Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction

[palani]

Anybody who participates in Social Security is subject to the income tax (at source).

If you have income you are subject to income tax. Social security is a recent innovation (relatively speaking) but income tax was introduced in the U.S. during the (un)Civil War. It was brought over from England who started the practice in the early 1800's.

Point being ... you don't need a SSN to owe tax.

http://i66.tinypic.com/2a5dtas.jpg

IRS forms are used for many many types of constitutional taxes.

You are mistaking the IRS for TREASURY. Don't mistake the agent for the principal.

"Entities" mean nothing and have no bearing.

Articulating a right or accepting an obligation creates a legal entity. If you lived in a world with no rights or obligations you would find no entities. Entities are created. A corporation is a legal entity. A person is a legal entity. A declaration of citizenship is a legal entity. Applying for a benefit such as Social Security creates an entity.

Once you start creating these things you are hooked as if on a drug. You create probably 100 entities a day and you do so without realizing this fact.

[monty]

UPDATE: Judge was a no-show

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.c...-hearing-date/


Houston Judge a no-show on appointed hearing-date

NOVEMBER 24, 2015SUPREMECOURTCASELEAVE A COMMENTThe Houston Division case is the initial case and the one that Petitioner appealed to the Fifth Circuit and, thereafter, the Supreme Court.


When the Supreme Court declined to review the decision of the Fifth Circuit, who affirmed the judgment in the Houston Division, Petitioner returned to the Houston Court and filed a motion to vacate the original Judgment and Order (Houston Dkt. #82), as void for multiple reasons.


The hearing date for the motion was set for September 30, 2015.


On September 29, 2015, the Houston Judge made a ruling and entered an Order (Houston Dkt. #83) denying the motion.


A month later, on October 28, 2015, Petitioner filed in the Houston Division case, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate the Court’s May 23, 2014, Amended Final Judgment (Dkt. #53) and Order of Sale and Vacature (Dkt. #54) as Void for (a) Lack of Constitutional Authority that gives the Court the Capacity to Take Jurisdiction and Enter Judgments, Orders, and Decrees in Favor of the United States Arising from a Civil or Criminal Proceeding Regarding a Debt, in Harris County, Texas, and (b) Denial of Due Process of Law (the “October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate”) (hyperlinked below).


The contents of the October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate are substantially identical to those of Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, Lufkin Division Objection and Demand—in response to which the Lufkin Court and plaintiff disappeared and declined to participate any further.


The October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate was docketed and a hearing set for November 18, 2015 (Houston Dkt. #84).


November 18, 2015, however, came and went with no word from the Houston Judge.


The Houston Court (as every other United States District Court in America) is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction with authority only in the District of Columbia (for proof of this fact, see Houston Division Record, Fifth Circuit Record, Supreme Court Record, or Lufkin Division Record), masquerading as a judicial-branch Article III constitutional court of limited jurisdiction (of which, since no later than June 25, 1948, there are no more: see 28 U.S.C. 132 and parenthesized legislative history thereunder).


In every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court in America, “United States” means a Federal Corporation (28 U.S.C. 3002(15))—and the supreme Federal corporation, over all other Federal corporations and other Federal entities of any kind, is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation (inc. February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419).


Every United States District Court in America, such as the Houston Court, is a District of Columbia Municipal Corporation tribunal, expounding and enforcing municipal (Roman civil) law, beyond the boundaries fixed therefor by the Constitution at Article 4 § 3(2): “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”—such as the District of Columbia.


Neither Harris County, Texas (in the Houston Division case), nor Tyler County, Texas (in the Lufkin Division case), is situate within “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”


The only geographic area in which any United States District Court anywhere in America is authorized to hear and decide cases is the District of Columbia—and every such “court” is a kangaroo court[1]operating under color[2] of law, office, and authority, deceiving and extorting the American People, with no constitutional authority to be doing business in any county, parish , or borough in America.


