I don't see how confirmation that a fiction must be represented in any debunks the strawman. It does appear to confirm it doesn't it? That there are different planes of jurisdiction. I think this person confuses diatribe with debunking.
But the conclusion appears to be correct. The party doesn't seem to have had the right standing for the outcome they wanted.
I filed amended returns for 2005, 2006 & 2007 stating I wasn't engaged in a trade or business as defined by relevant US tax law. They refunded everthing I had paid in. They denied my 2004 amended return because I was 4 months outside their 3 year window per IRS regulations. They told me I could sue them since the statute of limitations is 6 years. From 2008 through 2014 I filed corrected 1099s and submitted them with the requisite transmittal form 1096 and a statement I was not engaged in a trade or business pefrorming the functions of a public office. I didn't have W-2s because I was self employed.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ares
I thought it sounded pretty similar to the method that you used. Which could be used as a good argument for revoking ones signed W-2.Quote:
Originally Posted by 7th trump
I've also found a number of court cases ruling against such individuals:
An argument linked to the meaning of the words "includes" and "including" is the argument that for Federal income tax purposes, the term "employee" under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c) does not include a regular, private-sector employee. The courts have uniformly rejected this argument. The text of section 3401(c), which deals only with the employer's withholding requirements and not with the employee's requirement to report Internal Revenue Code section 61 compensation for personal services (whether called wages, salaries, or any other term), is as follows:
For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.[16]
In Sullivan v. United States, taxpayer Grant W. Sullivan argued that he had not received “wages” and was not an “employee” under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled against Sullivan, stating:
To the extent Sullivan argues that he received no “wages” in 1983 because he was not an “employee” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §3401(c), that contention is meritless. Section 3401(c), which relates to income tax withholding, indicates that the definition of “employee” includes government officers and employees, elected officials, and corporate officers. The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein.[17]
In United States v. Ferguson, taxpayer Joy Ferguson argued that she was not an “employee” under section 3401(c), and that she therefore could not have “wages.” The court ruled against her, stating:
The core of the dispute before the court is Ferguson's assertion that she was not an “employee” as defined by §3401(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore did not earn any "wages." [footnote omitted] As such, she argues that her Form 1040 and Form 4862 accurately reported her wages as zero. As noted by the government, Ferguson's interpretation of §3401(c) has been considered and rejected numerous times by many courts. This Court would agree with the overwhelming precedent on this issue, Ferguson's argument that she is not an employee as defined by §3401(c) is frivolous.[18]
In Luesse v. United States, taxpayer Chell C. Luesse of St. Louis Park, Minnesota, argued that he received no “wages” because he was not an “employee” under section 3401(c). The court ruled against Mr. Luesse.[19]
In Richey v. Stewart, the court stated:
Another familiar argument from Mr. Richey [the taxpayer] is that he is not an employee under the terms of the Internal Revenue Code, citing Section 3401(c), which states that the term “employee” includes government employees. What Mr. Richey misapprises in his reading of the statute is the inclusionary nature of the language. The Code does not exclude all other persons from taxation who are not government employees.[20]
In United States v. Charboneau, the court stated:
[ . . . ] Ms. Charboneau contends that the Code's definitions of "wage income" and "self employment income" only include income derived from individuals who work for the federal government, or whose work involves that of "the performance of the functions of a public office." Because Ms. Charboneau never worked for any federal or state government during the tax years in question, she claims that the IRS cannot make any tax assessments against her.
This nonsensical argument is belied by the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code itself. For example, 26 U.S.C. §3401 defines wages as "all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer...." 26 U.S.C. §3401(a) (emphasis added). The statute then goes on to define various exceptions to this broad definition of wages in certain categories of private employment, such as in the agricultural and domestic service fields, newspaper delivery, the clergy, and for wages incurred by individuals working for employers "other than the United States or an agency therof" within Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States. There is nothing in the statute limiting "wages" to solely publicly derived income. [footnotes omitted]
Ms. Charboneau, however, focuses on §3401(c), which states that:
the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.
26 U.S.C. §3401(c). Setting aside the last sentence of this provision, which clearly states that officers of private corporations are considered employees for purposes of determining wages, it is obvious that within the context of this statute that the word "includes" is a term of enlargement, not of limitation, and the reference to certain public officers and employees was not intended to exclude all others. See also Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 112-13 (1959) (concluding that similar provision in 26 U.S.C. §6331 dealing with levies on salaries and wages does not exclude wages of private citizens); Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813,815 ("[Section 3401(c)] does not purport to limit withholding to persons listed therein"); United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (the Internal Revenue Code definition of “employee” in 26 U.S.C. §3401 does not exclude privately employed wage earners);. In addition, 26 U.S.C. §7701, which provides the definitions of terms used throughout the Internal Revenue Code, states that the "terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. §7701(c).[21]
In McCoy v. United States, the court stated:
McCoy argues she should not have to pay taxes for 1996-98 because under Code Section 3401 she was not an “employee” which she contends is defined as an elected or appointed employee or official of the federal government. McCoy clearly misconstrues Section 3401(c). The definition of “employee” includes private-sector employees, employees of the federal government, as well as elected and appointed officials. The very language of the Code is inclusive, not limited to the examples of included persons.[22]
Joseph Alan Fennell's argument — that the compensation he received in exchange for "non-federally privileged private sector labor" was not taxable—was rejected by the United States Tax Court.[23] Fennell appealed his Tax Court loss, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that Fennell's challenges were "frivolous on the merits in any event."[24] Similarly, in United States v. Buras, the argument that the taxpayer can be subject to the federal income tax only if he benefits from a "privilege extended by a government agency" was ruled to be without merit.[25] See also Olson v. United States[26] and Nichols v. United States.[27]
A penalty of $1,000 under Internal Revenue Code section 6673 was imposed by the U.S. Tax Court on Patrick Michael Mooney for presenting frivolous arguments. The court rejected his argument that his wages earned from a private employer were not taxable. The court also rejected his argument that the term "employee" was limited to "someone performing the functions of a public office."[28]
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that an argument by Robert S. Morse that his income was not subject to federal taxation because it was derived from employment in the "private sector" was frivolous, and that Morse was liable for monetary sanctions, under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for making a frivolous argument.[29]
The argument that only certain types of taxpayers (such as only Federal government employees, corporations, nonresident aliens, residents of the District of Columbia, or residents of Federal territories) are subject to income tax and employment tax, and variations of this argument, have been officially identified as legally frivolous Federal tax return positions for purposes of the $5,000 frivolous tax return penalty imposed under Internal Revenue Code section 6702(a)
Does that mean it's because they did not revoke their signed W-2? Or they signed one to begin with and are trying to argue after the fact? I haven't looked into all of the cases yet as I just found them.
Hendricksons wife is in prison for contempt of court for refusing to change her tax return permthe judge's orders.Quote:
Originally Posted by 7th trump
Yeah there's my crux, I have a signed W-2 with my "employer".Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
Hendricksons wife is in prison for contempt of court for refusing to change her tax return per the judge's orders.Quote:
Originally Posted by 7th trump
Tell him you want to cancel the W-4 and give him a signed W-8 BE. (Foreign to the UNITED STATES aka "District of Columbia).Quote:
Originally Posted by Ares
Yeah, I'm still trying to get the balls to do that..... :)Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
I work for a multi-national tech company and get paid well doing it and don't want to risk being told "see ya"..
