Yep, he wrote a book about it and called it "The Law That Never Was"Quote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
Yep, he wrote a book about it and called it "The Law That Never Was"Quote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
I think there are still Red Beckman videos on youtube. I am Dane, my grandmother and grandfather were both Jensens.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
My late cousin married a Norwegian, Farstveet from North Dakota. Another Danish cousin married an Ostergard
From: avannavon@gmail.comQuote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
Re: United States Citizen - dead entity
There are multiple Congressional Records-- Congressional Record of the United States Congress and United States Congressional Record and Congressional Record of the United States of America in Congress Assembled and so on. Keep looking and you will find it.
she can't just provide the link?
the only references I can find are references to her stuff and people who have filed court documents referencing her statement but no actual congressional citation.
I would respond back, that's not what I asked for. I'm telling you your citation is inaccurate. You made the citation, and the citation does not exist in the source you specified.Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
I was just thinking that and insist that she provide me a link to one of the other records she claims exist.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ares
In the meantime I have found several web pages with the following, but no identity of the author:
On December 6, 1865, the 14th Amendment was proclaimed as ratified (even though it never properly was, see below). The 14th Amendment, which is private Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical Trust Law, constitutes a constructive, cestui que trust, a public charitable trust (PCT) that was expressly designed to bring every corporate franchise artificial person called a "citizen of the United States" into an inseparable merging with the government until the two are united (with power held by the government, not the people). A cestui que trust is fundamentally different from a regular trust, which is express [clear, definite, explicit] in nature and consists of a contractual indenture involving three (3) parties: Grantor (Creator or Trustor), Trustee, and Beneficiaries. In an express trust, legal ownership is transferred by written contract between Grantor and Trustee in which the Grantor surrenders ownership of property to the legal person, the Trust, to be managed by the Trustee on behalf of those who are to benefit from the arrangement, the Beneficiaries. A cestui que trust, on the other hand, differs from an express trust in several crucial ways:
a. It is not formed by express contract, i.e. overt agreement expressed in writing, but by legal construction, i.e. fiat.
b. A cestui que trust has no Grantor, but, being a constructive trust created by operation of law, i.e. by make-believe, has only co-trustees and co-beneficiaries. The co-trustees are the parties with the duties for managing property for the "public good," i.e. for the benefit of those designated as co-beneficiaries.
You make your own record.
Face it. There are lots of dead people out there and they really wrote a lot. They acted when they shouldn't have and didn't act when they should have. Are you bound by any of them?
How to make a record? LEGAL NOTICE. http://gold-silver.us/forum/showthre...t=LEGAL+NOTICE
That entire thread is about people making their record.
How do you make your record with respect to the XIV amendment? https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsllink.html
Go to volume 15 .. page 223 ... and read ch 249.. It is a short act but requires some interpretation. It concerns the rights of American citizens in foreign states. What most don't comprehend is that the foreign states they are permitting expatriation from are only states that they create as they cannot actually speak for other foreign states. The next day they enter the XIV amendment on their record and have created a foreign state expressly for you to get the h...e... double toothpicks out of.
Just cite this act in a public notice and give a notary address for responses to be directed to. Record same at the county level.
Now the State department will tell you that you must expatriate at some U.S. consulate in some foreign country and that this is the ONLY way to expatriate. They could be right but there is no need to expatriate from something that never existed and unless you have some document from a U.S. judge stating that your status is set in stone you make your notice NUNC PRO TUNC then what never was did not ever exist.
p.s. The system is more afraid of due process from YOU than you should be concerned of due process from THEM.
All of the dirty tricks that have been used against you may be used by you. I wouldn't recommend this against people who have done you no harm but are fair game against people who mean you nothing BUT harm.
When we look at what the lieyers have done is it any wonder that they don't want us to know. Everything they do is a lie. They write laws in code meant to deceive us, where it sounds acceptable when interpreted in its English grammar context, but when translated using their code it means something quite different.Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
So, to me the idea that the record has been scrubbed or buried should be no surprise to us. As that is the record they have left us, one of deceit and treachery.
The edit button went awol, so here I am replying to my little bit of Norwegian trivia.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
The current crop of Norwegians all use bokmal which is Danish and spell their names like the Danes. Fathers name with "sen" added or the patronymic name system.
All good Norwegians who came to America in the 18 hundreds had been under Danish rule and no self-respecting Norwegian wanted to be misidentified as being a Dane so they used "son". That is the version my mother taught me.
I'll reply here instead of adding this off topic item below:
The only people who use old Norse today are the Icelanders and the Faroe islands and they use "son".
I would guess that mom's explanation did not take into account that the western Norwegians were still probably using Norsk instead of the Danish derived bokmal.
Swedes have alway used the possessive s or PAPA'sson.
Ben is not a Scandinavian name though. Benson is probably British in origin, as you have the British cigarette brand Benson & Hedges. He or his ancestors may have Americanized the old Danish surname like Berndtsen or Bendtsen into Benson.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
Norway was in union with Sweden during most of the 1800's btw... So sorry to say your mothers version wasn't completely correct. However could be that Norway de facto was more independent during the Swedish union than during Danish rule, that people preferred to abandon the old Danish spellings of surnames, the slave names. ;)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_...den_and_Norway
Funny how Sweden was awarded Norway from Denmark in 1814, because Sweden had been on the sides of Britain-Russia during the Napoleonic wars. While Denmark-Norway was on Napoleons side. Especially since the new King of Sweden was the French General Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, who actually bought the crown of Sweden in 1814 with warloot from the Napoleonic wars where he made his fortune. That guy was the Lucky Larry Silverstein of his time I suppose. If he had stayed with Napoleon and France until Waterloo, he would have probably lost everything. Still this usurpers family has the throne of Sweden.
Interesting stuff. I didn't know of these circumstances regarding the creation of Swedish Norwegian union.
Stacy B posted a video where she discusses the Las Vegas Review Journal appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court, Ammon Bundy writes a book "The Road to Burns" and our email exchange and her opinions re Dr. Trowbridge's latest blog post. She begins the discussion about Dr. Trowbridge at the 30 minute mark.
http://youtu.be/354QUwfpj_w
https://youtu.be/354QUwfpj_w
Well I went and researched this a little bit and now believe my mom's version to be spot on.Quote:
Originally Posted by Neuro
Denmark controlled Norway for roughly 300 years preceding Norway being given as a prize of war to Sweden in 1814. 300 years of precedent in how Norwegians spelled their names trumps any Swedish influence.
Your remark about your King really makes sense to me as in looking around on the net I came across pictures of the Swedish Royal family and I remember thinking that the King did not look at all like a Nordic person.
It doesn't make sense they would wait until they reached the shores of USA, before they changed their Danish spelled surnames. When they could have done it during the 50 years they were in union with Sweden. Surely the Swedes would not mind if the Norwegians abandoned their Danish sounding family names...Quote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
Update from Dr. Trowbridge, previous post contained errors,
New post on supremecourtcase http://s0.wp.com/i/emails/blavatar.png
http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G Errors in previous post and Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition of August 16, 2016
by supremecourtcase
Error in previous post of January 16, 2017
That Congress in the Act of December 1, 1990, Public Law 101–650, at section 404 thereof, 104 Stat. 5124 alter materially by way of amendment the oath of office at 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907 and relieve justices and judges of the United States of any duty of fidelity to the Constitution.
The amended oath of December 1, 1990, at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States had no material effect on the activities of justices or judges of the United States and should not have been the subject of a post.
Errors in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition
That none of the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States Department of Justice, United States Marshals Service, Department of the Treasury, or Internal Revenue Service are bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.
Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit take the oath at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States and bind themselves by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.
Officers of United States Department of Justice and United States Marshals Service bind themselves by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution by what is called the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit, such as that taken by the current Attorney General of the United States, Loretta Elizabeth Lynch.
The Secretary of the Treasury’s webpage says the Secretary of the Treasury takes the oath of office provided therein. The oath is identical in substance to the 5 U.S.C. § 3331Oath of office, but not identical in form. Said webpage cites no source authority for said oath.
President Barrack Obama’s Executive Order of August 12, 2016, entitled “Providing an Order of Succession within the Department of the Treasury,” specifies that Under Secretaries of the Treasury, Deputy Under Secretaries of the Treasury, and Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury shall have taken an oath, but omits to identify which particular oath.
Though not mandated by act of Congress, it is believed that the oath taken by Under Secretaries of the Treasury and such others of the Department of the Treasury is the same oath as that taken by the Secretary of the Treasury (no source authority cited).
Internal Revenue Manual 6.300.1.4 (11-06-2009) Appointment Documents, Determinations, and Entitlements provides, in pertinent part of subsection 1: “OPM’s GPPA, Chapter 3, Subchapter 4, and the Job Aid specifies the required appointment documents. . . .”
The United States Office of Personnel Management’s “The Guide to Processing Personnel Actions,” Chapter 3, Subchapter 4, section 4-3, subsection c, implies that Internal Revenue Service employees take the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavitpart A Oath of Office; to wit:
“As part of the entry-on-duty process, the employee takes the oath of office. The Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit, contains the oath of office (part A) required by 5 U.S.C. 3331 . . ."
Motions withdrawn and amended
Petitioner has withdrawn the three motions hyperlinked in the previous post of January 16, 2017, and replaced two of them with an amended version and filed with the Harris and Montgomery County, Texas, District Attorneys an Amended Affidavit of Information: Criminal Complaint for Public Notice Filing.
There are no errors in the amended versions.
supremecourtcase | January 29, 2017 at 23:16 | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-oZ
Dr. Trowbridge's update February 11, 2017
Continnued . . . . . .
New post on supremecourtcase http://s0.wp.com/i/emails/blavatar.png
http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G The “Great Mystery” solved: seminal act of congressional, executive, and judicial fraud and treason
by supremecourtcase
This post also gives a remedy for the situation it reveals, as well as an application thereof in a new case filed against Petitioner for failure to produce books and records for an IRS summons.
Legislative power determines executive and judicial jurisdiction
The executive and judicial power of the new government implemented by the Constitution March 4, 1789, is co-extensive with the legislative power established by that instrument; officers of the executive and judicial branches have jurisdiction to the same extent that Congress have legislative power in a particular geographic area; to wit:
“It [the judicial power] is indeed commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive powers of the General Government . . .” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793).
[I]“t is an obvious maxim, ‘that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the Legislature.’ The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive with the legislative power. . . .” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824).
The Constitution confers upon Congress either limited or exclusive (general) legislative power, depending upon the geographic area; to wit:
“It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one, limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia. . . .” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821).
Three kinds of legislative power and executive or judicial jurisdiction
“Jurisdiction” is synonymous with “authority” and means, essentially, the geographic area in which a particular officer is authorized by law to discharge or perform his duties.
