Mans Court case may have cracked open Fraud of D.C. Federal Jurisdiction [Archive]

Glass

9th November 2015, 11:56 PM

Makes for a very interesting read. I am going to have to go back over the first post on this page.

I am not into the October post where he go the Feds to abandon in complete Silence, their claim against him. Basically they have this thing called Sub Silentio which means they don't have to tell you what they are doing to you.... all the while talking to you like they will do something else.

Docket and record, Houston and Lufkin Division Federal tax cases.

Houston Division case:

Not until shortly after Petitioner filed in the Supreme Court did Petitioner discover the obscure artifice used by the district judge to justify pretending that Petitioner is a resident of the geographic area in which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division is authorized to exercise jurisdiction: the District of Columbia.

You did not misunderstand the previous sentence.

The only geographic area in which any contemporary United States District Court in America has jurisdiction is the District of Columbia.

The supreme political authority in America is the American People (Declaration of Independence, Conclusion; Constitution, Preamble), referred to by the Supreme Court as “joint tenants in the sovereignty”; to wit:

“[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793).

The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, however—as ordained by the American People (the “Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty”) in the Constitution (Article 1 § 8(17))—is Congress.

Whereas, there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes Congress to legislate rules or regulations (statutes) against Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty, this is not so with residents of the District of Columbia—who are subject to any legislation Congress may impose on them.

To ensnare Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty in the banker-contrived artifice of income tax in behalf of their banker creditor, Congress enacted recondite[1] legislation that would foreclose Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty from fully comprehending the law, by transmuting certain everyday words into statutory terms with a convoluted or constitutionally opposite definition and meaning, and formulating statutes (and statutory definitions) using obscure rules of statutory construction to guarantee maximum complexity—thereby allowing Federal executive and judicial officers to operate within the “letter of the law” and justify treating Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty as residents of the District of Columbia, but without having to explain what they are doing.

“Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur. One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow,”[2] and today we are dealing, literally, with an infinity of absurdities foisted upon us in the wake of the initial absurdity perpetrated by Congress June 30, 1864 (described in detail in both the Houston and Lufkin Record).

On that date, Congress quietly decreed that the word “state” (and shortly thereafter “State” and “United States”) means “the territories and the District of Columbia” (13 Stat. 223, 306, ch. 173, sec. 182, June 30, 1864 [Go to “Turn to image” 306])—but ultimately translates to the District of Columbia only and excludes by design all commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union.

Since June 30, 1864, any Joint Tenant in the Sovereignty (you) who innocently believes or admits that he resides in a state, State, or the United States, unwittingly confesses or concedes that he is a resident of the District of Columbia—and subject to the absolute, exclusive legislative power of Congress and jurisdiction of District of Columbia executive and bench officers (Department of Justice attorneys and United States District Judges and Magistrates).

Congress incorporated the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation February 21, 1871,[3] and have ruled the District of Columbia under municipal (Roman civil) law ever since.

Petitioner had the Houston Division case won following Petitioner’s initial March 19, 2014, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Houston Docket #18)—because there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner was a resident of the only statutory “State” of the statutory “United States” whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C.: the District of Columbia.

The judge stacked the deck against Petitioner by commanding sua sponte[4] the DOJ attorney to file in the record what the judge would use sub silentio[5] to justify pretending that he was authorized to treat Petitioner as a resident of the District of Columbia: one of Petitioner’s tax returns.

Courtesy of Congress, the filing of a tax return is one of an indefinite number of undefined “acts or statements” that purportedly prove “a definite intention to acquire residence in the [statutory] United States” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii)), i.e., the District of Columbia.

In combination with legally defective congressional legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013(g) and (h), actors in government pretend that the filing of a tax return constitutes one’s voluntary election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia, and thereafter pretend that they are authorized to treat the filer as such without disclosing what they are doing.

Link to Pos (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/)t
Well worth bookmarking. IMO

monty

10th November 2015, 08:44 AM

It is true. It is in the definitions of the federal statutes.

The UNITED STATES for federal tax purposes is the statutory United States (District of Columbia) not the continental United States. 26 USC 7701(a)9 and (a)10

9) United StatesThe term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.
(10) StateThe term “State” shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.

7th trump

10th November 2015, 08:58 AM

I've been telling you guys this now for over 4 years.
Social Security puts you in the jurisdiction of Congress. Social Security is the reason why you are being taxed on your labor (at source).
Social Security is the why your earnings are labeled (defined) as "wages".

Heres the proof you are subject to federal jurisdiction. Couldn't get any more blatant than this.

5usc 522a(13)
(13) the term “Federal personnel” means officers and employees of the Government of the United States, members of the uniformed services (including members of the Reserve Components), individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States (including survivor benefits).

Social Security Administration is a federal agency over seeing your federal retirement program.

monty

10th November 2015, 09:02 AM

Ares

10th November 2015, 09:49 AM

On September 14, 2015, Petitioner filed in United States District Court, Eastern District of Texas, Lufkin Division Case No. 9:14-CV-138, Defendant’s Objection to Denial of Due Process of Law and Demand for Disclosure of the Constitutional Authority that Gives the Court the Capacity to Take Jurisdiction and Enter Judgments, Orders, and Decrees in Favor of the United States Arising from a Civil or Criminal Proceeding Regarding a Debt, in Tyler County, Texas (the “Objection and Demand”).