From Section 19 http://freedom-school.com/citizenshi...20Citizens.%92
In the Montello case, above, the U.S. Supreme Court, puts its cachet to this view:
"...The court [the Supreme Court of the State] also considered that the word 'including' was used as a word of enlargement, the learned court being of opinion that such was its ordinary sense. With this we cannot concur. It is its exceptional sense, as the dictionaries and cases indicate. We may concede to 'and' the additive power attributed to it. It gives in connection with 'including' a quality to the grant of 110,000 acres which it would not have had,-the quality of selection from the saline lands of the state. And that such quality would not exist unless expressly conferred we do not understand is controverted. Indeed, it cannot be controverted...."
Some 80 court cases have chosen the restrictive meaning of ‘includes,’ etc., such as this one last example:
Includes is a word of limitation. Where a general term in Statute is followed by the word ‘including’ the primary import of specific words following quoted words is to indicate restriction rather than enlargement. (Powers ex rel Dovon v. Charron R.I., 135 A. 2nd829)
To elucidate more clearly the 1961 definition, above: ‘includes’ and ‘including’ shall not be deemed to include things not enumerated, unless they are in the same general class. For instance, ‘State,’ in 26 USC 7701(10): "The term ‘State’ shall be construed to include the District of Columbia…" Here, "the District of Columbia," without any doubt, is not "in the same general class," category, or genus as Missouri or California—it is a federal "State." The District of Columbia has a totally different jurisdictional set up than a union state. It is under the absolute jurisdiction of the ‘U.S.,’ and the states are not. Only in the federal zone does the U.S. have jura summi imperii,right of supreme dominion, complete sovereignty.
At any rate, the judge denied all the unanswered filings because of lack of standing forbthe two corporations. That still leaves the question of having constitutional jurisdiction unanswered. Do you suppose the appeals court will address that issue? That was a 3 million dollar error.Quote:
Originally Posted by Glass
All I can tell you Monty is that social security "wages" (3121(a) "wages" [box 3 on the W2] are 3401(a) "wages" [box 1 on the W2].
So with this..............3401(a) "wages" does not leave out the enumerated Social Security earnings.Quote:
To elucidate more clearly the 1961 definition, above: ‘includes’ and ‘including’ shall not be deemed to include things not enumerated
The code is pretty simple once you get the "wrongs" Hendrickson put in your mind from reading his CtC book.
3401(a) is pretty straight forward to are deemed 3401(a) "wages".
Here Monty I'll show you using 3401(a) that all of Social Security "wages" are included in the 3401(a) "wages" definition except what Social Security excludes from 3121(a) "wages".
What you are going to find out is this. What "wages" (its actually occupations) Social Security excludes for the purpose of crediting your SS account are excluded from the 3401(a) "wage" definition.
3401(a) will actually tell you if certain agricultural [3121(g)] earnings are to be considered as 3121(a) "wages" then these 3121(a) "wages" are to be included in the 3401(a) "wage" definition.
Do you understand what (2) here is telling you?Quote:
(a) WagesFor purposes of this chapter, the term “wages” means all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include remuneration paid—
(ok Monty from this point forward..all these are excluded from 3401(a) "wages")
(1) for active service performed in a month for which such employee is entitled to the benefits of section 112 (relating to certain combat zone compensation of members of the Armed Forces of the United States) to the extent remuneration for such service is excludable from gross income under such section; or
(2) for agricultural labor (as defined in section 3121(g)) unless the remuneration paid for such labor is wages (as defined in section 3121(a)
First off 3401(a)(2) is telling that 3121(g) agricultural labor (occupation) is not included as 3401(a) "wages"....however if such 3121(g) agri labor remuneration is defined (or elected as) as 3121(a) "wages" (Social Security wages; box 3 on the W2) then all bets are off and this agri labor earnings are now deemed as 3401(a) "wages" and thus taxable under the Section 1 imposition.
Hope this helps you Monty because the "employee" and "trade or business" definitions really have no bearing on if you earn 3121(a) "wages". And while I'm at it here SS disqualifies most government employees from participating in SS because they already have another government retirement plan they use...so you cant argue the government employee angle.
And no Monty I dont use any method....I simply dont participate in SS to generate any "wages".
Ever wondered why box 1 (3401) and box 3 (3121) are always the same amount?
Its because 3121 and 3401 are one in the same.
Dont believe me...check a W2...any W2 that has one source of "employment" income ( as in you work one W4 job all year long and its all straight up hourly wages).....I'll bet 1 silver ounce both are identical.
And you know what stops the IRS dead in their tracks?
This stops the IRS dead in their tracks:
3121(a)
(a) Old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
My wages arent defined as 3121(a) because I'm not employed as defined. The IRS tried, but didnt succeed because they couldnt get around the fact my earning werent SS "wages" that must be in respect to 3121(b) "employment".Quote:
In addition to other taxes, there is hereby imposed on the income of every individual a tax equal to 6.2 percent of the wages (as defined in section 3121(a)) received by the individual with respect to employment (as defined in section 3121(b)) [1]
I dont participate in SS and thus my earnings arent "wages".
And theres no law on any books that says you must participate. In fact there's a regulation that says SS is voluntary...and I know why.....its because they cant force you to give up your Bill of Rights.
When you sign a W4 you sign it under penalty of Perjury to being a "US citizen"...a second class citizen having only privileges, not Rights.
They tried but when I mentioned to them they were trying to block me from accessing the Bill of Rights by perjury of being a US citizen...they said OK this meeting is over. I said "I know it is".
I didn't fell comfortable reading that guys material. I have heard about the Cracking the Code book but I thought that was written by someone else. I thought it was that Mary lady? Not even sure that name is right. How I kicked the butt of every government agency or something. Croft.
yes I would agree that employee / company officer status has little bearing on things. I've heard the story statutes only apply to government employees many times.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 7th trump
I have not signed a form W-4 since 2003. So I don't have any "wages". I don't sign W-9 forms.
I did however file Forms 1040 for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007,thinking I was required to. When I learned that W-4 and W-9 obligated me to pay Social Security I filed amended returns. They refunded my money.
edit: I still receive my Social Security pension.
See my post #134.Quote:
Originally Posted by 7th trump
They refunded your money because they didnt have any transmittal W3 info from the employer stating how much you contributed into SS. And those years you did file even though you didnt have a W4 active you weren't covered under SS like W4 people are.Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
The IRS will not fuck with you once you understand their game.
I understand all of that. I don't receive "wages". My Social Security account show $0.00 contributions for every year since 2005.Quote:
Originally Posted by 7th trump
Yeah I understand and they are probably giving you SS based on what you had already contributed into SS.Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
Yes, they are paying me based on 1956 - 2004. I get about $1600 dollars a monthQuote:
Originally Posted by 7th trump
Fuck I could live large on that now!Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
Citizenship is viewed as an unpaid office.Quote:
Originally Posted by Glass
I do. Like Ponce, I have no bills.Quote:
Originally Posted by Cebu_4_2
March 18 update.
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G Lufkin Judge awards judgment to United States; Petitioner files for temporary restraining order in District of Columbia
by supremecourtcase
There is, however, an automatic stay of 14 days before any execution may issue on a judgment (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62(a)).
On March 16, 2016, the 13th day following entry of the aforesaid memorandum order and final judgment, Petitioner filed, as plaintiff, against United States of America, as defendant, in United States District Court for the District of Columbia Case No. 1:16-cv-00506 BAH, a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at equity (not law), under equity rules, in order obtain that court’s assistance in preventing an injustice to Petitioner.
