It will be interesting to see how this all turns out.
I wonder if all federal courthouses are on federal land. Some Post Offices are leased on privately owned land.
Here is his argument concerning the 1040 the judge ordered into evidence:
Also, the federal court may be on federal land, but the crime was not commited in the court.
Petitioner had the Houston Division case won following Petitioner’s initial March 19, 2014, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Houston Docket #18)—because there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner was a resident of the only statutory “State” of the statutory “United States” whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C.: the District of Columbia.
The judge stacked the deck against Petitioner by commanding sua sponte[4] the DOJ attorney to file in the record what the judge would use sub silentio[5] to justify pretending that he was authorized to treat Petitioner as a resident of the District of Columbia: one of Petitioner’s tax returns.
Courtesy of Congress, the filing of a tax return is one of an indefinite number of undefined “acts or statements” that purportedly prove “a definite intention to acquire residence in the [statutory] United States” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii)), i.e., the District of Columbia.
In combination with legally defective congressional legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013(g) and (h), actors in government pretend that the filing of a tax return constitutes one’s voluntary election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia, and thereafter pretend that they are authorized to treat the filer as such without disclosing what they are doing.
The only flaw is that an alleged “definite intention to acquire residence” is insufficient legal ground in and of itself for someone to acquire or be granted residence or be treated by a government officer as a resident of a given place.
Under such logic, every non-American crossing the border into America without authorization could claim the right to be treated as a resident (Note: There is no substantial difference between being treated as a resident and being a resident).
Residence depends on facts and is established in one of two ways: through bodily presence as an inhabitant of, or realization of earnings in, a given place / geographic area.
The Supreme Court, whose opinions are not law per se, but have the effect of law, affirms that no one can elect (choose) to be treated as a resident of a particular place for the purpose of taxation (or any other purpose) without also having a factual presence in that location; to wit:
“When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose of taxation. . . .” Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com
UPDATE:
https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.c...eral-actors-2/
The Union is the collective of the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution, and the geographic area they occupy.
There is no provision of the Constitution that grants Congress power of territorial or personal legislation anywhere within the Union—only subject-matter legislation over certain things (Article 1 § 8(1-16)).
This means that Congress have no legislative power over property located anywhere within the Union or any American residing there, a limitation confirmed by the Supreme Court:
“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State [of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
Notwithstanding that there is no provision of Article III of the Constitution that authorizes Congress to ordain and establish any court with power of territorial or personal jurisdiction anywhere in the Union (only jurisdiction to hear or decide certain controversies, Article 3 § 2(1)): The United States District Courts created by Congress (28 U.S.C. 132(a)) and doing business throughout the Union are usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction over property located there and Americans residing there.
Wherefore, every Federal bench officer, including, without limitation, every Supreme Court justice, is culpable for:
- criminal negligence of the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction, in respect of the legislative powers therein conferred upon Congress;
- violation of their oath of office to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . [and] bear true faith and allegiance to the same” (5 U.S.C. 3331); and
- Treason to the Constitution; to wit:
“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821),
What separates Man from the beasts is the faculty of reason:
- "Ratio est radius divini luminis. Reason is a ray of the divine light." Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891) (hereinafter “Black’s 1st”), p. 995.
- "Ratio est formalis causa consuetudinis. Reason is the formal cause of custom." Id.
- "Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex. Reason is the soul of law ; the reason of law being changed, the law is also changed." Id.
At implementation of the Constitution March 4, 1789, the soul of law in America was personal liberty under the common law; to wit:
“Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law.” William Blackstone and John Innes Clark Hare, cited in John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 1965 (s.v. “Liberty”).
“Due course of law,” supra, is synonymous with “due process of law” and means process according to the law of the land, i.e., the Constitution; interpreted according to the principles of the common law; to wit:
“Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . . ." Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).
“Due process of law . . . refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . .” Id. at 535.
On June 30, 1864 (see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, pp. 4-14), Congress invoked the sovereignty of the American People to override their will as declared in the Constitution, and changed, beginning with the revenue act of that date, the reason of law in America, from personal liberty under the common law to civil liberty under municipal (Roman civil) law, i.e., rules and regulations commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong; to wit:
“Under the Roman law, civil liberty was the affirmance of a general restraint, while in our law it is the negation of a general restraint.” Ordronaux's Constitutional Legislation, quoted in Bouvier’s, p. 1965 (s.v. “Liberty”).
There is only one provision of the Constitution that expressly grants Congress power to make rules and regulations—Article 4 § 3(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .”
All “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id. (which is enumerated at Article 1 § 8(17) of the Constitution), is extraneous to the Union.
Congress have no authority to legislate rules and regulations (statutes) for the 50 commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, or the Americans who reside there—and in such geographic area the Department of Justice and United States District Courts are bereft of constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and execute or declare or enforce any such rule or regulation (statute) enacted by Congress.
The contents of this webpage reflect Petitioner’s efforts to dissolve unconstitutional, felonious, and treasonous attempts to impose Federal rules and regulations on Petitioner in order to justify seizure of Petitioner’s property.
“Est autem vis legem simulans. Violence may also put on the mask of law” (Black’s 1st, p. 433)—and Federal elements today, like an occupying army, usurp exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction and impose rules and regulations throughout the Union and deprive the Americans residing there of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, under municipal (Roman civil) law of the District of Columbia, in treason to the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the monstrousness of such organized outlawry, reason, not violence, is the answer.