There are three and only three kinds of legislative power and executive or judicial jurisdiction:
- Territorial (over cases arising or those residing in a particular geographic area);
- Personal (over someone’s rights); and
- Subject-matter (over the nature of the case or type of relief sought).
Unilateral authority to exercise all three types of legislative power or executive or judicial jurisdiction in a particular geographic area is called “power of exclusive legislation” or “general jurisdiction”; anything less is called “limited legislative power” or “limited jurisdiction.”
The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular provision of the Constitution, and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains, consists of:
- power of subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas, over the subjects enumerated at Art, I, 8, cl. 1-16;
- power of subject-matter and personal legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas and, in certain instances, residents thereof, over the types of cases and controversies enumerated at Art. III, 2;
- power of personal legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas, over anyone accused of a criminal offense cognizable under authority of the government established by the Constitution March 4, 1789, at Art. III, 2;
- power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of Columbia at Art, I, 8, cl. 17; and
- constructive (inferred) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV, 3, cl. 2 in the form of “Rules and Regulations,” id., “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.
Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union.
This means executive and judicial officers of the United States have no territorial jurisdiction anywhere in the Union.
“Territorial jurisdiction” is defined as follows:
“—Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1910), p. 673.
Were Congress to be authorized to exercise territorial legislative power over the Union they would have absolute exclusive legislative control over the entire country and there would be no need for any Union-member legislature or the Constitution in its present form.
Blackletter law[1] confirms that no executive or judicial officer of the United States has territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing anywhere in the Union; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic].” Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).
“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to . . . regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
“[95 U.S. 723] [T]he exercise of this jurisdiction [over those domiciled within its limits] in no manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State within which it is situated. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464.”
“Every State,” Pennoyer, supra, possesses supreme and “exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty,” id., over property located and Americans residing within its borders, and there is no provision of the Constitution that gives Congress power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union or any executive or judicial officer of the United States the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction or direct the disposition of any property located or American residing there.
The “Great Mystery”
The “Great Mystery,” then, is how certain officers of the United States can—with a straight face and no hesitation, even when directly challenged—knowingly and willfully repudiate the provisions of the Constitution relating to the legislative power of Congress and the commensurate jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers of that certain government established by the Constitution March 4, 1789, and usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing within the Union.
Such officers include the attorney general of the United States, assistant attorneys general of the United States, United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, United States marshals and deputy marshals, and other officers of the United States Department of Justice, Supreme Court justices, United States circuit judges, United States district judges, and United States magistrate judges, as well as personnel of the Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service.
A primary example of such usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction within the Union by officers of the United States is the United States district judge in the Houston action at law ordering (a) Petitioner to vacate the premises of Petitioner’s home in Montgomery County, Texas, under threat of application of deadly force by the United States marshal, and (b) seizure and sale of said real property.
Other examples of usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction within the Union by executive or judicial officers of the United States, as facilitated by congressional legislation, against property located or Americans residing there, are:
- IRS summonses
- Lawsuits for failure to respond to an IRS summons
- Judicial orders to show cause why defendant should not be compelled to obey an IRS summons
- Judicial orders to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt for failure to produce books and records in response to an IRS summons
- Judicial reduction of tax liens to judgment for purposes of foreclosure on real property
- IRS summons hearings and audits
- IRS seizure of funds in bank accounts by levy
- IRS seizure / garnishment of wages by levy
- Executive seizure of real or personal property
- Judicial or executive enforcement of the USA PATRIOT ACT
- Judicial or executive enforcement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)
- Judicial or executive enforcement of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (e.g., orders issued by Department of Homeland Security personnel to travelers at airports for non-immigration or non-customs reasons; detention of such travelers)
- Judicial or executive enforcement of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
- Judicial or executive enforcement of among others, the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Eighteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution
Principal part of executive and judicial jurisdiction
“Cujusque rei potissima pars principium est. The principal part of everything is the beginning.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 2130.
The beginning of our tripartite system of government is the Constitution, ordained and established by the People September 17, 1787, and implemented March 4, 1789, where Articles I, II, and III thereof establish, respectively, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
The beginning of the authority for any elected official or officer of the United States to exercise the legislative, executive, or judicial power of the United States is Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, which provides:
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”
The beginning of all congressional legislation is Section 1 of Statute I, Chapter I, “An Act to regulate the Time and Manner of administering certain Oaths,” 1 Stat. 23, June 1, 1789, which provides the oath of office for the president of the Senate and all members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added):
“Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and [House of] [sic] Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth article of the Constitution of the United States, shall be administered in the form following, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.’ The said oath or affirmation shall be administered within three days of the passing of this act . . .”
The beginning of authority for executive and judicial officers of the United States to exercise the executive or judicial power of the United States is Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 24; which provides (Underline emphasis added):
“Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That all officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed under the authority of the United States, shall, before they act in their respective offices, take the same oath or affirmation [as provided in Section 1], which shall be administered by the person or persons who shall be authorized by law to administer to such officers their respective oaths of office ; and such officers shall incur the same penalties, in case of failure, as shall be imposed by law in case of failure in taking their respective oaths of office.
Seminal act of congressional treason to the Constitution and American People
“The rich rules over the poor, and the borrower is the servant of the lender.” Proverbs 22:7.
Congress always has had other loyalties, bought and paid for by the highest bidder—in 1789 the Rothschild-run private Bank of England, world’s first state-sanctioned fractional-reserve “lender”[2] and future parent bank[3] of today’s Rothschild-run[4]private Federal Reserve,[5] sole “lender” (creditor) to today’s financially insatiable “borrower,” Congress.
Notwithstanding the clarity of Sections 1 and 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, supra, as to the oath of office to be taken by all executive and judicial “officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed under the authority of the United States,” supra, 1 Stat. 24, Congress 12 weeks later in “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,” Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, September 24, 1789 (the “Judiciary Act”), repudiate the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, at 76 in Section 8 thereof and create a special oath or affirmation exclusively for judicial officers of the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added):
“Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, a do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”
The above oath, taken by the original Supreme Court justices and district judges differs materially from the oath mandated at Section 1 of the Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 23, supra, and taken by the president of the Senate (vice president of the United States) and every member of the Senate and House of Representatives, in that it contains a religious test; to wit: “So help me God.”
Irrespective of how noble or virtuous said organic oath or affirmation for judicial officers may seem, said oath or affirmation and the ordinary act of Congress providing it are repugnant to Article VI, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, as such species of oath or affirmation is expressly prohibited by the provisions of said article and clause, supra, and therefore, for purposes of accession to “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, void; to wit:
“It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . .
“. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
“. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution tells us that “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”
The religious test required as a qualification to the office of justice of the Supreme Court or district judge in the oath or affirmation at Section 8 of the Judiciary Act taken by every such judicial officer means that no such justice or judge is authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, anywhere within the Union for failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
Every oath or affirmation taken by every justice or judge of the United States since September 24, 1789, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, circuit judge of the United States, United States district judge, or United States magistrate judge, the most modern of which is 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, December 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5124, which provides (Underline emphasis added.):
“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”
Whereas, any oath or affirmation that has a religious test as a qualification to any judicial office under the United States operates as an automatic bar to accession to authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, there has never been a justice or judge of the United States in the history of the Republic authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., for universal failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.[6]
No judge of the United States has taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution and no such judge has any business sitting on the bench of any United States district court anywhere in the Union—and each and every judge who does is a rogue judge.
Dr. Trowbridge's update continued. . .
https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com
Three species of court and judge
United States attorneys and district and magistrate judges and Supreme Court justices are constantly chirping about how federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; to wit:
“As we have repeatedly said: ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . .’” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 611 U. S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted)).
However true said statement may be, federal courts of limited jurisdiction are devoid of federal judges per se—because those who haunt the corridors and chambers of the federal courts of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union are not federal judges per se but judges of a different species.
It is essential that the reader understand the actual meaning of the word “federal”; to wit:
“fed′er-al . . . Of or pertaining to, or founded upon and organized by, a compact or act or union between separate sovereign states . . .” A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 667.
In the case of the Republic, the compact is the Constitution and the “separate sovereign states” the members of the Union.[7]
As shown below, all official use of the term “federal judge” is specious and intended to deceive—because no such judge has ever existed.
The three kinds of courts brought into existence by Congress, and their respective judges, are:
- Federal: courts of limited jurisdiction ordained and established by Congress under express authority Article III 1 of the Constitution, and federal judges authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., in such courts throughout the Union for having taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution—of which there has never been any such judge in American history.
- Territorial: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and territorial judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e. United States territories and enclaves; between the Judiciary Act (September 24, 1789) and sometime after incorporation of the District of Columbia, 16 Stat. 419 (February 21, 1871).
- Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and omit to define “United States” in a geographical sense—and today every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judge usurping exercise of general jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation throughout the Union with no authority to do so.
Bereft of authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, every justice of the Supreme Court and every United States district judge and magistrate judge is under the exclusive control of the legislative power (Congress), who manages the activities of such justices and judges by way of the laws of the “United States” (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation), i.e., municipal law of the District of Columbia known as, among others, the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations.
“Legal” tyranny
What distinguishes the Constitution from all other sovereign instruments of creation in the community of nations is the doctrine of separation of powers manifested in the tripartite system of government established by Articles I, II, and III thereof; to wit:
“separation of powers. The division of governmental authority into three branches of government — legislative, executive, and judicial — each with specified duties on which neither of the other branches can encroach; the constitutional doctrine of checks and balances by which the people are protected against tyranny.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1999) (hereinafter “Black’s”), pp. 1369-1370.
The political opposite of tyranny is liberty; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“LIBERTY (Lat. liber, free; libertas, freedom, liberty). Freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing, and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from without.
“Civil liberty . . . . Under the Roman law, civil liberty was the affirmance of a general restraint, while in our law it is the negation of a general restraint . . .
“Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most consistent with their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men. . . .
“Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law [*] . . . .” Bouvier’s, pp. 1964-1965.
* The essence of due course of law—also known as due process of law and the law of the land—is constitutional authority; to wit:
“Due process of law . . . refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed . . .” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292 (1884).
The primary purpose of separation of powers in government is the preservation of liberty; to wit (Underline emphasis added in all citations.):
“The framers of our political system had a full appreciation of the necessity of keeping separate and distinct the primary departments of the government. Mr. Hamilton, in the seventy-eighth number of the Federalist, says that he agrees with the maxim of Montesquieu, that ‘there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’” Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
“This Court [Supreme Court] consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty. See, e. g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 -696 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 725 . Madison, in writing about the principle of separated powers, said: ‘No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.’ The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).’” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
“[488 U.S. 380-381] Madison, defending the Constitution against charges that it established insufficiently separate Branches, addressed the point directly. Separation of powers, he wrote, ‘d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,’ but rather ‘that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.’ The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S., at 442 , n. 5. . . .”
