slvrbugjim
20th February 2015, 02:28 PM
The secret Part of the Minsk agreement was to let the US troops and EU troops that we can call Mercenaries, thousands of them to retreat and that Russia would not call them out on this fact and Western Media would in turn not report this as well.
http://syncreticstudies.com/2015/02/19/the-beautiful-truth-about-minsk-ii-the-debaltsevo-debacle/#more-1727
The US knew that among the UAF soldiers were also mercenaries from NATO countries, and even NATO advisers. It is unclear to what extent the French and the Germans are capable of assessing things which might first arise as leaks or rumors. It is also unclear to what extent the US would inform civilian authorities like Merkel and Hollande of the extent of NATO involvement. We do know that German intelligence is in a process of creating an inner network independent of US intelligence networks. In other words, Germany is in the process of becoming a sovereign state.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jsi5uqYQZFU
February 12th, on the day Minsk II was signed by the contact group as agreed to by the Normandy 4, we wrote:
“These are the relevant factors which produce the strong sense that these Normandy 4 meetings involve some very serious things and some complex levels that are beyond the scope of what is reported. Russia conducts itself in these meetings from a position of strength.”
Critical events since the February 12th ceasefire tell us what the real underlying factors beyond the scope of what was reported indeed were. With the Ukrainian Army having been encircled in the Debaltsevo region and without provisions, mass surrenders are already underway. There are already reports of thousands of UAF dead. Close fighting in the town itself have resulted in the UAF being pushed out, with the town now under Novorossiyan control. The UAF had nowhere to go, and were out of ammo.
Attempts to push out anywhere resulted in more needless deaths for the disheartened and broken Ukrainian force whose numbers range between five and eight thousand. Putin has publicly urged Poroshenko to allow the UAF soldiers to surrender. Unsurprisingly, Poroshenko has declared victory.
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/donetsk-1_2884919b.jpg?w=357&h=223 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/donetsk-1_2884919b.jpg)
The encirclement was complete in the week leading up to the Minsk II meeting. The political reality in which the EU gave its blessing to Novorossiya and Russia to finish of the encirclement was based in a few things, and US agreement on other points was based in other things. There are three sides at play here, even though it often appears as two. The Minsk II agreement enshrined the EU blessings. In return, the EU got something, but what exactly is the subject of some speculation.
Debaltsevo is a critical area because it has rail through it which connects Lughansk to Donetsk republics. The September 5th Ceasefire was intended to have this in control of Novorossiya. The September 19th memorandum explicitly restates this, and the map of the de-militarized and pull-back lines clearly show that Debaltsevo was to be withdrawn from.
Poroshenko stated that the Cauldron was actually a bridgehead. In fact, he is right, this was not a new development but an ongoing occupation of Debaltsevo which was in violation of the 9-19 memorandum.
All together, this agreement is reflective of the general direction things have gone, and reflects Russian mastery of geopolitical strategy, meaningful diplomacy and “lawfare”, hybrid warfare, and thorough planning all around.
Why Debaltsevo was an apparent exception to the ceasefire, what the new ceasefire agreement actually compels, what was really said at Minsk, what to make of the UN Security Council resolution, and what this says about the present state of affairs are all serious questions that are raised from this. These are the pressing questions surrounding this that we will try to answer in brief.
1.)The EU was forced to agree to a revised form of the September ceasefire, including the memorandum of the 19th of that month. US policy is failing, or rather succeeding in producing an unstable situation, precisely what most of European decision makers want to avoid. Even EU Atlanticists are not in it for the whole wild ride, and their Trans-Atlantic sensibilities are still based upon general notions of wealth creation and regional stability.
Evidence of this was the impending doom of thousands of UAF fighters, leaked information indicated a number of these may be from NATO countries, and Merkel and Hollande were right in knowing that they had better get clarification on this matter directly from the Russian head of state.
Indeed, this is why European leaders called the meeting, and rushed themselves to Minsk.
Poroshenko does not answer to the EU, they are not his guarantor, and they are not capable of pressuring him too much. They can only pressure the US, and by only by extension Poroshenko, by not going along with US plans for Russia and Ukraine. EU has said no to Ukraine in NATO, and no to the EU Association Agreement after all. The EU says on these critical points, over and over, the same thing that Russia says.