When cornered, District of Columbia Municipal Corporation legislative-branch officers—e.g., Federal judges, magistrates, and DOJ officers—routinely fall back on the policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”


This approach, however, will not work under these circumstances for all Federal officers.


Whereas, the Lufkin DOJ attorneys can disregard with impunity Petitioner’s Demand for the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and walk away from the case; the Lufkin Judge enjoys no such luxury: He cannot ignore his responsibility to attend to and conclude the case and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or (h)(3) or 41(b), without violating his oath of office; to wit:


“I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.” [Underline emphasis added.] 5 U.S.C. 3331 Oath of office.


There is, however, a bigger situation:

• The most important policy—over all others—in the Federal judicial system is to maintain the appearance of impartiality (not impartiality per se, only the appearance thereof);

• No one in government has come forward with the constitutional authority that gives any United States District Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt (28 U.S.C. 3002(8)), in any county, parish, or borough in America;

• The reason no one in government has come forward is that there exists no such constitutional authority[3];

• It is not possible to have a fair proceeding in a kangaroo court;

• Every United States District Court in America is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction, usurping exercise of jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area;

• Every United States District Court in America is a kangaroo court;

• The Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction can be concealed no longer; and

• The appearance of impartiality is crumbling under the weight of fraud and treason to the Constitution.

The reason the Houston Judge failed to rule on Petitioner’s October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate (hyperlinked below) as appointed on November 18, 2015, in Houston Dkt. #84, is that anything he may say that actually addresses the issue set forth in the motion—either for or against Petitioner—will amount to a confession of fraud and treason to the Constitution.


But as with the Lufkin Judge, the Houston Judge’s oath of office requires that he make a ruling on Petitioner’s October 28, 2015, motion within a reasonable time—or be in violation thereof.


The Lufkin Division case is over in substance, DOJ attorneys having abandoned the case and the Lufkin Judge having violated his of oath of office (70 days of silence, despite the duty to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction within a reasonable time).


The clock is ticking in the Houston Division.


Having been defrauded and deprived of Petitioner’s real and personal property in the Houston Division case under color of law, office, and authority, by way of complicity among the Houston Judge, Fifth Circuit Judges, and Supreme Court Justices, Petitioner is active in rectifying matters and will report all developments on this webpage as they occur.
Houston Motion To Vacate, October 28, 2015
* * *
Bonus:
Jeff Rense interviews John Trowbridge on RenseRadio.com (Nov. 16, 2015)

[Ares]

Awesome update. Although the corner he got them in there really is no way for them to remove themselves from without admitting to treason.

This is an interesting case which I will be monitoring for a while.

Madfranks or JohnQPublic would it be possible to sticky this thread so that it doesn't get buried?

This I feel is a landmark case and could be used against any federal district court.

[monty]

Awesome update. Although the corner he got them in there really is no way for them to remove themselves from without admitting to treason.

This is an interesting case which I will be monitoring for a while.

Madfranks or JohnQPublic would it be possible to sticky this thread so that it doesn't get buried?

This I feel is a landmark case and could be used against any federal district court.

I certainly have to agree. I think all anyone with a case in a federal court in any one of the fifty states needs to do is use this man's demand to show Constitutional authority and their case will stop dead in its tracks.

I imagine the feds are scrambling trying to come up with with another scheme to maintain thier control over the people.

[boogietillyapuke]

The Fifth Circuit cuts straight to the chase:“Silence can ... be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . .” U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032 (5th Circuit, 1970).

[monty]

Update Dec.15, 2015


The lesson they do not teach in law schools or high school civics classes: the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction


DECEMBER 15, 2015SUPREMECOURTCASELEAVE A COMMENT

• Part 1: Article III federal courts versus United States District Courts

The Constitution creates the judicial power of the national government at Article 3 § 1 and delineates the character of the controversies to which the judicial power extends at Article 3 § 2(1); to wit, respectively and in pertinent part:


“Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. . . .


“Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States will be a party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.


In a judicial sense, “jurisdiction” (from the Latin jus right, dictio act of saying) means, essentially, the legal power, right, or authority of a court to hear and decide causes and pronounce the sentence of the law within a certain geographic area; to wit:


“forum . . . 2 a : a judicial body or assembly . . . b : the territorial jurisdiction of a court forum before personal jurisdiction may be exercised — National Law Journal” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated: Springfield, Mass., 1996), p. 201.


“—Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed. . . .” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul. Minn., 1910) (hereinafter “Black’s 2nd”), p. 673.


The true distinction between courts is as to species of jurisdiction, i.e., either general or limited; to wit:


“General jurisdiction is that which extends to a great variety of matters. General jurisdiction in law and equity is jurisdiction of every kind that a court can possess, of the person, subject-matter, [and] territorial . . .

“. . . Limited jurisdiction (called, also, special and inferior) is that which extends only to certain specified causes.” [Emphasis in original.] John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.: 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 1761.


“—Limited jurisdiction. . . . The true distinction between courts is between such as possess a general and such as have only a special jurisdiction for a particular purpose . . .” Black’s 2nd, p. 673.


It is well settled that trial courts ordained and established by Congress under authority of Article III of the Constitution, supra, are courts of limited jurisdiction, with authority only over certain controversies; to wit:

• “The character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are delineated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. . . .” Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd., v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982).

• “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006).

• “[T]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States,411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 401; Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182, 319 U. S. 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).

• “It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 374.

• “The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction . . .” Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830).

• “[S]tate courts are courts of general jurisdiction . . . . By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 43 6 F.3d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 2006).

Whereas: Only courts with territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) can take cognizance of civil and criminal causes; and


Whereas: All Article III federal trial courts are courts of limited jurisdiction (certain controversies only),


Wherefore: No trial court ordained and established by Congress under Article III of the Constitution is authorized to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes.


Notwithstanding the above blackletter law,[1] Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure Section 3002 Definitions provides, in pertinent part:


“As used in this chapter:
“. . . (8) ‘Judgment’ means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.”


Whereas: No inferior trial court ordained and established by Congress under authority of Article III of the Constitution is invested with territorial jurisdiction; and


Whereas: No Article III federal trial court has the territorial jurisdiction necessary to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising from a civil or criminal proceeding; and
Whereas: Every United States District Court (28 U.S.C. 132(a)) located throughout the Union takes cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enters judgments arising therefrom; and


Whereas: No Federal trial court can take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising therefrom unless authorized to do so by the Constitution; and


Whereas: Article III of the Constitution is devoid of such authority,


Wherefore: No United States District Court is an Article III court—and we must look elsewhere in the Constitution for the authority that gives United States District Courts the territorial jurisdiction necessary to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, as authorized by statute in 28 U.S.C. 3002(8).

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.c...urisdiction-2/

[Glass]

“Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;

Because all activity in the US is under Admiralty and Maritime, this is how they do it. The extension of the 100 mile constitution free zone is an example of extending maritime reach inland. Highways are often classified as waterways which project inland and all "traffic" is considered to be maritime and subject to interdiction as per the rules of Admiralty.

[monty]

Part 2,

• Part 2: Treason to the Constitution

The only provision of the Constitution that grants Congress power to create inferior courts with territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising therefrom, is an implied authority, Article 4 § 3(2), also known as the territorial clause; to wit, in pertinent part:


“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .”