“[488 U.S. 394] [W]e recognize the continuing vitality of Montesquieu’s admonition: “‘Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul,’” The Federalist No. 47, p. 326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison), quoting Montesquieu . . .”
“[A]fter stating that the judiciary is the weakest of the three departments of the government, and that though oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, he [Hamilton, in Federalist 78] says: ‘The general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and the executive. For I agree that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments . . .” McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 180-181 (1891).
Absent the faculty of liberty, as derived from Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution by way of institution of separation of the powers of government, there would be no substantial difference between the tyrannical sovereignty of Great Britain from which the American People originally freed themselves beginning in 1776, and the new government in America, with Congress as collective monarch and the People its subjects; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“It will be sufficient to observe briefly that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That system considers the Prince as the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a court of justice or elsewhere. . . . The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the Prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.
“Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or State sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here, it rests with the people. . . .” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793).
The judicial power’s jurisdictional equal: the executive power
We know that the judicial power is commensurate or co-extensive with the legislative power; the same is true for “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
Section 4 of Statute I, Chapter I cited supra, 1 Stat. 24, June 1, 1789, requires that all executive officers of the United States take the oath or affirmation provided in Section 1 thereof prior to exercising “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution, supra, and Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, supra, as to the requirement to be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution free of a religious test, the organic act establishing the first “attorney-general for the United States,” 1 Stat. 93, i.e., the Judiciary Act, requires only that said executive officer be “sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office,” id.; no mention of the Constitution.
Today’s attorney general of the United States, Jeff Sessions, and every other officer of the United States Department of Justice takes what is known as the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit part A Oath of Office, which provides (Underline emphasis added.):
“I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.”
Every officer of the United States Department of Justice who takes the above oath of office self-disqualifies himself from acceding to “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1—and now we have our answer as to why in the Lufkin action at law the United States attorney goes silent when Petitioner on September 14, 2015, demands the provision of the Constitution that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgment against property in Tyler County, Texas, and the magistrate and district judge pretend in their court process and judgment that Petitioner never asked the question: None are authorized to exercise “The executive Power,” id., or “The judicial Power of the United States,” id. at Art. III, § 1 anywhere within the Union for failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
Every executive and judicial officer of the United States in the history of the Republic is a legislative-branch officer under the absolute exclusive legislative control of Congress, a political alien to the executive or judicial power, and bereft of authority without the boundaries of federal territory.
Beginning with the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, the People have been denied the “unalienable Rights,” The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, Preamble, of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” id., and deprived of life, liberty, and property[8] without due process of law by legislative-branch super-factotums ensconced in the so-called United States Department of Justice and district courts—courts where the power of judging is joined with that of legislating and executing and there is no separation of powers and there is no due process of law.
This means that in addition to the bulleted examples of usurpation of territorial jurisdiction cited supra, there is no authority for any such executive or judicial officer to exercise any form of jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, that every such act constitutes usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction and is an act of tyranny, and that the entire legal system is a fraud and hoax, with every United States district court a kangaroo court; to wit:
“kangaroo court.
1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . .
2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible.
3. A sham legal proceeding.” Black’s, p. 359.
It also means that every single Supreme Court decision and district court judgment since September 24, 1789, is void for every participating executive and judicial officer’s failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms with the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution and every such officer’s culpability for betrayal of public trust, usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction within the Union, and treason to the Constitution; to wit:
“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
New lawsuit to enforce IRS summons; Petitioner’s response
In June of 2016 a certain IRS revenue agent issued and personally served on Petitioner an administrative summons, Internal Revenue Manual 25.5.6.3.1.1, deceitfully entitled “Summons,” tacitly representing to be authorized to exercise “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, take territorial jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas, and issue the summons against Petitioner.
Petitioner responded with a “Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace” and heard nothing back for seven months when, on January 24, 2017, the same revenue agent personally served on Petitioner a petition instituted by the United States attorney in the local United States district court in behalf of the revenue agent and Internal Revenue Service, and accompanying Order to Show Cause, signed by the judge, as to why Petitioner “should not be ordered to comply with the Internal Revenue Service summons.”
Notwithstanding that said petition only contemplates the need for an order for Petitioner to produce the documents described in the summons, which would be determined at the hearing, the Order to Show Cause nevertheless asserts its own preemptive order for Petitioner to bring to the hearing the documents enumerated in the IRS summons.
The judge wants Petitioner to suffer the object of the lawsuit—production of books and records—prior to having a fair hearing and determining the need for such an order, confirmation that there is no due process of law in any United States district court; to wit:
“due process. The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.” Black’s, p. 516.
Also, the docket in the previous case, the Houston action at equity, now includes a new reference to the current IRS summons case, noting “Related Case: 4:16-mc-02878” (the IRS summons case)—which is unusual because that case was closed two months ago (December 5, 2016) and the subject matter of the two cases is unrelated; to wit: The previous case is an action at equity concerning a prior void judgment; the new case is about failure to respond to an IRS summons.
Wherefore, it is reasonable to presume that the judge in the new summons case is prejudiced against Petitioner, likely for steps taken by Petitioner against his co-worker, the judge in the said Houston action at equity—where Petitioner sued 47 defendants, the judge ruled against Petitioner, and Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the judge and then amended it (upon resolution of the “Great Mystery”)—and would be happy to be able to hold Petitioner in contempt and have Petitioner arrested and incarcerated and who knows what else.
In Petitioner’s response to the IRS summons petition, which incorporates the fruits of resolution of the “Great Mystery,” supra, Petitioner on February 8, 2017, sent to the court for filing February 9, 2017, and counsel for petitioner United States of America (and constructive petitioner Internal Revenue Service) a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be heard and decided before proceeding any further (Rule 12(i)).
Petitioner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion demonstrates that (a) the subject revenue agent has no authority to exercise “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, or take territorial jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas, or issue said summons against Petitioner, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b) the summons is a legal nullity, thereby depriving the United States attorney of any evidence of any fact upon which a claim for relief could be granted.
Continued . . . . . . .
Dr. Trowbridge's February 11, 2017 update continued . . . .
https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com
The actual situation
As of September 24, 1789, the People have been denied the “unalienable Rights,” The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, Preamble, of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” id., and deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law by legislative-branch super-factotum executive and judicial officers—in courts where the power of judging is joined with that of legislating and executing and there is no separation of powers and the unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property are a fantasy—the essence of tyranny.
The raison d’être of the actors perpetrating the above organized treasonous conspiracy is the longevity of their sole “lender” (creditor), the Rothschild private Federal Reserve (seefns. 3-5)—for without wholesale extortion and retirement from circulation of a substantial amount of electronic digits in the paychecks and bank accounts of ordinary Americans the fraud of the banking system reveals itself through rampant inflation and higher and higher prices with no commensurate rise in wages.
Although Petitioner and those helping him, as well as the American People, are forced to cope in a legal context with the fraud and treason of those trusted with the custody of the law and its execution by the Framers and those who ratified the Constitution, the ultimate situation is not of a legal nature but rather political—a potential state of affairs for which the Founding Fathers presciently provided; to wit:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. . . . That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” Id.
Same family of bankers pulling the strings today as in 1776
“[T]he policies of the monarch are always those of his creditors.” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1261.
The ultimate source of the policies of today’s stealth congressional, executive, and judicial tyranny is the same usurious family of fractional-reserve bankers and exclusive creditors to borrower-servant King George III: Rothschild.
Sen. Robert Latham Owen (D-Okla.), former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and Senate sponsor of the Glass-Owen Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, tries to make amends for supporting the Federal Reserve and on January 24, 1939, places into the Congressional Record the following historical account of Benjamin Franklin’s visit to England and events shortly thereafter (Benjamin Franklin’s words underlined); to wit:
“Benjamin Franklin, on being asked in Great Britain how he accounted for the prosperous condition of the Colonies, said:
“‘That is simple. It is only because in the Colonies we issue our own money. It is called colonial scrip[9], and we issue it in the proper proportion to the demand of trade and industry.’
“It was not very long until this information was brought to the Rothschilds’ bank, and they saw that here was a nation that was ready to be exploited; here was a nation that had been setting up an example that they could issue their own money in place of the money coming through the banks. So the Rothschild Bank caused a bill to be introduced in the English Parliament which provided that no colony of England could issue their own money. They had to use English money. Consequently the Colonies were compelled to discard their scrip and mortgage themselves to the Bank of England in order to get money. For the first time in the history . . . our money began to be based on debt.
“Benjamin Franklin stated that in 1 year from that date the streets of the Colonies were filled with the unemployed, because when England exchanged with them, she gave the Colonies only half as many units of payment in borrowed money from the Rothschild Bank as they had in scrip. In other words, their circulating medium was reduced 50 percent, and everyone became unemployed. The poor houses became filled, according to Benjamin Franklin's own statement. . . .
“He said that this was the original cause of the Revolutionary War. In his own language:
“‘The Colonies would gladly have borne the little tax on tea and other matter had it not been that England took away from the Colonies their money, which created unemployment and dissatisfaction.’” Benjamin Franklin, quoted in John R. Elsom, Lightning over the Treasury Building (Boston: Forum Press, 1941), pp. 29-30, quoted in Robert Latham Owen, National Economy and the Banking System of the United States: An Exposition of the Principles of Modern Monetary Science in their Relation to the National Economy and the Banking System of the United States, Senate Document No. 23, January 24, 1939, 76th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 98-99.
It took only about one percent of the American Colonists to defeat the Bank of England-financed British army and navy and 30,000 paid killers (Hessian mercenaries) and break free of Rothschild policies enforced by King George III.
There are today not near so many Rothschild quislings[[10]], grunts, or white-collar mercenaries in the District of Columbia or scattered around the Union (and globe).
PDF version (sans hyperlinks) of today’s post
______________________
[1] “blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1999), p. 163.
[2] “[T]he Bank [of England] had the power to issue [i.e., create from thin-air and loan into circulation its own promissory] notes.
“It issued [created from thin-air and loaned] these [promissory notes] to an amount equal to the sum [of gold] advanced [loaned] to the Government [thereby doubling its wealth as to the value of the loan, every time it made a loan of gold to the government]. . . .” A. Andréadès, History of the Bank of England 1640 to 1903, Fourth Edition (Reprint), Christabel Meredith, Translator (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 85.
“It [Bank of England] coined, in short, its own credit into paper money.” Thorold Rogers, The First Nine Years of the Bank of England (Oxford, 1887), p. 9, quoted in Andréadès, supra, p. 82.