To understand the Minsk agreement is to understand the EU’s relationship with the Kiev Junta. The EU knows that when it talks to Poroshenko, it is talking to a US sock puppet. The reason that Poroshenko was at the meeting, and not the US, was because the EU and Russia wanted to tell Poroshenko certain things in a security environment which only the nominally neutral Minsk could provide. No one really thinks that Belarus is neutral, but everyone can pretend that they do.
The EU generally is not happy with how the US has handled things, and yet it is sitting in two chairs on the question nevertheless. So this is about the US using its pull on the Atlanticist forces within the EU, and also within less formal NATO structures, to make a policy for Europe and on Europe outside of the scope of European agency.
This prior agreement among other things specifically placed control of Debaltsevo in the hands of Novorossiya. Both the September and February agreements contain some apparent defects, which work out favorably again for the Russians. This is why we have heard rebel commanders and DPR leader Zakharchenko affirm both that the agreement is vague and contains contradictions, and also that Debaltsevo was not included in the ceasefire. Rather, he means the opposite on these points.
First, the terms are vague and do not compel the rebels to end the rebellion (it places onus on Ukraine to do things first that it will never do, and is not compelled to do by the language). Second, abiding by the ceasefire, it entirely justifies the use of arms to resolve the UAF’s violation of the agreement through its intrusion into the Debaltsevo area. At least on paper, it boils down to how one interprets specific language from the Minsk II agreement of February 12th. We will look at this in a moment.
This map includes the September 19th line as a dotted black curving series of dots, which have Debaltsevo on the Novorossiyan side of the line. There are at least two ways to interpret the language of the latest agreement.
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/feb16done.jpg?w=404&h=321 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/feb16done.jpg)
2.) The agreement itself is vague in ways that help Novorossiya. This is mostly because the power to act on terms of an agreement in a manner which is beneficial is really a reflection of one’s advantage on the ground. As with anything, the ability to favorably act in one’s own interest is a practical question which is constrained by real existing forces and considerations. By and large, the memorandum in the abstract contains serious defects and cannot really be said to be an executable document by itself as it has many blank spots. It requires further agreements to fill in those blanks, both formal and tacit, between the two parties. These are not minor issues, but the core issues which strike at the heart of the civil war itself. These terms favor the party with the most agency. Each party has different kinds of agency and likely view that they will be able to, on the balance, make more out of this defective document than the other party.
The agreement has 13 points, most of which use terms which at first glance seem to compel certain actions, but in fact rather are contingent upon events which either do not have a specific time table, attach a time table to events which do not have a time table or are not executable, or still require future agreement.
What will figure prominently in the coming disagreements over implementation is the meaning of point 2 and point 4. The Minsk II agreement of February 12th refers back to the Minsk Memorandum of 19th September twice. These are in relation to the borders, one way or another, of Novorossiya.
In point 2 we read:
Pull-out of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distance with the aim of creation of a security zone on minimum 50 kilometres (31 mi) apart for artillery of 100mm calibre or more, and a security zone of 70 kilometres (43 mi) for MLRS and 140 kilometres (87 mi) for MLRS Tornado-S, Uragan, Smerch, and Tochka U tactical missile systems:
* for Ukrainian troops, from actual line of contact;
* for armed formations of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, from the contact line in accordance with the Minsk Memorandum as of 19 September 2014
The pullout of the above-mentioned heavy weapons must start no later than the second day after the start of the ceasefire and finish within 14 days.
This process will be assisted by OSCE with the support of the Trilateral Contact Group.
This refers to artillery pull-out, but note that there are different lines to withdraw from for each of the two sides. This can be interpreted different ways: the word ‘actual’ means ‘in reality’, but which reality – the past, present or the future; the line on the 12th, on the 15th, or 14 days after the 15th? Whatever the case what it does do inarguably is draw us back to the Minsk Memorandum of the 19th and reaffirms those lines. The line for Novorossiya in that 19 September agreement includes Debaltsevo within it.
Other points, such as the disbanding of illegal groups and removal of foreign soldiers and mercenaries might at first glance apply to either side. With the Novorossiyan militias, as a legal party to the agreement the LPR and DPR cannot simultaneously be those illegal groups. The agreement does not say which party does the disarming (or what constitutes an illegal group), and in the context of limited federal autonomy or rather ‘local self governance’, we infer that both parties have this authority in the areas which they respectively control. Being able to disarm an illegal group implies the power to do it, i.e. having a legally armed group capable of the task. All of this has been pointed out previously when similar language appeared in the September agreement.
It is not strange that western media, to the extent that any details of this are covered, refers to continued fighting at Debaltsevo as a violation of the February ceasefire.