Plaintiff United States had 14 days to respond, but went silent (first and only time of which Petitioner is aware, that the government failed to respond to a challenge of jurisdiction).

As of September 29, 2015, it was incumbent on the Court to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or (h)(3) or 41(b).

The Court, however, stood mute.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed on September 30, 2015, Petitioner’s Demand for Dismissal, with Prejudice, of this Alleged Case for Lack of Constitutional Authority that Gives the Court the Capacity to Take Jurisdiction and Enter Judgments, Orders, and Decrees in Favor of the United States Arising from a Civil or Criminal Proceeding Regarding a Debt, in Tyler County, Texas (the “Demand for Dismissal”).

Plaintiff had until October 14, 2015, to produce the constitutional authority that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas.

As of this post (October 28, 2015), 44 days have passed since the filing of the Objection and Demand and 28 since the Demand for Dismissal and neither the judge nor either of the Department of Justice attorneys has responded in any way following Petitioner’s demands.

The reason neither the judge nor DOJ attorneys will respond or confirm or deny Petitioner’s filings, is that anything that any of them may say in writing—whether for or against Petitioner—will evince treason to the Constitution, not only on their part, but on the part of every other Federal judge and DOJ attorney doing business anywhere in the Union.

Holy Shit!

monty

10th November 2015, 10:51 AM

The reason neither the judge nor DOJ attorneys will respond or confirm or deny Petitioner’s filings, is that anything that any of them may say in writing—whether for or against Petitioner—will evince treason to the Constitution, not only on their part, but on the part of every other Federal judge and DOJ attorney doing business anywhere in the Union.

Is this statement saying that if the judge dismisses the case he is responding in writing? I would think yes. That will leave this case in limbo. I wonder what this may do to future filings?

Ares

10th November 2015, 11:21 AM

Is this statement saying that if the judge dismisses the case he is responding in writing? I would think yes. That will leave this case in limbo. I wonder what this may do to future filings?

While it leaves the case in limbo, it basically nullifies all federal laws by passing such an objection / demand in any federal court case. Once jurisdiction is challenged it has to been proven before moving forward. You're right Monty I don't even think they can dismiss the case without committing treason.

Glass

10th November 2015, 11:24 AM

Is this statement saying that if the judge dismisses the case he is responding in writing? I would think yes. That will leave this case in limbo. I wonder what this may do to future filings?

I think so. They let it go "sine die" in politic/legal speak. (Sign-ey die). Basically means abandoned. That is what they did to the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1973. Set up a new one called Parliament of Australia. Moved sideways.

He has the court dockets etc linked. I guess we need to verify it's legit.

There was also the mention of an out, once you were in the system. Like the SS as Trump says. I've read through it again tonight but I can't see where the guy mentions it. I'm sure it was there.

7th trump

10th November 2015, 11:27 AM

palani

10th November 2015, 12:43 PM

That is what they did to the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1973. Set up a new one called Parliament of Australia. Moved sideways.

When I was growing up there was a settlement of native indians calling themselves MESQUAKI in Iowa. To own land the governor of the state had to create a trust for them. Now they call themselves MESKWAKI and they appear to be avoiding state laws on gambling by running a casino in a sovereign capacity (as near as I can tell).

Name changes signal a new entity on the block.

Glass

11th November 2015, 03:36 AM

I don't know this discussion video adds a lot to the story but it does give some more information about sovereign stance etc.

http://www.naturallybetter.tv/mission-impossible-global-2/

Has links to a few other web sites carrying the story.

monty

11th November 2015, 07:30 AM

https://scannedretina.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/trowbridge-demand-for-dismissal-filed-093015.pdf

palani

11th November 2015, 08:19 AM

Equity is a bitch. You know it is a court of Chancellery when there is only one judge. Don't try that Law nonsense when the topic is FAIRNESS.

You might not be able to kill a puppy without being charged with animal abuse but you can take it to an animal shelter where they can feed it for 10 days before sticking it with a needle.

monty

14th November 2015, 01:48 PM

Not until shortly after Petitioner filed in the Supreme Court did Petitioner discover the obscure artifice used by the district judge to justify pretending that Petitioner is a resident of the geographic area in which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division is authorized to exercise jurisdiction: the District of Columbia.

You did not misunderstand the previous sentence.

The only geographic area in which any contemporary United States District Court in America has jurisdiction is the District of Columbia.

The supreme political authority in America is the American People(Declaration of Independence, Conclusion; Constitution, Preamble), referred to by the Supreme Court as “joint tenants in the sovereignty”; to wit:

“[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793).

The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, however—as ordained by the American People (the “Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty”) in the Constitution (Article 1 § 8(17) (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf))—is Congress.

Whereas, there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes Congress to legislate rules or regulations (statutes) against Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty, this is not so with residents of the District of Columbia—who are subject to any legislation Congress may impose on them.

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com

This applies to the "Gun Control Act of 1964", and any other laws the congress has passed or shall pass.

Until the Constitution is amended Congress has no power to legislate in any of the the 50 sovereign states.

