Cebu_4_2
7th June 2017, 05:08 PM
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-jcomey-060817.pdf
Cant fucking copy/ paste the shit right...
Statement for the Record
Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
James B. Comey
June 8, 2017
Chairma
n Burr, Ranking Member Warner, M
embers of the Committee.
Thank you for inviting
me to appear before you today.
I was asked to testify today
to
describe for you my inter
a
c
tions with P
resident
-
Elect and Presiden
t Trump on
subjects that I understand are
of interest
to you
.
I have not included every detail
from my conversations with the President, but
, to the best of my recollection, I
have tried t
o include information that may
be releva
nt to the Committee.
January 6
Briefing
I first met then
-
Pr
esident
-
Elect Trump on Friday, January 6
in a conference
room at Trump Tower in New York. I was there wi
th other Intelligence
C
ommunity
(IC)
leaders to brief him and his new national security
team on the
findings of an I
C
assessment concerning Russian efforts to interfere in the
election. At the conclusion of that briefing, I re
mained alone with the President
-
Elect to brief him on some personally sensi
tive aspects of the informat
i
on
assembled
during the assessment.
The IC leadership
thought it important
,
for a variety of reasons
,
to alert the
incoming President to the existence of this material, even though it was salacious
and unverified.
Among tho
se reasons were
:
(1)
we knew the me
dia
was about to
publicly report
the material and we bel
ieved the IC
should not keep knowledge of
the material and its imminent release fr
om the President
-
Elect; and (2)
to the
extent there was
some effort to compromise an incomin
g President, we could blunt
a
ny such
effort with a defensive briefing
.
The Director of National Intelligence asked that I
personally
do this portion
of the briefing because I was staying in my position and
because
the material
implicated the FBI’s counter
-
intelligence responsibilities. We also agr
eed I would
do it alone to minimize potential embarrassment to
the President
-
Elect. Although
we agreed it made sense for me to do the briefing,
the
FBI’s leadership and
I
were
concerned
that the briefing might create a situation where a new President came
into office uncertain about whether the FBI was conducting a counter
-
intelligence
investi
gation of his personal conduct
.
2
It is important to understand that
FBI counte
r
-
intelligence investigations are
different than the more
-
commonly known criminal investigative work. The
Bureau’s goal in a counter
-
intelligence investigation is to understand the
technical
and human
methods
that
hostile foreign powers are using to influ
ence the United
States
or
to
steal our
secrets.
The FBI uses t
ha
t understanding
to
disrupt those
efforts. Sometimes disruption takes the form of alerting a person who is
targeted
for recruitment or influence by the foreign power
. Sometimes it involves
hardening
a co
mputer system that is being
attacked
. Sometimes it
involves
“turning” the recruited person i
n
to a
double
-
agent, or publicly calling out the
behavior with sa
nctions or expulsions of embassy
-
based intelligence officers
. On
occasion, criminal
prosecution is used to disrupt intelligence activities.
Because the nature of the hostile foreign nation is well known, counter
-
intelligence investigations tend to be centered on
individuals the FBI suspects to
be
witting or unwitting agents of that for
eign power. When the FBI develops
reason to believe an American has been targeted for recruitment by a foreign
power
or is covertly acting as an agent of the foreign power
, the FBI will “open an
investigation
” on that American and use legal authorities to
try to learn more about
the nature of any relationship with the foreign power
so it can be disrupted
.
In that context, p
rior to the
January 6
meeting,
I discussed with the FBI’s
leadership team whether I should be prepared
to assure President
-
Elect T
rump
that
we were not investigating him personally
. That was true; we did not have an open
counter
-
intelligence case on him
.
We agreed I should do so if circumstances
warranted.
During our one
-
on
-
one
meeting
at Trump Tower
,
b
ased
on President
-
Elect
Trump’s
reaction to the briefing
and without him
directly asking the
question
, I offered that assurance
.
I
felt compelled to document my first conversation
with the President
-
Elect
in a
memo
. To ensure accuracy, I began to type it
on a
laptop
in an FBI
vehicle
outside Trump Tower
the moment I walked out of the meeting
. Creating written
records immediately after
one
-
on
-
one
conversations with Mr. Trump was my
practice from that
point forward.
This had n
ot
been
my practice in the past.
I
spoke alone
with President Obama
twice
in person (and never on the phone)
–
once
in 2015
to discuss law enforcement policy issues and a second time, briefly,
for him to say goodbye
in late 2016
.
In neither
of those circumstances did I
mem
orialize the discussions.
I can recall nine one
-
on
-
one conversations with
President Trump in four months
–
three in person and six on the phone.
January 27 Dinner
The President and I
had dinner on Friday, January 27
at 6:30 pm in the
Green Room at
the White House. He had called me at lunchtime that day and
Cant fucking copy/ paste the shit right...