What we will see ultimately as a default reason for continued hostilities, that must work in conjunction with a favorable interpretation of the agreement, is the rationale of self defense. In reality a case of acceptable use of force during a ceasefire is in particular when a party defends itself from violations of the ceasefire. One element of one party, whether or not under orders, who violates the ceasefire does not deprive the other side of a means of response within the framework of a ceasefire. Thus it is possible for a party (being fired on) to simultaneously be adhering to a ceasefire and yet also be engaged in hostilities.
The next reference to the September 19th Minsk Memorandum is in point 4:
On the first day after the pullout a dialogue is to start on modalities of conducting local elections in accordance with the Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine “On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts,” and also about the future of these districts based on the above-mentioned law.
Without delays, but no later than 30 days from the date of signing of this document, a resolution has to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verkhovna_Rada_of_Ukraine), indicating the territory which falls under the special regime in accordance with the law “On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts,” based in the line set up by the Minsk Memorandum (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Memorandum) as of 19 September 2014.
These two cited sections taken together mean that some things in point 2 are obligated to have taken place on or about March 1st, and point 4’s ‘Rada resolution’ must be approved by Ukraine by mid March. But what is approved is a resolution that ‘indicates’ the territory, which is not the same thing as ‘recognizing’ that territory or vesting those local authorities with any specific rights and obligations.
In the course of the execution of the September agreement, each side accused the other of having violated it. Over the course of time, with each side making it known to the other, it can reasonably be said that much of it was no longer in effect. With those changes having effectively taken place to the original agreement, references to the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September begin to take on elements of vestigial clauses or vestigial language if they lack meaning or if subsequent practices and events have diminished their effect.
While point 2 seems to refer more strongly to the 19 September borders when it constrains the Novorossiyans, in point 4 in which the Ukrainian Rada ‘indicates’ their territory, the language is much softer and states that it be ‘based in’ that line. Other problems in point 4 which may make the entire agreement defective and void notwithstanding (this may relate to the details of the referenced Ukrainian law on local self-governance), we can see clearly that the Rada must ‘indicate’ – which does not carry the force of ‘determine’, and certainly not ‘recognize’. Furthermore it states that the boundaries are ‘based in the line’, not precisely the line determined then, but possible a new line which is ‘based in the line’ in some day – determined by the same rationale, recognizing the same interests, or closely resembling – so it would be argued – the September 19th line in some credible way.
It was required, therefore, to agree again on the terms, so that this ‘reset’ supersedes the previous deviations, which if unchallenged may actually establish a new tacit agreement. Even though the references to the September 19th line are not coupled with firm language which compels specific actions coupled with specified consequences for inaction and remedy process, they are still referenced too. This means that parties can justify their ‘ceasefire’ actions of this already confused document as being based on the agreement.
Taken all together, we can see we have drawn several distinct interpretations. One seems to not, but rather to to be based in the ‘actual line of contact’ for the Ukraine side, which would be where the UAF positions ‘are’ (but vague about ‘when’ we look. The other one allows us to interpret the language as effectively returning the strategically Debaltsevo region to Novorossiya in accordance with the September 19th agreement.
When we look at the following series of situation report maps, September, October, and November: we can see that soon after the September agreement characterized by a Novorossiyan Debaltsevo, the UAF took it in violation of that agreement.
Those who have been keeping an eye on these developments during the ‘ceasefire’ months will already appreciate that the encirclement did not form out of a recent advance of the UAF. This was not a blunder that pushed forward too far as a result of poor communication or bad planning. This ‘bridgehead’ it maintained was extraordinarily well fortified. It had intended to be surrounded on three sides and function like a fortification that could tolerate a near-siege. Indeed it was thought even that this bridgehead could become the focus of Novorossiya efforts, wicking them away from elsewhere, and once drawn in and then ground down, the protrusion could push farther south-east. Their strategy has been to develop this cleavage further until they can split Donetsk off from Lugansk entirely.
September
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/september-debaltsevo.jpg?w=429&h=349 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/september-debaltsevo.jpg)
October
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/october-debaltsevo.jpg?w=428&h=362 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/october-debaltsevo.jpg)
November
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/november-debaltsevo.jpg?w=416&h=345 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/november-debaltsevo.jpg)
3.) In standard form, the US misjudged the Russian willingness to enter into a ceasefire without pre-conditions as a weakness.They encouraged Poroshenko to attend at Europe’s request for a number of reasons. One consideration was due to the matter of the fate of thousands of soldiers in the Debaltsevo protrusion, and how these facts revolved around any Russian advantage. The US is ultimately on track to destabilize the region, but only with a Russian over-commitment which places it on course for its own internal destabilization as well.
