I wonder is it an indemnity bond for an upcoming prosecution? I'm asking generically about Document 85. Is there a US Code describing what a Doc 85's purpose is?Quote:
Originally Posted by crimethink
I wonder is it an indemnity bond for an upcoming prosecution? I'm asking generically about Document 85. Is there a US Code describing what a Doc 85's purpose is?Quote:
Originally Posted by crimethink
Document 85 is the sequence number of the documents filed in this case.Quote:
Originally Posted by Glass
Re: Updates?
oh yes, likely for many months ….. I have not yet begun to fight!
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
Liberty Above All
The End of the Hoax of Federal Usurpation: www.supremecourtcase.wordpress.com
dr.john.parks.trowbridge.jr
April 14, 2017 Update to SupremeCourtCase.WordPress.com from Dr. Trowbridge
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G Houston IRS summons case exposes linchpin of judicial-authority scam; Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment update
by supremecourtcase
In response to a petition for an order to enforce an IRS summons, Petitioner on February 9, 2017, filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In opposition thereto, counsel for IRS on March 8, 2017, filed his IRS response to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Although he could not provide a legal explanation as to why, the judge at the March 27, 2017, hearing denied said Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (transcript of hearing should be available soon and will be hyperlinked here).
Thereafter, Petitioner on April 5, 2017, filed the following three separate documents:
(1) Response to Petition,
(2) Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, and
(3) Motion to Withdraw Tag-end Order of Order to Show Cause.
As the reader will discover in the three aforementioned filings, particularly in the Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, the linchpin of the judicial-authority scam is the special statutory definition of “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts, and used sub silentio (under silence; without any notice) by every executive and judicial officer.
Whereas, the “United States” of the Constitution is the collective of the several commonwealths united by and under authority thereof and admitted into the Union; the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure in every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court rather is “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).
The organic “United States” of the Constitution has no relation to the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15).
Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust (elected office) under the United States (of the Constitution).
Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer requires a religious test (“So help me God.”) as a qualification to each respective office (whether elected or appointed), none are officers under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.
The supreme Federal corporation, incorporated February 21, 1871, under authority of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution, is a municipal corporation: the District of Columbia.
Because of their oath of office and the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” all executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the District of Columbia.
Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of the Constitution, have the capacity to take limited jurisdiction (personal and subject-matter jurisdiction) all over the Union (Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1–16).
The problem is there are no such executive or judicial officers and never have beenbecause, in accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the oath of office taken by every one of them disqualifies him from holding an office under the “United States” of the Constitution.
Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) have the capacity to take general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction), but only in the District of Columbia (16 Stat. 419).
All of today’s executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) “United States” (the District of Columbia) impersonating federal officers under the “United States” of the Constitution—and rely on mass ignorance of the meaning of the fraudulent statutory definition of “United States” to justify usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction outside their territory (the District of Columbia).
The most egregious usurpation is that of exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing within the Union—something about which we hear every day in the news for which there is no constitutional authority.
The three short, above-numbered and -hyperlinked filings in the Houston IRS summons case lay out the judicial-authority scam in simple terms.
Although counsel for IRS has no obligation to file a reply to the Response to Petition, the court-ordered deadline to do so expired April 10, 2017.
Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
Ten and a half months after the March 3, 2016, final judgment in the Lufkin action at law against Petitioner’s ranch, Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a motion to vacate said final judgment as void for the judge's failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
No judge who fails to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 accedes to any office under the “United States” of the Constitution or “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1.
Out of legal ammo and nowhere to hide, counsel for plaintiff on February 6, 2017, filed his response in opposition to Petitioner's motion to vacate the final judgment, making various ridiculous / frivolous arguments and factual contentions, with no evidentiary support, for which Petitioner, on February 22, 2017, in Petitioner's reply to counsel for plaintiff's response in opposition, recommended that said counsel be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)(1)-(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Petitioner’s motion granted.
The magistrate judge in charge of the Lufkin case has remained silent since receiving Petitioner’s February 22, 2017, reply to plaintiff’s February 6, 2017, response to Petitioner’s January 23, 2017, motion to vacate the final judgment as void over seven weeks ago.
• Revision to previous post
Near the top of the previous post of February 11, 2017, there were two sets of bulleted items: the first a set of three bullets and the second a set of five
The second set of five bulleted items has been reduced to three as follows:
“The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular provision of the Constitution, and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains, consists of:
- “power of personal and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas at Art, I, § 8, cl. 1-16;
- “power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of Columbia at Art, I, § 8, cl. 17; and
- “constructive (implied) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 in the form of “Rules and Regulations,” id., “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.
“Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation over person or property anywhere in the Union.”
supremecourtcase | April 14, 2017 at 15:07 | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-qr
Dr. Trowbridge's latest update, DOJ attorney floundering, judges silent . .
Respond to this post by replying above this line
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G DOJ attorney in Houston IRS summons case floundering; Lufkin court silent on motion to vacate final judgment
by supremecourtcase
When cornered and beaten at their own game, their general policy is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”
The United States attorney has failed to prove jurisdiction in any of Petitioner’s nine related cases (defendant in three, plaintiff in six) despite the legal duty to do so upon Petitioner’s challenge thereof; to wit:
“Generally, a plaintiff's allegations of jurisdiction are sufficient, but when they are questioned, as in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1936, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135; Welsh v. American Surety Co., 5 Cir. 1951, 186 F.2d 16; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra Sec. 1363 at 653. . . .” Rosemound Sand and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (1972).