Statement for the Record
Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
James B. Comey
June 8, 2017
Chairma
n Burr, Ranking Member Warner, M
embers of the Committee.
Thank you for inviting
me to appear before you today.
I was asked to testify today
to
describe for you my inter
a
c
tions with P
resident
-
Elect and Presiden
t Trump on
subjects that I understand are
of interest
to you
.
I have not included every detail
from my conversations with the President, but
, to the best of my recollection, I
have tried t
o include information that may
be releva
nt to the Committee.
January 6
Briefing
I first met then
-
Pr
esident
-
Elect Trump on Friday, January 6
in a conference
room at Trump Tower in New York. I was there wi
th other Intelligence
C
ommunity
(IC)
leaders to brief him and his new national security
team on the
findings of an I
C
assessment concerning Russian efforts to interfere in the
election. At the conclusion of that briefing, I re
mained alone with the President
-
Elect to brief him on some personally sensi
tive aspects of the informat
i
on
assembled
during the assessment.
The IC leadership
thought it important
,
for a variety of reasons
,
to alert the
incoming President to the existence of this material, even though it was salacious
and unverified.
Among tho
se reasons were
:
(1)
we knew the me
dia
was about to
publicly report
the material and we bel
ieved the IC
should not keep knowledge of
the material and its imminent release fr
om the President
-
Elect; and (2)
to the
extent there was
some effort to compromise an incomin
g President, we could blunt
a
ny such
effort with a defensive briefing
.
The Director of National Intelligence asked that I
personally
do this portion
of the briefing because I was staying in my position and
because
the material
implicated the FBI’s counter
-
intelligence responsibilities. We also agr
eed I would
do it alone to minimize potential embarrassment to
the President
-
Elect. Although
we agreed it made sense for me to do the briefing,
the
FBI’s leadership and
I
were
concerned
that the briefing might create a situation where a new President came
into office uncertain about whether the FBI was conducting a counter
-
intelligence
investi
gation of his personal conduct
.
2
It is important to understand that
FBI counte
r
-
intelligence investigations are
different than the more
-
commonly known criminal investigative work. The
Bureau’s goal in a counter
-
intelligence investigation is to understand the
technical
and human
methods
that
hostile foreign powers are using to influ
ence the United
States
or
to
steal our
secrets.
The FBI uses t
ha
t understanding
to
disrupt those
efforts. Sometimes disruption takes the form of alerting a person who is
targeted
for recruitment or influence by the foreign power
. Sometimes it involves
hardening
a co
mputer system that is being
attacked
. Sometimes it
involves
“turning” the recruited person i
n
to a
double
-
agent, or publicly calling out the
behavior with sa
nctions or expulsions of embassy
-
based intelligence officers
. On
occasion, criminal
prosecution is used to disrupt intelligence activities.
Because the nature of the hostile foreign nation is well known, counter
-
intelligence investigations tend to be centered on
individuals the FBI suspects to
be
witting or unwitting agents of that for
eign power. When the FBI develops
reason to believe an American has been targeted for recruitment by a foreign
power
or is covertly acting as an agent of the foreign power
, the FBI will “open an
investigation
” on that American and use legal authorities to
try to learn more about
the nature of any relationship with the foreign power
so it can be disrupted
.
In that context, p
rior to the
January 6
meeting,
I discussed with the FBI’s
leadership team whether I should be prepared
to assure President
-
Elect T
rump
that
we were not investigating him personally
. That was true; we did not have an open
counter
-
intelligence case on him
.
We agreed I should do so if circumstances
warranted.
During our one
-
on
-
one
meeting
at Trump Tower
,
b
ased
on President
-
Elect
Trump’s
reaction to the briefing
and without him
directly asking the
question
, I offered that assurance
.
I
felt compelled to document my first conversation
with the President
-
Elect
in a
memo
. To ensure accuracy, I began to type it
on a
laptop
in an FBI
vehicle
outside Trump Tower
the moment I walked out of the meeting
. Creating written
records immediately after
one
-
on
-
one
conversations with Mr. Trump was my
practice from that
point forward.
This had n
ot
been
my practice in the past.
I
spoke alone
with President Obama
twice
in person (and never on the phone)
–
once
in 2015
to discuss law enforcement policy issues and a second time, briefly,
for him to say goodbye
in late 2016
.
In neither
of those circumstances did I
mem
orialize the discussions.
I can recall nine one
-
on
-
one conversations with
President Trump in four months
–
three in person and six on the phone.
January 27 Dinner
The President and I
had dinner on Friday, January 27
at 6:30 pm in the
Green Room at
the White House. He had called me at lunchtime that day and