It has taken all this time—roughly 100 years (since Federal actors first began enforcing provisions of the fraudulent Sixteenth and Eighteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution on Americans residing throughout the Union; see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 8)—for someone to divine the question that Federal aggressors are required by blackletter law[1] to answer, but cannot without also incriminating themselves for treason to the Constitution.
Petitioner’s objective is the exact estimation of effort that gets Federal actors to honor their oath of office and bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and cease usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction without “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)).
For the first time in their professional life, upon receipt of Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, objection to denial of due process of law and demand for the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, the Federal judges, magistrates, law clerk, attorneys general of the United States, and DOJ attorneys involved in that case hewed to the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and ceased attempting to defraud Petitioner and deprive Petitioner of Petitioner’s property under color of law, office, and authority.
Despite this positive sign, however, said actors cannot be trusted to resign their office or refrain from committing the same crimes against other Americans less knowledgeable in such matters than Petitioner, and therefore must be brought under control.
Wherefore, in accordance with provisions of the Fourth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, and as provided in 18 U.S.C. 4 Misprision[2] of felony, Petitioner on December 30, 2015, filed by mail with certain of the only Federal authorities who might be worthy of trust—66 senior officers in military authority—an affidavit of information (criminal complaint), upon probable cause of misdemeanor, felony, and treason supported by oath and particularly describing the persons to be seized, against every Federal actor in the Lufkin Division case, and a second affidavit of information limited to the Lufkin Judges and Magistrate Judges only.
Petitioner also lodged each Affidavit of Information with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—and sent each Lufkin Federal defendant his own copy.
“Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy,” Bouvier’s, p. 2165—and every Federal Lufkin defendant is liable to Petitioner for damages for, among other things, denial of the constitutional right to due process of law—wherefore, Petitioner has remedies.
These criminal complaints are the first step on the path to obtaining remedy.
Affidavit of Information No. 1 – all Federal actors, Lufkin Division
Affidavit of Information No. 2 – Lufkin Division judges only
* * * *
[1] blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief, (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 163.
[2] mis-pri′sion, mis-prizh′un, n. . . . Law. . . . The concealment of a crime, especially of treason or felony. . . . A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903), p. 1133.
supremecourtcase | December 30, 2015 at 22:07 | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-aJ
Reads like a conspiracy website.....as usual.
And nothing, and I mean nothing, is going to come of it because the guy is a "US citizen" under Congressional policy.
His argument his no merit other than the court letting the cat out of the bag that "US citizens" are under federal policy and not legally a member of "The People".
The Constitution doesn't need to give authority for District courts to operate within state land when the courts are on federal land dealing with federal personnel and federal issues.
This is just an example of the stupidity of people.
The way I read these court cases it appears the Supreme Court does not share your opinion.
"Special provision is made in the constitution, for the cession of jurisdiction from the states over places where the federal government shall establish forts, or other military works. And it is only in these places, or in the territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction."
[New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836)]
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands. And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative: because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted. 7 ”
[Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 213, 221, 223 (1845)]
“In another, not unrelated context, Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264 (1821), could well have been the explanation of the Rule of Necessity; he wrote that a court “must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.” Id., at 404 (emphasis added)
[U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980)]
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State[of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
The "crimes" were not committed in the Federal Courthouse.
Probably nothing will become of it because to do so would unravel the entire federal bureaucracy. Nobody in government will enforce it. I believe Trowbridge will have no further problems with the feds because to do so they would be incriminating themselves. The feds will continue to rape the uneducated.Quote:
And nothing, and I mean nothing, is going to come of it because the guy is a "US citizen" under Congressional policy.
To expect the US DOJ to act on its unconstitutional court system is beyond imagination. Ain't gonna happen.
Its not unconstitutional. You just dont want to see the truth and pander in believing its all a conspiracy.
There are no district courts operating outside it's jurisdiction.
The first district court was approved by the very first Congress and has been intact ever since and then nobody batted an eye about district courts.
They are all on allotted federal land within the boundaries of the union states.
Its you who has fallen within their jurisdiction. And that appears as though they are within the state and unconstitutional.
So where exactly does it say that District Courts have jurisdiction to try cases in matters of debt outside of the District of Columbia? This is the guys whole basis, that the post civil war congress made changes to the definition of words in order to redefine DC jurisdiction.
You cannot possibly with a straight face sit there and say that the 17th Amendment passed when there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution says states have the authority to give up their suffrage to the people turning a Republic into a Democracy. Or how there is mounds of evidence that supports the original 13th Amendment denying anyone with titles of nobility (BAR carrying attorney's) from being able to serve in Congress. All the evidence points that the original 13th Amendment passed, yet while there is also mounds of evidence that shows the 17th Amendment failed to pass, yet it was declared.
Why the fuck (and how the hell is this even lawful) that Delaware didn't even Ratify the 17th Amendment until 2010. (97 years later)
http://guides.lib.udel.edu/c.php?g=85632&p=548217
There isn't always a conspiracy everywhere, but there always seems to be one when power attempts subjugation of people are involved. If there wasn't we would not even be discussing this on this forum.
The first district courts were admiralty courts hearing maritime cases. There have been several changes made to the federal court system by the Congress since the first district courts were created.
The Supreme Court says all Federal Courts are Article III courts, courts of limited jurisdiction not able to hear civil and criminal cases.