Any high school student should have learned this in his civics class. I guess today though, they teach students to put rubbers on bananas instead of civics.

monty

15th November 2015, 08:10 PM

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/

Revocation of election to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia

AUGUST 20, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/)SUPREMECOURTCASE (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)LEAVE A COMMENT (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/#respond)“Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam. He who uses his

legal rights harms no one.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn. 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 2157

The Internal Revenue Code provides for one to revoke his (apparent) general election to be treated as a resident of the United States—defined by Congress in Title 26 U.S.C. to mean the District of Columbia[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/#_ftn1)—and can be

accomplished in as little as one sentence.

As any legal professional (other than one with a vested interest in the 26 U.S.C. 6013 general-election-facility hoax) can verify: No one can elect (choose) to be a resident of a particular geographic area for purposes of taxation without also (1) physically moving there and establishing his personal abode / dwelling / home, or (2) realizing earnings there.

There is no difference between “being a resident” and “being treated as a resident” of a particular place; the legal effect is the same.

That government pretends that all of the American People are residents of the District of Columbia—and treats them as such—gives one an idea of the magnitude of the situation.

“Quando lex est specialis, ratio autem generalis, generaliter lex est intelligenda. When the law is special, but its reason is general, the law is to be understood generally.” Bouvier’s, p. 2156.

“GENERAL. Pertaining to, or designating, the genus or class, as distinguished from that which characterizes the species or individual. Universal, not particularized ; as opposed to special. Principal or central ; as opposed to local. Open or available to all, as opposed to select. Obtaining commonly, or recognized universally ; as opposed to particular. Universal or unbounded ; as opposed to limited. Comprehending the whole or directed to the whole ; as distinguished from anything applying to or designed for a portion only.” Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1890), p. 534.

The purported 26 U.S.C. 6013 election facility is designated as “general” and therefore is universal or unbounded (as opposed to limited) and is the ultimate inference used by actors in government to subject its creator, the American People, to rules of conduct and regulations, in the form of statutes, and deprive them of life, liberty, and property for alleged violation thereof, under color of law, office, and authority.

There is no constitutional authority for any American legislature to impose any rule or regulation on any American except residents of the District of Columbia or one of the Territories—and no one can produce any such authority.[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/#_ftn2)

Actors in government and the Internal Revenue Service follow the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (which are grounded in fraud); they just did not expect that anyone would figure out the true meaning thereof.

The meaning of the definition of the Internal Revenue Code terms “United States” and “State” is the District of Columbia (seeMemorandum of Law, August 10, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-081415-website-signed.pdf), p. 6, posted August 11, 2015, infra, for proof).

Anyone can revoke his alleged general election to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia. To see Petitioner’s “Statement of Revocation,” click on the hyperlink below.

(Note: Revocation of election applies only to the current and future tax years; it does not apply retroactively to previous tax years.)

[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/#_ftnref1) See Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-081415-website-signed.pdf), pp. 8-18, posted August 11, 2015, infra, for proof.

[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/#_ftnref2) The wild-card in the 16th Amendment that fooled everyone is the meaning of the operative definition of the statutory term “State,” which is used in the text thereof and comprehends the District of Columbia and the Territories (see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-081415-website-signed.pdf), pp. 4-8, posted August 11, 2015, infra, for proof).

****

Petitioner’s July 20, 2015, “Statement of Revocation” (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/2-petitioner_s-statement-of-revocation-of-july-20-2015.pdf)
Correction (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/5-correction.pdf)

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Glass

15th November 2015, 08:41 PM

I've been thinking I need to knuckle down and read our Income Tax Act 1974 from front to back and see what is really in it. It's a humongous document so you can see how enthusiastic one could be about that little job.

However, since there was a coup in 1973, the whole of that Act might not even be lawful or valid. Since 1973, a lot of our laws are not enacted lawfully and can be challenged on that basis. Trying to come up with a way to find out without having to go through a court case like this guy did and using the Discovery process which only comes into play during a court matter.

monty

15th November 2015, 09:11 PM

Apparently this case has its beginnings some 20 years ago.

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/09/10/supreme-court-declines-to-review-case-petitioner-moves-district-court-to-vacate-judgment/

Supreme Court declines to review case; Petitioner moves district court to vacate judgment

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/09/10/supreme-court-declines-to-review-case-petitioner-moves-district-court-to-vacate-judgment/)SUPREMECOURTCASE (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)LEAVE A COMMENT (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/09/10/supreme-court-declines-to-review-case-petitioner-moves-district-court-to-vacate-judgment/#respond)The origins of this case go back 20-plus years and involve an alleged tax liability of more than $3 million, factors that evince a significant investment of time, energy, and resources on the part of the Internal Revenue Service and government to acquire Petitioner’s property.

Only at the very end of the process, on June 8, 2015, when Petitioner first learns of the Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s April 29, 2015, Petition for Writ of Certiorari (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/1-supreme-court-no-14-1305-petition-for-writ-of-certiorari-filed-april-29-20151.pdf), does Petitioner find the last piece of the puzzle.

Said discovery merits a second petition, the June 30, 2015, Petition for Rehearing (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/13-petition-for-rehearing-filed-june-30-2015.pdf), which the law clerks and justices of the Supreme Court review and accept for consideration, a rarity, within one day of submission.