“The above cited decisions [six Supreme Court cases] and authorities cited therein conclusively establish the rule that if the issue is presented in any way the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon him who invokes it. . . .” Town of Lantana, Fla. v. Hopper, 102 F2d 188 (5th Cir.1989).
Whereas, United States Department of Justice attorneys are too terrified of exposure for fraud to tangle with Petitioner on the question of jurisdiction using actual evidence, they rely on their tag-team partners, United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges, to do the dirty work for them.
District, magistrate, and circuit judges, however, do not have the luxury of ignoring Petitioner; they must deal with unresolved motions and bring a case to a conclusion.
The MO. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the United States and cherry-pick and present immaterial facts which appear to support their position.
This is called lying by omission.
It is also constructive fraud.
It is the same reason no legal professional will execute an affidavit sworn to as true, correct, and complete; only a so-called declaration, which is sworn to only as “true and correct” (in some instances only “based on information and belief”).
This approach allows attorneys and judges to present a false picture of things without risking a charge of perjury; they simply leave out whatever works against them.
Since the United States district and magistrate judges control all the trial courts and the United States circuit judges the appeals courts, they figure no one is going to be able to penetrate their little coven or hold them accountable for the consequences of what they omitted to say.
This may be true legally, once things are in the court, but it is not true commercially, before matters arrive at a lawsuit.
Only municipal judges in United States district courts
Courtesy of a corrupt Congress, who fraudulently defined “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, all municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges rely for their existence exclusively on linguistic confusion and cognitive dissonance among the victims of the scheme, the American People, “joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), to perpetrate their fraud.
In civil actions, the primary job of attorneys of the United States Department of Justice is to get past the demand-letter stage (a common-law requirement before invoking the assistance of the court) and file suit and get the matter into the hands of a municipal co-worker, a United States (District of Columbia) district judge.
Once the United States (District of Columbia) attorney has done that, he can count on the United States (District of Columbia) district judge to usurp exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) and adopt and prosecute the cause sua sponte (of his own will), essentially guaranteeing the outcome; unless, of course, the case is too high-profile and the facts too clear and judgment for the United States (District of Columbia) would work against the appearance of impartiality and operate to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
The main outpoint in this and every other action at law in every United States (District of Columbia) district court in which the United States is plaintiff, is that the district judge takes territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) over the defendant and the defendant’s property—a measure which is not authorized by any provision of the Constitution and amounting to usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
Municipal judges (every justice and judge of the United States is a District of Columbia municipal bench officer) have authority to exercise general jurisdiction, but only in the District of Columbia.
Today’s municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges have extended their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of their corporate existence, 16 Stat. 419, to the exterior limits of the District of Columbia, into the Union.
As shown in most of Petitioner’s filings and particularly in the recent ones in the Houston IRS summons case hyperlinked below, they are all District of Columbia municipal judges impersonating Article III constitutional judges.
The foregoing is verifiable in the record of any of the recent nine cases in which Petitioner is involved.
A municipal (not federal per se) debt collection operation
What we know as the executive and judicial branches are a collective corporate commercial debt-collection operation of the District of Columbia (“United States”), operating under color of law and masquerading as the de jure executive and judicial branches established by the Constitution; to wit: Every so-called civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court is administered under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.
The jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793), Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat, 738, 808 (1824)): If judicial officers do not have jurisdiction in a particular geographic area, such as the Union, the same is true for executive officers—and no United States attorney has presented evidence of constitutional authority despite being challenged for the same in every one of the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved.
The remedy to the situation is commercial (not legal per se): by dealing with matters prior to the filing of a suit, before a District of Columbia municipal judge gets involved, by holding the District of Columbia Department of Justice municipal attorney personally accountable for knowing and willful usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction outside his territory (District of Columbia) under color of authority—a criminal offense for which he has no immunity and is personally liable.
Upon receipt of a demand letter from a United States (District of Columbia) attorney, by presenting him with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace requiring proof of jurisdiction and presenting evidence that he has no jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, if the he proceeds with a lawsuit without first presenting constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and do so (impossibility), he acts on his own.
Thereafter, the next step is the filing with competent authority in the particular county / borough / parish in which one is a resident or one’s property is located or the court is located or the District of Columbia or more than one of the foregoing, of an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) sworn to as true, correct, and complete before two or three witnesses (do not use a notary public), swearing as to the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney and attaching documentary evidence when appropriate.
Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority, the next step is to do a verified accounting of the criminal offenses sworn to in the Affidavit of Information and invoice him for the commercial value thereof, due and payable in 15 days from the date the invoice is sent.
After 20 days of mailing (five days grace for payment to arrive if mailed on the fifteenth day), if the United States attorney has not discharged his debt to you, the next step is a commercial lien in the amount of unpaid debt, filed with (a) the county recorder against any real property held in his name, and (b) the Secretary of State of the particular Union member where the county is situate, against his name.
You can also do it in the District of Columbia or with the Secretary of State of any Union member where the United States attorney debtor is considered a resident.
Such liens are passive claims which can be sold to professional debt collectors—accompanied by indisputable documentary evidence of the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney—at a discount. The commercial paperwork can even lead to a lawsuit against him by the debt collector.