[3] The Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de Rothschild (1842–1918), director of the Bank of England (Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Staunton, Va.: Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization, 1992), p. 102), implemented via his straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg (id. at 128), a German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911 specifically for this purpose; later dubbed “Father of the Federal Reserve” by the New York Times. The private Federal Reserve, incorporated under aegis of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, is modeled by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after the private Bank of England.
[4] An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own 96% of all media worldwide) reveals unilateral Rothschild control of the American economy (via controlling interest in each of the New York Fed’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the other 11 regional Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the Fed’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and Congress’ employer, the U.S. Government, and, by virtue of the Fed’s private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy); to wit, in pertinent part:
“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).
“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.” AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009,
http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A.
[5] “Federal Reserve Banks . . . are not federal instrumentalities . . . but are independent, privately owned and locally controlled corporations.” Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.1982).
“The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. . . .” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.
[6] It will come as a shock for every officer of the uniformed services who has taken the oath at 5 U.S.C. § 3331 to learn that he or she and his or her compatriots are serving something other than the Republic or “their country”: the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation (infra, under “Three species of court and judge”).
[7] These facts are acknowledged by Congress in but a single obscure provision of Title 28 U.S.C., which admits of members of the Union as actual countries; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
Ҥ 297 Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states
“(a) The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may assign any circuit, district, magistrate, or territorial judge of a court of the Ninth Circuit, with the consent of the judge so assigned, to serve temporarily as a judge of any duly constituted court of the freely associated compact states whenever an official duly authorized by the laws of the respective compact state requests such assignment and such assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the respective court.
“(b) The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses, including transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts any amount received pursuant to this subsection.”
[8] “Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. . . .” Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872).
[9] “scrip. . . . [U. S.] paper currency of a denomination less than a dollar: not now issued.”A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 1606.
[10] “quisling , , , noun . . . a traitorous national who aids the invader of his country and often serves as chief agent or puppet governor.” Webster’s New Third International Dictionary, Unabridged (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1993), s.v. “Quisling.”
supremecourtcase | February 11, 2017 at 17:29 | Categories: Uncategorized |
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The previous post of Dr. John Parks Trowbridge Jr.'s most recent blog entry is quite long, probably many wont read it. It can be distilled down to a few sentences.
First, the Constitution has not given the United States Congress or her courts TERRITORIAL jurisdiction in any of the states of the Union.
Per John Parks Trowbridge Jr.
His objection and demand brought the US District Courts for the Eastern District of Texas to a screeching haltQuote:
Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union.This means executive and judicial officers of the United States have no territiorial jurisdiction anywhere in the Union.
“Territorial jurisdiction” is defined as follows:
“—Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1910), p. 673.
https://supremecourtcase.files.wordp...and-091415.pdf
His motion to dismiss provides remedy
https://supremecourtcase.files.wordp...led-093015.pdf
Doctor Trowbridge quotes case law and provides legal definitions to validate his writings.
Then he continues on to explain how these imposters in black robes can lie with a straight face when they usurp jurisdiction.
In a nutshell, the oath of office contain a religious test which is repugnant to Article VI Oaths Clause, No religious tests. Any judicial officer taking the oath is an imposter becuase the oath is repugnant to the Constitution.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_R...us_Test_Clause
No Religious Test Clause
The No Religious Test Clause of the United States Constitution is a clause within Article VI, Section 3. By its plain terms, no federal office holder or employee can be required to adhere to or accept any particular religion or doctrine as a prerequisite to holding a federal office or a federal government job. It immediately follows a clause requiring all federal and state officers to take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution. This clause contains the only explicit reference to religion in the original seven articles of the U.S. Constitution.
The ban on religious tests contained in this clause protects only federal office holders and employees. It does not apply to the states, many of which imposed religious tests at the time of the nation's founding. State tests limited public offices to Christians or, in some states, only to Protestants. The national government, on the other hand, could not impose any religious test whatsoever. National offices would be open to everyone. No federal official has ever been subjected to a formal religious test for holding office.[1]
This clause is cited by advocates of separation of church and state as an example of the "original intent" of the Framers of the Constitution to avoid any entanglement between church and state, or involving the government in any way as a determiner of religious beliefs or practices. This is significant because this clause represents the words of the original Framers, even prior to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Since Sept. 24, 1789 the oath has contained a religious test. The oath is invalid because it is repugnant to the Constituion. The justices and judges can usurp jurisdiction and feel no guilt because their oath of office means nothing. This is the "GREAT MYSTERY" Dr. Trowbridge has exposed. Dr. Trowbridge contends no federal officer, including the judiciary is legitimate and cannot represent the government of the United States of America in an official capacity.
He further points out they are operating under the municipal law of Washington DC.
The complete details of this massive fraud are in his post.
Thanks for summarizing. He keeps digging down the rabbit hole, he's going to eventually come up to why we are where we are... Civil War, and the reconstruction act.Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
The recent actions in the Trowbridge v Lew Et Al and new cases filed can be read here. They are pdf fotos, not embedable.
https://supremecourtcase.files.wordp...rict-court.pdf
https://supremecourtcase.files.wordp...terye2809d.pdf
Edit: Because the oath of office for the federal officers contains a religious test and is repugnant to Article VI Sec. 3 the federal judges and justices cannot hold the judicial power of the Article III judicial branch of government.
Also, all the agencies of the administrative branch are usurping jurisdiction under the municipal government of Washington DC as explained below.
Exertped from the recent blog post:
It is essential that the reader understand the actual meaning of the word “federal”; to wit:
“fed′er–al . . . Of or pertaining to, or founded upon and organized by, a compact or act or union between separate sovereign states . . .” A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 667.
In the case of the Republic, the compact is the Constitution and the “separate sovereign states” the members of the Union.[7] (Footnote 7 is posted below)
As shown below, all official use of the term “federal judge” is specious and intended to deceive—because no such judge has ever existed.
The three kinds of courts brought into existence by Congress, and their respective judges, are:
- Federal: courts of limited jurisdiction ordained and established by Congress under express authority Article III 1 of the Constitution, and federal judges authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., in such courts throughout the Union for having taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution—of which there has never been any such judge in American history.
- Territorial: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and territorial judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e. United States territories and enclaves; between the Judiciary Act (September 24, 1789) and sometime after incorporation of the District of Columbia, 16 Stat. 419 (February 21, 1871).
- Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and omit to define “United States” in a geographical sense—and today every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judge usurping exercise of general jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation throughout the Union with no authority to do so.
Bereft of authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, every justice of the Supreme Court and every United States district judge and magistrate judge is under the exclusive control of the legislative power (Congress), who manages the activities of such justices and judges by way of the laws of the “United States” (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation),i.e., municipal law of the District of Columbia known as, among others, the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations.)
Footnote 7:
[7] These facts are acknowledged by Congress in but a single obscure provision of Title 28 U.S.C., which admits of members of the Union as actual countries; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
Ҥ 297 Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states
“(a) The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may assign any circuit, district, magistrate, or territorial judge of a court of the Ninth Circuit, with the consent of the judge so assigned, to serve temporarily as a judge of any duly constituted court of the freely associated compact states whenever an official duly authorized by the laws of the respective compact state requests such assignment and such assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the respective court.
“(b) The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses, including transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts any amount received pursuant to this subsection.”
This is unconstitutional, as it sets up a separate state within a state. They had no charter to do this.Quote:
- Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and omit to define “United States” in a geographical sense—and today every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judge usurping exercise of general jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation throughout the Union with no authority to do so.
Yes, but isn't most of what they do unconstitutional? Until the public becomes aware this isn't going to change.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
If states and counties weren't "greenmailed" with federal grant dollars it might be possible to get local legislatures and law enforcement to run them out of the states.
Its a "parallel universe".
And people aren't given a choice because slave traders keep entering the first universe and coercing everyone into the parallel universe or kidnapping those that don't want to go / cross over.
And the key to it's function is political parties and politics. Neither of these are government but people mistake them as government. The Democrats are not Government, nor are the Republicans. They are politics who have convinced people to hand over their right to of control of government to them. They all have superior allegiances than to the constitution and other institutions of government, or to the people. They then tell the government (trustee) what to do, and basically what they tell it is designed to benefit them and theirs at the cost of you and yours.
People need to realize that the political parties are all owned by someone.... they are not simply friendship groups. Someone owns them.
Until politics is removed from the process/situation the problems will persist. For this to happen, the people need to evolve into mature responsible people prepared to take on this responsibility themselves. I fear we still have a long way to go.... and we seem to be going backwards.
Unfortunately (as well as by plan) this is a result of the XIV amendment which creates a national government. Prior to this the US of A was merely a federation of independent countries. Each of these independent countries under the federation had a capital city with territory attached. The laws these state citizens complied with were all municipal laws of the capital city. The purpose of the federation was to control the interaction between signatory countries.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bigjon
In much the same way the U.N. has established PRIVATE international law between their member countries. The reason their international law is PRIVATE is that originally international law in general was intended to define the relations between CHRISTIAN countries.
Anytime you have a nation you have a capital city and the laws of that municipality apply to the territory attached.
Attributes of parties are all the same. They come with funny hats, horns to blow, party favors and frequently booze, sex and outrageous behavior. Political parties share these features with any other class of party (wedding,birthday, anniversary).Quote:
Originally Posted by Glass
The Washington DC US District Court judge also said her jurisdiction and the Texas Court jurisdiction comes from Congress power to tax, Article I Sec. 8. Cl. 1. She didn't say her that her court was created by implied Article I Sec. 8 Cl. 17 authority, but I believe she backs up Dr. Trowbridge's allegation. The Article I Sec. 8 Cl. 1 taxing power does not explain the Oregon and Nevada courts claiming criminal jurisdiction. The Clause 17 municipal court does cover it. Congressmen's allegiance to the Rothchild's banks since their first central bank in the 18th century is the direct cause.Quote:
- Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and omit to define “United States” in a geographical sense—and today every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judgeusurping exercise of general jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation throughout the Union with no authority to do so.
https://supremecourtcase.files.wordp...-complaint.pdf
https://s19.postimg.org/8gfe4bw9v/IMG_1499.png
https://rasica.files.wordpress.com/2...on-regret4.jpg
The United States deposited $100,000.00 into the Court Registy (CRIS) for One of their cases against Trowbridge. That must be their reward for entering a judgement against him
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/...idge,_Jr_et_al
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Trowbridge, Jr. et al
Texas Eastern District Court Judge: Ron Clark Referred: Zack Hawthorn Case #: 9:14-cv-00138 Nature of Suit 870 Federal Tax Suits - Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) Cause 26:7401 IRS: Tax Liability
Case Filed: Jul 07, 2014 Terminated: Mar 03, 2016
Docket last updated: 03/10/2017 11:59 PM CST
Friday, March 03, 2017
https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!...0/oDe7hGVvMsAJ
Court Registry Investment System, how courts earn interest on investements
While your comment is correct, it's the banking system that the courts are, its setting off Big Ben Bells ringing for me.