Although the Petition for Rehearing presents sufficient grounds for the justices to grant it, it is not surprising that they decline to do so,[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/09/10/supreme-court-declines-to-review-case-petitioner-moves-district-court-to-vacate-judgment/#_ftn1) given what is at stake: willingness of the average American to continue participating in the “voluntary tax system” (only thing that allows principals of the Federal Reserve to maintain their private banking monopoly[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/09/10/supreme-court-declines-to-review-case-petitioner-moves-district-court-to-vacate-judgment/#_ftn2)).

The Clerk of the Supreme Court notifies Petitioner of the disposition of the Petition for Rehearing in the Clerk’s August 10, 2015, notice of entry of order. (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/august-10-2015-notice-of-entry-of-order.pdf)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, at Rule 60, provide for relief in proceedings of the character of that of the district court of first instance; to wit, in pertinent part:

“(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons
:
“. . . (4) the judgment is void;”

It is well settled that final judgments and orders entered in a manner inconsistent with due process of law—a Right guaranteed by the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution—are void; e.g.:

“The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144 [of Title 28 U.S.C.], but on the Due Process Clause. . . .” United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir., 1976).

“A judgment is void if the court that rendered it . . . acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (http://www.leagle.com/cite/660%20F.2d%20291) (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1256, 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (http://www.leagle.com/cite/502%20F.2d%20834) (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S.Ct. 516, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1975). Mere error does not render the judgment void unless the error is of constitutional dimension. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (http://www.leagle.com/cite/661%20F.2d%20655) (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, sub nom Simer v. United States, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982).” Klugh v. United States, 620 F.Supp. 892 (1985).

“[[U]I]f a ‘judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgment.’ United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip. from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55 F.3d 1311 (http://www.leagle.com/cite/55%20F.3d%201311), 1317 (7th Cir.1995). A judgment is void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) if ‘the court that rendered the judgment acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’ Id. at 1316 (citations omitted) . . .” Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624 (7th Cir., 2007).

“[D]enying a motion to vacate a void judgment is a per se abuse of discretion.” Burrell v. Henderson, et al, 434 F.3d, 826, 831 (6th Cir., 2006).

Whereas, the record of the district court of first instance is rife with violations of due process of law, Petitioner documents the same in Petitioner’s September 9, 2015, Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order (below) and moves the district court to vacate said court’s May 23, 2014, Amended Final Judgment and Order of Sale and Vacature. (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/may-23-2014-amended-final-judgment-and-order-of-sale-and-vacature.pdf)

Had Petitioner known at the beginning of this case what Petitioner knows now, it is unlikely that Petitioner would have needed to take the measures chronicled in this website.

Petitioner’s motion to vacate (1) condenses into 19 pages the fruits of the last 18 months of litigation, in both this and a sister case (USDC, E. Dist. Tex., Lufkin Div. No. 9:14-cv-00138, which, following Petitioner’s filings, stagnated and has gone nowhere since beginning 14 months ago), (2) reveals how Federal judges evade and defeat the jurisdictional limitations of the Constitution in every civil and criminal action brought throughout the Union, and (3) provides sufficient grounds for the judge in the district court of first instance to vacate the aforesaid May 23, 2014, judgment and order (basis of the Supreme Court appeal presented in this website), as mandated by law.

The contents of the below motion to vacate have direct and intimate bearing on the life of every American who resides without the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.

Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order, September 9, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/6-motion-to-vacate-judgment-and-order-september-9-2015.pdf)

[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/09/10/supreme-court-declines-to-review-case-petitioner-moves-district-court-to-vacate-judgment/#_ftnref1) “[T]he Supreme Court has admonished us [[U]10th Circuit Court of Appeals] that ‘[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case . . .’ United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490, 43 S.Ct. 181, 182, 67 L.Ed. 361 (1923) (emphasis added) . . .” Chaney v. Brown, 712 F.2d 441 (10th Cir., 1983).

[2] “The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. . . .” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

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←REVOCATION OF ELECTION TO BE TREATED AS A RESIDENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/)

monty

15th November 2015, 09:41 PM

The contents of the below motion to vacate have direct and intimate bearing on the life of every American who resides without the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.

Motion to Vacate Judgment and Order, September 9, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/6-motion-to-vacate-judgment-and-order-september-9-2015.pdf)

monty

17th November 2015, 03:47 PM

I think so. They let it go "sine die" in politic/legal speak. (Sign-ey die). Basically means abandoned. That is what they did to the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1973. Set up a new one called Parliament of Australia. Moved sideways.

He has the court dockets etc linked. I guess we need to verify it's legit.

There was also the mention of an out, once you were in the system. Like the SS as Trump says. I've read through it again tonight but I can't see where the guy mentions it. I'm sure it was there.

Glass, Is this what you were refering to?

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/2-petitioner_s-statement-of-revocation-of-july-20-2015.pdf

monty

18th November 2015, 05:40 PM

Some history on Dr. John Parks Trowbridge
http://www.grfcpa.com/resources/washington-tax-update/citizen-of-us-state-cant-avoid-federal-income-tax

Washington Tax Updatehttp://www.grfcpa.com/media/Capitol.jpg

Citizen of a US State Can’t Avoid Federal Income Tax

Gelman, Rosenberg & Freedman CPAs is a member of CPAmerica International, an association of CPA and consulting firms that provides industry knowledge including insightful articles, to help member firms serve clients and other individuals and organizations.