Houston IRS summons case
Petitioner’s below two Replies (third document in each of Set 1 and Set 2) are the most recent filings and demonstrate the judge’s lack of jurisdiction in simple terms.
Set 1:
- Motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (in the presence of a person not a judge)
- Counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to dismiss
- Reply to counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to dismiss
Set 2:
- Motion to withdraw tag-end order in order to show cause
- Counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order
- Reply to counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order
Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for the judge’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
The United States on February 6, 2017, filed United States' opposition to Petitioner's supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.
Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed a reply to United States' opposition to Petitioner's supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.
Petitioner filed the original motion 106 days ago, the above reply 76 days ago; the judge remains silent.
supremecourtcase | May 9, 2017 at 18:53 | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-sq
Wow, I'm impressed. He just found a way to hold them PERSONALLY and financially accountable.
Quote:
Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority
Yes, he did. He has also filed affidavits of criminal complaint against some of them in additiin to the UCC-1 liens he filed on them. A woman in Las Vegas forwarded this information to Ryan Bundy's legal assistand and to Ammon Bundy's para-legal.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ares
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G Hearing set in Houston IRS summons case; Lufkin judge confirms it is time to abolish the current form of government
by supremecourtcase
There are two pending motions in the Houston IRS summons case, a motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (before a person not a judge), and a motion to withdraw the unwarranted order included in the order to show cause.
A hearing is set for May 30, 2017: Notice Setting Hearing.
Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
The judge who entered final judgment in the Lufkin case March 3, 2016, Michael H. Schneider, retired seven months later, October 1, 2016, and Ron Clark took over.
Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for Michael H. Schneider’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
The government responded February 6, 2017, with its opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate.
Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed Petitioner’s reply to the government’s opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate.
Ron Clark on May 4, 2017, denied Petitioner’s motion to vacate (Clark’s denial hyperlinked below).
Nature of the situation that necessitated Petitioner’s motion to vacate
Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the requirement of a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”
The oath mandated by Congress in Section 453 of Title 28 of the United States Code and taken by Michael H. Schneider, however, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
Ҥ 453. Oaths of justices and judges
“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ____ ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”
In accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the religious test (“So help me God.”) required of the former judge in the Lufkin case, Michael H. Schneider, as a qualification to the office of district judge, bars Michael H. Schneider from assuming or holding any office under the United States.
But Michael H. Schneider (and every other district, magistrate, and circuit judge and Supreme Court justice) keeps rolling along—in blatant repudiation of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
How do they justify this?
Congress create another kind of “United States” for use in the courts
The reason all the aforementioned judicial officers willfully repudiate and disregard Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution is that they are using a different “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts and withholding from the American People that they are pretending that the new statutory “United States” displaces / supersedes the organic “United States” of the Constitution.
All civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States are administered in accordance with Chapter 176 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
For purposes of all civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States, Congress have decreed in subsection 15 of Section 3002 of Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. that “United States” means “a Federal corporation”; to wit:
Ҥ 3002. Definitions
“As used in this chapter:
“. . . (15) ‘United States’ means—
“(A) a Federal corporation;
“(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of [a Federal corporation] the United States; or
“(C) an instrumentality of [a Federal corporation] the United States.”
This means that every appearance of “United States” in anything to do with any civil or criminal proceeding in any district court means “a Federal corporation.”
That the 28 U.S.C. § 453 oath of office requires a religious test as a qualification to every judicial office means that no taker of said oath may assume or hold any judicial office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution—but said religious test, however, does not preclude a taker from holding a judicial office under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).
Every contemporary judge is an officer of the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.
Every such judge throughout the Union is also impersonating a judicial officer of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.
Fraud and treason to the Constitution
This, of course, is wholesale fraud and treason to the Constitution on the part of Congress and connivance therewith on the part of every Supreme Court justice and district, magistrate, and circuit judge of the purported 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”—because no government official or officer is authorized to construe “United States” to mean anything other than what it means in the Constitution; to wit:
“A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time. . . .
“Chief Justice Taney, in Dread Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426, said that, while the Constitution remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption; that it is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
“And in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-449, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, this court quoted these words with approval, and said:
“‘The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it met when adopted, it means now. . . .’” [Underline emphasis added.] Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-450 (1934).
The purported legislative act of Congress that says “United States” means “a Federal corporation,” i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 3002, is a hoax and bogus and void; to wit:
“It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . .
“. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
“. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.” [Underline emphasis added.] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).
A municipal (not federal / constitutional) judicial system and government
The 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States” also includes an agency, department, commission, board, instrumentality, or other entity of a Federal corporation.
The only Federal corporation that possesses agencies, departments, commissions, boards, instrumentalities, and other entities is the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.[1]
The District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, 16 Stat. 419, was created by Congress under authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution—but that is where the relationship between said corporation and the Constitution begins and ends, as the selfsame provision confers upon Congress power of exclusive (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) legislation within (what will be) the District of Columbia, and therefore carte blanche to legislate whatever they want for that municipal corporation within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.
The problem is, district, magistrate, and circuit judges of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation are extending their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of said Municipal Corporation’s existence at 16 Stat. 419, i.e., the District of Columbia, and usurping exercise of jurisdiction throughout the Union.
Courts constituted by Congress under authority of Article, I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the Constitution are courts of limited jurisdiction, exercising only personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, with no power of territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the Union; such jurisdiction being the exclusive domain of each respective member of the Union; to wit:
"[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic]. Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).