Whereas: As granted in Article 1 § 8(17) of the Constitution (infra), Congress have power of exclusive legislation (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (supra); to wit:


“Section 8. The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings;”; and


Whereas: The full extent of the “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (id. at 4 § 3(2)) today is the collective of:

• the District of Columbia;

• Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS, Sand Island, Kingman Reef, and Navassa Island [2]; and

• any other “Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings” ( at 1 § 8(17)); and

Whereas: All courts created by Congress under authority of Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution are legislative Article IV territorial courts of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction); and


Whereas: Every United States District Court is authorized by statute (28 U.S.C. 3002(8)) to exercise general jurisdiction and take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt; and


Whereas: Every United States District Court is authorized at Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution to exercise territorial jurisdiction and “dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations [statutes] respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”; and


Whereas: Every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union—numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959—is situate without all “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (id.), and


Whereas: There is no constitutional authority for any United States District Court to exercise territorial jurisdiction and take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt anywhere within the exterior limits of the geographic area occupied by the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union; and


Whereas: Every United States District Court doing business within the exterior limits of the Union is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction, under the exclusive control Congress, extending its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed therefor by the Constitution at Article 4 § 3(2) (“Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”), and usurping exercise of jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area (the Union), under color[3] of law, office, and authority, and therefore a kangaroo court[4]; and


Whereas: “We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution,” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821),


Wherefore: Every single Congressman, Federal bench officer, and Department of Justice attorney is in violation of his oath of office and culpable for, among numerous other crimes and high crimes: fraud; misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance in public office; misprision of felony; misprision of treason; and treason to the Constitution.

• Part 3: Legislative fraud on the part of Congress; connivance therewith on the part of Federal bench officers and Department of Justice attorneys

The only 26 U.S.C.7701(a)(10) “State”[5] of the 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) “United States”[6] whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code is the Title 26 U.S.C. State of District of Columbia.[7]


Notwithstanding the above statutory fact, bench officers in the Federal judiciary and attorneys in the Department of Justice treat virtually every American as a resident of the District of Columbia: liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code and subject to all other Federal rules and regulations.


Said Federal officers justify this by construing / interpreting any of an unknown number of “acts and statements” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii)) arising in the course of normal and ordinary interaction between individual Americans and government agencies / programs, as evidence of “a definite intention to acquire residence in the [26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9)] United States” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii)), i.e., the District of Columbia.


Such “acts and statements” include evidence created through the application of one’s signature to a driver’s license application, voter registration form, tax return, application for Social Security benefits, IRS Form W-4, passport application, and any other of the myriad government forms one encounters in the course of his life—and require that the applicant certify that he is a citizen or resident of the (statutory) United States or resident of a (statutory) State.[8]


Americans who make such “acts and statements” are deemed to have made a general election (comprehensive choice) to be (1) treated as a resident of the District of Columbia under general legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013(g)(1) or (h)(1), (2) liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Chapters 1 Normal taxes and surtaxes and 24 Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages, and (3) subject to all legislation within the 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) “United States” (District of Columbia only), not just income-tax statutes; to wit:


“Quando lex est specialis, ratio autem generalis, generaliter lex est intelligenda. When the law is special, but its reason is general, the law is to be understood generally.” Bouvier’s, p. 2156.


We learn from the Supreme Court, however, that such “legislation” is legally fatally flawed, and therefore ultimately unenforceable—because no one can elect (choose)—or appear to elect—to be treated as a resident of a particular place for the purpose of taxation (or any other purpose) without also having a factual presence in that location; to wit:


“When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose of taxation. . . .” Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).


To acquire residence in a particular place one must do one of two things: (1) establish bodily presence as an inhabitant (by taking up housekeeping in a fixed and permanent abode), or (1) realize earnings (by way of permanency of occupation) from a source located therein.


Wherefore: It is clear that Congress have another master than the American People—and that every Federal bench officer and DOJ attorney is in connivance with Congress and complicit in the legislative fraud and treason to the Constitution

• Part 4: Dealing with the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction

That the statutes of Congress may authorize United States Attorneys to bring suit in United States District Court is insufficient, in and of itself, to vest jurisdiction in any such court; to wit:


“So, we conclude, as we did in the prior case, that, although these suits may sometimes so present questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States that the Federal courts will have jurisdiction, yet the mere fact that a suit is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal courts.” Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900).