If you were to steal money from the Post Office or kill someone on Nellis Aire Force Base in the State of Nevada you would be tried in the Article IV District Court of general jurisdiction because that would be on property belonging to the United States where they do have general jurisdiction.
- Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006)
- T]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States,411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 401; Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182, 319 U. S. 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
- “It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 374.
- “The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction . . .” Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830).
- “[S]tate courts are courts of general jurisdiction . . . . By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 43 6 F.3d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 2006).
Quote:
Its not unconstitutional. You just dont want to see the truth and pander in believing its all a conspiracy.
The courts are not unconstitutional. The act of usurping the states jurisdiction is unconstitutional.
And these two court cases precede, in date, the Civil War. The Civil War brought out of it Congresses first ever subjects...."US citizens"...via the 14th amendment.
Shortly after the 14th, Congress gave its new subject citizens "rights" as not many of the "Bill of Rights" applied to these brand new subjects and therefore enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Do you see the separation between "The People" and "US citizens"?
Its in the rights you hold and possess.
Congress doesnt choose which rights you have....you do unless you are of colored skin. Then you have no choice in the matter.
Ever heard of "State citizens"?
Thats where the Bill of Rights applies....to those individuals.
A State citizen and "We the People" are one in the same.
Heres the thing with this idiot......hes applying court cases that cannot and do not apply to US citizens (which they proved he was with the 1040) in that context didnt exist until after the Civil War. And that last court case Pennoyer v. Neff applies to those who are not US citizens pre Civil War era and politics.
This idiot is picking and choosing what he whats to argue with and his picks dont even apply.....or is that you, Monty, supplying the three court cases? One of you is a completely ignorant of how whats going on.
The guy is an idiot douche with a so called high IQ???
Maybe you reading comprehension isn't so great. Here are 4 cases all after the civil war. 3 of them since 1978.
Care to explain why the Lufkin Court bailed and took the 5th when they were about to sieze his hobby farm for part of his 3 million dallar debt?
Pennyoyer V. Neff (1878)
- Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006)
- T]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States,411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 401; Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182, 319 U. S. 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
- “It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 374.
- “The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction . . .” Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830).
- “[S]tate courts are courts of general jurisdiction . . . . By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 43 6 F.3d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 2006).
Update Jan. 14
Petitioner files superseding Lufkin criminal complaint; demands payment of debt totaling $195,988,000
https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.c...g-195988000-2/
https://supremecourtcase.files.wordp...ry-14-2016.pdf
https://supremecourtcase.files.wordp...ry-14-2016.pdf
I seriously ask you to click the link and read the whole thing.
Until you do you aren't going to understand why your beloved people holed up are going to lose and possible get themselves killed or hurt.
http://freedom-school.com/citizenshi...tizenship.html
No white person born within the limits of the United States and subject to their jurisdiction, or born without those limits and subsequently naturalized under their laws, owes his status of citizenship to the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution.
Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal 43. You have to remember the 14th amendment is not law, it´s never been passed, not ratified. So when you claim you are a U.S. citizen, you claim that you´re a little green man from Mars with six heads; and that´s the way the court looks at you, a dummy that doesn´t know what he´s talking about.
And how did you become a U.S. citizen? When you got your social security number. What you have now is the original social security act of 1935. I´d like you to read the top paragraph, and tell me where that trust fund is that they´re talking about on television and radio. You hear them say, "give us your money, we´ll keep it in the trust fund". Read what it says: Wards of court. Infants and persons ofunsound mind ... Their rights must be guarded jealously ...
Black´s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition.His [attorney] first duty is to the courts and the public, not to the client, and whenever the duties to his client conflict with those he owes as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the latter.Nobody here looks like an imbecile or and infant to me, but you claim you are, and the courts recognize you as such. That´s why you have to have an attorney.
Corpus Juris Secundum, 1980 Edition. Clients are also called "wards of the court" in regard to their relationship with their attorneys.
Corpus Juris Secundum, 1980 Edition.
And when you became a U.S. citizen, you became a citizen of the United States government. Now read what the United States government is:
The United States government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state.Ninety-nine percent of the time when they say small ´s state, they´re referring to the common law republic country. A capital ´S´ State is a corporation. Large ´S" means corporation, fiction; small ´s´ means land mass, country.
In re Merriam, 163 US 625.
Next is California Government Code section 242. Remember, as a U.S. citizen, you are a citizen of the District of Columbia. Is the District of Columbia a state of the Union? No. Now, you tell me under California law what you are, either (a) or (b):Persons in the State not its citizens are either:
(a) Citizens of other States; or
(b) Aliens.
AN ACT To provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes.It´s for revenue raising, and other purposes. There is no trust fund. Everything you give to the government is for revenue purposes. They do not have to pay you anything in Social Security. It´s a gratuity given by government. It can be abolished, and taken away tomorrow. That´s what the courts have ruled, many times.
And when you´ve got your social security number you said " I want some welfare, I want some workmen´s comp, I want, I want, I want ... and you have my power of attorney to regulate and control me. I´m a fictitious entity. I´m not a human being anymore."
When you do that, you give the federal government power of attorney.Then the government gives it to their courts. You become a ward of the court. So, read what a ward of the court is:
I've been harping and harping about the Social Security Act and what it really did to those who went and applied for one.
I hope this goes far and wide because those up in Idaho are gonna lose when the feds decide they've had enough of this and go in with guns.
These guys are doing more harm than any good for the cause of returning the government back into what it once was.
They should do some R and R........."retreat and regroup", but this time use their heads and learn where they stand within the law and step out of it and into the jurisdiction where they can do something about it.