I think Winston Shrout might have covered this. I don't have my notes here with me but I feel confident he might have covered this. He did a bunch of presentations. I would probably look at his Shenowa? seminar. Not sure if that is the right spelling but it should be obvious if you can find a list of his videos.
It maybe that you can do an Accept for Value on the court paperwork and cash out that account. I'm not sure if I have my wires crossed about this specific account but Winston certainly went over an A4V process to do with court documents..... and the "clerk" paid out on the paperwork.
Either that or the Agency is extremely confident they will be warehousing the goods in the very near future.
I have a PACER account, so I logged in to take a look. Interesting. The document in question is Document 85, and, of course, is not available. Just a simple line entry.Quote:
Originally Posted by monty
I wonder is it an indemnity bond for an upcoming prosecution? I'm asking generically about Document 85. Is there a US Code describing what a Doc 85's purpose is?Quote:
Originally Posted by crimethink
Document 85 is the sequence number of the documents filed in this case.Quote:
Originally Posted by Glass
Re: Updates?
oh yes, likely for many months ….. I have not yet begun to fight!
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
Liberty Above All
The End of the Hoax of Federal Usurpation: www.supremecourtcase.wordpress.com
dr.john.parks.trowbridge.jr
April 14, 2017 Update to SupremeCourtCase.WordPress.com from Dr. Trowbridge
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G Houston IRS summons case exposes linchpin of judicial-authority scam; Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment update
by supremecourtcase
In response to a petition for an order to enforce an IRS summons, Petitioner on February 9, 2017, filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In opposition thereto, counsel for IRS on March 8, 2017, filed his IRS response to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Although he could not provide a legal explanation as to why, the judge at the March 27, 2017, hearing denied said Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (transcript of hearing should be available soon and will be hyperlinked here).
Thereafter, Petitioner on April 5, 2017, filed the following three separate documents:
(1) Response to Petition,
(2) Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, and
(3) Motion to Withdraw Tag-end Order of Order to Show Cause.
As the reader will discover in the three aforementioned filings, particularly in the Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice, the linchpin of the judicial-authority scam is the special statutory definition of “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts, and used sub silentio (under silence; without any notice) by every executive and judicial officer.
Whereas, the “United States” of the Constitution is the collective of the several commonwealths united by and under authority thereof and admitted into the Union; the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure in every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court rather is “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).
The organic “United States” of the Constitution has no relation to the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15).
Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust (elected office) under the United States (of the Constitution).
Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer requires a religious test (“So help me God.”) as a qualification to each respective office (whether elected or appointed), none are officers under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.
The supreme Federal corporation, incorporated February 21, 1871, under authority of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution, is a municipal corporation: the District of Columbia.
Because of their oath of office and the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” all executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the District of Columbia.
Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of the Constitution, have the capacity to take limited jurisdiction (personal and subject-matter jurisdiction) all over the Union (Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1–16).
The problem is there are no such executive or judicial officers and never have beenbecause, in accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the oath of office taken by every one of them disqualifies him from holding an office under the “United States” of the Constitution.
Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) have the capacity to take general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction), but only in the District of Columbia (16 Stat. 419).
All of today’s executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) “United States” (the District of Columbia) impersonating federal officers under the “United States” of the Constitution—and rely on mass ignorance of the meaning of the fraudulent statutory definition of “United States” to justify usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction outside their territory (the District of Columbia).
The most egregious usurpation is that of exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing within the Union—something about which we hear every day in the news for which there is no constitutional authority.
The three short, above-numbered and -hyperlinked filings in the Houston IRS summons case lay out the judicial-authority scam in simple terms.
Although counsel for IRS has no obligation to file a reply to the Response to Petition, the court-ordered deadline to do so expired April 10, 2017.
Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
Ten and a half months after the March 3, 2016, final judgment in the Lufkin action at law against Petitioner’s ranch, Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a motion to vacate said final judgment as void for the judge's failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
No judge who fails to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 accedes to any office under the “United States” of the Constitution or “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1.
Out of legal ammo and nowhere to hide, counsel for plaintiff on February 6, 2017, filed his response in opposition to Petitioner's motion to vacate the final judgment, making various ridiculous / frivolous arguments and factual contentions, with no evidentiary support, for which Petitioner, on February 22, 2017, in Petitioner's reply to counsel for plaintiff's response in opposition, recommended that said counsel be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)(1)-(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Petitioner’s motion granted.
The magistrate judge in charge of the Lufkin case has remained silent since receiving Petitioner’s February 22, 2017, reply to plaintiff’s February 6, 2017, response to Petitioner’s January 23, 2017, motion to vacate the final judgment as void over seven weeks ago.
• Revision to previous post
Near the top of the previous post of February 11, 2017, there were two sets of bulleted items: the first a set of three bullets and the second a set of five
The second set of five bulleted items has been reduced to three as follows:
“The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular provision of the Constitution, and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains, consists of:
- “power of personal and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas at Art, I, § 8, cl. 1-16;
- “power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of Columbia at Art, I, § 8, cl. 17; and
- “constructive (implied) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 in the form of “Rules and Regulations,” id., “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.
“Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation over person or property anywhere in the Union.”
supremecourtcase | April 14, 2017 at 15:07 | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-qr
Dr. Trowbridge's latest update, DOJ attorney floundering, judges silent . .
Respond to this post by replying above this line
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G DOJ attorney in Houston IRS summons case floundering; Lufkin court silent on motion to vacate final judgment
by supremecourtcase
When cornered and beaten at their own game, their general policy is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”
The United States attorney has failed to prove jurisdiction in any of Petitioner’s nine related cases (defendant in three, plaintiff in six) despite the legal duty to do so upon Petitioner’s challenge thereof; to wit:
“Generally, a plaintiff's allegations of jurisdiction are sufficient, but when they are questioned, as in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1936, 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135; Welsh v. American Surety Co., 5 Cir. 1951, 186 F.2d 16; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra Sec. 1363 at 653. . . .” Rosemound Sand and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (1972).
“The above cited decisions [six Supreme Court cases] and authorities cited therein conclusively establish the rule that if the issue is presented in any way the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon him who invokes it. . . .” Town of Lantana, Fla. v. Hopper, 102 F2d 188 (5th Cir.1989).
Whereas, United States Department of Justice attorneys are too terrified of exposure for fraud to tangle with Petitioner on the question of jurisdiction using actual evidence, they rely on their tag-team partners, United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges, to do the dirty work for them.
District, magistrate, and circuit judges, however, do not have the luxury of ignoring Petitioner; they must deal with unresolved motions and bring a case to a conclusion.
The MO. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the United States and cherry-pick and present immaterial facts which appear to support their position.
This is called lying by omission.
It is also constructive fraud.
It is the same reason no legal professional will execute an affidavit sworn to as true, correct, and complete; only a so-called declaration, which is sworn to only as “true and correct” (in some instances only “based on information and belief”).
This approach allows attorneys and judges to present a false picture of things without risking a charge of perjury; they simply leave out whatever works against them.
Since the United States district and magistrate judges control all the trial courts and the United States circuit judges the appeals courts, they figure no one is going to be able to penetrate their little coven or hold them accountable for the consequences of what they omitted to say.
This may be true legally, once things are in the court, but it is not true commercially, before matters arrive at a lawsuit.
Only municipal judges in United States district courts
Courtesy of a corrupt Congress, who fraudulently defined “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, all municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges rely for their existence exclusively on linguistic confusion and cognitive dissonance among the victims of the scheme, the American People, “joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), to perpetrate their fraud.
In civil actions, the primary job of attorneys of the United States Department of Justice is to get past the demand-letter stage (a common-law requirement before invoking the assistance of the court) and file suit and get the matter into the hands of a municipal co-worker, a United States (District of Columbia) district judge.
Once the United States (District of Columbia) attorney has done that, he can count on the United States (District of Columbia) district judge to usurp exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) and adopt and prosecute the cause sua sponte (of his own will), essentially guaranteeing the outcome; unless, of course, the case is too high-profile and the facts too clear and judgment for the United States (District of Columbia) would work against the appearance of impartiality and operate to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
The main outpoint in this and every other action at law in every United States (District of Columbia) district court in which the United States is plaintiff, is that the district judge takes territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) over the defendant and the defendant’s property—a measure which is not authorized by any provision of the Constitution and amounting to usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
Municipal judges (every justice and judge of the United States is a District of Columbia municipal bench officer) have authority to exercise general jurisdiction, but only in the District of Columbia.
Today’s municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges have extended their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of their corporate existence, 16 Stat. 419, to the exterior limits of the District of Columbia, into the Union.
As shown in most of Petitioner’s filings and particularly in the recent ones in the Houston IRS summons case hyperlinked below, they are all District of Columbia municipal judges impersonating Article III constitutional judges.
The foregoing is verifiable in the record of any of the recent nine cases in which Petitioner is involved.
A municipal (not federal per se) debt collection operation
What we know as the executive and judicial branches are a collective corporate commercial debt-collection operation of the District of Columbia (“United States”), operating under color of law and masquerading as the de jure executive and judicial branches established by the Constitution; to wit: Every so-called civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court is administered under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.
The jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793), Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat, 738, 808 (1824)): If judicial officers do not have jurisdiction in a particular geographic area, such as the Union, the same is true for executive officers—and no United States attorney has presented evidence of constitutional authority despite being challenged for the same in every one of the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved.
The remedy to the situation is commercial (not legal per se): by dealing with matters prior to the filing of a suit, before a District of Columbia municipal judge gets involved, by holding the District of Columbia Department of Justice municipal attorney personally accountable for knowing and willful usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction outside his territory (District of Columbia) under color of authority—a criminal offense for which he has no immunity and is personally liable.
Upon receipt of a demand letter from a United States (District of Columbia) attorney, by presenting him with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace requiring proof of jurisdiction and presenting evidence that he has no jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, if the he proceeds with a lawsuit without first presenting constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and do so (impossibility), he acts on his own.
Thereafter, the next step is the filing with competent authority in the particular county / borough / parish in which one is a resident or one’s property is located or the court is located or the District of Columbia or more than one of the foregoing, of an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) sworn to as true, correct, and complete before two or three witnesses (do not use a notary public), swearing as to the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney and attaching documentary evidence when appropriate.
Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority, the next step is to do a verified accounting of the criminal offenses sworn to in the Affidavit of Information and invoice him for the commercial value thereof, due and payable in 15 days from the date the invoice is sent.
After 20 days of mailing (five days grace for payment to arrive if mailed on the fifteenth day), if the United States attorney has not discharged his debt to you, the next step is a commercial lien in the amount of unpaid debt, filed with (a) the county recorder against any real property held in his name, and (b) the Secretary of State of the particular Union member where the county is situate, against his name.