It is well settled that before a federal judge can rely on the authority of a statute for jurisdiction to hear and decide a particular cause, said judge must confirm that the Constitution has given him the capacity to take it; to wit:


“It remains rudimentary law that “[a]s regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. . . . To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.” The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1868) (emphasis added); accord, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Co., 486 U.S. 800, 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2179, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-380, 101 S.Ct. 669, 676-677, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82-83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922); Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577-578, 586-587, 21 L.Ed. 914 (1874); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845); McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506, 3 L.Ed. 420 (1813). [Underline emphasis only added.] Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).


Bereft of lawful authority, United States District Courts located within the Union depend utterly upon the ability of their respective bench officers to prevaricate,[9] dissemble,[10] and sidestep issues that would destroy the charade of legitimacy and appearance of impartiality.


Until Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, Objection and Demand and September 30, 2015, Demand for Dismissal, Petitioner had never heard of a Department of Justice attorney failing to respond to a challenge of jurisdiction or a United States District Judge refusing to rule on a motion or abandoning an ongoing case (and failing to provide otherwise for its disposition).


But that is what happened in the Lufkin Division case (see October 28, 2015, post, infra).


Here is the reason:


Anything either DOJ attorney would have said, whether for or against Petitioner’s demand for the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority, would have amounted to admission of fraud or treason to the Constitution or proof of incompetence.


Whereas, DOJ attorneys can back out of a case without incident, this is not so for a United States District Judge; to wit:


“Judicis officium est opus diei in die suo perficere. It is the duty if a judge to finish the work of each day within that day.” Bouvier’s, p. 2140.
“Boni judicis est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite oritur, et interest republicæ ut sint fines litium. It is the duty of a good judge to prevent litigations, that suit may not grow out of suit, and it concerns the welfare of a state that an end be put to litigation.” Id. at 2127.


The Lufkin Judge has a duty not only to Petitioner, but to the American Republic—by way of his oath of office (5 U.S.C. 3331), to“bear true faith and allegiance” (id.) to the Constitution and “well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office” (id.) of United States District Judge—and conclude the instant litigation:


“When it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach the merits. In such a situation the action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Melo v. U.S., 505 F.2d 1026.
Instead, the Lufkin Judge went silent.


The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (to whom Petitioner would appeal for resolution of the instant unresolved motion), explains in United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir., 1970), the significance of the Lufkin Judge’s silence:


“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.24


“. . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani,265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S. 918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3 L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f., Avery v. Clearly, 132 U.S. 604, 10 S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694, 698 (5th Cir. 1969); American Nat’l Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1967).”


Presently, there is a neglected unresolved motion on both the Lufkin and Houston Division Docket.


Notwithstanding the fraudulent statutory definitions of “State” throughout the United States Code, “We are bound to interpret the constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted,” Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).


Wherefore, no United States District Judge has constitutional authority to expound or enforce Federal statutes in Texas or any other of the “several States of the Union” (infra) against any American residing there or property located there; to wit:


“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State[of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).


“Judici officium suum excedenti non paretur. To a judge who exceeds his office (or jurisdiction) no obedience is due,” Bouvier’s, p. 2140, and, as demonstrated hereinabove and elsewhere in this webpage, every United States District Judge and Magistrate in every United States District Court within the Union, in connivance with Congress and conspiracy with officers of the Department of Justice, is exceeding his jurisdiction, beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution, at Article 4 § 3(2), for Federal trial courts of general jurisdiction, and perpetrating the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction.


“Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam. He who uses his legal rights harms no one,” id. at 2157, and there is nothing prohibiting any other litigant from making the same demands as Petitioner, in any other Federal case, civil or criminal, anywhere in the Union.