Mar 3, 2015

The modern-day secession movement that has sprung up around the country in recent years is evidence that a number of states – as many as 20, stretching from New Jersey to Oregon to Texas – have citizens who would like to assert their independence from the federal government.

John Trowbridge Jr. found out the hard way that living in Texas means he is a US citizen and is subject to U.S. tax laws.

In addition, district courts have the jurisdiction, and the Internal Revenue Code gives them the power, to hear tax cases and settle those disputes.

Trowbridge has been a long-time tax protester. He has on two prior occasions lost Tax Court cases regarding similar issues.

This particular case involved the district court, which had reduced Trowbridge’s tax liabilities for the years 1993 through 1997 to the amount of the associated tax liens on his property. The court foreclosed on the liens and then sold Trowbridge’s property for back taxes.

Trowbridge’s argument against the court is that he lives in Harris County, Texas, which he doesn’t consider a part of the United States, meaning that he is not, therefore, a US citizen. He feels that he isn’t subject to the federal income tax laws and that the district court doesn’t have jurisdiction in his case.

The courts have already held in prior cases that citizens of Texas are also citizens of the United States, so Trowbridge lost that argument. There is also an Internal Revenue Code section authorizing the district courts to hear Tax Court cases and disputes, so he lost on that issue as well (United States of America v. John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., No. 14-20333 (tel:14-20333), US Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Feb. 3, 2015).

Having lost his case with the court, Trowbridge was fined an additional $8,000 for bringing this frivolous appeal before the appeals court.

- See more at: http://www.grfcpa.com/resources/washington-tax-update/citizen-of-us-state-cant-avoid-federal-income-tax#.dpuf

Glass

18th November 2015, 06:09 PM

Is that the guys name is it?

Doesn't hurt to keep on fighting. Most things are won on appeal somewhere.

Is the exit process actually valid?

JohnQPublic

19th November 2015, 03:26 PM

Revocation of election to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia

... (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/08/20/revocation-of-election-to-be-treated-as-a-resident-of-the-district-of-columbia/)

Petitioner’s July 20, 2015, “Statement of Revocation” (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/2-petitioner_s-statement-of-revocation-of-july-20-2015.pdf)
Correction (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/5-correction.pdf)

In doing so, do you surrender your Social Security account and all future value of it?

Glass

19th November 2015, 03:44 PM

In doing so, do you surrender your Social Security account and all future value of it?

that would be the hope.

monty

19th November 2015, 03:49 PM

In doing so, do you surrender your Social Security account and all future value of it?

I don't know. Maybe our resident legal experts will weigh in on this.

7th trump

20th November 2015, 01:52 PM

In doing so, do you surrender your Social Security account and all future value of it?

Yes and no.
Yes. you will surrender any form of benefit. Meaning you'll have to be an active participant to gain access to what you currently have built up.
No, the ss account will always be intact and doesnt just go away if you decide not to be a "US citizen".
That SS account is part of the over all Social Security Trust.

monty

20th November 2015, 08:48 PM

Section 182 state . . . . . . .

http://s19.postimg.org/mf8kxl46b/03360306.png

monty

20th November 2015, 09:52 PM

In doing so, do you surrender your Social Security account and all future value of it?

No. A non resident alien revokes his status to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia.
26 CFR 1.6013-6(b)(1)(ii)

26 CFR 1.6013-6 - Election to treat nonresident alien individual as resident of the United States.
http://s19.postimg.org/eb0gsuhr7/image.png

Bigjon

20th November 2015, 10:00 PM

Rense audio
https://anticorruptionsociety.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/rense-111615-john-trowbridge.mp3?_=1
mp3 file

http://anticorruptionsociety.com/2015/11/17/searching-for-the-authority-of-the-irs/

monty

21st November 2015, 10:09 PM

http://www.constitution.org/juris/fedjur1.htm

Since the time of the ratification and implementation of the present U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court and all lower courts have had many opportunities to construe and apply the above provision of the Constitution. And the essence of all these decisions is that the States of this nation have exclusive jurisdiction of property and persons located within their borders, excluding such lands and persons residing thereon which have been ceded to the United States.

Perhaps one of the earliest decisions on this point was United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818), which involved a federal prosecution for a murder committed on board the Warship, Independence, anchored in the harbor of Boston, Massachusetts. The defense complained that only the state had jurisdiction to prosecute and argued that the federal Circuit Courts had no jurisdiction of this crime supposedly committed within the federal government's admiralty jurisdiction. In argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the United States admitted as follows:

"The exclusive jurisdiction which the United States have in forts and dock-yards ceded to them, is derived from the express assent of the states by whom the cessions are made. It could be derived in no other manner; because without it, the authority of the state would be supreme and exclusive therein," 3 Wheat., at 350, 351.

In holding that the State of Massachusetts had jurisdiction over the crime, the Court held:

"What, then, is the extent of jurisdiction which a state possesses?

"We answer, without hesitation, the jurisdiction of a state is co-extensive with its territory; co-extensive with its legislative power," 3 Wheat., at 386, 387.

"The article which describes the judicial power of the United States is not intended for the cession of territory or of general jurisdiction. ... Congress has power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this district, and over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.

"It is observable that the power of exclusive legislation (which is jurisdiction) is united with cession of territory, which is to be the free act of the states. It is difficult to compare the two sections together, without feeling a conviction, not to be strengthened by any commentary on them, that, in describing the judicial power, the framers of our constitution had not in view any cession of territory; or, which is essentially the same, of general jurisdiction," 3 Wheat., at 388.

