Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
I don't see how confirmation that a fiction must be represented in any debunks the strawman. It does appear to confirm it doesn't it? That there are different planes of jurisdiction. I think this person confuses diatribe with debunking.
But the conclusion appears to be correct. The party doesn't seem to have had the right standing for the outcome they wanted.
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ares
I thought these were VERY interesting at that site Monty.
I filed amended returns for 2005, 2006 & 2007 stating I wasn't engaged in a trade or business as defined by relevant US tax law. They refunded everthing I had paid in. They denied my 2004 amended return because I was 4 months outside their 3 year window per IRS regulations. They told me I could sue them since the statute of limitations is 6 years. From 2008 through 2014 I filed corrected 1099s and submitted them with the requisite transmittal form 1096 and a statement I was not engaged in a trade or business pefrorming the functions of a public office. I didn't have W-2s because I was self employed.
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
Quote:
Originally Posted by
7th trump
Thats a hendrickson CtC return. Its now catching anyone using that method a 5,000.00 penalty. Hendrickson who developed that method lost his court case and went to prison....now I believe his wife is currently in prison over this method. Theres a few others who have been convicted and sent to prison.
I thought it sounded pretty similar to the method that you used. Which could be used as a good argument for revoking ones signed W-2.
I've also found a number of court cases ruling against such individuals:
An argument linked to the meaning of the words "includes" and "including" is the argument that for Federal income tax purposes, the term "employee" under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c) does not include a regular, private-sector employee. The courts have uniformly rejected this argument. The text of section 3401(c), which deals only with the employer's withholding requirements and not with the employee's requirement to report Internal Revenue Code section 61 compensation for personal services (whether called wages, salaries, or any other term), is as follows:
For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.[16]
In Sullivan v. United States, taxpayer Grant W. Sullivan argued that he had not received “wages” and was not an “employee” under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled against Sullivan, stating:
To the extent Sullivan argues that he received no “wages” in 1983 because he was not an “employee” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §3401(c), that contention is meritless. Section 3401(c), which relates to income tax withholding, indicates that the definition of “employee” includes government officers and employees, elected officials, and corporate officers. The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein.[17]
In United States v. Ferguson, taxpayer Joy Ferguson argued that she was not an “employee” under section 3401(c), and that she therefore could not have “wages.” The court ruled against her, stating:
The core of the dispute before the court is Ferguson's assertion that she was not an “employee” as defined by §3401(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore did not earn any "wages." [footnote omitted] As such, she argues that her Form 1040 and Form 4862 accurately reported her wages as zero. As noted by the government, Ferguson's interpretation of §3401(c) has been considered and rejected numerous times by many courts. This Court would agree with the overwhelming precedent on this issue, Ferguson's argument that she is not an employee as defined by §3401(c) is frivolous.[18]
In Luesse v. United States, taxpayer Chell C. Luesse of St. Louis Park, Minnesota, argued that he received no “wages” because he was not an “employee” under section 3401(c). The court ruled against Mr. Luesse.[19]
In Richey v. Stewart, the court stated:
Another familiar argument from Mr. Richey [the taxpayer] is that he is not an employee under the terms of the Internal Revenue Code, citing Section 3401(c), which states that the term “employee” includes government employees. What Mr. Richey misapprises in his reading of the statute is the inclusionary nature of the language. The Code does not exclude all other persons from taxation who are not government employees.[20]
In United States v. Charboneau, the court stated:
[ . . . ] Ms. Charboneau contends that the Code's definitions of "wage income" and "self employment income" only include income derived from individuals who work for the federal government, or whose work involves that of "the performance of the functions of a public office." Because Ms. Charboneau never worked for any federal or state government during the tax years in question, she claims that the IRS cannot make any tax assessments against her.
This nonsensical argument is belied by the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code itself. For example, 26 U.S.C. §3401 defines wages as "all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer...." 26 U.S.C. §3401(a) (emphasis added). The statute then goes on to define various exceptions to this broad definition of wages in certain categories of private employment, such as in the agricultural and domestic service fields, newspaper delivery, the clergy, and for wages incurred by individuals working for employers "other than the United States or an agency therof" within Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States. There is nothing in the statute limiting "wages" to solely publicly derived income. [footnotes omitted]
Ms. Charboneau, however, focuses on §3401(c), which states that:
the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.