A large number of those elites in Europe who are cautiously sitting in two chairs and trying to appease US policy, will only continue to entertain the US course so long as it does not result in further destabilization. In a mid-intensity conflict such as this where the information war is central, it is a poor move to be the party which turns down unconditional overtures for ceasefire talks.
The US thought it was in a ‘win-win’ with this situation.
If on the one hand Poroshenko could get the Russians, in light of the recent advances and the statements from Zakharchenko, to stop the push and return to the September lines, this would be good. If they gain more territory which is not strategically important, this is also fine. Over the course of the last few months, the US lost control of the narrative and accusations that Novorossiya had violated the ceasefire fell on deaf ears. Additionally, as with the MH17 downing, the US failed to get a false flag to result in real shift in the public discourse and the position of their European partners.
The core of this also then for the Us is that this provided a new opportunity to bind Russia to terms, the vagueness of which allows the US to construe as an abrogation on the part of Russia in the media war and as a justification for increased sanctions.
If it fails, and Poroshenko’s army there is destroyed, then Poroshenko faces being removed from office in a Pravy Sektor type coup, and the US goes forward with the next part of its plan. The UAF had reason to believe, days before the talks, that a well executed push could keep the encirclement from finally closing, allowing necessary provisions and ammo inside. This only was need to work, or last, until after the agreement was made.
The US deemed that if it was not a party to the talks, then there was nothing binding on them and in the US view. Conversely, Russia was a party to the talks, and could be held responsible as a guarantor of commitments stemming from these talks.
The US knew that among the UAF soldiers were also mercenaries from NATO countries, and even NATO advisers. It is unclear to what extent the French and the Germans are capable of assessing things which might first arise as leaks or rumors. It is also unclear to what extent the US would inform civilian authorities like Merkel and Hollande of the extent of NATO involvement. We do know that German intelligence is in a process of creating an inner network independent of US intelligence networks. In other words, Germany is in the process of becoming a sovereign state.
So there are various scenarios concerning the degree of European knowledge about the mercenaries and NATO soldiers in Debaltsevo. What we do know is that the Russians know about it, and these sorts of rare face to face meetings away from the US are places where the other players are free to share what they know and speak bluntly about what facts they have and what they are working with.
4.)The US was fooled into thinking that it was fooling the public and the Russians. Hollande’s public statements prior to the Minsk II talks were a critical part of the illusion performed on the US. Recall that before the Normandy 4 met, his statements were critical because they set a clear expectation that the agreement would entail different borders than the September ceasefire agreement, and more autonomy for Novorossiya within a federalized Ukraine (new constitution, etc.).
In particular certain things were referred to here. Not only would the framework of the September ceasefire and memorandum be used for a new ceasefire, but also that both more territory and more autonomy than had previously been realized would be given to the Novorossiyan side. Recall that after the resumption of military operations of scale in December, it was the Novorossiyan forces that gained territory. This, then, would seem to refer to that territory.
Hollande and Merkel communicate in wooden language, even with other heads of state. Nuance can only be inferred through context, and subordinates reassure their counterparts in the parallel structures of what the president or prime minister really meant to imply. The US was encouraged by Hollande’s public statements prior to Minsk II because it held out the possibility of the Russians agreeing to concede ground to the Junta in Debaltsevo in exchange for more territory elsewhere, as well as reaffirming that Novorossiya is to remain inside of Ukraine.
Thus we could read this as the EU willing to go in to negotiations and push to redraw the borders in a way which this time recognized the fact of Kiev control over Debaltsevo.
Putting 3.) and 4.) together, what we can reasonably deduce is that Poroshenko was thinking that if the language of the ceasefire could be interpreted with a focus on the ‘line of contact’, that holding onto the bridgehead (or claiming it was so) would recognize the UAF’s new territory, even though it went against the borders of September Minsk Memorandum. After all, the Novorossiyan forces elsewhere had picked up territory, and were intending to keep it.
The US and Poroshenko were both encouraged by the signed document that came out of the contact group. As we can see, it recognizes the Ukrainian gains since September (the actual line of contact) but restricts the Novorossiyan side to the borders of September, thus negating their achievements in territorial terms.