In addition to the verified complaint, Petitioner also filed an application (motion) for a temporary restraining order and a memorandum in support of that application (each is hyperlinked below). A proposed temporary restraining order (for the judge to sign and issue) is attached to the memorandum in support.
To correct a technical error in the caption of the verified complaint, Petitioner on March 18, 2016, filed an Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (hyperlinked below).
Here is a brief introduction to the subject of equity:
“EQUITY. 1. In its broadest and most general signification, this term denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men,—the rule of doing to all others as we desire them to do to us ; or, as it is expressed by Justinian, “to live honestly, to harm nobody, to render to every man his due.” Inst. 1, 1, 3. It is therefore the synonym of natural right or justice. But in this sense its obligation is ethical rather than jural,[1] and its discussion belongs to the sphere of morals. It is grounded in the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of positive law.
“2. In a more restricted sense, the word denotes equal and impartial justice as between two persons whose rights or claims are in conflict ; justice, that is, as ascertained by natural reason or ethical insight, but independent of the formulated body of law. This is not a technical meaning of the term, except insofar as courts which administer equity seek to discover it by the agencies above mentioned, or apply it beyond the strict lines of positive law. . . .” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891 (“Black’s 1st”), pp. 427–428.
“EQUITY. . . .
“. . . Rules and maxims. In the administration of the jurisdiction, there are certain rules and maxims which are of special significance.
“First. Equity having once had jurisdiction of a subject-matter because there was no remedy at law, or because the remedy is inadequate, does not lose the jurisdiction merely because the courts of law afterwards give the name or a similar relief.
“Second. Equity follows the law. This is true as a general maxim. Equity follows the law, except in relation to those matters which give a title to equitable relief because the rules of law would operate to sanction fraud or injustice in the particular case.
“Third. Between equal equities the law must prevail. . . .
“Fourth. Equality is equity . . .
“Fifth. He who seeks equity must do equity. A party cannot claim the interposition of the court for relief unless he will do what it is equitable should be done by him as a condition precedent to that relief. See the eleventh maxim, infra.
“Sixth. Equity considers that as done which ought to have been done. . . .
“Seventh. Equity will not permit a wrong without a remedy.
“Eighth. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.
“Ninth. Where equities are equal the first in time prevails—qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure.
“Tenth. Equity imputes an intention to perform an obligation.
“ Eleventh. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. . . .
“Twelfth. It is to the vigilant and not those who sleep upon their rights, that Equity leads assistance—vigilantibus et non dormientibus equitas subvenit.
“Thirteenth. Equity acts in personam[2] and not in rem.[3] As a result of this principle, jurisdiction of the person gives power to affect by the decree property outside the jurisdiction. . . .
“Fourteenth. Equity delights to do justice and not by halves.” [Emphasis in original.] John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), pp. 1057, 1062–1063.
“. . . In America, the federal courts have equity powers under the constitution, where an adequate remedy at law does not exist. . . . The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the same as that of the former court of chancery in England, is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the states . . .
“In the administration of that jurisdiction the federal courts are not to ‘look only to the statutes of congress. The principles of equity exist independently of, and anterior to, all congressional legislation, and the statutes are either enunciations of those principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases ; U. S. v. Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 20 Sup. Ct. 282, 50 L. Ed. 499 . . .’” Id., pp. 1064–1065.
Two of the remedies available at equity are injunction and declaratory judgment:
“injunction (in-jəngk-shən), n. A court order commanding or preventing an action. ● To get an injunction a complainant must show that there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and that an irreparable injury will result unless the relief is granted. . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999) (“Black’s 7th”), p. 788.
“DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. A declaratory judgment is one which simply declares the rights of the parties, or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done.” “Black’s 1st, p. 340.
Petitioner initially seeks a type of injunction called an ex parte injunction or temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction.
“ex parte[4] injunction. A preliminary injunction issued after the court has heard from only the moving party.” Black’s 7th, p. 788.
“RESTRAINING ORDER. An order in the nature of an injunction. . . . Black’s 1st, p. 1036.
“temporary restraining order. A court order preserving the status quo until a litigant’s application for a preliminary or permanent injunction can be heard. ● A temporary restraining order may sometimes be granted without notifying the opposing party in advance. — Abbr. TRO. — Often shortened to restraining order.” Id. at 1477.
“—Preliminary injunction. An injunction granted at the institution of a suit, to restrain the defendant from doing or continuing some act, the right to which is in dispute, and which may either be discharged or made perpetual, according to the result of the controversy, as soon as the rights of the parties are determined. . . .” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1910), p. 627.
“—Permanent injunction. One intended to remain in force until the final termination of the particular suit.” Id.
“—Perpetual injunction. . . . An injunction which finally disposes of the suit, and is indefinite in point in time.” Id.
As the reader will discover: The United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the only de jure[5] United States District Court in North America and the only one with the jurisdiction necessary to decide the controversy set forth in the amended complaint; every other purported United States District Court is a de facto[6] “court” which has no lawful existence under the Constitution.
As of this post, March 18, 2016, a file-stamped copy of court filings is not available.
The legal and equitable process involved in this action at equity is as follows:
Lufkin Court's Memorandum Order, March 3, 2016
Lufkin Court's Final Judgment, March 3, 2016
Petitioner's Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, March 18, 2016
Petitioner's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016
Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016
* * * *
[1] JURAL. Founded in law ; organized upon the basis of a fundamental law, and existing for the recognition and protection of rights. . . . Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 661.
[2] In personam (in pər-soh-nam), adj. [Latin “against a person”] Involving or determining the personal rights and interests of the parties. — Also termed personal. . . . Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 795.
[3] In rem (in rem), adj. [Latin “against a thing”] Involving or determining the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of personas generally with respect to that thing. — Also termed impersonal. . . . Id. at 797.
[4] ex parte [(eks pahr-tee)], adj. Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested <an ex parte hearing> <an ex parte injunction> . Black’s 7th, p. 597.
[5] DE JURE. Of right ; legitimate ; lawful. In this sense it is the contrary of de facto, (which see.) . . . Black’s 1st , p. 328.
[6] DE FACTO. In fact, in deed, actually. This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which exists actually and must be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is illegal or illegitimate. In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. . . Id. at 325.
