebold's GEMS version 1.18.19 after the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project discovered that GEMS had silently dropped 197 ballots from its tabulation of a single precinct in Eureka, California.[28] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-28) The discovery was made after project members conducted an independent count using the ballot counting program Ballot Browser (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballot_Browser).
Leaked memosIn September 2003, a large number of internal Diebold memos, dating back to 1999, were posted to the BlackBoxVoting.org web site, resulting in the site being shut down due to a Diebold cease and desist order. Later, other website organizations Why War? (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Why_War%3F_%28anti-war_organization%29&action=edit&redlink=1) and the Swarthmore Coalition for the Digital Commons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Culture_Swarthmore), a group of student activists at Swarthmore College (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swarthmore_College) posted the memos. U.S. Representative (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives) Dennis Kucinich (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Kucinich), a Democrat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_%28United_States%29) from Ohio (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio), placed portions of the files on his websites.[29] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-29) The full set of these internal memos is posted here: Original Diebold Memos—FULL SET [30] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-30)
Diebold attempted to stop the publication of these internal memos by sending cease-and-desist letters (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cease_and_desist) to each site hosting these documents, demanding that they be removed. Diebold claimed the memos as their copyrighted material, and asserted that anyone who published the memos online was in violation of the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Copyright_Infringement_Liability_Limitation _Act) provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Millennium_Copyright_Act) found in §512 of the United States Copyright Act (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Copyright_Act).
When it turned out that some of the challenged groups would not back down, Diebold retracted their threat. Those who had been threatened by Diebold then sued for court costs and damages, in OPG v. Diebold (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OPG_v._Diebold). This suit eventually led to a victory for the plaintiffs against Diebold, when in October 2004 Judge Jeremy Fogel ruled that Diebold abused its copyrights in its efforts to suppress the embarrassing memos.
Stephen Heller (whistleblower)In January and February 2004, a whistleblower (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whistleblower) named Stephen Heller brought to light memos from Jones Day (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jones_Day), Diebold's attorneys, informing Diebold that they were in breach of California (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California) law by continuing to use illegal and uncertified software in California voting machines. California Attorney General (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Attorney_General) Bill Lockyer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Lockyer) filed civil and criminal suits against the company, which were dropped when Diebold settled out of court for $2.6 million. In February 2006, Heller was charged with three felonies for this action.[31] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-31)[32] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-32) On 20 November 2006 Heller made a plea agreement to pay $10,000 to Jones Day, write an apology, and receive three years probation.[33] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-33)
Diebold and Kenneth Blackwell's conflict of interestOhio State Senator Jeff Jacobson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Jacobson_%28Ohio%29), Republican, asked Ohio Secretary of State (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio_Secretary_of_State) Ken Blackwell (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Blackwell), also a Republican, in July, 2003 to disqualify Diebold's bid to supply voting machines for the state, after security problems were discovered in its software, but was refused.[34] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-34) Blackwell had ordered Diebold touch screen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Touch_screen) voting machines, reversing an earlier decision by the state to purchase only optical scan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optical_scan) voting machines which, unlike the touch screen devices, would leave a "paper trail" for recount purposes. Blackwell was found in April 2006, to own 83 shares of Diebold stock, down from 178 shares purchased in January 2005, which he attributed to an unidentified financial manager at Credit Suisse First Boston (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_Suisse_First_Boston) who had violated his instructions to avoid potential conflict of interest (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_of_interest), without his knowledge.[35] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-35) When Cuyahoga county's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuyahoga_County,_Ohio) primary was held on May 2, 2006, officials ordered the hand-counting of more than 18,000 paper ballots after Diebold's new optical scan machines produced inconsistent tabulations, leaving several local races in limbo for days and eventually resulting in a reversal of the outcome of one race for state representative. Blackwell ordered an investigation by the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections; Ohio Democrats demanded that Blackwell, who was also the Republican gubernatorial candidate in 2006, recuse (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recuse) himself from the investigation due to conflicts of interest, but Blackwell did not do so.[36] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-36)
The Republican head of the Franklin County, Ohio (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franklin_County,_Ohio) Board of Elections, Matt Damschroder, said a Diebold contractor came to him and bragged of a $50,000 check he had written to Blackwell’s "political interests."[37] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-37)
Name Change and Acquisition by Election Systems & SoftwareIn 2006, Diebold removed its name from the voting machines[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-gimbel-4)and in August 2007 changed its name to "Premier Election Solutions" ("PES").
Election Systems & Software (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_Systems_%26_Software) (ES&S) acquired Premier Election Solutions on September 3, 2009. ES&S President and CEO Aldo Tesi said combining the two companies will result in better products and services for customers and voters. The sale did not affect the Brazilian division.[38] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-38)
The United States Department of Justice (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice) objected to the acquisition on anti-trust grounds.
Acquisition by DominionDominion Voting Systems (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominion_Voting_Systems) acquired Premier on May 19, 2010. "We are extremely pleased to conclude this transaction, which will restore much-needed competition to the American voting systems market and will allow Dominion to expand its capabilities and operational footprint to every corner of the United States," said John Poulos, CEO of Dominion. The transaction has been approved by the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and nine state attorneys general.[39] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_Election_Solutions#cite_note-39)
See also