"Nothing Has Been Fixed" - Citi's Five Reasons Why This Sucker Is Going Down

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"Nothing Has Been Fixed" - Citi's Five Reasons Why This Sucker Is Going DownSource: Zero Hedge (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-05-04/nothing-has-been-fixed-citis-five-reasons-why-sucker-going-down)

As a result of the dramatic surge in the S&P500 from its February lows, which erased the worst ever start to a year, and nearly regained the all time highs in the US stock market on a combination of a central bank scramble to reflate, the "Shanghai Accord", and the most violent short squeeze in history, coupled with a historic credit injection by China which as we first reported amounted to a record $1 trillion (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-04-15/1001000000000-china-just-flooded-its-economy-record-amount-new-debt)in just the first three months of the year...
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2016/04/09/20160415_TSF_0.jpg (http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2016/04/09/20160415_TSF.jpg)
... economists have shelved discussions about the threat of a US recession.
That is a mistake.

According to Citi, the Q1 2016 stabilization in Chinese, EM and global growth looks fragile and is likely to be temporary. In other words, nothing has been fixed. In fact, Citi goes on to say precisely that:

In particular, none of the structural headwinds that seem to have plagued the global economy in recent years (a mix of excessive indebtedness, deteriorating demographics, rising political uncertainty as well as the end of the China growth miracle and the commodity supercycle) have been resolved.
Looking forward, these are the four key risks that keep Citi up at night "in the near term."


The Chinese stabilization could be even more short-lived than we currently expect. As noted above, the duration of China’s old-style investment-led fiscal stimulus and credit binge may prove rather short, as Chinese policymakers pivot back and forth between supporting growth and supporting reform and rebalancing. In the light of the evident imbalances and excesses in the Chinese economy, the Chinese stimulus may also prove to be less effective in sustaining aggregate demand – even in the short run – than hoped for.
One contributor to the potential stabilization in China’s and EM activity has been the weaker US dollar and receding expectations of a US rate hike. But these may well prove temporary. In particular, financial markets probably currently underprice the risk of Fed rate hikes over the next year or two (our US team currently expects one more hike in 2016, probably in September, but the next hike could also happen in June or, more likely, July). It remains to be seen whether EM financial conditions and the tentative stabilization in EM economic activity would prove resilient to renewed Fed tightening and dollar strength.
A US downturn could threaten. The recent weakness in the US data, continued cautious behavior of US consumers, and the lack of "animal spirits" to raise investment spending leave questions as to whether there may be further economic weakness to come.
Political risks in Europe are high and rising. The UK’s upcoming EU referendum (June 23) remains a key uncertainty for the coming months and we believe Brexit, if it happens, would be a major negative in economic and political terms for the UK and EU as a whole. We still put the probability that the UK votes to leave the EU at 30-40% – i.e. not our base case but by no means a trivial risk – but there are some reasons to think that the risk may be even higher. And Brexit is by no means the only source of political uncertainty and risk in Europe, with new elections due in Spain, high support for non-mainstream parties in many countries including Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and rising non-mainstream support even in Germany.

But what may be the biggest concern to Citi is that the credibility - and ability - of central banks, to effectively prop up the system is now openly in question:

The recent IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings made clear that the perceived reduction in global recession risk was greeted with a major sigh of relief from policymakers around the world. This is in at least part because it may not be straightforward to come up with an appropriate policy response in the event of a major downturn. Of course, there are still various options for stimulus in most economies. On the monetary side, the ECB highlighted that a pivot towards more domestically-oriented easing (including credit easing implemented through purchases of corporate bonds and subsidized (negative interest rate) loans to banks) is possible; the BoJ has shown that purchases of equity ETFs and REITs are among the tools of policymakers; and for both the BoJ and ECB, there is probably some more room to lower policy rates (including offering (more) negative interest rates on loans to banks) and to increase purchases of public assets. Yet it is almost universally acknowledged that the incremental boost to demand from monetary stimulus is diminishing and the side-effects (including political side-effects) may be rising.
If monetary options are limited, the obvious alternatives would be stronger fiscal or quasi-fiscal support or, indeed, the much-heralded ‘three-pronged strategy’ of combining monetary and fiscal stimulus with structural reforms. But even though, at least in the advanced economies, fiscal policy is slowly and gradually turning less procyclical and more supportive of economic activity, hurdles (legal, ideological, political or reflecting (lack of) fiscal space) to timely and sizable fiscal stimulus remain relatively high in most economies. Meanwhile, prospects of structural reform remain rather limited across both DMs and EMs. The limited likelihood of effective policy stimulus in the event of a downturn therefore adds to the potential fragility of the recent more positive developments in financial markets and real activity, if sentiment (business, consumer or financial market) were to turn more pessimistic again and /or if one or more of the adverse contingencies listed above were to materialize.
Which is ironic, because now that asset prices and thus the market is the only real mandate of the Fed, the moment there is an uncontrolled drop in the S&P500 or any other global market, is when the global central bank put will finally be put to the test, and if Citi is right, it will be exposed as the bluff it was all along.
Which incidentally explains why the SF Fed's John Williams just two days ago explained what he thinks may be the biggest systemic risk factor: dropping asset prices. From Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-williams-rates-idUSKCN0XT1ZP):


San Francisco Federal Reserve President John Williams reiterated Monday his view that the U.S. economy is ready for higher interest rates, but flagged the risk of broad-based declines in asset prices as a result.
Speaking at a panel on systemic risk at the Milken Institute Global Conference, Williams said the biggest systemic financial risk currently is the possibility that "broad sets of assets are going to see big movements downward" as interest rates rise. "That's an area that I think is a potential risk."
Ignoring the insanity that the Fed now has to warn that a market selloff is a "systemic risk", it also exposes not only the weakest link in the modern financial system, namely artificially inflated prices, but by definition confirms that just like in China where having a bearish opinion is now officially prohibited, it reveals that the market is only where it is due to constant and unrelenting central bank intervention, something "conspiracy theory" fringe blogs have been saying for nearly a decade.
For those wondering how to trade this, we unfortunately have no advice: because if one is buying puts on expectations of the Fed losing control, we have bad news: the market will simply be shut down and all capital flows will be halted indefinitely before true price discovery is allowed. As such those hoping to be paid when all central bank control is lost will be disappointed. It is also why none other than JPM warned last Thursday (http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-04-28/why-jpms-quant-guru-suddenly-worried-about-endgame)that the best option is not to bet on financial assets, either long or short, but to move into physical assets among which, JPMorgan listed, gold.

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Why Is JPM's "Quant Guru" Suddenly Worried About The "Endgame
When JPM quant Marko Kolanovic released his latest report today, we were expecting him to read his latest insight on the positioning of quant funds, on the relative imbalance of risk parity, or perhaps whether market gamma was suggesting that the market is poised for an inflection point, either lower or higher. Instead, we were surprised to read an extended analysis looking at how trapped the "out of options" central banks are, what the next steps are for the global economy, how the market is now as overvalued as it was before the 2000 crash, how rising rates "would make the current S&P 500 level look like a bubble", and the exhaustion of all available policy options, which he dubbed the "endgame." To wit:





If investors lose confidence that the debt can ever be repaid, they will reduce their holdings, increasing the cost to governments or inviting more central bank buying. This can eventually result in the devaluation of all currencies against real assets such as gold, high inflation or even outright defaults (as was the case in Greece). If such a trend develops in one of the large economies, it could have far-reaching consequences.
We were most surprised by Kolanovic's strong case to buy gold, although considering it comes just one week after a Pimco economist dared to propose that central banks should monetize gold next in an attempt to massively boost inflation expectations (while send the price of gold to $5,000), perhaps we are not that surprised.
* * * .
We are confident readers will find it just as an engaging read.
From JPM's Marko Kolanovic