Nevertheless, at the end of the day we see now what Hollande’s pre-meeting public comments were all about. In a rare example of transparency, he was saying exactly what he thought would be amenable to France.
http://syncreticstudies.com/2015/02/19/the-beautiful-truth-about-minsk-ii-the-debaltsevo-debacle/#more-1727
The US knew that among the UAF soldiers were also mercenaries from NATO countries, and even NATO advisers. It is unclear to what extent the French and the Germans are capable of assessing things which might first arise as leaks or rumors. It is also unclear to what extent the US would inform civilian authorities like Merkel and Hollande of the extent of NATO involvement. We do know that German intelligence is in a process of creating an inner network independent of US intelligence networks. In other words, Germany is in the process of becoming a sovereign state.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jsi5uqYQZFU
February 12th, on the day Minsk II was signed by the contact group as agreed to by the Normandy 4, we wrote:
“These are the relevant factors which produce the strong sense that these Normandy 4 meetings involve some very serious things and some complex levels that are beyond the scope of what is reported. Russia conducts itself in these meetings from a position of strength.”
Critical events since the February 12th ceasefire tell us what the real underlying factors beyond the scope of what was reported indeed were. With the Ukrainian Army having been encircled in the Debaltsevo region and without provisions, mass surrenders are already underway. There are already reports of thousands of UAF dead. Close fighting in the town itself have resulted in the UAF being pushed out, with the town now under Novorossiyan control. The UAF had nowhere to go, and were out of ammo.
Attempts to push out anywhere resulted in more needless deaths for the disheartened and broken Ukrainian force whose numbers range between five and eight thousand. Putin has publicly urged Poroshenko to allow the UAF soldiers to surrender. Unsurprisingly, Poroshenko has declared victory.
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/donetsk-1_2884919b.jpg?w=357&h=223 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/donetsk-1_2884919b.jpg)
The encirclement was complete in the week leading up to the Minsk II meeting. The political reality in which the EU gave its blessing to Novorossiya and Russia to finish of the encirclement was based in a few things, and US agreement on other points was based in other things. There are three sides at play here, even though it often appears as two. The Minsk II agreement enshrined the EU blessings. In return, the EU got something, but what exactly is the subject of some speculation.
Debaltsevo is a critical area because it has rail through it which connects Lughansk to Donetsk republics. The September 5th Ceasefire was intended to have this in control of Novorossiya. The September 19th memorandum explicitly restates this, and the map of the de-militarized and pull-back lines clearly show that Debaltsevo was to be withdrawn from.
Poroshenko stated that the Cauldron was actually a bridgehead. In fact, he is right, this was not a new development but an ongoing occupation of Debaltsevo which was in violation of the 9-19 memorandum.
All together, this agreement is reflective of the general direction things have gone, and reflects Russian mastery of geopolitical strategy, meaningful diplomacy and “lawfare”, hybrid warfare, and thorough planning all around.
Why Debaltsevo was an apparent exception to the ceasefire, what the new ceasefire agreement actually compels, what was really said at Minsk, what to make of the UN Security Council resolution, and what this says about the present state of affairs are all serious questions that are raised from this. These are the pressing questions surrounding this that we will try to answer in brief.
1.)The EU was forced to agree to a revised form of the September ceasefire, including the memorandum of the 19th of that month. US policy is failing, or rather succeeding in producing an unstable situation, precisely what most of European decision makers want to avoid. Even EU Atlanticists are not in it for the whole wild ride, and their Trans-Atlantic sensibilities are still based upon general notions of wealth creation and regional stability.
Evidence of this was the impending doom of thousands of UAF fighters, leaked information indicated a number of these may be from NATO countries, and Merkel and Hollande were right in knowing that they had better get clarification on this matter directly from the Russian head of state.
Indeed, this is why European leaders called the meeting, and rushed themselves to Minsk.
Poroshenko does not answer to the EU, they are not his guarantor, and they are not capable of pressuring him too much. They can only pressure the US, and by only by extension Poroshenko, by not going along with US plans for Russia and Ukraine. EU has said no to Ukraine in NATO, and no to the EU Association Agreement after all. The EU says on these critical points, over and over, the same thing that Russia says.
To understand the Minsk agreement is to understand the EU’s relationship with the Kiev Junta. The EU knows that when it talks to Poroshenko, it is talking to a US sock puppet. The reason that Poroshenko was at the meeting, and not the US, was because the EU and Russia wanted to tell Poroshenko certain things in a security environment which only the nominally neutral Minsk could provide. No one really thinks that Belarus is neutral, but everyone can pretend that they do.