supremecourtcase | March 18, 2016 at 13:33 | Categories: Uncategorized |
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Dismissed with prejudice persuant to:28 U.S. Code § 1915 - Proceedings in forma pauperis
TROWBRIDGE v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
District Of Columbia District Court Judge: Beryl A Howell Case #: 1:16-cv-00506 Nature of Suit 220 Real Property - Foreclosure Cause 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)
Case Filed: Mar 16, 2016 Terminated: Mar 22, 2016
Docket as of: Thursday Mar 24, 2016 12:05 AM EDT
Tuesday, March 22, 2016 5 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/pn...AAAElFTkSuQmCC order.OrderTue 11:58 AMMEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING this case, with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and QUASHING the summonses previously issued to the plaintiff. See Order for further details. The Clerk is directed to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell on March 22, 2016. (lcbah2)Friday, March 18, 2016 4 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/pn...AAAElFTkSuQmCC cmpAmended ComplaintFri 3:02 PMAMENDED COMPLAINT against UNITED STATES OF AMERICA filed by JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.(zrdj)Thursday, March 17, 2016 Wednesday, March 16, 2016 3 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/pn...AAAElFTkSuQmCC serviceSummons Returned Executed as to U.S. Attorney General Summons Returned Executed as to US AttorneyThu 11:00 AMRETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 3/16/2016., RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 3/16/2016. ( Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 5/15/2016.) (zrdj)2 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/pn...AAAElFTkSuQmCC motionTemporary Restraining Order Show Cause Preliminary InjunctionWed 3:50 PMMOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, MOTION for Order to Show Cause, MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR(jf)Att: 1 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/pn...AAAElFTkSuQmCC Exhibit, Att: 2 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/pn...AAAElFTkSuQmCC Text of Proposed Order 1 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/pn...AAAElFTkSuQmCC cmpComplaintWed 3:47 PMCOMPLAINT against UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ( Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 46160765559) filed by JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.(jf)Att: 1 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/pn...AAAElFTkSuQmCC Civil Cover Sheet
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G DC Judge rubber-stamps Lufkin judgment; Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title
by supremecourtcase
The correct answer to this question signals the end of the legislative tribunals known as United States District Courts—except for the only three de jure United States District Courts in existence: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
For Judge Howell to cop to the indisputable legislative fact that the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress (Federal territory only) and does not extend into the Union, would be to invalidate the Lufkin Judge’s decision—but more importantly, would undo over 150 years of legislative-branch mischief and lead, ultimately, to the demise of the most elaborately constructed monolith of institutionalized crime in world history: the contemporary so-called Federal Government, i.e., the terrain of the District of Columbia,[1] i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation,[2] i.e., the “United States,”[3] located in the District of Columbia[4] and doing business as “United States™”[5] and “United States®.”[6]
A weighty burden for Ms. Howell to bear, we all can agree.
Another sobering influence on Judge Howell’s handling of Petitioner’s filing would be the fate of the last bench officer to rule against the nature of the private Federal Reserve,[7]Justice of the Peace Martin V. Mahoney in the Credit River Township Case,[8] Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968: Mahoney was poisoned thereafter and died of a complication, aspiration of vomitus, August 22, 1969, at the age of 54.[9]
Since 1969, no more such adverse judgments.
It is easy to see that the Honorable Beryl A. Howell had ample motivation to deny Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order, evade settling the controversy submitted by Petitioner, falsify the record, and dismiss Petitioner’s complaint (entries hyperlinked infra).
Judge Howell must have been concerned about Petitioner, however—because she tipped her hand and divulged the ultimate-but-frivolous[10] rationalization used by the Federal judiciary and attorneys of the United States Department of Justice to justify usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction throughout the Union in their joint efforts to exact what is called “income tax” from the American People; a theory best described as “subject-matter jurisdiction conveys territorial jurisdiction.”
Judge Howell propounds on page 4, paragraph 2 of her Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint (hyperlinked infra) by way of circumlocution and inference, that the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, is Article 1 § 8(1).
If it were that simple, it seems the Lufkin Judge and Lufkin Magistrate would have said the same thing instead of going silent and stonewalling the matter for six months.
For the benefit of anyone who might be duped by such a patently absurd argument, let us identify the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and the extent to which they obtain.
Jurisdiction 101
The American People on September 17, 1787, ordain and establish the Constitution and Congress on March 4, 1789, implement it.
The Constitution confers upon Congress certain powers of legislation in certain geographic areas.
Those powers of legislation give executive-branch and judicial-branch officers the capacity to take jurisdiction in those geographic areas and execute and declare, respectively, the laws enacted by Congress.
It is not too complicated.[11]
But the loyalty of congressmen goes to the highest bidder, and until arrival of the private Federal Reserve in 1913, the principals of its parent bank, the private Bank of England (inc. July 27, 1694; first government-sanctioned fractional-reserve-banking institution), beginning circa mid-19th century, dictate to Congress—and the nature of jurisdiction is cunningly perverted in form through stealth legislation and redefinition of a key common noun and proper noun in the Constitution, “State” and “United States,” so as to give each a constitutionally opposite statutory meaning.
The Federal Reserve Act (Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913) is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de Rothschild[12] (1842–1918), director of the private Bank of England.
The Federal Reserve Act is implemented by Baron Rothschild’s straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg,[13] a German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911 specifically for this purpose (the New York Times dubs Warburg “Father of the Federal Reserve”[14]).
Each of the 12 private regional Federal Reserve banks is a private joint-stock company instituted under aegis of the novel District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, inc. February 21, 1871 (fns. 1 and 2), and patterned by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after its parent bank, the private Bank of England.[15]
The elephant in the room
- “A tax is a demand of sovereignty . . . State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall (U. S.) 278, 21 L. Ed. 146.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 3220.
The sovereign authority throughout the Union is the American People[16]; the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress.[17]
The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress, is providing legislation for the laying and collection of tax (income tax) without the territory over which they are sovereign, in geographic area occupied by another sovereign, the American People.
That Congress appears to be demanding income tax of the joint tenants in the sovereignty (the American People) residing throughout the Union means either that Congress is usurping exercise of territorial and personal legislation outside their territory or what we know as “income tax” is not actually a tax.
- “A tax is not a debt . . . New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 27 Sup. Ct. 137, 51 L. Ed. 284 ; and has none of the incidents of a debt ; 21 Harv L. Rev. 283 ; technically it is not a debt . . .” Id.
All alleged Federal income tax liability is classified as debt, 28 U.S.C. 3002(3), and all Federal income-tax cases, civil and criminal, are prosecuted under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.
What is called “income tax” ultimately is not a tax per se but a commercial penalty for the use of private property of the Federal Reserve Bank known as Federal Reserve Notes[18](“FRNs”).
The alleged income-tax liability generated from multiple transactions involving the same FRN (called velocity of money) will exceed the face value of the FRN after a few transactions.
- “No tax is valid which is not laid for a public purpose ; Citizens’ S. & L. Ass’n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. Ed. 455, where it was said that there are limitations on the power of the three branches of government which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments—implied reservations of individual rights without which the social compact could not exist, and among these is that taxation must be for a public purpose ; such are (according to Cooley, Tax. 18) to preserve the public order ; to make compensation to public officers, etc. ; to erect, etc. public buildings ; to pay the expenses of legislation and of administering the laws, etc. ; also, to provide secular instruction ; Colley, Tax. 2d ed. 119–124 ; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 81, 26 L. Ed. 658 . . .” Id. at 3221.
No collection of what is called income tax goes toward a public purpose; all collections of income tax are used for a private purpose, i.e., to pay interest on the so-called national debt incurred by Congress and owed to the private Federal Reserve; to wit:
“Resistance to additional income taxes would be even more widespread if people were aware that . . . 100 percent of what is collected is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.
Banks do not pay income tax; to wit:
“Sec. 7. . . . Tax exemption. Federal reserve banks, including the capital stock and surplus therein, and the income derived therefrom shall be exempt from Federal, State, and local taxation, except taxes upon real estate.” Federal Reserve Act, H. R. 7837, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913.
All collections of income tax paid to the private Federal Reserve are retired from circulation the same way they are created by banks in the so-called loan process—by computer-keypad keystroke, in exchange for the borrower’s promise-to-pay; to wit:
“What they [banks] do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the borrowers’ transaction [checking or credit-card] accounts.” Modern Money Mechanics: A Workbook on Bank Reserves and Deposit Expansion, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1994, pp. 3–6.
“If it [a bank] makes loans, it will simply credit the checking accounts of the borrowers. . . . [N]ew money, in the form of additional checkable deposits, will be “created.” The Federal Reserve Today: Fed Funds Rate, Discount Rate, 11th ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1994, p. 21.