Thus in Bevans, the Court established a principle that federal jurisdiction extends only over the areas wherein it possesses the power of exclusive legislation, and this is a principle incorporated into all subsequent decisions regarding the extent of federal jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would destroy the purpose, intent and meaning of the entire U.S. Constitution.
The decision in Bevans was closely followed by decisions made in two state courts and one federal court within the next two years. In Commonwealth v. Young, Brightly, N.P. 302, 309 (Pa. 1818), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was presented with the issue of whether lands owned by the United States for which Pennsylvania had never ceded jurisdiction had to be sold pursuant to state law. In deciding that the state law of Pennsylvania exclusively controlled this sale of federal land, the Court held:

"The legislation and authority of congress is confined to cessions by particular states for the seat of government, and purchases made by consent of the legislature of the state, for the purpose of erecting forts. The legislative power and exclusive jurisdiction remained in the several states, of all territory within their limits, not ceded to, or purchased by, congress, with the assent of the state legislature, to prevent the collision of legislation and authority between the United States and the several states."

A year later, the Supreme Court of New York was presented with the issue of whether the State of New York had jurisdiction over a murder committed at Fort Niagara, a federal fort. In People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233 (N.Y. 1819), that court held that the fort was subject to the jurisdiction of the State since the lands therefore had not been ceded to the United States. The rationale of its opinion stated:

"To oust this state of its jurisdiction to support and maintain its laws, and to punish crimes, it must be shown that an offense committed within the acknowledged limits of the state, is clearly and exclusively cognizable by the laws and courts of the United States. In the case already cited, Chief Justice Marshall observed, that to bring the offense within the jurisdiction of the courts of the union, it must have been committed out of the jurisdiction of any state; it is not (he says,) the offence committed, but the place in which it is committed, which must be out of the jurisdiction of the state."

The case relied upon by this court was U.S. v. Bevans, supra.
At about the same time that the New York Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Godfrey, a similar fact situation was before a federal court, the only difference being that the murder committed in the case occurred on land which had been ceded to the United States. In United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed.Cas. 646, 648 No. 14,867 (C.C.D.R.I. 1819), the court held that the case fell within federal jurisdiction, describing such jurisdiction as follows:

"But although the United States may well purchase and hold lands for public purposes, within the territorial limits of a state, this does not of itself oust the jurisdiction or sovereignty of such State over the lands so purchased. It remains until the State has relinquished its authority over the land either expressly or by necessary implication.

"When therefore a purchase of land for any of these purposes is made by the national government, and the State Legislature has given its consent to the purchase, the land so purchased by the very terms of the constitution ipso facto falls within the exclusive legislation of Congress, and the State jurisdiction is completely ousted."

Almost 18 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court was again presented with a case involving the distinction between State and federal jurisdiction. In New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 737 (1836), the United States claimed title to property in New Orleans likewise claimed by the city. After holding that title to the subject lands was owned by the city, the Court addressed the question of federal jurisdiction and stated:

"Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the States over places where the federal government shall establish forts or other military works. And it is only in these places, or in the territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction."

In New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), the question before the Court involved the attempt by the City of New York to assess penalties against the master of a ship for his failure to make a report as to the persons his ship brought to New York. As against the master's contention that the act was unconstitutional and that New York had no jurisdiction in the matter, the Court held:

"If we look at the place of its operation, we find it to be within the territory, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of New York. If we look at the person on whom it operates, he is found within the same territory and jurisdiction," 36 U.S., at 133.

"They are these: that a State has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a State, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to these ends; where the power over the particular subject, or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the manner just stated. That all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a State is complete, unqualified and exclusive," 36 U.S., at 139.

Some eight years later, in Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), the question of federal jurisdiction was once again before the Court. This case involved a contest of the title to real property, with one of the parties claiming a right to the disputed property via a U.S. patent; the lands in question were situated in Mobile, Alabama, adjacent to Mobile Bay. In discussing the subject of federal jurisdiction, the Court held:

"We think a proper examination of this subject will show that the United States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory, of which Alabama or any of the new States were formed," 44 U.S., at 221.

"[B]ecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted," 44 U.S., at 223.

"Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory within her limits, subject to the common law," 44 U.S., at 228, 229.

The single most important case regarding the subject of federal jurisdiction appears to be Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531, 5 S.Ct. 995 (1885), which sets forth the law on this point fully. There, the railroad company property which passed through the Fort Leavenworth federal enclave was being subjected to taxation by Kansas, and the company claimed an exemption from state taxation. In holding that the railroad company's property could be taxed, the Court carefully explained federal jurisdiction within the States:

"The consent of the states to the purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named, is, however, essential, under the constitution, to the transfer to the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion. Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the government, is subject to the legislative authority and control of the states equally with the property of private individuals."