“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
As can be verified at any news outlet, however, the judges of today’s “United States” district courts usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over person and property throughout the Union on a daily basis.
There is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes any such act—and every one of Petitioner’s demands for constitutional authority in the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved over the last three and a half years has been met with silence.
Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer and Member of Congress requires the same religious test, “So help me God,” as a qualification to his respective office or public trust, none are authorized to assume or hold such office or public trust under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the purported statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the Federal corporation by the name of District of Columbia.
By reason of the oath of office mandated by Congress for justices and judges at 28 U.S.C. § 453 and the repugnancy of the religious test therein to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, no such justice or judge is an officer under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only a municipal officer under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), the Federal corporation by the name District of Columbia.
Whereas, there is nothing inherently wrong with a judicial officer of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation exercising general (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) jurisdiction within his territory (the District of Columbia), everything is wrong with such officer usurping exercise of general jurisdiction anywhere else, in places like Tyler County, Texas.
How the Lufkin judge disposed of Petitioner’s motion to vacate
The substance of Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate is laid out above.
As mentioned in the previous post (May 9, 2017), the M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction, is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the "United States" (District of Columbia) and make false allegations and cherry-pick immaterial facts which will support the "United States'" (District of Columbia's) position.
True to form, Ron Clark ignored all facts and failures relating to the religious test required of Michael H. Schneider as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution and on May 4, 2017, repudiated the meaning of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” and entered his Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate.
Most of the content of Ron Clark’s Memorandum Opinion and Order is a regurgitation of immaterial facts; the ruling is based on allegation for which there is no evidentiary support.
The only portion that relates directly to the substance of Petitioner’s motion is in the second paragraph on page two, where Clark alleges that Petitioner argues that (a) the phrase “So help me God” violates the religious-test provision of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b) the oath is not valid and the final judgment therefore void.
Inspection of Petitioner’s motion to vacate shows that Petitioner never used any form of the word “violate” in respect of the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider in its relation to Article VI, Clause3 of the Constitution or stated that the oath was not valid.
Rather, that the subject oath of office is insufficient as authority for Michael H. Schneider to assume or hold an office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, accede to “The judicial Power of the [organic] United States,” Constitution, Art. III, §1, or exercise the limited jurisdiction of an Article III court anywhere in the Union.
As stated in Petitioner’s motion and reply, the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider is benign and wholly valid for a territorial or municipal judge, but insufficient for a federal / constitutional judge by reason of requirement of a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution.
Having falsely attributed to Petitioner the aforesaid arguments fabricated by himself, Ron Clark then summarily dismissed Petitioner’s motion by slyly destructively declaring that “His arguments are meritless and not relevant to the judgment.”
Institutionalized piracy
The behavior exhibited by Ron Clark is systemic among all executive and judicial officers of what most people falsely believe are the executive and judicial branches of the government of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.
Because of the religious test required in the oath of office for every executive and judicial officer and the fraudulent “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) for which they all work and to which they are all beholden for a paycheck, all aforesaid officers are municipal employees ensconced in the legislative branch under the exclusive control of Congress and there is no de jure executive or judicial branch of the government as contemplated in the Constitution, no separation of powers, and no due process of law or remedy in any so-called United States district court anywhere in the Union.
All challenges of authority / jurisdiction are stonewalled via application of their general policy “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”
They are usurpers.
They are incorrigible
And the current municipal form of government is destructive of the unalienable rights of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”
This is why the only civilized short-term remedy for such institutionalized piracy is pre-judicial, i.e., commercial, under common-law rules, as outlined in the previous post, i.e., before matters arrive in the courts.
The American People are “joint tenants in the sovereignty,” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), and the Founding Fathers long ago provided them with the long-term remedy in the Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776: Abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a federal / constitutional form of government, with separation of powers, as contemplated by the Framers and established in the Constitution.
[1] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).
supremecourtcase | May 28, 2017 at 11:32 | Categories: Uncategorized |
URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-sZ
I thought I posted about this guy on this thread, but I can't find it now.
He is using this commercial lien process to silence our unlawful lieyers.
https://johnhenryhill.wordpress.com/about/
DONUTS, THE CUSTOMS-IMMIGRATION SERVICE (CIS), AND COMMERCIAL LIENS
January 31, 2015 · by JohnHenryHill · in Original Articles · Leave a comment
Donuts, the Customs-Immigration Service (CIS), and Commercial LiensMaxim of Law: “An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth.”
(My First Two Serious Adverse Encounters with DHS-CIS)
by John-Henry Hill, M.D.
August 11, 2014; Reposted January 30, 2015
First incident:
My first very serious adverse encounter with DHS-CIS started with a JOKE. I admit it: I joke around a LOT !!! It is just my nature. Prior to 2008 I had never had any serious problems re-entering the U.S. – only the occasional luggage searches and brief interrogations. Then on December 28, 2008 the first very serious incident occurred at Boston’s Logan Airport (on return flights from Odessa, Ukraine via Kiev and Amsterdam) I was waiting in line for the “passport check” (usually called “Passport Control” in most other countries), where they ask all manner of stupid questions. Several flights from abroad must have arrived within a short space of time, so the immense room was jammed full of travelers
(certainly in excess of a thousand) slowly shuffling along through a maze of those winding, roped off lines so often seen in large airports. As is my custom, I spoke with some people waiting in line nearby, wondering aloud if we would receive a piece of cheese as a reward after successfully navigating through this maze. I waited and waited and waited. Finally, there was only ONE guy left in front of me. He answered the custom officer’s questions dutifully, but then they began chatting about where the BEST DONUTS could be found in Kittery, Maine. (I used to vacation at a friend’s summer home in Kittery, so I was rather amused at first.) But their conversation went on and on… about the Kittery Trading Post … the old-fashioned candy shop, etc.