The EU generally is not happy with how the US has handled things, and yet it is sitting in two chairs on the question nevertheless. So this is about the US using its pull on the Atlanticist forces within the EU, and also within less formal NATO structures, to make a policy for Europe and on Europe outside of the scope of European agency.
This prior agreement among other things specifically placed control of Debaltsevo in the hands of Novorossiya. Both the September and February agreements contain some apparent defects, which work out favorably again for the Russians. This is why we have heard rebel commanders and DPR leader Zakharchenko affirm both that the agreement is vague and contains contradictions, and also that Debaltsevo was not included in the ceasefire. Rather, he means the opposite on these points.
First, the terms are vague and do not compel the rebels to end the rebellion (it places onus on Ukraine to do things first that it will never do, and is not compelled to do by the language). Second, abiding by the ceasefire, it entirely justifies the use of arms to resolve the UAF’s violation of the agreement through its intrusion into the Debaltsevo area. At least on paper, it boils down to how one interprets specific language from the Minsk II agreement of February 12th. We will look at this in a moment.
This map includes the September 19th line as a dotted black curving series of dots, which have Debaltsevo on the Novorossiyan side of the line. There are at least two ways to interpret the language of the latest agreement.
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/feb16done.jpg?w=404&h=321 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/feb16done.jpg)
2.) The agreement itself is vague in ways that help Novorossiya. This is mostly because the power to act on terms of an agreement in a manner which is beneficial is really a reflection of one’s advantage on the ground. As with anything, the ability to favorably act in one’s own interest is a practical question which is constrained by real existing forces and considerations. By and large, the memorandum in the abstract contains serious defects and cannot really be said to be an executable document by itself as it has many blank spots. It requires further agreements to fill in those blanks, both formal and tacit, between the two parties. These are not minor issues, but the core issues which strike at the heart of the civil war itself. These terms favor the party with the most agency. Each party has different kinds of agency and likely view that they will be able to, on the balance, make more out of this defective document than the other party.
The agreement has 13 points, most of which use terms which at first glance seem to compel certain actions, but in fact rather are contingent upon events which either do not have a specific time table, attach a time table to events which do not have a time table or are not executable, or still require future agreement.
What will figure prominently in the coming disagreements over implementation is the meaning of point 2 and point 4. The Minsk II agreement of February 12th refers back to the Minsk Memorandum of 19th September twice. These are in relation to the borders, one way or another, of Novorossiya.
In point 2 we read:
Pull-out of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distance with the aim of creation of a security zone on minimum 50 kilometres (31 mi) apart for artillery of 100mm calibre or more, and a security zone of 70 kilometres (43 mi) for MLRS and 140 kilometres (87 mi) for MLRS Tornado-S, Uragan, Smerch, and Tochka U tactical missile systems:
* for Ukrainian troops, from actual line of contact;
* for armed formations of particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, from the contact line in accordance with the Minsk Memorandum as of 19 September 2014
The pullout of the above-mentioned heavy weapons must start no later than the second day after the start of the ceasefire and finish within 14 days.
This process will be assisted by OSCE with the support of the Trilateral Contact Group.
This refers to artillery pull-out, but note that there are different lines to withdraw from for each of the two sides. This can be interpreted different ways: the word ‘actual’ means ‘in reality’, but which reality – the past, present or the future; the line on the 12th, on the 15th, or 14 days after the 15th? Whatever the case what it does do inarguably is draw us back to the Minsk Memorandum of the 19th and reaffirms those lines. The line for Novorossiya in that 19 September agreement includes Debaltsevo within it.
Other points, such as the disbanding of illegal groups and removal of foreign soldiers and mercenaries might at first glance apply to either side. With the Novorossiyan militias, as a legal party to the agreement the LPR and DPR cannot simultaneously be those illegal groups. The agreement does not say which party does the disarming (or what constitutes an illegal group), and in the context of limited federal autonomy or rather ‘local self governance’, we infer that both parties have this authority in the areas which they respectively control. Being able to disarm an illegal group implies the power to do it, i.e. having a legally armed group capable of the task. All of this has been pointed out previously when similar language appeared in the September agreement.
It is not strange that western media, to the extent that any details of this are covered, refers to continued fighting at Debaltsevo as a violation of the February ceasefire.