Thus, the cases decided within the 19th century clearly disclosed the extent and scope of both State and federal jurisdiction. In essence, these cases, among many others, hold that the jurisdiction of any particular State is co-extensive with its borders or territory, and all persons and property located or found therein are subject to such jurisdiction; this jurisdiction is superior. Federal jurisdiction results only from a conveyance of state jurisdiction to the federal government for lands owned or otherwise possessed by the federal government, and thus federal jurisdiction is extremely limited in nature. And there is no federal jurisdiction if there be no grant or cession of jurisdiction by the State to the federal government. Therefore, federal territorial jurisdiction exists only in Washington, D.C., the federal enclaves within the States, and the territories and possessions of the United States.

mick silver

22nd November 2015, 07:59 AM

thanks monty ... if you win do you get back the funds you PAID into SS

monty

22nd November 2015, 10:27 AM

thanks monty ... if you win do you get back the funds you PAID into SS

I don't think so. The IRS will refund back 3 years. The IRS says if you want more sue them in court. The satute of limitations for refunds is six years.

What I do believe though is, any of the livestock familes who graze their cattle on federal rangelands and are sued by the Forest Service or the BLM and the BLM landgrabs such as the one going on in Texas now could be stopped dead in their tracks using this man's demand for proof of Constittional authority.

Texas was a republic and owned their land when they joined the union. The BLM argument is that a strip of land in Texas was part of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. They, in effect are saying the Louisiana Purchase Treaty gave them ownership of this parcel of land. But treatys don't trump the Constitution. Any part of a treaty that is repugnant to the Constitution is null and void. The United States can only own land for forts, magazines and other needful buildings which they must purchase from the state with the aproval of the state legislature.

My opinion, and my opinion and 2 dollars will get you a cup of coffee.

Glass

22nd November 2015, 04:13 PM

Texas was a republic and owned their land when they joined the union. The BLM argument is that a strip of land in Texas was part of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. They, in effect are saying the Louisiana Purchase Treaty gave them ownership of this parcel of land. But treatys don't trump the Constitution. Any part of a treaty that is repugnant to the Constitution is null and void. The United States can only own land for forts, magazines and other needful buildings which they must purchase from the state with the aproval of the state legislature.

My opinion, and my opinion and 2 dollars will get you a cup of coffee.

Same thing applies here. Fed property is that which is ceeded. Our Feds do a lot of in-state road funding of highways. I figured they would use these in land waterways to extend their reach.

monty

22nd November 2015, 05:33 PM

Same thing applies here. Fed property is that which is ceeded. Our Feds do a lot of in-state road funding of highways. I figured they would use these in land waterways to extend their reach.

The feds give federal highway grants to the states also here with many strings attached. They also have grant money for counties and municipalities. These come with not just strings attached but are like a noose around your neck. This is ome more way the feds increase their power over the states, counties and towns all across America. The county and town governments in Nevada have positions for grant writers. The politicians say "why not? It's free money" Yes it is free if you implement all the regulations and stipulations and give up your rights.

palani

22nd November 2015, 05:51 PM

... and give up your rights.
That ship sailed long ago.

monty

22nd November 2015, 06:28 PM

That ship sailed long ago.
It left port the day after the fitst Congress convened. But it seems to me like the wind really filled her sails after the Kennedy assasination and the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Gun Control Act and Public Safety Act.

Ares

23rd November 2015, 07:10 AM

monty

23rd November 2015, 09:13 AM

So if I'm reading that Statement of Revocation correctly, you could in theory go back to your employer and correct your W2 to mark it as Exempt. You'd no longer pay any taxes or be required to file a 1040 every year.

No, do NOT mark you W-4 exempt. Go back to your employer and cancel your W-4. Do not sign any Form W-9. You will no longer be required to file a form 1040. No more social security, medicare or obamacare

7th trump

23rd November 2015, 09:37 AM

No, do NOT mark you W-4 exempt. Go back to your employer and cancel your W-4. Do not sign any Form W-9. You will no longer be required to file a form 1040. No more social security, medicare or obamacare

I think monty has been listening to me.

The form W4 is only for participating in Social Security where you give permission to the employer to treat your earnings as "wages" which such "wages" are subject to deductions and withholdings.

If you look on the back of a W4 in fine print theres two statutes that must be on the form that tells you what the purpose of the form is for.

The two statutes in fine print are all about "employment". And "Employment" is defined in the Social Security Act and can be found in Title 26 (income taxes) at 26usc 3121(c) and all federal taxes are under Subtitle C- Employment Taxes

Wow....it only took 8 plus years of pounding this keyboard on various website for someone to finally GET IT!
And it has absolutely nothing at all to do with FRN's or being a federal employee or any other stupid theory out there.
It all has to do with you participating in Social Security to earn taxable "wages".

The very most important statute when it comes to taxes being imposed on your earnings is this one (26usc 3101)

(a) Old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
In addition to other taxes, there is hereby imposed on the income of every individual a tax equal to the following percentages of the wages (as defined in section 3121(a)) received by him with respect to employment (as defined in section 3121(b))—

The reason why it is the most important one is because this statute is the Dmarc that separates untaxable earnings from taxable "wages"
This statute specifically states that in order earn taxable wages (3121(a) "wages") is to be (3121(b) "employed"). And the heart of Social Security is earning credits towards your social security benefits by earning 3121(b) "wages".
If you do not participate in Social Security you do not earn 3121(a) "wages".
And theres no law in any books that says social security participation is mandatory...in fact the SSA will tell you it is not mandatory.
This is how I revoked the W4 by informing the employer just what he was forcing me into which was forcing me to give up Constitutional protections by them forcing me into participating in social security (signing the W4).
Palani will pipe in and disagree and tell you a bunch of garbage, but remember its palani who doesnt research the statutes or the law to find the exit out of the rabbit hole.

monty

23rd November 2015, 10:19 AM

I think monty has been listening to me.