Famguardian has more half truths than truths. I wouldn't go there...they are conspiracy minded.
1215.org is great in showing theres two citizenship.
But state-citizen.org (not up for some reason) has the best court cases to show how the two citizenships differentiate and what you can do to try and regain the Status of "WE the People".
Monty to stay unconfused you need to know the basics and that's knowing that "We the People" are state citizens while "US citizens" are federal citizens under the jurisdiction established by the 14th amendment.....the rest falls into place
No I dont rely upon statute. I study the statute to understand its operation and jurisdiction.....aka how one falls within its authority.
Know your enemy to understand your enemy.
But then again we both understand this but you like to play games.
Imagine that....you, a conpiratist, protecting a site that full of conspiracy. Seems you have an eye for recognizing a site filled with bullshit and feel obligated to come to its aid!
you are out of your mind. You rely on SEMI-COLONS. If that isn't taking devotion to the nth level I don't know what is.
Famguardian? I suppose their information is better than some and not as good as others.
And I have no beef with conspiracies .. either pro or con. My approach is called REASON 'cause that is the basis for Law. Now you can find REASON in many places and yes there is occasionally even REASON to be found in statutes. Where I find REASON I have no problem with accepting Law based upon that REASON.
What you call conspiracies is nothing more than other people considering what they think are facts, looking for a REASON behind those facts and formulating theories. I don't do this because I have no facts to go on. All these people do to construct their favorite conspiracy is rely upon others observations (aka 'hearsay' or opinion). They have no facts. And then the action of REASONING requires LOGIC. You have provided sufficient clues that you do not know what LOGIC actually is.
In short your analysis fall far short of being accurate because I have seen mules that are more flexible.
Lack of facts means belief becomes a dominant factor.
I have no facts.
Neither do you have facts.
Your opinion matters (to you).
Your opinion matters not at all (to me).
You have no facts.
You have no reason.
You have no logic.
Perhaps you care to examine what you HAVE because you surely know what you have NOT.
Then perhaps you should look into each of your conspiracy fallacy tales and search for facts to see if the conspiracies you hold to your heart have any merit. If not then discard them instead of continuing to look for facts you will not and cannot find that would validate the merit of the conspiracy lie.
Theres a saying about being insane........something about doing the same thing over and over in hopes for a different outcome.
So why do you cling to fallacies you know have no facts (which you call evil) and pass them off as being legit?
People present fallacies all the time on this board (and others) based upon opinion and belief. This does not mean they are wrong but it also does not mean they are right. I try not to judge but see no reason not to present alternative 'views'.
Etymology online quotes the source of the word symbol 'fact' as being of evil origin. Am I wrong in pointing out this? Or do you select the meaning of the words you use to gain some advantage?
Is the difference between what you view as the 'real' world and the actual fantasy land you live in based upon some concept of what is 'legit' and what is not?
Damages of $37,822,100 demanded of 31 Federal actors in the Houston case; criminal complaint filed with military
In the original Houston Division case, 31 Federal actors in the United States District Court, United States Department of Justice, and United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit taken collectively, committed over a thousand felonies while perpetrating the theft of Petitioner’s house in Montgomery County, Texas.
This is known as “Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity” (Texas Penal Code Sec. 71.02).
Presently, United States District Courts located throughout the Union purport to have territorial and personal jurisdiction, over property located and people residing there.
Success of such United States District Courts, in tandem with the United States Department of Justice, in defrauding and depriving the American People of life, liberty, and property, depends utterly on concealment of the fact that the Constitution authorizes Government to exercise territorial and personal jurisdiction only in geographic area in which Congress have power of territorial and personal legislation.
There is no provision of the Constitution that confers upon Congress the power of territorial or personal legislation anywhere within the Union.
Congress have power of territorial and personal legislation (two of the three aspects of exclusive legislation, the other being subject-matter) only as expressly provided in Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution.
The geographic area in which the Constitution grants Congress power of territorial and personal legislation is “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)), e.g., the District of Columbia and the territories.
There really is nothing more to the Federal con than that simple fact.
Government is usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area throughout the Union, and engaging in organized criminal activity in doing so.
Every such act is an instance of usurpation, constituting breach of oath of office and treason to the Constitution.[1]
Petitioner is in the process of effectuating remedy in the Houston Division case, for the unlawful taking of Petitioner’s home without constitutional authority (theft), and the below-hyperlinked instruments represent the first step toward that end.
The below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information was filed with the same 65 senior officers in military authority as previous criminal complaints.
Letter to 65 senior officers in military authority, January 28, 2016 (10.3 MB)
Affidavit of Information, Purported Houston Litigation, January 28, 2016
Demand for Payment (of Damages), 31 Federal actors, January 28, 2016
* * * *
[1] We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. . . . Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).
https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/
The magistrate judge took 11 pages to avoid addressing the real issue, the courts lack of constitutional authority.
Lufkin magistrate recommends the Court grant United States’ motion for summary judgment; Petitioner responds
FEBRUARY 17, 2016SUPREMECOURTCASELEAVE A COMMENT
After five months of silence there is movement in the Lufkin Division.
A Lufkin Division actor has made a move to compensate for the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority to take territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and facilitate theft of Petitioner’s real property under color of authority.
Petitioner on September 14, 2015, demanded the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority—and following the United States’ failure to respond thereto, on September 30, 2015, alleged lack of territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and demanded dismissal of the case, to which demand the United States never filed an opposition.
Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, unanswered demands signify that the Lufkin Court has no territorial or personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, the United States is not entitled to summary judgment, and Petitioner is entitled to dismissal with prejudice of the case.
With no dismissal forthcoming, Petitioner on January 14, 2016, filed an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) with the military and served the Lufkin Division actors with a copy, as well as a Verified Accounting of Offenses and Debt and a Demand for Payment.
Whereupon, United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on January 26, 2016, entered a Report and Recommendation on Motion for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss (the “Report and Recommendation”), hyperlinked below, in which he cherry-picks from the record of the Lufkin Division case certain facts, which he presents as conclusive “proof” that the United States is entitled to summary judgment, and Petitioner’s real property—to the exclusion of all material facts and evidence in the same record from Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings, and the United States’ failure to respond thereto, that supersede and nullify those he uses as the basis of his recommendation.
Magistrate Giblin is applying the Government policy, “Never respond, confirm, or deny when confronted with a situation where anything you say will work against you,” and pretending that Petitioner never made the September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.
Magistrate Giblin is counting on his co-workers to go along with the ruse.
This convention has a name: culture of silence.
In an impartial judicial system such custom could never gain any footing.
Magistrate Giblin is gambling that the general appearance of his 11-page Report and Recommendation is so “official” and its contents so “thorough” and “authoritative” that the idea of verifying its conclusions and recommendation against the actual record of the case never crosses the reader’s mind.
“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.24
“. . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S. 918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3 L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f., Avery v. Clearly, 132 U.S. 604, 10 S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694, 698 (5th Cir. 1969); American Nat’l Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967).” United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970).”
Ongoing silence on the part of the United States for the last five months, followed by the preposterous whitewash of the record by Magistrate Giblin, operates to confirm that Petitioner has correctly identified the ultimate Achilles’ heel of every de facto United States District Court throughout the Union: no constitutional authority to take territorial and personal jurisdiction.
Magistrate Giblin’s employer, plaintiff United States, is too terrified to reply to Petitioner’s demands and put anything in writing, lest it be used as evidence of a crime—hence the stratagem of the Report and Recommendation.
Magistrate Giblin’s “solution” to his employer’s jurisdictional problem is to ignore the evidence, falsify the record, and recommend that the Lufkin Judge “authorize” the taking of Petitioner’s home in Tyler County, Texas, without constitutional authority—among numerous other offenses, a felony of the first degree under the Texas Penal Code.
The Report and Recommendation is a desperation attempt to stave off the inevitable.
General ignorance of the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution is what has led to the disappearance of judicial-branch Article III constitutional courts and proliferation of legislative-branch Article IV territorial courts, called “United States District Courts” (28 U.S.C. 132(a)), of which the Lufkin Division court is one.
Anyone who can grasp pages 3–5 of Petitioner’s Objection to Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, hyperlinked below, will know more about constitutional jurisdiction than any law professor (or at least what he teaches and will admit to).
That Government has been so successful at defrauding and swindling other Americans of their wealth over the last century or so without constitutional authority, is no reason that Petitioner has to go along with the charade, bend to pretended authority, and consent to the theft of his home under pretext of a judicial proceeding.
“Extra territorium jus dicenti non paretur impune. One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory cannot be obeyed with impunity.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), p. 2134.
Lufkin Division actors who conspire to falsify the record, exercise jurisdiction out of their territory, and take Petitioner’s property without constitutional authority are whistling past the graveyard if they think they are going to do it with impunity.
Petitioner on February 16, 2016, filed the aforementioned Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) with Angelina County, Texas, District Attorney Art Baureiess, who has authority to charge and prosecute Lufkin Division actors for violations of the Texas Penal Code.
The more that Lufkin Division actors struggle, the messier it is going to get.
“Semper necessitas probandi incumbit et qui agit. The claimant is always bound to prove (the burden of proof lies on him).” Id. at2162.
“Qui tacet consentire videtur ubi tractatur de ejus commodo. A party who is silent is considered as assenting, when his advantage is debated.” Id. at 2158.
“De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio. The law is the same respecting things which do not appear and things which do not exist.” Id. at 2130.
“Idem est non probari et non esse ; non deficit jus sed probatio. What is not proved and what does not exist, are the same ; it is not a defect of the law, but of proof.” Id. at 2136.
“Actore non probante, reus absolvitur. If the plaintiff does not prove his case, the defendant is absolved.” Id. at 2124.
“Omnia præsumuntur legitime facta donec probetur in contrarium. All things are presumed to be done legitimately until the contrary is proved.” Id. at 2152.
“Quod per recordum probatum, non debet esse negatum. What is proved by the record, ought not to be denied.” Id. at 2159.
“Facta sunt potentiora verbis. Facts are more powerful than words.” Id. at 2134.
This situation is not going to go away and magically disappear just because Magistrate Giblin has decided to play make-believe with the record: Lufkin Division actors have no authority to take Petitioner’s home—and are liable to Petitioner in individual capacity if they do, for criminal offenses knowingly and willfully committed without the scope of their office or employment under color of authority.
Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation
Petitioner’s Objection to Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation
https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com
Interesting. I heard a new to me term this week that I have been trying to find more information on.
The term is called Fraudulent Concealment and from what I heard, Texas is the place where this has been addressed by the courts. So far I haven't turned up a direct reference for it but basically if someone conceals something in order to obtain a gain or benefit it is Fraudulent Concealment.