You can also do it in the District of Columbia or with the Secretary of State of any Union member where the United States attorney debtor is considered a resident.
Such liens are passive claims which can be sold to professional debt collectors—accompanied by indisputable documentary evidence of the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney—at a discount. The commercial paperwork can even lead to a lawsuit against him by the debt collector.
Houston IRS summons case
Petitioner’s below two Replies (third document in each of Set 1 and Set 2) are the most recent filings and demonstrate the judge’s lack of jurisdiction in simple terms.
Set 1:
- Motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (in the presence of a person not a judge)
- Counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to dismiss
- Reply to counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to dismiss
Set 2:
- Motion to withdraw tag-end order in order to show cause
- Counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order
- Reply to counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order
Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for the judge’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
The United States on February 6, 2017, filed United States' opposition to Petitioner's supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.
Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed a reply to United States' opposition to Petitioner's supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void.
Petitioner filed the original motion 106 days ago, the above reply 76 days ago; the judge remains silent.
supremecourtcase | May 9, 2017 at 18:53 | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-sq
Wow, I'm impressed. He just found a way to hold them PERSONALLY and financially accountable.
Quote:
Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority
Yes, he did. He has also filed affidavits of criminal complaint against some of them in additiin to the UCC-1 liens he filed on them. A woman in Las Vegas forwarded this information to Ryan Bundy's legal assistand and to Ammon Bundy's para-legal.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ares
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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362...=identicon&r=G Hearing set in Houston IRS summons case; Lufkin judge confirms it is time to abolish the current form of government
by supremecourtcase
There are two pending motions in the Houston IRS summons case, a motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (before a person not a judge), and a motion to withdraw the unwarranted order included in the order to show cause.
A hearing is set for May 30, 2017: Notice Setting Hearing.
Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
The judge who entered final judgment in the Lufkin case March 3, 2016, Michael H. Schneider, retired seven months later, October 1, 2016, and Ron Clark took over.
Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for Michael H. Schneider’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
The government responded February 6, 2017, with its opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate.
Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed Petitioner’s reply to the government’s opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate.
Ron Clark on May 4, 2017, denied Petitioner’s motion to vacate (Clark’s denial hyperlinked below).
Nature of the situation that necessitated Petitioner’s motion to vacate
Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the requirement of a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”
The oath mandated by Congress in Section 453 of Title 28 of the United States Code and taken by Michael H. Schneider, however, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
Ҥ 453. Oaths of justices and judges
“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ____ ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”
In accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the religious test (“So help me God.”) required of the former judge in the Lufkin case, Michael H. Schneider, as a qualification to the office of district judge, bars Michael H. Schneider from assuming or holding any office under the United States.
But Michael H. Schneider (and every other district, magistrate, and circuit judge and Supreme Court justice) keeps rolling along—in blatant repudiation of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
How do they justify this?
Congress create another kind of “United States” for use in the courts
The reason all the aforementioned judicial officers willfully repudiate and disregard Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution is that they are using a different “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts and withholding from the American People that they are pretending that the new statutory “United States” displaces / supersedes the organic “United States” of the Constitution.
All civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States are administered in accordance with Chapter 176 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
For purposes of all civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States, Congress have decreed in subsection 15 of Section 3002 of Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. that “United States” means “a Federal corporation”; to wit:
Ҥ 3002. Definitions
“As used in this chapter:
“. . . (15) ‘United States’ means—
“(A) a Federal corporation;
“(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of [a Federal corporation] the United States; or
“(C) an instrumentality of [a Federal corporation] the United States.”
This means that every appearance of “United States” in anything to do with any civil or criminal proceeding in any district court means “a Federal corporation.”
That the 28 U.S.C. § 453 oath of office requires a religious test as a qualification to every judicial office means that no taker of said oath may assume or hold any judicial office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution—but said religious test, however, does not preclude a taker from holding a judicial office under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).
Every contemporary judge is an officer of the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.
Every such judge throughout the Union is also impersonating a judicial officer of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.
Fraud and treason to the Constitution
This, of course, is wholesale fraud and treason to the Constitution on the part of Congress and connivance therewith on the part of every Supreme Court justice and district, magistrate, and circuit judge of the purported 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”—because no government official or officer is authorized to construe “United States” to mean anything other than what it means in the Constitution; to wit:
“A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time. . . .
“Chief Justice Taney, in Dread Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426, said that, while the Constitution remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption; that it is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
“And in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-449, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, this court quoted these words with approval, and said:
“‘The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it met when adopted, it means now. . . .’” [Underline emphasis added.] Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-450 (1934).
The purported legislative act of Congress that says “United States” means “a Federal corporation,” i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 3002, is a hoax and bogus and void; to wit:
“It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . .
“. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
“. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.” [Underline emphasis added.] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).
A municipal (not federal / constitutional) judicial system and government
The 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States” also includes an agency, department, commission, board, instrumentality, or other entity of a Federal corporation.
The only Federal corporation that possesses agencies, departments, commissions, boards, instrumentalities, and other entities is the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.[1]
The District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, 16 Stat. 419, was created by Congress under authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution—but that is where the relationship between said corporation and the Constitution begins and ends, as the selfsame provision confers upon Congress power of exclusive (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) legislation within (what will be) the District of Columbia, and therefore carte blanche to legislate whatever they want for that municipal corporation within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.
The problem is, district, magistrate, and circuit judges of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation are extending their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of said Municipal Corporation’s existence at 16 Stat. 419, i.e., the District of Columbia, and usurping exercise of jurisdiction throughout the Union.
Courts constituted by Congress under authority of Article, I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the Constitution are courts of limited jurisdiction, exercising only personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, with no power of territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the Union; such jurisdiction being the exclusive domain of each respective member of the Union; to wit:
"[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic]. Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).
“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
As can be verified at any news outlet, however, the judges of today’s “United States” district courts usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over person and property throughout the Union on a daily basis.
There is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes any such act—and every one of Petitioner’s demands for constitutional authority in the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved over the last three and a half years has been met with silence.
Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer and Member of Congress requires the same religious test, “So help me God,” as a qualification to his respective office or public trust, none are authorized to assume or hold such office or public trust under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the purported statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the Federal corporation by the name of District of Columbia.
By reason of the oath of office mandated by Congress for justices and judges at 28 U.S.C. § 453 and the repugnancy of the religious test therein to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, no such justice or judge is an officer under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only a municipal officer under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), the Federal corporation by the name District of Columbia.
Whereas, there is nothing inherently wrong with a judicial officer of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation exercising general (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) jurisdiction within his territory (the District of Columbia), everything is wrong with such officer usurping exercise of general jurisdiction anywhere else, in places like Tyler County, Texas.
How the Lufkin judge disposed of Petitioner’s motion to vacate
The substance of Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate is laid out above.
As mentioned in the previous post (May 9, 2017), the M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction, is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the "United States" (District of Columbia) and make false allegations and cherry-pick immaterial facts which will support the "United States'" (District of Columbia's) position.
True to form, Ron Clark ignored all facts and failures relating to the religious test required of Michael H. Schneider as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution and on May 4, 2017, repudiated the meaning of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” and entered his Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate.
Most of the content of Ron Clark’s Memorandum Opinion and Order is a regurgitation of immaterial facts; the ruling is based on allegation for which there is no evidentiary support.
The only portion that relates directly to the substance of Petitioner’s motion is in the second paragraph on page two, where Clark alleges that Petitioner argues that (a) the phrase “So help me God” violates the religious-test provision of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b) the oath is not valid and the final judgment therefore void.
Inspection of Petitioner’s motion to vacate shows that Petitioner never used any form of the word “violate” in respect of the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider in its relation to Article VI, Clause3 of the Constitution or stated that the oath was not valid.
Rather, that the subject oath of office is insufficient as authority for Michael H. Schneider to assume or hold an office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, accede to “The judicial Power of the [organic] United States,” Constitution, Art. III, §1, or exercise the limited jurisdiction of an Article III court anywhere in the Union.
As stated in Petitioner’s motion and reply, the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider is benign and wholly valid for a territorial or municipal judge, but insufficient for a federal / constitutional judge by reason of requirement of a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution.
Having falsely attributed to Petitioner the aforesaid arguments fabricated by himself, Ron Clark then summarily dismissed Petitioner’s motion by slyly destructively declaring that “His arguments are meritless and not relevant to the judgment.”
Institutionalized piracy
The behavior exhibited by Ron Clark is systemic among all executive and judicial officers of what most people falsely believe are the executive and judicial branches of the government of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.
Because of the religious test required in the oath of office for every executive and judicial officer and the fraudulent “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) for which they all work and to which they are all beholden for a paycheck, all aforesaid officers are municipal employees ensconced in the legislative branch under the exclusive control of Congress and there is no de jure executive or judicial branch of the government as contemplated in the Constitution, no separation of powers, and no due process of law or remedy in any so-called United States district court anywhere in the Union.
All challenges of authority / jurisdiction are stonewalled via application of their general policy “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”
They are usurpers.
They are incorrigible
And the current municipal form of government is destructive of the unalienable rights of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”
This is why the only civilized short-term remedy for such institutionalized piracy is pre-judicial, i.e., commercial, under common-law rules, as outlined in the previous post, i.e., before matters arrive in the courts.
The American People are “joint tenants in the sovereignty,” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), and the Founding Fathers long ago provided them with the long-term remedy in the Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776: Abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a federal / constitutional form of government, with separation of powers, as contemplated by the Framers and established in the Constitution.
[1] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).
supremecourtcase | May 28, 2017 at 11:32 | Categories: Uncategorized |
URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-sZ
I thought I posted about this guy on this thread, but I can't find it now.
He is using this commercial lien process to silence our unlawful lieyers.
https://johnhenryhill.wordpress.com/about/
DONUTS, THE CUSTOMS-IMMIGRATION SERVICE (CIS), AND COMMERCIAL LIENS
January 31, 2015 · by JohnHenryHill · in Original Articles · Leave a comment
Donuts, the Customs-Immigration Service (CIS), and Commercial LiensMaxim of Law: “An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth.”
(My First Two Serious Adverse Encounters with DHS-CIS)
by John-Henry Hill, M.D.