No United States District Judge or Magistrate can reply responsively (meaningfully) to a demand for dismissal of a Federal case, civil or criminal, within the Union, for lack of constitutional authority that gives the particular United States District Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in the defendant’s particular county, parish, or borough, without also producing evidence of serious wrongdoing on his part.


Evidently, the Lufkin and Houston Judges have “taken the Fifth” sub silentio[11] and refused to answer their respective unresolved motion on the ground that it may tend to incriminate them.


The Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction can be concealed no longer.


Petitioner is in the process of rectifying matters in these cases, and will report developments as they occur.


* * * *


[1] blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief, (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999) (hereinafter “Black’s 7th”), p. 163.


[2] U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, (1) “All OIA Jurisdictions,” and (2) “U.S. Territories under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Jurisdiction or Shared with Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS): (1) http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/index.cfm, (2) http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/islandfactsheet2.cfm, respectively.


[3] COLOR. An appearance, semblance, or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real. A prima facie or apparent right. Hence a deceptive appearance ; a plausible, assumed exterior, concealing a lack of reality ; a guise or pretext. . . . Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891) (hereinafter “Black’s 1st”), p. 222.


[4] kangaroo court. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding. Black’s 7th, p. 359.


[5] The 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) States are the bodies politic of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and no other. Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, pp. 8–14.


[6] The 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) United States is the collective of the geographic area occupied by the bodies politic of the six respective 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) States, supra, fn. 5. Id.


[7] Id. at 15. (Continued)

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[monty]

Definitions continued:

[8] In all Federal law, “State” is a statutory term and means, ultimately, the District of Columbia, id.., which is why use of “State” is avoided in this webpage.

Unpunctuated, grammatically incorrect, two-capital-letter United States Postal Service (“U.S.P.S.”) designators for each of the putative 50 States (50 political subdivisions of the District of Columbia; id. at 11), and ZIP Codes, are political—not geographical—identifiers.

ZIP Codes are assigned to United States Post Offices only, not geographic areas, Domestic Mail Manual (“DMM”) § 602-1.8.1 Purpose of ZIP Code, the purpose of which is to facilitate processing of mail within and between U.S.P.S. facilities only, id. at 708-10.1 and 2—not delivery of mail, id. at 602-1.8.1.

Whereas, a ZIP Code is not required in a sender’s return address, id. at 602-1.3(e)(2), a ZIP Code is a required element of a sender’s return domestic address, id. at 602-1.5.3—signifying that, the word “domestic” in DMM carries a duty and means District of Columbia, because such ZIP Code use, otherwise optional, is mandatory in the District of Columbia (all District of Columbia residents are subject to the absolute, exclusive legislative power of Congress and must obey all legislation within the District of Columbia, such as DMM, or risk subjection to a criminal charge and fine).

Use of a ZIP Code is voluntary, id. at 602-1.3(e)(2), confirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:

“We note that under section 122.32 of the U.S. Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual, the use of a zip code remains voluntary. See United States Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual § 122.32, at 55 (Mar. 1992). . . .” Joseph Peters v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 966 F.2d 1483, 296 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 22 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1123 (1992).

Carrier delivery of mail is free, DMM § 508-4.1.2 Purpose; postage pays for transmission of mail between U.S.P.S. facilities only, id. at 708-10.2 Application.

[9] pre-var′i-cate . . . v. . . . i. . . .To use ambiguous or evasive language for the purpose of deceiving or diverting attention; misrepresent by shape or turn of statement; give a wrong color to facts in speaking or answering; quibble; shuffle. . . . A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903), p.1410.

[10] dis-sem′ble . . . v. . . . i. . . . To put on false appearances; disguise the reality; represent a thing or things untruly. Id. at 531.

[11] SUB SILENTIO. Under silence ; without any notice being taken. . . . Black’s 1st, p. 1129.


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[Ares]

Thanks for the update Monty.

Definitely a very interesting case. Really enjoy watching this unfold and keeping notes as well as downloading documentation.