Finally it was my turn. The CIS officer looked at my passport, then asked the usual “Where ya been…etc.” questions. I answered his initial questions very politely, but then just couldn’t resist adding, “And yes, I have been to Kittery, but I don’t eat donuts.”
https://johnhenryhill.files.wordpres...pg?w=276&h=251
Out came his red felt pen – something I would fear seeing in the future. He wrote something on my “customs declaration form”, then told me to move on. Downstairs at the baggage claim, I retrieved my luggage, then spotted 2 armed officers briskly walking toward me. They told me I had to go with them; and I was escorted by them and 2 other armed officers into an interview room.
To make a long story short, I was questioned, threatened with arrest, insulted with extremely vulgar accusations (e.g., being a child rapist, child pornographer, drug dealer, etc.), insisted that I was “mentally disturbed” and might have me committed to a psychiatric hospital, and screamed at for over 6 hours by 4 armed men in this tiny room. My baggage, computer, mobile phone and everything else were torn apart and examined. Citing my “right to remain silent” guaranteed by the 5th Amendment to the Constitution,
I was repeatedly told that I was “officially NOT in the U.S. and therefore had NO rights”! I responded that if we were not in the U.S., then they had NO authority to detain me, search me and my belongings, or question me. I refused to answer any of their questions and repeatedly demanded to phone my lawyer. Finally, after 6 hours they let me go. I was extremely angry, but also exhausted by the incident. At that time my primary concern was simply getting home.
Second incident:
One night in July 7, 2009 the second very serious incident occurred. I again arrived at Logan Airport in Boston, MA from Kiev, Ukraine (via Paris’ CDG airport) after having visited my fiancée of 3 years and her son to celebrate my birthday. (We try to celebrate all of our birthdays together.)
At Passport Control, I answered every question the Customs officers asked of me, including the reasons for my visit. When he asked how much money I had with me, I answered that I did not know the exact amount, since it was in currencies of several different countries, but it was “most certainly not even close to the $10,000 limit”. (Only a very limited number of places in the Ukraine take credit cards.
Except for major tourist businesses, it is essentially a cash-based society; and by law all cash transactions must take place using the Ukrainian currency. In major shopping malls, restaurants and even supermarkets,
ATM’s and currency-exchange booths are abundantly located to convert credit/debit cards and foreign currencies into Ukrainian currency. On this trip ALL of my transactions were in cash – U.S. dollars, Ukrainian UAH and Euros. Further, as any frequent traveler knows, one ALWAYS loses money in any currency exchange, especially converting a foreign currency back into U.S. dollars. Therefore, it makes far more sense simply too keep the foreign currency for later use.) In any event, the Customs officer brusquely told me to give him a specific amount in dollars, to which I replied that I could give him only an estimate of about $2,000-3,000. He marked my Customs Declaration form with a red felt pen and told me to proceed.
Downstairs after claiming my checked bag, I looked over to the second Customs check line. A Customs officer RAN over to me (literally ran!), told me I had been “randomly selected” and escorted me to another Customs officer for inspection of me and my baggage. We remained at regular inspection station, with its X-ray scanner, where everyone’s baggage is examined, thus avoiding the dreaded “interview room”
– I was interrogated by 2 CIS officers in front of other arriving passengers.
Not wanting to be there all night, I answered every RELEVANT question asked by the 2 CIS officers, while 4 other armed CIS officers surrounded us. (But I refused to answer all irrelevant questions.) Why did I travel to the Ukraine so often? How could I afford it? Why go there for only 6 days this trip? After inspecting some old flight “tickets” still in my briefcase, why did I travel sometimes to only Kiev and other times to Odessa? I explained that on this trip my fiancée and I had met in Kiev due to time constraints: it would save me 2 days of travel time (i.e., sitting around in airports), plus allow us to look around Kiev.
The inspection of my bags was also very thorough, including removal of the linings of luggage. Computer CD’s containing photos of the trip, 2 computer games, 2 English-Russian language CD’s by Rosetta Stone, and a few music CD’s were taken and examined, as were my cell phone and camera. (I repeatedly explained that, since my fiancée had taken her computer with her, I chose not to take mine.) Every item in my possession was repeatedly examined. I was questioned in detail about 2 English-Russian dictionaries. Had I traveled to Russia? I finally convinced them that most Ukrainians spoke Russian rather than Ukrainian; that Ukraine had been part of the old Soviet Union and for centuries before that, a part of Russia; that Russian and Ukrainian languages were quite different; and my fiancée spoke only Russian and some English (and only her son spoke Ukrainian fluently from his schooling). The 2 Customs officers were demanding, but polite.
After approximately 5 hours, the 4 armed CIS officers left the scene. I was allowed pack my bags and leave. As I began walking away the primary Customs officer wished me a “Happy Birthday”. The second Customs officer then asked me in a surprised tone, “Is it your birthday?” I said, “Yes, that is why I went over there. I told you folks that several times.