August 11, 2014; Reposted January 30, 2015
First incident:
My first very serious adverse encounter with DHS-CIS started with a JOKE. I admit it: I joke around a LOT !!! It is just my nature. Prior to 2008 I had never had any serious problems re-entering the U.S. – only the occasional luggage searches and brief interrogations. Then on December 28, 2008 the first very serious incident occurred at Boston’s Logan Airport (on return flights from Odessa, Ukraine via Kiev and Amsterdam) I was waiting in line for the “passport check” (usually called “Passport Control” in most other countries), where they ask all manner of stupid questions. Several flights from abroad must have arrived within a short space of time, so the immense room was jammed full of travelers
(certainly in excess of a thousand) slowly shuffling along through a maze of those winding, roped off lines so often seen in large airports. As is my custom, I spoke with some people waiting in line nearby, wondering aloud if we would receive a piece of cheese as a reward after successfully navigating through this maze. I waited and waited and waited. Finally, there was only ONE guy left in front of me. He answered the custom officer’s questions dutifully, but then they began chatting about where the BEST DONUTS could be found in Kittery, Maine. (I used to vacation at a friend’s summer home in Kittery, so I was rather amused at first.) But their conversation went on and on… about the Kittery Trading Post … the old-fashioned candy shop, etc.
Finally it was my turn. The CIS officer looked at my passport, then asked the usual “Where ya been…etc.” questions. I answered his initial questions very politely, but then just couldn’t resist adding, “And yes, I have been to Kittery, but I don’t eat donuts.”
https://johnhenryhill.files.wordpres...pg?w=276&h=251
Out came his red felt pen – something I would fear seeing in the future. He wrote something on my “customs declaration form”, then told me to move on. Downstairs at the baggage claim, I retrieved my luggage, then spotted 2 armed officers briskly walking toward me. They told me I had to go with them; and I was escorted by them and 2 other armed officers into an interview room.
To make a long story short, I was questioned, threatened with arrest, insulted with extremely vulgar accusations (e.g., being a child rapist, child pornographer, drug dealer, etc.), insisted that I was “mentally disturbed” and might have me committed to a psychiatric hospital, and screamed at for over 6 hours by 4 armed men in this tiny room. My baggage, computer, mobile phone and everything else were torn apart and examined. Citing my “right to remain silent” guaranteed by the 5th Amendment to the Constitution,
I was repeatedly told that I was “officially NOT in the U.S. and therefore had NO rights”! I responded that if we were not in the U.S., then they had NO authority to detain me, search me and my belongings, or question me. I refused to answer any of their questions and repeatedly demanded to phone my lawyer. Finally, after 6 hours they let me go. I was extremely angry, but also exhausted by the incident. At that time my primary concern was simply getting home.
Second incident:
One night in July 7, 2009 the second very serious incident occurred. I again arrived at Logan Airport in Boston, MA from Kiev, Ukraine (via Paris’ CDG airport) after having visited my fiancée of 3 years and her son to celebrate my birthday. (We try to celebrate all of our birthdays together.)
At Passport Control, I answered every question the Customs officers asked of me, including the reasons for my visit. When he asked how much money I had with me, I answered that I did not know the exact amount, since it was in currencies of several different countries, but it was “most certainly not even close to the $10,000 limit”. (Only a very limited number of places in the Ukraine take credit cards.
Except for major tourist businesses, it is essentially a cash-based society; and by law all cash transactions must take place using the Ukrainian currency. In major shopping malls, restaurants and even supermarkets,
ATM’s and currency-exchange booths are abundantly located to convert credit/debit cards and foreign currencies into Ukrainian currency. On this trip ALL of my transactions were in cash – U.S. dollars, Ukrainian UAH and Euros. Further, as any frequent traveler knows, one ALWAYS loses money in any currency exchange, especially converting a foreign currency back into U.S. dollars. Therefore, it makes far more sense simply too keep the foreign currency for later use.) In any event, the Customs officer brusquely told me to give him a specific amount in dollars, to which I replied that I could give him only an estimate of about $2,000-3,000. He marked my Customs Declaration form with a red felt pen and told me to proceed.
Downstairs after claiming my checked bag, I looked over to the second Customs check line. A Customs officer RAN over to me (literally ran!), told me I had been “randomly selected” and escorted me to another Customs officer for inspection of me and my baggage. We remained at regular inspection station, with its X-ray scanner, where everyone’s baggage is examined, thus avoiding the dreaded “interview room”
– I was interrogated by 2 CIS officers in front of other arriving passengers.
Not wanting to be there all night, I answered every RELEVANT question asked by the 2 CIS officers, while 4 other armed CIS officers surrounded us. (But I refused to answer all irrelevant questions.) Why did I travel to the Ukraine so often? How could I afford it? Why go there for only 6 days this trip? After inspecting some old flight “tickets” still in my briefcase, why did I travel sometimes to only Kiev and other times to Odessa? I explained that on this trip my fiancée and I had met in Kiev due to time constraints: it would save me 2 days of travel time (i.e., sitting around in airports), plus allow us to look around Kiev.
The inspection of my bags was also very thorough, including removal of the linings of luggage. Computer CD’s containing photos of the trip, 2 computer games, 2 English-Russian language CD’s by Rosetta Stone, and a few music CD’s were taken and examined, as were my cell phone and camera. (I repeatedly explained that, since my fiancée had taken her computer with her, I chose not to take mine.) Every item in my possession was repeatedly examined. I was questioned in detail about 2 English-Russian dictionaries. Had I traveled to Russia? I finally convinced them that most Ukrainians spoke Russian rather than Ukrainian; that Ukraine had been part of the old Soviet Union and for centuries before that, a part of Russia; that Russian and Ukrainian languages were quite different; and my fiancée spoke only Russian and some English (and only her son spoke Ukrainian fluently from his schooling). The 2 Customs officers were demanding, but polite.
After approximately 5 hours, the 4 armed CIS officers left the scene. I was allowed pack my bags and leave. As I began walking away the primary Customs officer wished me a “Happy Birthday”. The second Customs officer then asked me in a surprised tone, “Is it your birthday?” I said, “Yes, that is why I went over there. I told you folks that several times.
But I was ‘randomly chosen’, right?” The second officer then said to the first officer [exact quote], “We did this to him on his BIRTHDAY? What BULLSHIT ! !” I turned around, smiled and waved “good-bye” to them, then walked out.
I filed a formal complaint through my lawyer with Janet Napolitano (then Secretary of Homeland Security), DHS-CIS, and finally with DHS-TRIP, but their replies were total bullshit. He suggested we sue DHS, but warned that it would be a very expensive and lengthy process with little hope of success.
Instead, I chose another tactic. I wrote and mailed sworn affidavits detailing the events and infringements on my rights (my “claims”) to each of the six (6) men involved in their private capacity; NOT as agents or officers of the DHS-CIS. Not one of the six men answered with any type of rebuttal – which is precisely what I had hoped for. At various time intervals over the next 3 months I mailed them additional documents, again receiving no responses. By these actions I had created commercial liens on all the assets of each of the six men in the amount of $40 million U.S. dollars per man – a total of $240 million.
The entire process took about three (3) months, and approximately 30 hours of research, writing, going to the post office, etc. In essence, I had “frozen” all of their assets (e.g., houses, cars, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, other investments and whatever) for the next 99 years; so they could neither sell them nor use them as collateral for any loans.
I next registered these commercial liens with the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), which legally converted each of these 6 commercial liens into “negotiable instruments” (similar to a bond or stock) which I could sell to anyone – even to a Wall Street investment bank. Had I then created a legal Trust, then placed these liens into that Trust, the 99 year expiration date would have been extended to “forever” – that is, NO expiration date.
(I could have instituted legal proceedings for the seizure (“levy”) of their assets, but that is a complex and difficult process that I would leave to someone else with the time and money.) The harassment continued on my returns to U.S. airports for few months, but was much milder until it suddenly stopped completely. All of their attempts to void these liens through the courts were unsuccessful. I finally lifted the liens about 3 years after the original incidents, but only after receiving written apologies from all 6 men (CIS officers), their supervisors and the Director of DHS-CIS.
It was about then that I decided that the U.S. was NO LONGER the same country in which I was born and raised. And I knew it would only get worse! So a few months later in 2009 I left America permanently. I was already permanently living outside the U.S. when the liens were voided by me.
From what I have read about events in the U.S. since then, it sounds like my decision was warranted.
And it all started with a JOKE. Go figure …
True story!
P.S. By the way, I still do NOT like donuts!
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
NOTES:
1.) The first question readers might ask, aside from whether this story is total bullshit, is how I recall the details of these events after 8 years. First, anticipating my lawyer’s wishes, the day after the first incident I wrote down everything I could recall about the incident in the airport the preceding evening and night. I then presented to my lawyer, who had it typed up as an affidavit, signed by me and two witnesses and then notarized by him – which he then filed in his office records.
On a subsequent flights back into the U.S., I made audio recordings (the recorder easy visible in my shirt pocket) of all my conversations with CIS personnel until I had exited the airport.
These recordings were then typed up into affidavits, duly signed, witnessed and notarized. These documents provided the detailed information we used in my in my formal complaints to Janet Napolitano, CIS, DHA and finally DHS-TRIP.
I still possess copies of those affidavits and transcripts of the audio recordings, as well as the formal complaints sent to the above federal officials and agencies. These documents were meant to be used by my lawyer in filing a civil suit. It was not until later when I was researching and creating the commercial liens that I discovered how essential they were to me, especially if the 6 men responded with affidavits of rebuttal. Under the ancient maximum of law,
“Claims made without accountability are void.” (In order to have any credibility, the claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims proved to be false. In fact, in the Common Law and Commercial Law (as opposed to statutory law as legislated acts), the more one places himself at risk in any claim, the greater the presumption that his claim is truthful.) In other words, should these 6 men be able to refute my claims by their sworn affidavits, backed up by affidavits from other witnesses and such evidence as airport audio and/or video tapes, I would be financially “screwed” for life.
2.) About the “Commercial Lien Process”
The process of initiating a commercial lien begins with writing an affidavit of truth, signed under oath, in which you (the “affiant”) make a “claim” by stating the facts of an incident(s) and describe how you were injured (your charges) by the actions of another man or woman (the “accused”). The commercial lien process requires NO court action or judge’s approval.
In fact, the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) is a totally private contract matter. CAP is a pre-common law process. It is also referred to as a “commercial law process,” not to be confused with the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and other statutes, rules and regulations. It is a pre-common law process because until there is a disagreement, there is no dispute. All that is being done is the establishment of claims and obligations.
The purpose of the CAP is to make claims and determine if the accused agrees or not. If the Accused does not contest the claims, there is no dispute to be adjudicated; thus the appropriate damages are consensually agreed-upon. Thus it is pre-judicial. It may also be completely non-judicial if it is properly (composed of unrebuttable truth) and successfully implemented.
The Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) places the full power of justice back in the hands of the common man. It cannot be overstated that the whole Commercial Affidavit Process is not dependent on the court system. It functions quite well on its own OUTSIDE the current legal system.