“[M]oney exists simply as a bookkeeping entry at a bank . . .” The Story of Money, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009, p. 17.
“[W]hen a bank makes a loan, it simply adds to the borrower’s deposit account in the bank by the amount of the loan. This money is not taken from anyone else’s deposit; it was not previously paid in to the bank by anyone. It’s new money, created by the bank for the use of the borrower.” Robert B. Anderson, quoted in U.S. News & World Report, “How Much Will Your Dollar Buy – Interview with Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson,” August 31, 1959, pp. 68–69.
The purpose of income tax is to remove from circulation a substantial portion of the digits of credit “loaned” into circulation by banks by bookkeeping entry in the so-called loan process.
Unless a significant amount of the digits “loaned” into circulation by the banks are collected by the IRS in the form of FRNs from (1) payments of income tax, (2) seizure and sale of real and personal property, and (3) seizure of bank accounts and paychecks and thereafter gifted or bequeathed (31 U.S.C. 321(d)(1) and (2)) to a non-U.S. Government employee and proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve, i.e., the Secretary of the Treasury,[19] for transmittal to the private Federal Reserve as payments of interest on the national debt and thereupon retired from circulation, inflation skyrockets, prices go through the roof, and the fraudulent nature of the fractional-reserve banking system of the private Federal Reserve can be concealed no longer.[20]
Hence, the need to select and screen and vet and test and groom and own and control every single United States District Judge, Magistrate Judge, and Appeals Judge and Supreme Court Justice and United States Attorney and Assistant United States Attorney.
Only two kinds of taxes: direct or indirect
Article 1 § 8(1) of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;”
This division of taxation into two classes, i.e., (1) direct taxes, called taxes, and (2) indirect taxes, called duties, imposts and excises, is recognized throughout the Constitution, Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 24 S.Ct. 305, 48 L.Ed. 481.
“Taxes are classified as direct, which includes ‘those which are assessed upon the property, person, business, income, etc. of those who pay them ; and indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market price of the commodity.’ Cooley, Tax. 61. The latter includes duties, imposts and excises ; Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S. 557, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759 . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3220, s.v. “Tax.”
There is nothing wrong with direct taxes per se, so long as they are apportioned, i.e., divided and assigned in proportion, as provided in pertinent part of Article 1 § 2(3) of the Constitution; to wit:
“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . .”
Income tax, which is not apportioned, to any reasonable man is clearly a direct tax on supreme political authority in America, the American People (fn. 15), and therefore unconstitutional; yet today income tax is regarded by government as an excise, or indirect tax, without the need to be apportioned, and therefore constitutional.
The only way such absurdities can come to pass is by ownership and control of those making, declaring, and executing the law.
All the chaos arrived with the Federal Reserve Act.
Congress transmute Americans into corporately colored franchisees
The only Americans who allegedly are liable to income tax are called individuals (26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals).
The statutory term “individual” is defined at 5 U.S.C. 552a Records maintained on individuals as follows:
“(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—
“. . . (2) the term ‘individual’ means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;”
The phrase “citizen of the United States” means resident of the District of Columbia (seeMemorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45).
The phrase “alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” means non-resident of the District of Columbia who appears to have made an election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia (Id. at 15–17, paragraphs 46–51).
The statutory so-called individual is an artificial person, a creature of the law in the nature of a corporation and, like a corporation, designated by a name written in ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS (style of writing a proper noun for which the rules of English grammar make no provision).[21]
A corporation is a franchise; to wit:
“FRAN′CHISE, n. . . . A particular privilege or right granted by a prince or sovereign to an individual, or to a number of persons; as the right to be a body corporate with perpetual succession . . .” Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (S. Converse: New York, 1828), Vol. I, s.v. “Franchise.”
“FRANCHISE. . . . A franchise is privilege or immunity of a public nature, which cannot be exercised without legislative grant. To be a corporation is a franchise. The various powers conferred upon corporations are franchises.
“The word ‘franchise’ has various significations, both in a legal and popular sense. A corporation is itself a franchise belonging to the members of a corporation, and the corporation, itself a franchise, may hold other franchises. So, also, the different powers of a corporation, such as the right to hold and dispose of property, are its franchises. In a popular sense, the political rights of subjects and citizens are franchises, such as the right of suffrage, etc.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 515.
The right to receive Social Security retirement or survivor benefits and the right to vote for the president of the United States (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation) are political rights and franchises conferred by the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress, a.k.a. “Congress of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 3002(2), i.e., the Congress of a Federal corporation, id. at 3002(15), the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.
Nature of so-called individual income tax
“The federal corporation tax act (August 5, 1909)provided that every corporation for profit . . . engaged in business in any state should be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to carrying-on or doing business by such corporation . . . upon the entire net income . . . received by it from all sources. This act was held valid in Flint v. Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312 (followed in McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842), as being an impost or excise on the doing of business and not a direct tax.
“It was also there held that it complies with the provision for uniformity throughout the United States . . . and that the tax is properly measured by the entire income of the companies subject to it . . .
“. . . It [the corporation income tax] is an excise tax measured by the corporate income ; Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. —; imposed upon the doing of business and not upon the franchises or property of the corporation ; McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842. . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3229.
The only kind of income tax that is not a direct tax but an indirect tax and excise on the income, from whatever source derived, of a franchisee, is what modernly is known as "income tax."
That the post-19th century Supreme Court has ruled that the personal income tax on American men and women is an excise is proof that Government treats of every American People as an ALL-CAPITAL LETTER franchise, i.e., an individual: artificial person and creature of the law in the nature of a corporation who, like all franchises, exists by privilege conferred by the state (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation).
All so-called State (District of Columbia) tax codes draw substantially (almost exclusively) from the Internal Revenue Code for their respective provisions and deal strictly with franchisees, i.e. individuals (citizens of the United States, 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(2), i.e., residents of the District of Columbia, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45) and corporations.
For example, the State of California Franchise Tax Board taxes only individuals and corporations who reside or are doing business in the District of Columbia.
The California Revenue and Taxation Code provides, in pertinent part, that California is neither a statutory State nor part of the statutory geographical United States but a foreign country thereto; to wit:
“17017. ‘United States,’ when used in a geographical sense, includes the states, the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.
"17018. 'State' includes the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.
“17019. ‘Foreign country’ means any jurisdiction other than one embraced within the United States.”
For the meaning of the word “includes” in the above code citations, see Rule 6, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, of the rules of statutory construction, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 3, paragraph 6.
The 16th Amendment provides for an excise tax on franchisees
The Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of February 3, 1913, provides:
“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”
The 16th Amendment provides that Congress shall have power to lay and collect an indirect tax, an excise, on incomes, from whatever source derived, of franchisees residing or doing business in one of the several statutory States of February 3, 1913: the District of Columbia, Porto Rico (changed to Puerto Rico in 1932) Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Midway Atoll, and the Panama Canal Zone and no other thing, id. at 8, paragraph 23.
M.O. of all Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys
Using the absurd and constitutionally opposite meaning of the definition of the novel statutory terms “State” and “United States” provided by Congress in the United States Code as complete justification: Every Federal bench officer and attorney of the United States Department of Justice follow the policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny” when confronted with the actual-but-fraudulent definition and meaning of said statutory terms and, remaining silent, pretend by inference that such citations are nonsensical (“frivolous”) and that “State” and “United States” mean what essentially every non-insider believes they mean: the several commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959.