The other thing that I was reminded of, and had not heard for maybe 15 years was the term "With clean hands". No party to a prosecution or claim in equity can succeed if they come to the matter with out clean hands. That means that they cannot conceal information or take action that detriments the other party because it means they are dishonest and the claim should be ejected.
Paraphrasing from memory. I'll be re listening over the next day or so, so am hoping I can add some more to that.
Bouviers 1856 Dictionary:
Fraud is a component of concealment. There is no legal construction 'fraudulent concealment' because all concealment is fraud.Quote:
CONCEALMENT, contracts. The unlawful suppression of any fact or circumstance, by one of the partis to a contract, from the other,which in justice ought to be made known. 1 Bro. Ch. R. 420; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, c. 3, §4, note (n); 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §207.
2. Fraud occurs when one person substantially misrepresents or conceals a material fact peculiarly within his own knowledge, in consequence of which a delusion exists; or uses a device naturally calculated to lull the suspicions of a careful man, and induce him to forego inquiry into a matter upon which the other party has information, although such information be not exclusively within his reach.
Viewing all actions man to man as either contracts or wrongs, an offer to engage in physical combat in which one party pulls a concealed knife and the other pulls a concealed gun really means both parties are participating in fraud. Whichever party loses the other can be charged with a criminal act.
A concealed carry permit is a lot like an abortion. It permits the holder to engage in fraud to a certain extent. If he displays the weapon under improper circumstances society is going to put him in jail regardless of the permit.
I agree, it is clearly part of the act of Fraud. I thought it was strange to hear coming from this person. They are very pedantic about what legal reference they provide. I got the impression they were using that specific term to try and explain how concealment forms an act of fraud.
With clean hands is a maxim AFAIK so worth looking into as well.
Your comments about concealed carry reminded me of something I read a week or so ago. It comes from the Washington Post and because of this and the content I was quite surprised.
Quote:
English legal history and the right to carry arms
A few weeks ago, I joined several legal historians in filing an amicus brief about the Second Amendment right to carry arms; the case is Wrenn v. District of Columbia, currently before the D.C. Circuit. The brief addressed English legal history, and also American legal history through the 19th century. Stanford history professor Priya Satia has written an article in Slate, asserting that our description of English legal history is incorrect–that it is “incongruous” with “well-established history.” So let’s take a look at what the history really says.
In 1328, the government in England was near collapse. The previous year, King Edward II was had been deposed by an invasion led by his wife, Queen Isabella (a French Princess). Isabella and her consort Roger Mortimer took over the government. The monarchy’s ability to enforce the law was close to non-existent. As historian Anthony Verduyn explains, the primary concern was “the gentry…using armed force to defeat the course of justice.” For decades there had been a problem of “magnates maintaining criminals.” (The Politics of Law and Order during the Early Years of Edward III, 108 Eng. Hist. Rev. 842 (1993).) As numerous royal instructions to Sheriffs of the era indicate, these armed gangs prevented the monarch’s courts from functioning in many places, and attacked jurors who were traveling to perform jury service.
Besides that, as Verduyn writes, Isabella and Mortimer were fearful of being overthrown; with Parliament composed exclusively of aristocrats, Isabella and Mortimer did not want armed men coming to Parliament, nor traveling armed to meet the Queen. They favored a measure to “politically necessary to check dissent against the increasingly unpopular regime.” So in 1328, the Statute of Northampton was enacted. It provided:
As the text of the Statute indicates, the first concern was the thwarting of government functions. The penalty of forfeiture of “armour” indicates a statute aimed primarily at the aristocracy; commoners could not afford a coat of chain mail.Quote:
Item, it is enacted, that no man great nor small, of what condition soever he be, except the king’s servants in his presence, and his ministers in executing of the king’s precepts, or of their office, and such as be in their company assisting them, and also [upon a cry made for arms to keep the peace, and the same in such places where such acts happen,] be so hardy to come before the King’s justices, or other of the King’s ministers doing their office, with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night or by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the King’s pleasure.
Yet the statute could be read broadly. The “in no part elsewhere” could be interpreted as a comprehensive ban on carrying by anyone except for “the king’s ministers” and except for people in hot pursuit of fleeing criminals (the hue and cry). It seems impossible that the Statute could ever have been enforced with the literal rigor that Prof. Satia imagines. Separate from the duty to join a hue and cry (which presumably would not be an everyday event), there was the ordinary duty of persons in towns and villages to keep “watch and ward”–this is to serve in daytime and night-time patrols to confront and question any unfamiliar person who attempted to enter. On top of that, the Tudor monarchs of the 16th century mandated that all towns and villages maintain public target ranges. Parents were required to teach their children how to use arms, and various Sunday amusements were outlawed, in order to remove distractions from target practice. The target mandates at first were for long bows, and later for muskets.
Also, there was the very common practice of people carrying knives, as a necessary tool for everyday use in cutting food and other tasks–and necessarily available for self-defense in an emergency.
So we know that the Statute of Northampton was not interpreted literally. A literal reading would forbid what the law required: watch and ward, Flutrand arms training.
What did the law actually forbid? The only case on the subject seems to be Sir John Knight’s Case, from 1686. It was charged that Knight and three friends “did walk about the streets armed with guns, and that he went into church of St. Michael, in Bristol, in the time of divine service, with a gun, to terrify the King’s subjects.” In the prosecution’s theory of the case, Knight’s intent was “to terrify.”