Central banks, Inflation, and Debt Endgame
With the Fed and BoJ meetings behind us, markets are increasingly accepting that central banks are nearly out of options. Central banks can hardly raise interest rates, and there is a growing realization that negative interest rates simply make no sense (see analysis below). Unconventional approaches of buying corporate bonds (ECB) and stocks (Japan) so far have not produced significant results, and run the risk of tainting these assets for private investors. The next attempt to boost the economy or prevent a potential market crisis will likely need to be accomplished by fiscal measures. Fiscal measures may be employed even if there is no crisis (e.g., post US election), and over the next months investors will look closely at potential measures and their impact on equity markets, commodities (potential positive impact on certain sectors – e.g., from infrastructure spending), and the value of debt and currencies (likely negative impact).
Before we discuss the implications and risks that could result from such developments, we present an analysis that suggests that central banks face the risk of entrenched low inflation (rather than the risk of high inflation) and likely will not be able to raise rates meaningfully. Figure 1 shows the cumulative PCE (relative to the Fed’s 2% target) that shows significant and persistent undershooting over the past 8 years. Since 2000, the cumulative undershoot is 6% on the core PCE measure. Over the past 4 years, core PCE undershot by more than 1.5 % (and headline by 3.5%, the difference being largely due to the 2014 decline in energy). This undershooting is fairly significant: over the past 2 years headline PCE undershot by 3% (2 standard deviations) and Core by 1% (1 standard deviation). What should be more worrying is that PCE readings historically show strong persistence (serial correlations). This means that a low core PCE reading today implies that PCE is more likely to stay low in the future as well (e.g., core PCE reading today has 80% correlation with the reading of 12 months ago). Our quantitative model of core PCE indicates the most likely level is still below the Fed’s 2% target and continuing to undershoot over the next 3 years.
In that context, the Fed should welcome any overshooting of the target as that is the only way it can end up closer to the stated 2% target over any meaningful time period (e.g., 2, 5, or 10 years). For instance, overshooting the target over the next 2-3 years by ~0.5% each year (or over the next 1-2 years by ~1%) would put the inflation averages within the margin of the stated 2% target. The problem is that it simply may not happen, and inflation breakeven rates in the US, Europe and Japan point to the same direction.
Over the past 20 years, PCE overshoots (undershoots) tended to coincide with S&P 500 rallies (declines). However, over the past 8 years, PCE kept trending lower, while the market rallied strongly. While the Fed’s QE programs did not prevent inflation to persistently undershoot the 2% target, a potential byproduct was inflated S&P 500 valuations. Indeed, many clients ask us how much of the S&P 500 rally can be attributed to near zero rates and can be at risk should rates continue to rise? Assuming the S&P 500 returning to median P/E levels for comparable rate and inflation environments in the past, it would suggest a 5%-15% de-rating of the equity multiple should rates continue to rise at a moderate pace and assuming no increase of recession probability. If rates increase the probability of recession, it would likely result in a larger market pullback, as both earnings and multiples would suffer.
Should the problem of low inflation go away (e.g., if there is an oil price shock, or upside growth surprise) and there is need to raise rates more significantly, the Fed will face another problem. That is how to hike but not push the equity market significantly lower. The reason is that with current levels of leverage, rates behave like a ratchet (easy to turn lower, but hard to turn higher without breaking the gears). Over the years of ZIRP, asset prices and business models adjusted to low rates. For example, home buyers make decisions based on monthly mortgage payment levels, and S&P 500 companies (ex-financials) have the highest leverage since 2007 (when leverage was at record levels), with some of the debt used to buy back shares.
Indeed, the current S&P 500 P/EBITDA ratio is at the same level as shortly before the market crash of 2000. The distinction between current market valuations being reasonable vs. bubble-like is due to low interest rates (as well as lower effective tax rates). Significant increase of rates (e.g., to levels implied by 2018 Fed dots) would make the current S&P 500 level look like a bubble.
As we argued above, it is hard to see short-term rates moving meaningfully higher any time soon. We also think that rates cannot go much lower either as negative rates fundamentally don’t make sense (issues such as physical storage of cash can make negative yields viable only over short periods of time). So the attempt to boost growth or fight a potential crisis will likely need to be accomplished by fiscal measures.