Using their “secret clubhouse” knowledge of the actual statutory meaning of “State” and “United States,” they casually toss these terms around like any other American would, but silently weave a web of statutory deceit so incomprehensible to unwitting victims and so matter-of-fact to the perpetrator, to be able to justify, with confidence, that their prey will never be able to understand what is happening, much less convince anyone else of the injustice.
In the Lufkin Division Civil Action, Petitioner conceded everything except jurisdiction in Petitioner’s answer to the complaint at the outset of the proceedings; to wit:
“Defendant hereby confesses the truth of the facts recited in the instant Complaint and admits the apparent truth of Plaintiff’s allegations and right of action . . .” Defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s Amended Answer, Dkt. #10, p. 1.
From the beginning Petitioner has addressed only the issue of jurisdiction.
Every slur, allegation, and denigration of Petitioner by the Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys is the Lufkin Division Civil Action is contrived and fabricated—but bystanders reading the words of these officers would not know this unless they were to do an exhaustive inspection of the record and realize that Petitioner never argues about anything or makes any claim—rather only recites the law, presents the facts, refers to the evidence, and demands proof of jurisdiction or constitutional authority—and that such snide remarks are falsehoods.
Institutionalized crime
Every writing filed by the DOJ attorneys or entered by the Lufkin Judge, Lufkin Magistrate, or District of Columbia Judge is devoid of mention of the following material facts and failures: (1) Petitioner’s demand for the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority, (2) United States’ failure to produce such authority despite blackletter-law obligation to do so, (3) allegation of the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority in Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, or (4) United States’ failure to oppose said motion to dismiss.
The District of Columbia Judge, Beryl A. Howell, falsely declared that the Lufkin Judge “considered and rejected” the above material facts and material failures in his ruling against Petitioner—despite no evidence of either in the Lufkin Record; to wit:
“[T]he plaintiff’s [Petitioner John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s] Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1916 . . . . because the plaintiff’s present claim that the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Texas lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s real property was considered and rejected in the prior action between the parties, in which the defendant [United States] prevailed . . .” United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell’s Memorandum and Order of March 22, 2016, p. 3 (hyperlinked below).
People who lie as a way of life cannot be respected or trusted with anything; their word is like garbage.
Congress is the most despised class in America for good reason[22]—and the Federal judiciary and United States Department of Justice, in connivance therewith, are populated almost exclusively by active or latent pathological liars and marauders.
The Houston and Lufkin Records prove it.
The nature of their job (debt collectors working to ensure the longevity of the fraudulent private Federal Reserve) requires it.
Statute law vs. commercial law
What is actually going on in the Lufkin Division Civil Action is not law per se but commerce.
It only appears to be a legal proceeding.
The Lufkin Court is a for-profit District of Columbia commercial debt-collection forum.
The real party of interest is the Department of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Treasury (non-U.S. Government employee, fn. 18) is the proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve.
Commercial principles underlie everything that is happening in the Lufkin Division Civil Action.
Commerce and the common law afford more effective ways to deal with a Federal summons and complaint than the filing of an answer, but these remedies must be undertaken at the outset, without joining the action.
Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title
Counsel for the United States in the Lufkin Division Civil Action on March 14, 2016 (two and a half weeks prior to this post), filed United States’ Motion for Order of Sale and to Vacate Property, but the Lufkin Judge has yet to rule on it or even acknowledge that it has been filed.
Petitioner on March 28, 2016, sued the Lufkin Judge, Michael H. Schneider, in the District Court of Tyler County, Texas, to quiet the title to Petitioner’s real property in Tyler County, Texas, and on March 29, 2016, served Mr. Schneider with the summons and complaint therefor.
Mr. Schneider has till Monday next following lapse of 20 days from date of service to answer the complaint (April 25, 2016).
Documents from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and District Court of Tyler County, Texas, follow below.
District of Columbia Minute Order Denying Petitioner’s Request for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 17, 2016
District of Columbia Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint
Petitioner’s Complaint against Lufkin Judge to Quiet Title, March 28, 2016
Return of Service of Process on Lufkin Judge, March 29, 2016
* * * *
[1] Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the “District of Columbia,” by which name it is hereby constituted a body-corporate for municipal purposes . . . “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871 [Go to “Turn to image” 419].
[2] Id.; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).
[3] (15) “United States” means—
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States [a Federal corporation]; or
(C) an instrumentality of the United States [a Federal corporation]. 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Sec. 3002 Definitions.
[4] (h) [Location of United States.]
The United States is located in the District of Columbia. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-307 Location of debtor.
[5] “United States™ Census Bureau,” official logo of the Census Bureau, United States Department of Commerce, https://www.commerce.gov/us-census-bureau.
[6] “United States® Census 2010,” title of official hardcopy form used to collect 2010 census data; also logo of official online form, Form D-61 (1-15-2009): http://www.censusquestions.com/2010-us-census-form.pdf.
[7] The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.
[8] First National Bank of Montgomery v. Jerome Daly, Township of Credit River, Minnesota, Martin V. Mahoney, Justice, Judgment and Decree, December 9, 1968: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/Credi...tanddecree.pdf (Minnesota State Law Library).
[9] Federal Reserve operatives have expended extraordinary effort to obliterate the effects of the Montgomery v. Daly case, but have failed to do so. For more details and a colorful account of the proceedings in the courtroom from a witness who was there that day, Minnesota Associate Justice of the Peace William Drexler, visit
http://www.constitutionalconcepts.org/creditriver.htm.
[10] frivolous, adj. Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful <a frivolous claim>. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 677.
[11] For a simple depiction of the legislative powers of Congress and the jurisdiction of the remainder of government, see this one-page tabular display: Extent of Federal and State Legislative Power and Federal and State Jurisdiction.
[12] Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization: Staunton, Va., 1992), p. 102.
[13] Id. at 128.
[14] “According to Chernow [infra], Paul Warburg was the only person in America who understood how a central bank works. In 1912 and 1913, he drew up the basic plan for the Federal Reserve banking system, and he drafted the Federal Reserve Act. In December 1913 President Wilson signed the Act establishing the new central bank. If anyone can be called the father of the Federal Reserve Bank, the New York Times has rightly noted, it is Paul Warburg.” John Weir, Institute for Historical Review, “Powerful Jewish Family Profiled,” Review of Ron Chernow, The Warburgs: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of a Remarkable Jewish Family (Random House: New York, 1993), http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v15/v15n5p33_Weir.html.
[15] The private Bank of England (joint-stock company), prior to arrival of the private Federal Reserve indisputably the most powerful political force ever known, is nationalized March 1, 1946, shortly after a conference attended by representatives of 44 different governments in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, and the founding of the so-called International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later to be called the World Bank, both of which private banks became operational in the District of Columbia in 1958.
The change in character of the Bank of England in 1946 has no practical effect on the personal fortune and political power amassed by the principals thereof up to this time—who are the same principals of the private Federal Reserve.
An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own or control 96% of all media worldwide) reveals Rothschild control of the American economy via controlling interest in each of the private Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the remaining 11 regional private Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the private Federal Reserve’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and, by virtue of private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy; to wit:
“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).
“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.” AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A.
[16] Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but, in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. . . . Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
[T]here is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld. . . . Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884).
[17] Constitution, Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2).
[18] Federal Reserve Notes are not negotiable as they do not contain a promise-to-pay nor may title thereto be transferred by delivery or indorsement, essential properties of a negotiable instrument.