The Chief Justice of the King’s Bench agreed with that legal standard. The Chief Justice observed that the law was nearly obsolete from disuse: “this statute be almost gone in desuetudinem.” In 1686, “now there be a general connivance to gentlemen to ride armed for their security.” Yet even though the Statute of Northampton was hardly ever enforced, “where the crime shall appear to be malo animo it will come within the act.” (Malo animo= with bad intent.)
Thus, carrying arms was lawful if done with good intent, and unlawful if done with bad intent. This standard was reflected in an influential book a few years later, which linked the rights of ancient Britons and modern Englishmen. (James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica 639 (London, W. Rawlins, S. Roycroft & H. Sawbridge 1694) (Statute of Northampton allows persons to carry arms “in their own defence against Illegal Violence.”).
The major criminal law treatise of the 18th century and for several decades of the 19th century was William Hawkins “Pleas of the Crown” (1716). It said that the Statute of Northampton applied “where a Man arms himself with dangerous and unusual Weapons, in such a Manner as will naturally cause a Terror to the People.”
Quote:
So we have the standard that peaceable carry is lawful, and terrifying carry is unlawful. That is the standard which is advocated by the amicus brief which I joined, and which Professor Satia criticizes. She writes that:
This is not an accurate description of our brief. First, we never claimed that the Statute of Northampton was “inconsistently applied.” Rather, we argued that the Statute “was interpreted” so as to apply only to carrying “in such a manner as would cause fear or terror in the populace.”Quote:
The amicus brief by Kopel et al. paints a picture of widespread gun carrying incongruous with this well-established history. The authors invoke the 1686 acquittal of the gun-toting Sir John Knight as evidence that the 1328 statute was inconsistently applied, but Patrick J. Charles, the award-winning historian for Air Force Special Operations Command, has shown that Joyce Malcolm (one of the brief’s authors) created this finding “out of thin air.” In fact, Knight was acquitted because he was armed while cloaked with government authority. In an era of rapid urban growth, before state provision of police, the wealthy and noble fulfilled the role of informal police.
Second, our legal argument, as discussed above, was based on the case reports of the Chief Justice’s explication of the law, and on subsequent law books which restated the rule. The fact that the jury acquitted Knight was simply because the jury did not think that Knight had done what the prosecutor alleged: carrying arms “to terrify the King’s subjects.” A diary written by a contemporary, and published in 1857, recounted that when Knight was “tried by a jury of his own city, that knew him well, he was acquitted, not thinking he did it with any ill design.” (Narcissus Luttrell, “A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714″, vol. 1, p. 380 (1857).)
A few more paragraphs here @ the WP
On path, on glide slope. Guy obviously stays on point like a laser beam. Asks the same questions over and over to which they can't answer without giving away the fraud, they have jurisdiction only because " they say so".
Obviously read Mark Stevens somewhere along the way.
Lufkin Division DOJ attorneys reappear after 174 days, falsify the record; Federal-jurisdiction Achilles’ heel confirmed
https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.c...eel-confirmed/
After almost six months of silence (since September 2, 2015), counsel for plaintiff United States file on February 23, 2016, a response (hyperlinked below) to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection to the magistrate judge’s January 22, 2016, report and recommendation.
Petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation because it omitted mention of Petitioner’s unresolved September 14, 2015, challenge of the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority to exercise territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and September 30, 2015, demand for dismissal for lack of constitutional authority.
All United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States District Judges and Magistrate Judges work for the same for-profit corporate employer, the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, a.k.a. “United States” (28 U.S.C. 3002(15))—and the Lufkin Court is just another legislative-branch corporate debt-collection forum (28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure) masquerading as a judicial-branch Article III constitutional court.
Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations are fatal to this and every other Federal lawsuit within the Union.
United States’ solution to the contents of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”
Like the magistrate’s report and recommendation, United States’ February 23, 2016, response is devoid of mention of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.
Three stages of truth
“Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In the first it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, in the third it is regarded as self-evident.”[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, 1818.
District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees have long since ceased ridiculing what Petitioner has to say.
They are too terrified of it to mention it.
By Schopenhauer’s standard, this matter is now at opposition-stage.
District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees are opposing the contents of Petitioner’s filings by refusing to admit of their existence and attempting to denigrate the source thereof, i.e., Petitioner, with ad hominem attacks consisting of falsehoods that paint Petitioner as a lunatic, in the hope that such “official” statements will dissuade the reader from choosing to investigate the matter personally and reconcile the condemnations of Petitioner with the actual record of the case.
Such fabrications are easily invalidated because they have no basis in fact.
Beginning of the end of the Hoax of Federal Territorial and Personal Jurisdiction
Sorry, but that crack they see there in the dam, is not going to go away by pretending it does not exist.
Whatever happens in this case will only accelerate the inevitable.
The genie is out of the bottle.
And he is not going back in.
It is only a matter of time.
Too bad none of the principals in the San Bernardino-Apple iPhone case know the right question[2] to ask.
Notwithstanding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit a reply to United States’ February 23, 2016, response to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection: Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(2) provides that the Lufkin Court must take judicial notice of certain facts if Petitioner requests it and supplies the necessary information—which Petitioner has done.
United States’ Response to Petitioner’s Objection to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, February 23, 2016
Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 24, 2016
Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 25, 2016
* * * *
[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, quoted in Robert I. Fitzhenry, The Harper Book of Quotations, 3rd ed. (HarperCollins Publishers: New York, 1993), p. 451, quoted in Garson O’Toole, PhD, Quote Investigator, “In a Time of Universal Deceit — Telling the Truth Is a Revolutionary Act,” www.quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/24/truth-revolutionary/.
