Docket and record, Houston and Lufkin Division Federal tax cases.
Houston Division case:
Not until shortly after Petitioner filed in the Supreme Court did Petitioner discover the obscure artifice used by the district judge to justify pretending that Petitioner is a resident of the geographic area in which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division is authorized to exercise jurisdiction: the District of Columbia.
You did not misunderstand the previous sentence.
The only geographic area in which any contemporary United States District Court in America has jurisdiction is the District of Columbia.
The supreme political authority in America is the American People (Declaration of Independence, Conclusion; Constitution, Preamble), referred to by the Supreme Court as “joint tenants in the sovereignty”; to wit:
“[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793).
The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, however—as ordained by the American People (the “Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty”) in the Constitution (Article 1 § 8(17))—is Congress.
Whereas, there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes Congress to legislate rules or regulations (statutes) against Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty, this is not so with residents of the District of Columbia—who are subject to any legislation Congress may impose on them.
To ensnare Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty in the banker-contrived artifice of income tax in behalf of their banker creditor, Congress enacted recondite[1] legislation that would foreclose Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty from fully comprehending the law, by transmuting certain everyday words into statutory terms with a convoluted or constitutionally opposite definition and meaning, and formulating statutes (and statutory definitions) using obscure rules of statutory construction to guarantee maximum complexity—thereby allowing Federal executive and judicial officers to operate within the “letter of the law” and justify treating Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty as residents of the District of Columbia, but without having to explain what they are doing.
“Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur. One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow,”[2] and today we are dealing, literally, with an infinity of absurdities foisted upon us in the wake of the initial absurdity perpetrated by Congress June 30, 1864 (described in detail in both the Houston and Lufkin Record).
On that date, Congress quietly decreed that the word “state” (and shortly thereafter “State” and “United States”) means “the territories and the District of Columbia” (13 Stat. 223, 306, ch. 173, sec. 182, June 30, 1864 [Go to “Turn to image” 306])—but ultimately translates to the District of Columbia only and excludes by design all commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union.
Since June 30, 1864, any Joint Tenant in the Sovereignty (you) who innocently believes or admits that he resides in a state, State, or the United States, unwittingly confesses or concedes that he is a resident of the District of Columbia—and subject to the absolute, exclusive legislative power of Congress and jurisdiction of District of Columbia executive and bench officers (Department of Justice attorneys and United States District Judges and Magistrates).
Congress incorporated the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation February 21, 1871,[3] and have ruled the District of Columbia under municipal (Roman civil) law ever since.
Petitioner had the Houston Division case won following Petitioner’s initial March 19, 2014, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Houston Docket #18)—because there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner was a resident of the only statutory “State” of the statutory “United States” whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C.: the District of Columbia.
The judge stacked the deck against Petitioner by commanding sua sponte[4] the DOJ attorney to file in the record what the judge would use sub silentio[5] to justify pretending that he was authorized to treat Petitioner as a resident of the District of Columbia: one of Petitioner’s tax returns.
Courtesy of Congress, the filing of a tax return is one of an indefinite number of undefined “acts or statements” that purportedly prove “a definite intention to acquire residence in the [statutory] United States” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii)), i.e., the District of Columbia.
In combination with legally defective congressional legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013(g) and (h), actors in government pretend that the filing of a tax return constitutes one’s voluntary election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia, and thereafter pretend that they are authorized to treat the filer as such without disclosing what they are doing.