[19] The Secretary of the Treasury is the Governor of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (f.k.a. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), both of which are domiciled in the District of Columbia.
“No person shall be entitled to receive any salary or other compensation from the United States for services as a Governor, executive director, councilor, alternate, or associate [of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank]. 22 U.S.C. 286a(d)(1)(Bretton Woods Agreements Act, P.L. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660, October 19, 1976; amended December 18, 2015)).
“The second part of the amendments prohibits the . . . [Secretary of the Treasury] from receiving salary or other compensation from the U.S. Government. . . . The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury receives no compensation for representing the United States.” Senate Report No. 94-1148 of Oct. 1, 1976, re amendment of Bretton Woods Agreements Act, supra, re Sec. 2 of House Report 13955 [p. 8], p. 5942.
[20] There is no difference in the nature of the lending policy (fractional-reserve banking) of the private Federal Reserve and that of the Central Bank of Zimbabwe, only the degree to which it is practiced.
When the rate of inflation passed the quadrillions of percent in Zimbabwe in 2008 the government ceased tracking it (it ended up hitting 89.7 sextillion percent, 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000%, in November of that year).
For absolutely mind-blowing photos that show what can happen in a fractional-reserve banking system when the tax agency does not extort from the populace and retire from circulation a sufficient amount of digits in income tax to keep up with the rate of lending: http://www.financialjesus.com/financ...we-pictures-2/.
“In February 2009 Zimbabwe was the only country in the world without debt. Nobody owed anyone anything. Following the abandonment of the Zimbabwe Dollar as the local currency all local debt was wiped out and the country started with a clean slate.” Alf Field, “Zimbabwe: A Fresh Start,” November 11, 2009, http://www.321gold.com/editorials/fi...eld111109.html.
[21] Generally the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS individual initially is created by the United States Social Security Administration upon assignment of a Social Security Account Number, but not all Americans have such a number. Any application for anything from a bank, corporation, or government agency, if granted, will be issued in the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS NAME of the statutory individual, the corporately colored version of the full true name of the particular boy / girl / man / woman written in proper English.
[22] "Survey finds only Congress is thought of more poorly than financial institutions.
"In the annals of image problems, the banking industry ranks right up there — or rather down there — with Congress, with a high-profile survey ranking Bank of America Corp. at the bottom of the heap.
"Five years after the financial crisis, the Reputation Institute survey said that banking has a worse reputation than BigPharma, the media, oil companies and telecommunications firms — just slightly above Congress. . . ." Los Angeles Times, “Banks have worst industry image,” August 29, 2013, B3."
supremecourtcase | April 1, 2016 at 00:08 | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-iz
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http://s19.postimg.org/o9i1dgqqr/image.jpg
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-E5w6nQso5p...daryStones.jpg
Ellicott's team, minus Banneker, who left after the placement of the south stone, then began the formal survey by clearing twenty feet of land on both sides of each boundary line and placing other stones, made of Aquia Creek sandstone, at one-mile intervals. On each stone, the side facing the District of Columbia displayed the inscription "Jurisdiction of the United States" and a mile number. The opposite side said either "Virginia" or "Maryland," as appropriate. The third and fourth sides displayed the year in which the stone was placed (1791 for the 14 Virginia stones and 1792 for the 26 Maryland stones) and the magnetic compass variance at that place. Stones along the northwest Maryland boundary also displayed the number of miles they fell from NW4, the first stone placed in Maryland. Stones placed at intervals of more than a mile included that extra distance measured in poles.
http://www.boundarystones.org
Will be interesting to see how that judge responds to being sued to quiet title. :)
You can lead a judge to law but you can't make him void his own retirement plan.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ares
You can't void it, but you can take a good portion of it away from him. :)Quote:
Originally Posted by palani
Every payment you make into the court system builds his retirement plan.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ares
Equity and law were merged in the 1950s, about the same time that code pleading went away and was replaced with notice pleading.
Now law is masculine while equity is female. All judicial actors must be bipolar as a result since (as a rule) the part of the universe occupied by the masculine can never be viewed by the feminine and vice versa.
One female judge was adamant about spectators not being covered (with a hat) and would instruct them to remove that instrument of disrespect. A defendant noticed that one spectator was not being asked to remove his hat and pointed that fact out. Her response "that is my husband".
http://s19.postimg.org/bagottmxv/image.jpgQuote:
Originally Posted by palani
[IMG]file:///page1image128[/IMG]Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
http://www.boundarystones.org/articl...tinel_1791.pdf
Update from Dr. Trowbridge . . . .
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G Petitioner sues six Federal judges and 41 others to recover home stolen two years ago under color of authority
by supremecourtcase
The root word of “constructive” is construe (not construct):
“con׳strue . . . to determine the meaning of ; interpret ; explain, as to construe a foreign language (into English) ; to construe one’s conduct ; to construe a clause or a law.” A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903) (hereinafter “Funk & Wagnalls”), p. 404.
“constructive, adj. Legally imputed; having an effect in law though not necessarily in fact. ● Courts usu. give something a constructive effect for equitable reasons <the court held that the shift supervisor had constructive knowledge of the machine’s failure even though he did not actually know until two days later>.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul Minn., 1999), p. 309.
A constructive trust is not an actual trust per se but an equitable remedy imposed by the court to redress wrongs and prevent unjust enrichment resulting from, among other things, constructive fraud; to wit:
“constructive trust . . . a trust set up by a court to deal with property that has been acquired by fraud or by inequitable means; specifically : a trust so formed to distribute property where distribution and enjoyment under the original transaction was against the principles of equity.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated: Springfield, Mass., 2000), s.v. “Constructive trust.”
“Constructive fraud occurs when there is a breach of a legal or equitable duty that, irrespective of guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public interests . . . . An example of constructive, as opposed to actual, fraud involves the failure to disclose facts when there is a duty to make a disclosure. . . .” William V. Dorsaneo III, Texas Litigation Guide, Vol. 4, Ch. 55 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.: New York, 2016) (“Dorsaneo”), p. 55-5.
“The most important and common type of constructive fraud supporting the imposition of constructive trusts involves the breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship . . . . When an abuse of a confidential or fiduciary relationship is alleged, the burden of proof is on the fiduciary to establish the fairness of the transaction, that there was full disclosure of all facts and circumstances, and that there was good faith and the absence of pressure or influence on the part of the fiduciary . . . .” Id. at 55-8.
“Fiduciary relationships are those that, as a matter of law, are relationships of trust and confidence. . . .” Id. at 55-9.
Every judge is a fiduciary toward the public, of which Petitioner is a part; to wit:
“ ‘Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit -- and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.1985) -- includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. . . .’ ” McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371–372 (1987), quoting Judge Posner in United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (1987).
United States District Judge Lynn Nettleton Hughes of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division had an equitable duty to disclose certain material facts and information to Petitioner, but failed to do so, even when expressly requested of him.
Further, Defendant Hughes failed to discharge / perform a certain legal duty imposed by law (this same legal duty applies in every Federal civil case in every Federal court throughout the Union), which resulted in Petitioner’s loss of, among other things, beneficial use of Petitioner’s real property (Petitioner’s home) for the last 27 months and permanent loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars in personal property (in law, called “personalty”).
“A constructive trust may be imposed on anyone who knowingly participates in another’s breach of a fiduciary duty or knowingly benefits from the breach. The remedy ‘reaches all those who are actually concerned in the fraud, all who directly and knowingly participate in its fruits, and all those who derive title from them voluntarily or with notice.’ ” Dorsaneo, p. 55-14.