26 U.S.C. §3401(c). Setting aside the last sentence of this provision, which clearly states that officers of private corporations are considered employees for purposes of determining wages, it is obvious that within the context of this statute that the word "includes" is a term of enlargement, not of limitation, and the reference to certain public officers and employees was not intended to exclude all others. See also Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 112-13 (1959) (concluding that similar provision in 26 U.S.C. §6331 dealing with levies on salaries and wages does not exclude wages of private citizens); Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813,815 ("[Section 3401(c)] does not purport to limit withholding to persons listed therein"); United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (the Internal Revenue Code definition of “employee” in 26 U.S.C. §3401 does not exclude privately employed wage earners);. In addition, 26 U.S.C. §7701, which provides the definitions of terms used throughout the Internal Revenue Code, states that the "terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. §7701(c).[21]
In McCoy v. United States, the court stated:
McCoy argues she should not have to pay taxes for 1996-98 because under Code Section 3401 she was not an “employee” which she contends is defined as an elected or appointed employee or official of the federal government. McCoy clearly misconstrues Section 3401(c). The definition of “employee” includes private-sector employees, employees of the federal government, as well as elected and appointed officials. The very language of the Code is inclusive, not limited to the examples of included persons.[22]
Joseph Alan Fennell's argument — that the compensation he received in exchange for "non-federally privileged private sector labor" was not taxable—was rejected by the United States Tax Court.[23] Fennell appealed his Tax Court loss, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that Fennell's challenges were "frivolous on the merits in any event."[24] Similarly, in United States v. Buras, the argument that the taxpayer can be subject to the federal income tax only if he benefits from a "privilege extended by a government agency" was ruled to be without merit.[25] See also Olson v. United States[26] and Nichols v. United States.[27]
A penalty of $1,000 under Internal Revenue Code section 6673 was imposed by the U.S. Tax Court on Patrick Michael Mooney for presenting frivolous arguments. The court rejected his argument that his wages earned from a private employer were not taxable. The court also rejected his argument that the term "employee" was limited to "someone performing the functions of a public office."[28]
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that an argument by Robert S. Morse that his income was not subject to federal taxation because it was derived from employment in the "private sector" was frivolous, and that Morse was liable for monetary sanctions, under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for making a frivolous argument.[29]
The argument that only certain types of taxpayers (such as only Federal government employees, corporations, nonresident aliens, residents of the District of Columbia, or residents of Federal territories) are subject to income tax and employment tax, and variations of this argument, have been officially identified as legally frivolous Federal tax return positions for purposes of the $5,000 frivolous tax return penalty imposed under Internal Revenue Code section 6702(a)
Does that mean it's because they did not revoke their signed W-2? Or they signed one to begin with and are trying to argue after the fact? I haven't looked into all of the cases yet as I just found them.
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
Quote:
Originally Posted by
7th trump
Thats a hendrickson CtC return. Its now catching anyone using that method a 5,000.00 penalty. Hendrickson who developed that method lost his court case and went to prison....now I believe his wife is currently in prison over this method. Theres a few others who have been convicted and sent to prison.
Hendricksons wife is in prison for contempt of court for refusing to change her tax return permthe judge's orders.
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
Quote:
Originally Posted by
monty
I filed amended returns for 2005, 2006 & 2007 stating I wasn't engaged in a trade or business as defined by relevant US tax law. They refunded everthing I had paid in. They denied my 2004 amended return because I was 4 months outside their 3 year window per IRS regulations. They told me I could sue them since the statute of limitations is 6 years. From 2008 through 2014 I filed corrected 1099s and submitted them with the requisite transmittal form 1096 and a statement I was not engaged in a trade or business pefrorming the functions of a public office. I didn't have W-2s because I was self employed.
Yeah there's my crux, I have a signed W-2 with my "employer".
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
Quote:
Originally Posted by
7th trump
Thats a hendrickson CtC return. Its now catching anyone using that method a 5,000.00 penalty. Hendrickson who developed that method lost his court case and went to prison....now I believe his wife is currently in prison over this method. Theres a few others who have been convicted and sent to prison.
Hendricksons wife is in prison for contempt of court for refusing to change her tax return per the judge's orders.
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ares
Yeah there's my crux, I have a signed W-2 with my "employer".
Tell him you want to cancel the W-4 and give him a signed W-8 BE. (Foreign to the UNITED STATES aka "District of Columbia).
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
Quote:
Originally Posted by
monty
Tell him you want to cancel the W-4 and give him a signed W-8 BE. (Foreign to the UNITED STATES aka "District of Columbia).
Yeah, I'm still trying to get the balls to do that..... :)
I work for a multi-national tech company and get paid well doing it and don't want to risk being told "see ya"..
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
From Section 19 http://freedom-school.com/citizenshi...20Citizens.%92
In the Montello case, above, the U.S. Supreme Court, puts its cachet to this view:
"...The court [the Supreme Court of the State] also considered that the word 'including' was used as a word of enlargement, the learned court being of opinion that such was its ordinary sense. With this we cannot concur. It is its exceptional sense, as the dictionaries and cases indicate. We may concede to 'and' the additive power attributed to it. It gives in connection with 'including' a quality to the grant of 110,000 acres which it would not have had,-the quality of selection from the saline lands of the state. And that such quality would not exist unless expressly conferred we do not understand is controverted. Indeed, it cannot be controverted...."
Some 80 court cases have chosen the restrictive meaning of ‘includes,’ etc., such as this one last example:
Includes is a word of limitation. Where a general term in Statute is followed by the word ‘including’ the primary import of specific words following quoted words is to indicate restriction rather than enlargement. (Powers ex rel Dovon v. Charron R.I., 135 A. 2nd829)
To elucidate more clearly the 1961 definition, above: ‘includes’ and ‘including’ shall not be deemed to include things not enumerated, unless they are in the same general class. For instance, ‘State,’ in 26 USC 7701(10): "The term ‘State’ shall be construed to include the District of Columbia…" Here, "the District of Columbia," without any doubt, is not "in the same general class," category, or genus as Missouri or California—it is a federal "State." The District of Columbia has a totally different jurisdictional set up than a union state. It is under the absolute jurisdiction of the ‘U.S.,’ and the states are not. Only in the federal zone does the U.S. have jura summi imperii,right of supreme dominion, complete sovereignty.
Re: Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Glass
I don't see how confirmation that a fiction must be represented in any debunks the strawman. It does appear to confirm it doesn't it? That there are different planes of jurisdiction. I think this person confuses diatribe with debunking.
But the conclusion appears to be correct. The party doesn't seem to have had the right standing for the outcome they wanted.
At any rate, the judge denied all the unanswered filings because of lack of standing forbthe two corporations. That still leaves the question of having constitutional jurisdiction unanswered. Do you suppose the appeals court will address that issue? That was a 3 million dollar error.