But I was ‘randomly chosen’, right?” The second officer then said to the first officer [exact quote], “We did this to him on his BIRTHDAY? What BULLSHIT ! !” I turned around, smiled and waved “good-bye” to them, then walked out.
I filed a formal complaint through my lawyer with Janet Napolitano (then Secretary of Homeland Security), DHS-CIS, and finally with DHS-TRIP, but their replies were total bullshit. He suggested we sue DHS, but warned that it would be a very expensive and lengthy process with little hope of success.
Instead, I chose another tactic. I wrote and mailed sworn affidavits detailing the events and infringements on my rights (my “claims”) to each of the six (6) men involved in their private capacity; NOT as agents or officers of the DHS-CIS. Not one of the six men answered with any type of rebuttal – which is precisely what I had hoped for. At various time intervals over the next 3 months I mailed them additional documents, again receiving no responses. By these actions I had created commercial liens on all the assets of each of the six men in the amount of $40 million U.S. dollars per man – a total of $240 million.
The entire process took about three (3) months, and approximately 30 hours of research, writing, going to the post office, etc. In essence, I had “frozen” all of their assets (e.g., houses, cars, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, other investments and whatever) for the next 99 years; so they could neither sell them nor use them as collateral for any loans.
I next registered these commercial liens with the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), which legally converted each of these 6 commercial liens into “negotiable instruments” (similar to a bond or stock) which I could sell to anyone – even to a Wall Street investment bank. Had I then created a legal Trust, then placed these liens into that Trust, the 99 year expiration date would have been extended to “forever” – that is, NO expiration date.
(I could have instituted legal proceedings for the seizure (“levy”) of their assets, but that is a complex and difficult process that I would leave to someone else with the time and money.) The harassment continued on my returns to U.S. airports for few months, but was much milder until it suddenly stopped completely. All of their attempts to void these liens through the courts were unsuccessful. I finally lifted the liens about 3 years after the original incidents, but only after receiving written apologies from all 6 men (CIS officers), their supervisors and the Director of DHS-CIS.
It was about then that I decided that the U.S. was NO LONGER the same country in which I was born and raised. And I knew it would only get worse! So a few months later in 2009 I left America permanently. I was already permanently living outside the U.S. when the liens were voided by me.
From what I have read about events in the U.S. since then, it sounds like my decision was warranted.
And it all started with a JOKE. Go figure …
True story!
P.S. By the way, I still do NOT like donuts!
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
NOTES:
1.) The first question readers might ask, aside from whether this story is total bullshit, is how I recall the details of these events after 8 years. First, anticipating my lawyer’s wishes, the day after the first incident I wrote down everything I could recall about the incident in the airport the preceding evening and night. I then presented to my lawyer, who had it typed up as an affidavit, signed by me and two witnesses and then notarized by him – which he then filed in his office records.
On a subsequent flights back into the U.S., I made audio recordings (the recorder easy visible in my shirt pocket) of all my conversations with CIS personnel until I had exited the airport.
These recordings were then typed up into affidavits, duly signed, witnessed and notarized. These documents provided the detailed information we used in my in my formal complaints to Janet Napolitano, CIS, DHA and finally DHS-TRIP.
I still possess copies of those affidavits and transcripts of the audio recordings, as well as the formal complaints sent to the above federal officials and agencies. These documents were meant to be used by my lawyer in filing a civil suit. It was not until later when I was researching and creating the commercial liens that I discovered how essential they were to me, especially if the 6 men responded with affidavits of rebuttal. Under the ancient maximum of law,
“Claims made without accountability are void.” (In order to have any credibility, the claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims proved to be false. In fact, in the Common Law and Commercial Law (as opposed to statutory law as legislated acts), the more one places himself at risk in any claim, the greater the presumption that his claim is truthful.) In other words, should these 6 men be able to refute my claims by their sworn affidavits, backed up by affidavits from other witnesses and such evidence as airport audio and/or video tapes, I would be financially “screwed” for life.
2.) About the “Commercial Lien Process”
The process of initiating a commercial lien begins with writing an affidavit of truth, signed under oath, in which you (the “affiant”) make a “claim” by stating the facts of an incident(s) and describe how you were injured (your charges) by the actions of another man or woman (the “accused”). The commercial lien process requires NO court action or judge’s approval.
In fact, the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) is a totally private contract matter. CAP is a pre-common law process. It is also referred to as a “commercial law process,” not to be confused with the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and other statutes, rules and regulations. It is a pre-common law process because until there is a disagreement, there is no dispute. All that is being done is the establishment of claims and obligations.
The purpose of the CAP is to make claims and determine if the accused agrees or not. If the Accused does not contest the claims, there is no dispute to be adjudicated; thus the appropriate damages are consensually agreed-upon. Thus it is pre-judicial. It may also be completely non-judicial if it is properly (composed of unrebuttable truth) and successfully implemented.
The Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) places the full power of justice back in the hands of the common man. It cannot be overstated that the whole Commercial Affidavit Process is not dependent on the court system. It functions quite well on its own OUTSIDE the current legal system.