There are 46 other Defendants who knowingly participated in Defendant Hughes’ breach of fiduciary duty, one of whom is JPMRRE, LLC, who acquired title to Petitioner’s home in Porter, Texas (the “Porter Property”)—not at a public auction as ordered by Defendant Hughes in his May 23, 2014, Order of Sale and Vacature, but privately and secretly and at less than 75 percent of its fair market value on date of sale, August 25, 2014.
Defendant JPMRRE, LLC is not entitled to retain the Porter Property; to wit:
“A third party who obtains property as a result of the defendant’s [Defendant Hughes’]fraud or other wrongdoing is not entitled to retain that property . . . . The key is whether the recipient is unjustly enriched. A bona fide purchaser for full value would not be unjustly enriched by being allowed to retain the property; instead, the constructive trust is imposed on the proceeds of the sale in the hands of the wrongdoer . . . . In contrast, those who benefit from another’s
wrongdoing and do not pay full value for the property may be forced to accept a constructive trust on the property they have received. . . .” Dorsaneo, p. 55-21.
Normal Federal solution: Remove case to Federal court
What normally happens in cases like this when someone sues the Federal government or a Federal officer in a state court, is that an officer of the United States Department of Justice simply gives notice to the state court that he is removing the case to a Federal court under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 or 1442 and thereafter opens a new case in the closest United States District Court.
Any application to remove this Texas case to a Federal court is unauthorized, fraudulent, and willful—because the only species of court to which the aforementioned statutes authorize removal—a limited-jurisdiction District Court of the United States—no longer exists, rendering lawful removal impossible.
Typically, Federal actors just bulldoze over anyone and everyone in their path to achieve their objective; in this instance, removal of the Texas case to a Federal court.
The commercial liability that accrues to each defendant personally / organizationally for unlawful removal of this case, however, is far more extreme than the few millions of dollars in damages owed as a consequence of Defendant Hughes’ constructive fraud and theft of Petitioner’s home under color of authority and the 46 other defendants’ participation therein.
The penalty for such removal is spelled out in Petitioner’s “Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace,” which appears at the top of Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition(hyperlinked below).
Petitioner on (a) August 11, 2016, filed the original petition; (b) August 15, 2016, a “Notice of Lis Pendens” (lis means controversy or dispute or suit at law or equity; pendensmeans pending) against Petitioner’s stolen home; and (c) August 16, 2016, an amended original petition.
The amended original petition was served on Defendants either by personal delivery or USPS Certified Mail, return receipt requested, beginning August 25, 2016.
In the process of conspiring criminally and committing theft of Petitioner’s home under color of authority, Defendants committed collectively between 10,000 and 15,000 felonies—each of which has a substantial monetary value and for which every Defendant, beginning as of his respective initial date of participation in the purported case employed to defraud Petitioner of his home, would be personally liable to Petitioner should any Defendant purport to remove said Montgomery County, Texas, case to a purported United States District Court without statutory or constitutional authority.
A description of the two files hyperlinked below:
- “Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition, August 16, 2016 (18.6 MB)” (a) dissolves any confusion the reader may have developed over his life as to the exact nature of what he mistakenly believes is the United States, Department of the Treasury, Secretary of the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Internal Revenue Service, United States Department of Justice, Office of the Clerk of Court (of any Federal court), United States District Courts, United States Marshals Service, United States Courts of Appeals, United States Treasury, and Federal Reserve—intentionally manufactured by Congress (and actors within the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation and these organizations) over the last 152 years, in order to defraud Americans of their birthright and deprive them of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, (b) documents the constructive fraud of the trial-court judge, Defendant Lynn Nettleton Hughes, and connivance with Defendant Hughes on the part of the five circuit judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, (c) demonstrates that (i) no Defendant individual is bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, (ii) every United States District Court is a municipal court of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation; and (iii) other than Defendant United States of America, no Defendant organization is part of the organic general government of the de jure Republic of March 4, 1789, (d) itemizes the dollar-value of the constructive fraud and various types of damages resulting therefrom, and (e) demands judgment decreeing, among other things, a constructive trust on the Porter Property, with Defendant JPMRRE, LLC as constructive trustee for the benefit of Petitioner, and ordering Defendant JPMRRE, LLC to convey to Petitioner within 20 days free and clear of all encumbrances the entire interest held by Defendant JPMRRE, LLC in the Porter Property;
- The “Notice of Lis Pendens, August 15, 2016,” filed four days after the original petition, one day before the amended original petition, in the Official Public Records of Montgomery County, Texas, against the Porter Property warns potential buyers that the title thereto presently held in the name of Defendant JPMRRE, LLC is in litigation and that, should someone purchase Defendant JPMRRE, LLC’s claim to the Porter Property, he is in danger of being bound by an adverse judgment.
Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition, August 16, 2016 (18.6 MB) *
Notice of Lis Pendens, August 15, 2016
* Note: This document has numerous references to the United States Statutes at Large. In this context, the phrase “at large” means “Not included within particular limitations; in general; for all; as, a Congressman at large” (Funk & Wagnalls, p. 1003, s.v. “Large”). For example, 104 Stat. 4935 means the 104th volume of the Statutes at Large, page 4935. Using the following link the reader can verify for himself the accuracy of any reference herein to the Statutes at Large: http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=4935#. When the page comes up, simply insert the number of the desired volume and page in the appropriate box and click “Get Document” and that particular page of that particular volume of the Statutes at Large will appear. From there the reader can click to go to the next sequential page or prior page or insert new numbers and go to an entirely different volume or page.
supremecourtcase | September 14, 2016 at 21:48 | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-md
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You beat me to it Monty. I keep an eye on his page and noticed there was an update. Good job keeping this thread going!!
Dr. Trowbridge has two pending cases againts judges and other government employees. Both were filed in the Texas state court system. The defendants, all federal employees, going against Trowbridge's warning have removed the cases to the federal US District Courts.
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/...e,_Jr_v_Giblin
http://www.open-public-records.com/c...s-19054099.htm
I questioned Dr. about the lack of action in the Giblin case and about the consequenses of the defendants ignoring his warnings in the Lew case.
The Dr.'s response:
Thanks for your kind observations — be not dismayed, you will see the story unfold in coming weeks — the Giblin
case has some special dimensions, which you will also see —
They do not yet sense that the end is near — something to celebrate not be disappointed about.
Stay the course!!!
Keep the faith!!!
Share with others the website!!!
JPT
Quote:
Any application to remove this Texas case to a Federal court is unauthorized, fraudulent, and willful—because the only species of court to which the aforementioned statutes authorize removal—a limited-jurisdiction District Court of the United States—no longer exists, rendering lawful removal impossible.Typically, Federal actors just bulldoze over anyone and everyone in their path to achieve their objective; in this instance, removal of the Texas case to a Federal court.
The commercial liability that accrues to each defendant personally / organizationally for unlawful removal of this case, however, is far more extreme than the few millions of dollars in damages owed as a consequence of Defendant Hughes’ constructive fraud and theft of Petitioner’s home under color of authority and the 46 other defendants’ participation therein.
The penalty for such removal is spelled out in Petitioner’s “Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace,” which appears at the top of Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition(hyperlinked below).
Plaintiff's Amended Original Petition. https://supremecourtcase.files.wordp...16-18-6-mb.pdf