What we will see ultimately as a default reason for continued hostilities, that must work in conjunction with a favorable interpretation of the agreement, is the rationale of self defense. In reality a case of acceptable use of force during a ceasefire is in particular when a party defends itself from violations of the ceasefire. One element of one party, whether or not under orders, who violates the ceasefire does not deprive the other side of a means of response within the framework of a ceasefire. Thus it is possible for a party (being fired on) to simultaneously be adhering to a ceasefire and yet also be engaged in hostilities.
The next reference to the September 19th Minsk Memorandum is in point 4:
On the first day after the pullout a dialogue is to start on modalities of conducting local elections in accordance with the Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine “On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts,” and also about the future of these districts based on the above-mentioned law.
Without delays, but no later than 30 days from the date of signing of this document, a resolution has to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verkhovna_Rada_of_Ukraine), indicating the territory which falls under the special regime in accordance with the law “On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts,” based in the line set up by the Minsk Memorandum (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Memorandum) as of 19 September 2014.
These two cited sections taken together mean that some things in point 2 are obligated to have taken place on or about March 1st, and point 4’s ‘Rada resolution’ must be approved by Ukraine by mid March. But what is approved is a resolution that ‘indicates’ the territory, which is not the same thing as ‘recognizing’ that territory or vesting those local authorities with any specific rights and obligations.
In the course of the execution of the September agreement, each side accused the other of having violated it. Over the course of time, with each side making it known to the other, it can reasonably be said that much of it was no longer in effect. With those changes having effectively taken place to the original agreement, references to the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September begin to take on elements of vestigial clauses or vestigial language if they lack meaning or if subsequent practices and events have diminished their effect.
While point 2 seems to refer more strongly to the 19 September borders when it constrains the Novorossiyans, in point 4 in which the Ukrainian Rada ‘indicates’ their territory, the language is much softer and states that it be ‘based in’ that line. Other problems in point 4 which may make the entire agreement defective and void notwithstanding (this may relate to the details of the referenced Ukrainian law on local self-governance), we can see clearly that the Rada must ‘indicate’ – which does not carry the force of ‘determine’, and certainly not ‘recognize’. Furthermore it states that the boundaries are ‘based in the line’, not precisely the line determined then, but possible a new line which is ‘based in the line’ in some day – determined by the same rationale, recognizing the same interests, or closely resembling – so it would be argued – the September 19th line in some credible way.
It was required, therefore, to agree again on the terms, so that this ‘reset’ supersedes the previous deviations, which if unchallenged may actually establish a new tacit agreement. Even though the references to the September 19th line are not coupled with firm language which compels specific actions coupled with specified consequences for inaction and remedy process, they are still referenced too. This means that parties can justify their ‘ceasefire’ actions of this already confused document as being based on the agreement.
Taken all together, we can see we have drawn several distinct interpretations. One seems to not, but rather to to be based in the ‘actual line of contact’ for the Ukraine side, which would be where the UAF positions ‘are’ (but vague about ‘when’ we look. The other one allows us to interpret the language as effectively returning the strategically Debaltsevo region to Novorossiya in accordance with the September 19th agreement.
When we look at the following series of situation report maps, September, October, and November: we can see that soon after the September agreement characterized by a Novorossiyan Debaltsevo, the UAF took it in violation of that agreement.
Those who have been keeping an eye on these developments during the ‘ceasefire’ months will already appreciate that the encirclement did not form out of a recent advance of the UAF. This was not a blunder that pushed forward too far as a result of poor communication or bad planning. This ‘bridgehead’ it maintained was extraordinarily well fortified. It had intended to be surrounded on three sides and function like a fortification that could tolerate a near-siege. Indeed it was thought even that this bridgehead could become the focus of Novorossiya efforts, wicking them away from elsewhere, and once drawn in and then ground down, the protrusion could push farther south-east. Their strategy has been to develop this cleavage further until they can split Donetsk off from Lugansk entirely.
September
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/september-debaltsevo.jpg?w=429&h=349 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/september-debaltsevo.jpg)
October
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/october-debaltsevo.jpg?w=428&h=362 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/october-debaltsevo.jpg)
November
https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/november-debaltsevo.jpg?w=416&h=345 (https://syncreticstudies.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/november-debaltsevo.jpg)
3.) In standard form, the US misjudged the Russian willingness to enter into a ceasefire without pre-conditions as a weakness.They encouraged Poroshenko to attend at Europe’s request for a number of reasons. One consideration was due to the matter of the fate of thousands of soldiers in the Debaltsevo protrusion, and how these facts revolved around any Russian advantage. The US is ultimately on track to destabilize the region, but only with a Russian over-commitment which places it on course for its own internal destabilization as well.