Although the government court system MAY have an essential part to play once the Commercial Affidavit has been served AND ANSWERED (rebutted point-by-point in a sworn affidavit by the accused), that government court system is not and cannot be invoked until the charges in the affidavit have been answered by sworn affidavit with a point-by-point rebuttal. A disagreement could arise only from such a rebuttal by the accused. Until that point, THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT TO ADJUDICATE. Thus, it remains a totally private matter. A failure to rebut via affidavit is acquiescence: a contractual agreement that the affiant’s original affidavit was truthful and has been accepted by the accused as a contract under Commercial Law. The subsequent failure by the accused to answer the affiant’s claims for damages then leads to a “default judgment” for the affiant – as far the law is concerned, the matter is settled and can NOT be revisited by either the affiant or the accused.. It is a private contract which neither party has disputed within a timely manner; and, without any dispute, the courts have no jurisdiction of any kind.
In short, if the accused issues no affidavit of rebuttal, he agrees with the affiant’s affidavit (acquiescence – even by silence), and the affiant wins automatically. If the accused fails to respond within a stated time period (let’s say 14 days) to the affiant’s sworn Affidavit of truth by means of his own sworn affidavit in which he rebuts each of the affiant’s claims point-by-point, then the accused has in law agreed with the affiant’s claims by default and is liable for the damages claimed by the affiant. Maxim of Law: “An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth in Law.” Therefore, by the accused NOT rebutting point-by-point in his own sworn affidavit each claim of the affiant, under the ancient Laws of Commerce the accused has ALREADY agreed that the affiant’s claims are the truth. At that point, the NO court can intervene, since there is NO disagreement to adjudicate.
Applicable MAXIMS of law are:
A man may not with impunity infringe upon another man’s rights.
A matter must be expressed to be resolved.
Truth is expressed in the form of an affidavit.
(This is the reason that under the Common Law in America and guaranteed by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, NO arrest or search warrant can be issued unless a signed affidavit sworn as the truth under oath (a contract), along with some objective evidence of a crime (“probable cause”) is submitted to a court, after which a judge, also acting under oath, may issue the warrant with his signature. As agents of the government, both the police officer and the judge are protected from civil suits by “limited commercial immunity” granted by statutes and thereby relieved of “full and unlimited commercial liability” by the commercial bonds purchased on their behalf by the government.
However, this limited immunity is valid only as long as they did not exceed the powers of office lawfully granted to them.)
4th Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
An affidavit must be rebutted point-for-point.
An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth.
“He, who does not object, consents.”
Truth stands supreme.
Claims made without accountability are void. (The claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims proved to be false.)
“In law none is credited unless he is sworn. All the facts must, when established by witnesses, be under oath or affirmation.”
“There is no stronger bond between men than an oath.”
“They are perjured, who, preserving the words of an oath,deceive the ears of those who receive it.”
“An oath is a contract in law.”
“An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth in Law.”
While the battle continues, he who first leaves the field or refuses to contend loses by default. (The man who quits first loses; the last-man-standing wins.)
and most importantly
All are equal under the Law. (judges, police, etc. as MEN have NO extra rights)
Like the police, these six CIS officers (as federal agents) are granted by U.S. statutes “limited immunity” from civil suits in government, public courts when “in performance of their official duties”. What most police and, obviously these six men, failed to realize is that the Commercial Affidavit Process is a pre-judicial process; it is a private contract between men in their private capacities under “complete and unlimited commercial liability” by all parties involved – NOT in their capacities as officers of government with “limited immunity”. It depends on NO statutes and does NOT involve any court. In a “nutshell”, I made a “claim” by written, sworn affidavits against each of these 6 men in their private capacities in which I detailed the harm caused to me by them and the damages (reparations) I sought from each man to “make me whole”. I offered them a CONTRACT via sworn affidavit and by NOT responding to my “offer to contract” they fell into “dishonor” AND thereby unwittingly accepted my contract AND agreed to all the claims within my affidavit as the truth in law.
It needs to be thoroughly understood that because it is driven by SWORN TRUTH, the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) is outside the jurisdiction of any equity court. It is a private contract matter. Should an attempt be made by anyone, including a judge or anyone else, to involve an equity court it would result in a trespass against the Affiant’s rights. Consequently, those interfering individuals who were unlawfully trying to insert themselves into the controversy, could easily be added as additional “lien debtors” to the 6 commercial liens and their assets “frozen” as well – simply by adding their names and a brief description of their interference on the back of each lien .
An equity court has no jurisdiction whatsoever, for the CAP is strictly a non-judicial or pre-judicial process between individuals and is private.
It should also be emphasized that this process is not to be undertaken lightly. Under the maxim “Claims made without accountability are void.” (The claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims),
I have taken a great risk should my claims be proved false.
One should NOT hire an attorney (whose primary duty is to the court, since he is an “officer of the court”.)
By NOT hiring an attorney, you avoid becoming a “client” (by definition, a “ward of the court” by reason of “mental incompetence”),
The commercial lien, which is authorized both by the Common Law and by Title 15 of the United States Code (USC); and is similar to the lien the IRS uses to take Americans’ homes, cars, savings, etc. However, instead of depending on Title 15 (which would grant the government courts some jurisdiction over the case), one should base your commercial lien process solely upon the Common Law of negotiable instruments (a.k.a. Commercial Law or Law of Commerce).
And since NO attorney is allowed to speak in a Common Law court (except as a witness with direct, personal knowledge of events), the hiring of an attorney would be a waste of money. (It is completely unrelated to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.))