[2] “What is the constitutional authority that gives this Federal court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction over property located in San Bernardino County, California?”
Judge ruled against Trowbridge, denied all motions not ruled on case closed for appeal purposes.
http://losthorizons.com/MidEditionUpdate.htm#1c
Serendipitous Find
WHILE DOING SOME RESEARCH FOR YET ANOTHER ARTICLE on misunderstandings of jurisdictional aspects of the income tax, I came across a Supreme Court ruling from a couple of decades back that I'd never read before. Happily, it proves to contain very useful information that ought to help debunk another batch of infectious misunderstandings long-embedded in certain segments of the "tax honesty" community-- the "strawman", "everyone is presumed to be a corporation by the state", "income only means corporate profit" and "ALL CAPS" myths (all of which are intertwined with each other in one complex way or another).
I found this ruling cited in the opinion of the district court judge making an early partial judgment against John Trowbridge in what Trowbridge has called "The Lufkin Case" and which will be the subject of that upcoming article. (The final judgment in the case was issued 11 days ago.)
While explaining why summary judgment was found in the government's favor in regard to two corporations apparently owned by the other Trowbridge, the judge points out that under the federal rules, any kind of artificial person MUST be represented by an attorney in order to have standing as either plaintiff or defendant. It is because this was not done that summary judgment was issued for the government against these two defendants, who effectively never showed up and offered no defense.
The case to which the judge cites is Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993), which makes the following observation:
"It has been the law for the better part of two centuries, for example, that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 829 (1824); see Turner v. American Bar Assn., 407 F. Supp. 451, 476 (ND Tex., 1975) (citing the "long line of cases" from 1824 to the present holding that a corporation may only be represented by licensed counsel), affirmance order sub nom. Taylor v. Montgomery, 539 F. 2d 715 (CA7 1976), and aff'd sub nom. Pilla v. American Bar Assn., 542 F. 2d 56 (CA8 1976)."Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (This is also a great case for making clear that "individual" means "natural person", by the way.)
A pretty straightforward debunk of the nonsensical assertion that everyone in a federal court is presumed to be a corporation (i.e., those captive to the "ALL-CAPS" nonsense-- long-since thoroughly-debunked here; the "tax only falls on corporate profits" nonsense-- long-since debunked here; and the "strawman" nonsense-- long-since debunked here). Those who have fallen prey to these various flavors of nonsense ought to take careful note.
Plainly, if any of this stuff which they have clung-to and striven to spread like a virus were true, every legal contest in which they acted pro se (which is pretty much all of them) or any in which they observed anyone acting pro se, would have ended with the same simple ruling issued against Trowbridge in this case-- that is, that the defendant lost by default for having never shown up, legally speaking.
Or, to put it another way, not one of these pro se litigants would have been allowed to proceed in prosecuting or defending their cases, if they were all being presumed to be corporations in order to be taxed, or to be dealt with by the government in any fashion, as the various nonsense theories argue. Every one of them coming into court "pro se" would be told they must have a licensed attorney represent them. Where they are defendants, the court would invariably appoint an attorney, and refuse to allow self-representation (making the "Faretta" ruling and doctrine an absurdity, of course, but at this point, who's counting...).
Of course, none of these things have ever happened (except where, as in this "Lufkin" case, actual corporations WERE involved, and were accordingly deemed to have offered no defense due to no attorney acting on their behalf, per this rule). So, anyone harboring (and promoting) these foolishnesses really need to just deep-six their erroneous notions and learn the real truth about the law (andespecially about the income tax).
The happy fact is, if every person pulled off into the woods by "strawman" or "ALL CAPS" gibberish, or any of the rest of the troll-spawned distractions pushed out into the "tax honesty" community (for exactly the purpose of sending folks off on wild goose chases so they become harmless to the real problem) were to stay on the real field of battle and get busy with the real fight, we would win in a month. .
Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 67 Filed 03/03/16 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 591
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS LUFKIN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
§
Plaintiff, §
VS. §§
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.,
§
BRIGHT FUTURE INVESTMENTS, INC.,
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:14-CV-
1and IDEAL ABILITIES,
Defendants.
§§
This Final Judgment is entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 and the court’s Order Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, entered contemporaneously with this judgment.
It is ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff United States granting its motion for summary judgment against defendant Trowbridge. The United States' federal tax liens have attached to the Tyler County property, the Tyler County property belongs to Trowbridge and the United States may enforce its federal tax liens against such property and foreclose upon and sell the Tyler County Property using the sale proceeds to help satisfy the tax liabilities.
All relief not specifically granted herein is denied. All motions by either party not previously ruled on are DENIED. This case is CLOSED and this constitutes a final judgment for appeal purposes.
SIGNED this 3rd day of March, 2016.
FINAL JUDGMENT
[IMG]file:///page1image7360[/IMG] ____________________________________MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I thought these were VERY interesting at that site Monty.
http://losthorizons.com/tax/taximage...overLetter.jpg
http://losthorizons.com/tax/taximages2/QZfed2012.jpg
Thats a hendrickson CtC return. Its now catching anyone using that method a 5,000.00 penalty. Hendrickson who developed that method lost his court case and went to prison....now I believe his wife is currently in prison over this method. Theres a few others who have been convicted and sent to prison.