A large number of those elites in Europe who are cautiously sitting in two chairs and trying to appease US policy, will only continue to entertain the US course so long as it does not result in further destabilization. In a mid-intensity conflict such as this where the information war is central, it is a poor move to be the party which turns down unconditional overtures for ceasefire talks.
The US thought it was in a ‘win-win’ with this situation.
If on the one hand Poroshenko could get the Russians, in light of the recent advances and the statements from Zakharchenko, to stop the push and return to the September lines, this would be good. If they gain more territory which is not strategically important, this is also fine. Over the course of the last few months, the US lost control of the narrative and accusations that Novorossiya had violated the ceasefire fell on deaf ears. Additionally, as with the MH17 downing, the US failed to get a false flag to result in real shift in the public discourse and the position of their European partners.
The core of this also then for the Us is that this provided a new opportunity to bind Russia to terms, the vagueness of which allows the US to construe as an abrogation on the part of Russia in the media war and as a justification for increased sanctions.
If it fails, and Poroshenko’s army there is destroyed, then Poroshenko faces being removed from office in a Pravy Sektor type coup, and the US goes forward with the next part of its plan. The UAF had reason to believe, days before the talks, that a well executed push could keep the encirclement from finally closing, allowing necessary provisions and ammo inside. This only was need to work, or last, until after the agreement was made.
The US deemed that if it was not a party to the talks, then there was nothing binding on them and in the US view. Conversely, Russia was a party to the talks, and could be held responsible as a guarantor of commitments stemming from these talks.
The US knew that among the UAF soldiers were also mercenaries from NATO countries, and even NATO advisers. It is unclear to what extent the French and the Germans are capable of assessing things which might first arise as leaks or rumors. It is also unclear to what extent the US would inform civilian authorities like Merkel and Hollande of the extent of NATO involvement. We do know that German intelligence is in a process of creating an inner network independent of US intelligence networks. In other words, Germany is in the process of becoming a sovereign state.
So there are various scenarios concerning the degree of European knowledge about the mercenaries and NATO soldiers in Debaltsevo. What we do know is that the Russians know about it, and these sorts of rare face to face meetings away from the US are places where the other players are free to share what they know and speak bluntly about what facts they have and what they are working with.
4.)The US was fooled into thinking that it was fooling the public and the Russians. Hollande’s public statements prior to the Minsk II talks were a critical part of the illusion performed on the US. Recall that before the Normandy 4 met, his statements were critical because they set a clear expectation that the agreement would entail different borders than the September ceasefire agreement, and more autonomy for Novorossiya within a federalized Ukraine (new constitution, etc.).
In particular certain things were referred to here. Not only would the framework of the September ceasefire and memorandum be used for a new ceasefire, but also that both more territory and more autonomy than had previously been realized would be given to the Novorossiyan side. Recall that after the resumption of military operations of scale in December, it was the Novorossiyan forces that gained territory. This, then, would seem to refer to that territory.
Hollande and Merkel communicate in wooden language, even with other heads of state. Nuance can only be inferred through context, and subordinates reassure their counterparts in the parallel structures of what the president or prime minister really meant to imply. The US was encouraged by Hollande’s public statements prior to Minsk II because it held out the possibility of the Russians agreeing to concede ground to the Junta in Debaltsevo in exchange for more territory elsewhere, as well as reaffirming that Novorossiya is to remain inside of Ukraine.
Thus we could read this as the EU willing to go in to negotiations and push to redraw the borders in a way which this time recognized the fact of Kiev control over Debaltsevo.
Putting 3.) and 4.) together, what we can reasonably deduce is that Poroshenko was thinking that if the language of the ceasefire could be interpreted with a focus on the ‘line of contact’, that holding onto the bridgehead (or claiming it was so) would recognize the UAF’s new territory, even though it went against the borders of September Minsk Memorandum. After all, the Novorossiyan forces elsewhere had picked up territory, and were intending to keep it.
The US and Poroshenko were both encouraged by the signed document that came out of the contact group. As we can see, it recognizes the Ukrainian gains since September (the actual line of contact) but restricts the Novorossiyan side to the borders of September, thus negating their achievements in territorial terms.
Nevertheless, at the end of the day we see now what Hollande’s pre-meeting public comments were all about. In a rare example of transparency, he was saying exactly what he thought would be amenable to France.