Since CAP is strictly a non-judicial or pre-judicial process between individuals and is PRIVATE, it’s almost impossible to remove a commercial lien without the approval of the individual claimant who filed the lien. Although a commercial lien can be challenged by a Common Law court or by a 7th Amendment trial by jury in a court operating under the Common Law (a true “court of record”, meaning statutes and regulations do NOT apply), it does not require a court process or a court judgment for its establishment, validity, or execution. Therefore, the courts can NOT simply extinguish this lien on their own discretion (or on motion from the lien debtors) without the voluntary approval of the person who filed the lien.
(7th Amendment: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”)
Traditionally, these liens can only be removed by (1) the voluntary decision of the person who filed the lien, (2) by the decision of a constitutional Common Law trial by jury (a true “Court of Record”), or (3) by waiting 99 or 100 years. Since the Common Law has been smothered in the U.S.A., almost all judges are essentially powerless to overcome the commercial liens since they have no knowledge of the procedures of a Common Law court (a true “court of record”). Further, in a Common Law court the “judge” can act ONLY as an administrator of the proceedings; he can NOT act as the “tribunal” under any circumstances. ONLY the “tribunal” (the plaintiff/affiant or the 12-man jury, if requested by the accused) can issue any orders, issue contempt citations, render verdicts, or make any other decisions for the court. If the “judge” exceeds his authority as the administrator (for example, by issuing any order or rendering a verdict, the “tribunal” may void that order or verdict by simply issuing an order voiding the judge’s order. If the judge persists in such actions, the tribunal may issue a “contempt of court” order against him and order his arrest and/or a fine. And anyone (such a police officer, the “judge”, court bailiff, sheriff or anyone else who obstructs the “contempt of court” order can be added as one of the “accused” on the commercial lien – and even prosecuted in a Common Law court.
Now, it was extremely unlikely that I would ever collect the $40 million judgment (to which they had agreed simply by their non-responses to my initial affidavits) from each of these six men. However, simply by filing these liens with a county clerk’s office, registering these liens with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and by placing notices to the public in a few newspapers (and keeping evidence of these such public notices), I had converted these 6 liens into “negotiable instruments” (like stocks or bonds) which I then could have sold for cash to anyone, including investment companies (as on Wall Street), banks, insurance companies, and so on
What would have happened if I had sold the six commercial liens to an investment bank, insurance company or whatever? Since the commercial liens (registered with the SEC) were $20 million per man, the total amounted to $240 million. Now, if I approached a broker from an investment bank and asked him to sell these liens on my behalf, he would certainly NOT quote me a price of $240 million. Because of the high risk involved regarding the eventual recovery of this $240 million, he would likely offer between 1-3 percent maximum of the nominal value, that is, between $2.4 million and $7.2 million maximum in cash. (And since it was an award or reparation for damages – “to make one whole” – that money paid to me would NOT be subject to taxes.)
That is a LOT of money! That investor might then re-sell the liens for a greater amount OR, more likely, use it as collateral for loans which with to make other investments, thereby leveraging this $240 million commercial lien (as it very common among large investment banks today, at a 20 to 1 ratio) into $4,800 million (i.e., $4.8 billion). Because of this fact, it would be more lucrative for any investment bank NOT to go to court in an attempt to levy the $240 million from these six men! (Now you know why the investment bankers on Wall Street are so filthy rich!)
Thus, the personal assets of the six men would remain “frozen” for the next 99 years. Now, had I been the vindictive type and actually sought to have someone make a REAL attempt to collect the $240 million from the six men, among my options would be to donate the liens to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Since the IRS is forbidden by U.S statutes from “hypothecating” such liens and, as we all know, is famous (or infamous) for its ability and experience in seizing the assets of people, it certainly would have attempted to seize all the assets of these six men. And had these six men attempted to stop such seizures using the courts, under Commercial Law and U.S. statutes, the men had ALREADY agreed to and admitted that they owed the $240 million. Case closed. Assets seized.
+++++++++++++++ END +++++++++++++++
3.) Sources of information:
There are numerous articles and books, many available for free on the Internet, explaining the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) and Commercial Lien Process. As a non-attorney, that is how I taught myself the theory and procedures; and used so many sources that I will mention only a few. I did NOT use an attorney.
See my essay below on this blog below titled, “COMMERCIAL LIENS: The MOST POTENT WEAPON by Alfred Adask et al 1995”
Another good article comes from BILL THORTON (of www.1215.org ) – perhaps the BEST web site regarding the Common Law:
COMMERCIAL_LIEN__Application_of_COMMERCIAL_LAW___B ILL_THORNTON_1215-org
There are also numerous VIDEOS posted on various Internet web sites, including on YouTube.com. Many of these videos are not very informative and/or simply incorrect. Perhaps the best VIDEO explaining the mechanics of the Commercial Lien Process (as applicable in Britain, although the process in America is almost identical) is “Commercial Maritime Liens” by Simon (aka, “El Spaniardo” or “WhiteRabbitTrust”). I could only locate this video as reposted by “John Smith” using the title, “Commercial Liens The Most Potent Commercial Weapon”, so I presume El Spaniardo’s previous postings were deleted. The video is currently available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJnEDT3jsI8
Another source of information on Commercial Liens (as well as the Common Law in general) are the video interviews of Karl Lentz, specifically “Karl Lentz 59 – Commercial lien process vs. common law process”available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3h8T5WQwS0M However, I have found Mr. Lentz rather vague and far less organized in his presentations than El Spaniardo (aka, Simon and WhiteRabbitTrust)
+++++++++++++++++++++ End of Essay +++++++++++++++++++++