Although the government court system MAY have an essential part to play once the Commercial Affidavit has been served AND ANSWERED (rebutted point-by-point in a sworn affidavit by the accused), that government court system is not and cannot be invoked until the charges in the affidavit have been answered by sworn affidavit with a point-by-point rebuttal. A disagreement could arise only from such a rebuttal by the accused. Until that point, THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT TO ADJUDICATE. Thus, it remains a totally private matter. A failure to rebut via affidavit is acquiescence: a contractual agreement that the affiant’s original affidavit was truthful and has been accepted by the accused as a contract under Commercial Law. The subsequent failure by the accused to answer the affiant’s claims for damages then leads to a “default judgment” for the affiant – as far the law is concerned, the matter is settled and can NOT be revisited by either the affiant or the accused.. It is a private contract which neither party has disputed within a timely manner; and, without any dispute, the courts have no jurisdiction of any kind.
In short, if the accused issues no affidavit of rebuttal, he agrees with the affiant’s affidavit (acquiescence – even by silence), and the affiant wins automatically. If the accused fails to respond within a stated time period (let’s say 14 days) to the affiant’s sworn Affidavit of truth by means of his own sworn affidavit in which he rebuts each of the affiant’s claims point-by-point, then the accused has in law agreed with the affiant’s claims by default and is liable for the damages claimed by the affiant. Maxim of Law: “An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth in Law.” Therefore, by the accused NOT rebutting point-by-point in his own sworn affidavit each claim of the affiant, under the ancient Laws of Commerce the accused has ALREADY agreed that the affiant’s claims are the truth. At that point, the NO court can intervene, since there is NO disagreement to adjudicate.
Applicable MAXIMS of law are:
A man may not with impunity infringe upon another man’s rights.
A matter must be expressed to be resolved.
Truth is expressed in the form of an affidavit.
(This is the reason that under the Common Law in America and guaranteed by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, NO arrest or search warrant can be issued unless a signed affidavit sworn as the truth under oath (a contract), along with some objective evidence of a crime (“probable cause”) is submitted to a court, after which a judge, also acting under oath, may issue the warrant with his signature. As agents of the government, both the police officer and the judge are protected from civil suits by “limited commercial immunity” granted by statutes and thereby relieved of “full and unlimited commercial liability” by the commercial bonds purchased on their behalf by the government.
However, this limited immunity is valid only as long as they did not exceed the powers of office lawfully granted to them.)
4th Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
An affidavit must be rebutted point-for-point.
An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth.
“He, who does not object, consents.”
Truth stands supreme.
Claims made without accountability are void. (The claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims proved to be false.)
“In law none is credited unless he is sworn. All the facts must, when established by witnesses, be under oath or affirmation.”
“There is no stronger bond between men than an oath.”
“They are perjured, who, preserving the words of an oath,deceive the ears of those who receive it.”
“An oath is a contract in law.”
“An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth in Law.”
While the battle continues, he who first leaves the field or refuses to contend loses by default. (The man who quits first loses; the last-man-standing wins.)
and most importantly
All are equal under the Law. (judges, police, etc. as MEN have NO extra rights)
Like the police, these six CIS officers (as federal agents) are granted by U.S. statutes “limited immunity” from civil suits in government, public courts when “in performance of their official duties”. What most police and, obviously these six men, failed to realize is that the Commercial Affidavit Process is a pre-judicial process; it is a private contract between men in their private capacities under “complete and unlimited commercial liability” by all parties involved – NOT in their capacities as officers of government with “limited immunity”. It depends on NO statutes and does NOT involve any court. In a “nutshell”, I made a “claim” by written, sworn affidavits against each of these 6 men in their private capacities in which I detailed the harm caused to me by them and the damages (reparations) I sought from each man to “make me whole”. I offered them a CONTRACT via sworn affidavit and by NOT responding to my “offer to contract” they fell into “dishonor” AND thereby unwittingly accepted my contract AND agreed to all the claims within my affidavit as the truth in law.
It needs to be thoroughly understood that because it is driven by SWORN TRUTH, the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) is outside the jurisdiction of any equity court. It is a private contract matter. Should an attempt be made by anyone, including a judge or anyone else, to involve an equity court it would result in a trespass against the Affiant’s rights. Consequently, those interfering individuals who were unlawfully trying to insert themselves into the controversy, could easily be added as additional “lien debtors” to the 6 commercial liens and their assets “frozen” as well – simply by adding their names and a brief description of their interference on the back of each lien .
An equity court has no jurisdiction whatsoever, for the CAP is strictly a non-judicial or pre-judicial process between individuals and is private.
It should also be emphasized that this process is not to be undertaken lightly. Under the maxim “Claims made without accountability are void.” (The claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims),
I have taken a great risk should my claims be proved false.
One should NOT hire an attorney (whose primary duty is to the court, since he is an “officer of the court”.)
By NOT hiring an attorney, you avoid becoming a “client” (by definition, a “ward of the court” by reason of “mental incompetence”),
The commercial lien, which is authorized both by the Common Law and by Title 15 of the United States Code (USC); and is similar to the lien the IRS uses to take Americans’ homes, cars, savings, etc. However, instead of depending on Title 15 (which would grant the government courts some jurisdiction over the case), one should base your commercial lien process solely upon the Common Law of negotiable instruments (a.k.a. Commercial Law or Law of Commerce).
And since NO attorney is allowed to speak in a Common Law court (except as a witness with direct, personal knowledge of events), the hiring of an attorney would be a waste of money. (It is completely unrelated to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.))
Since CAP is strictly a non-judicial or pre-judicial process between individuals and is PRIVATE, it’s almost impossible to remove a commercial lien without the approval of the individual claimant who filed the lien. Although a commercial lien can be challenged by a Common Law court or by a 7th Amendment trial by jury in a court operating under the Common Law (a true “court of record”, meaning statutes and regulations do NOT apply), it does not require a court process or a court judgment for its establishment, validity, or execution. Therefore, the courts can NOT simply extinguish this lien on their own discretion (or on motion from the lien debtors) without the voluntary approval of the person who filed the lien.
(7th Amendment: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”)
Traditionally, these liens can only be removed by (1) the voluntary decision of the person who filed the lien, (2) by the decision of a constitutional Common Law trial by jury (a true “Court of Record”), or (3) by waiting 99 or 100 years. Since the Common Law has been smothered in the U.S.A., almost all judges are essentially powerless to overcome the commercial liens since they have no knowledge of the procedures of a Common Law court (a true “court of record”). Further, in a Common Law court the “judge” can act ONLY as an administrator of the proceedings; he can NOT act as the “tribunal” under any circumstances. ONLY the “tribunal” (the plaintiff/affiant or the 12-man jury, if requested by the accused) can issue any orders, issue contempt citations, render verdicts, or make any other decisions for the court. If the “judge” exceeds his authority as the administrator (for example, by issuing any order or rendering a verdict, the “tribunal” may void that order or verdict by simply issuing an order voiding the judge’s order. If the judge persists in such actions, the tribunal may issue a “contempt of court” order against him and order his arrest and/or a fine. And anyone (such a police officer, the “judge”, court bailiff, sheriff or anyone else who obstructs the “contempt of court” order can be added as one of the “accused” on the commercial lien – and even prosecuted in a Common Law court.
Now, it was extremely unlikely that I would ever collect the $40 million judgment (to which they had agreed simply by their non-responses to my initial affidavits) from each of these six men. However, simply by filing these liens with a county clerk’s office, registering these liens with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and by placing notices to the public in a few newspapers (and keeping evidence of these such public notices), I had converted these 6 liens into “negotiable instruments” (like stocks or bonds) which I then could have sold for cash to anyone, including investment companies (as on Wall Street), banks, insurance companies, and so on
What would have happened if I had sold the six commercial liens to an investment bank, insurance company or whatever? Since the commercial liens (registered with the SEC) were $20 million per man, the total amounted to $240 million. Now, if I approached a broker from an investment bank and asked him to sell these liens on my behalf, he would certainly NOT quote me a price of $240 million. Because of the high risk involved regarding the eventual recovery of this $240 million, he would likely offer between 1-3 percent maximum of the nominal value, that is, between $2.4 million and $7.2 million maximum in cash. (And since it was an award or reparation for damages – “to make one whole” – that money paid to me would NOT be subject to taxes.)
That is a LOT of money! That investor might then re-sell the liens for a greater amount OR, more likely, use it as collateral for loans which with to make other investments, thereby leveraging this $240 million commercial lien (as it very common among large investment banks today, at a 20 to 1 ratio) into $4,800 million (i.e., $4.8 billion). Because of this fact, it would be more lucrative for any investment bank NOT to go to court in an attempt to levy the $240 million from these six men! (Now you know why the investment bankers on Wall Street are so filthy rich!)
Thus, the personal assets of the six men would remain “frozen” for the next 99 years. Now, had I been the vindictive type and actually sought to have someone make a REAL attempt to collect the $240 million from the six men, among my options would be to donate the liens to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Since the IRS is forbidden by U.S statutes from “hypothecating” such liens and, as we all know, is famous (or infamous) for its ability and experience in seizing the assets of people, it certainly would have attempted to seize all the assets of these six men. And had these six men attempted to stop such seizures using the courts, under Commercial Law and U.S. statutes, the men had ALREADY agreed to and admitted that they owed the $240 million. Case closed. Assets seized.
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3.) Sources of information:
There are numerous articles and books, many available for free on the Internet, explaining the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) and Commercial Lien Process. As a non-attorney, that is how I taught myself the theory and procedures; and used so many sources that I will mention only a few. I did NOT use an attorney.
See my essay below on this blog below titled, “COMMERCIAL LIENS: The MOST POTENT WEAPON by Alfred Adask et al 1995”
Another good article comes from BILL THORTON (of www.1215.org ) – perhaps the BEST web site regarding the Common Law:
COMMERCIAL_LIEN__Application_of_COMMERCIAL_LAW___B ILL_THORNTON_1215-org
There are also numerous VIDEOS posted on various Internet web sites, including on YouTube.com. Many of these videos are not very informative and/or simply incorrect. Perhaps the best VIDEO explaining the mechanics of the Commercial Lien Process (as applicable in Britain, although the process in America is almost identical) is “Commercial Maritime Liens” by Simon (aka, “El Spaniardo” or “WhiteRabbitTrust”). I could only locate this video as reposted by “John Smith” using the title, “Commercial Liens The Most Potent Commercial Weapon”, so I presume El Spaniardo’s previous postings were deleted. The video is currently available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJnEDT3jsI8
Another source of information on Commercial Liens (as well as the Common Law in general) are the video interviews of Karl Lentz, specifically “Karl Lentz 59 – Commercial lien process vs. common law process”available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3h8T5WQwS0M However, I have found Mr. Lentz rather vague and far less organized in his presentations than El Spaniardo (aka, Simon and WhiteRabbitTrust)
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