However, fiscal measures also bring an increased level of government debt and increased market and credit risk of owning government bonds. These risks are in addition to current low yields and a less favorable correlation of bonds to risky assets. The unfavorable risk-reward of government bonds near the point of zero yields will likely prevent asset managers from increasing holdings of government bonds. If there are no private buyers, governments can still place their bonds with central banks. This trend is of course already in place – for instance, the Fed’s holdings of US Treasuries increased from ~18% in 2008 to ~34% today.
Increased government spending, financed by central banks could indeed create inflation, but will further elevate the problem of debt viability. If investors lose confidence that the debt can ever be repaid, they will reduce their holdings, increasing the cost to governments or inviting more central bank buying. This can eventually result in the devaluation of all currencies against real assets such as gold, high inflation or even outright defaults (as was the case in Greece). If such a trend develops in one of the large economies, it could have far-reaching consequences.
Once fiscal measures replace monetary measures, we think investors will increasingly focus on the dynamics of government debt and currency valuations, particularly in Japan and the US.
How can an investor hedge against the risk of these potential developments? One can reduce allocation to bonds and increase allocation to real assets and equity sectors related to real assets. Investors can also move away from bonds that are not backed by reserve assets such as currency reserves or gold. The ability of a government to pay back debt and at the same time as maintaining the value of the currency should be measured by hard assets for which transfer to bondholders is politically viable. For example, during the Greek crisis, the option of selling islands owned by the government was off limits. On the other hand, governments can easily part with assets with no national or cultural attachments such as FX reserves or gold, as was recently the case with Ukraine and Venezuela.
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$1,001,000,000,000: China Just Flooded Its Economy With A Record Amount Of New De
When China reported its economic data dump last night which was modestly better than expected (one has to marvel at China's phenomenal ability to calculate its GDP just two weeks after the quarter ended - not even the Bureau of Economic Analysis is that fast), the investing community could finally exhale: after all, the biggest source of "global" instability for the Fed appears to have been neutralized.
But what was the reason for this seeming halt to China's incipient hard landing? The answer was in the secondary data that was reported alongside the primary economic numbers: the March new loan and Total Social Financing report.
As the PBOC reported last night, Chinese banks made 1.37 trillion yuan ($211.23 billion) in new local-currency loans in March, well above analyst expectations, as the central bank scrambled to keep the economy engorged with new loans "to keep policy accomodative to underpin the slowing economy" as Reuters put it. This was up from February's 726.6 billion yuan but off a record of 2.51 trillion yuan extended in January. Outstanding yuan loans grew 14.7 percent by month-end on an annual basis, versus expectations of 14.5 percent.
But it wasn't the total loan tally that is the key figure tracking China's credit largesse: for that one has to look at the total social financing, which in just the month of March rose to 2.34 trillion yuan, the equivalent of more than a third of a trillion in dollars!
And there is your answer, because if one adds up the Total Social Financing injected in the first quarter, one gets a stunning $1 trillion dollars in new credit, or $1,001,000,000,000 to be precise, shoved down China's economic throat. As shown on the chart below, this was an all time high in dollar terms, and puts to rest any naive suggestion that China may be pursuing "debt reform." Quite the contrary, China has once again resorted to the old "growth" model where GDP is to be saved at any cost, even if it means flooding the economy with record amount of debt.
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2016/04/09/20160415_TSF_0.jpg (http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2016/04/09/20160415_TSF.jpg)

And to put it all together, the PBOC also reported that the broad M2 money supply measure grew 13.4% in March from a year earlier, or precisely double the rate of growth of GDP. This means that it took two dollars in new loans to create one dollar of GDP growth.
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2016/04/09/20160415_chinam2gdp_0.jpg (http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2016/04/09/20160415_chinam2gdp.jpg)

With China's debt/GDP already estimate at 350%, how much longer can China sustain this stunning debt (and by definition, deposit) growth continue?