The form W4 is only for participating in Social Security where you give permission to the employer to treat your earnings as "wages" which such "wages" are subject to deductions and withholdings.

If you look on the back of a W4 in fine print theres two statutes that must be on the form that tells you what the purpose of the form is for.

The two statutes in fine print are all about "employment". And "Employment" is defined in the Social Security Act and can be found in Title 26 (income taxes) at 26usc 3121(c) and all federal taxes are under Subtitle C- Employment Taxes

Wow....it only took 8 plus years of pounding this keyboard on various website for someone to finally GET IT!
And it has absolutely nothing at all to do with FRN's or being a federal employee or any other stupid theory out there.
It all has to do with you participating in Social Security to earn taxable "wages".

The very most important statute when it comes to taxes being imposed on your earnings is this one (26usc 3101)

The reason why it is the most important one is because this statute is the Dmarc that separates untaxable earnings from taxable "wages"
This statute specifically states that in order earn taxable wages (3121(a) "wages") is to be (3121(b) "employed"). And the heart of Social Security is earning credits towards your social security benefits by earning 3121(b) "wages".
If you do not participate in Social Security you do not earn 3121(a) "wages".
And theres no law in any books that says social security participation is mandatory...in fact the SSA will tell you it is not mandatory.
This is how I revoked the W4 by informing the employer just what he was forcing me into which was forcing me to give up Constitutional protections by them forcing me into participating in social security (signing the W4).
Palani will pipe in and disagree and tell you a bunch of garbage, but remember its palani who doesnt research the statutes or the law to find the exit out of the rabbit hole.

Actually, I read Pete Hendrickson's book. From the information he put forth I determined that I am not a taxpayer according to the relevant tax law. I no longer sign W-4 or W-9 forms.

Ares

23rd November 2015, 10:45 AM

The problem is most employers require a signed W-4, before they'll even let you start.

I work for a global Information Technology company, not having a signed W-4 is on file I don't think is going to fly for me.

7th trump

23rd November 2015, 11:41 AM

The problem is most employers require a signed W-4.

And that stems from the employer not fully understanding what the W4 is all about. Hence why I look at the fine print on the back of the W4 (Paperwork Reduction Act) to understand the purpose of the form.
All employers believe they pay "wages" and they must have a signed W4 on file for the employee. They believe what they pay to their employee as compensation are these taxable "wages".
Problem with this belief is that they don't understand that its not their decision for the employee's to sign a W4....its the employees decision not the participate in Social Security to NOT sign a W4.

The government cannot pass any laws that force participation to any program where there are mandatory imposed taxes...Social Security is one such program. This is why you sign a W4 instead of the government just taking the imposition.
There are many court cases citing this.

And the kicker is the employer is also responsible for half of each employees SS taxes to boot for a tax thats not their legal decision for an employee participate in and is completely voluntary!
These CPA's they hire to do their taxes dont have a clue and are just as worthless when it comes to tax laws. All they do is file the taxes for the company..............and anyone with a half a brain can do that on their own.
CPA"s are stupid educated brain dead morons only doing what the are taught.....the real brains and intelligence is the person who can figure it all out and stop the madness. CPA's need everyone to be as stupid as they are to keep their worthless job.

monty

23rd November 2015, 11:57 AM

And that stems from the employer not fully understanding what the W4 is all about. Hence why I look at the fine print on the back of the W4 (Paperwork Reduction Act) to understand the purpose of the form.
All employers believe they pay "wages" and they must have a signed W4 on file for the employee. They believe what they pay to their employee as compensation are these taxable "wages".
Problem with this belief is that they don't understand that its not their decision for the employee's to sign a W4....its the employees decision not the participate in Social Security to NOT sign a W4.

The government cannot pass any laws that force participation to any program where there are mandatory imposed direct taxes ..Social Security is one such program. This is why you sign a W4 instead of the government just taking the imposition.
There are many court cases citing this.

And the kicker is the employer is also responsible for half of each employees SS taxes to boot for a tax thats not their legal decision for an employee participate in and is completely voluntary!
These CPA's they hire to do their taxes dont have a clue and are just as worthless when it comes to tax laws. All they do is file the taxes for the company..............and anyone with a half a brain can do that on their own.
CPA"s are stupid educated brain dead morons only doing what the are taught.....the real brains and intelligence is the person who can figure it all out and stop the madness. CPA's need everyone to be as stupid as they are to keep their worthless job.

Quoted for truth.

One other point. Self-employed who participate in Social Security via W-9 pay 100% of FICA (15% of taxable income)

7th trump

23rd November 2015, 12:24 PM

Quoted for truth.

One other point. Self-employed who participate in Social Security via W-9 pay 100% of FICA (15% of taxable income)

Direct or indirect taxes...the government cannot force anyone into a social program that has an imposition....period! And they dont!
Notice for all the programs out there including obama care....it takes your signiture?

A W9 is not a form for the self employed...all it does is verify that the participant in Social security, whether or not employed or self employed, can legally participate. It was designed to weed out illegals using fake credentials.

monty

23rd November 2015, 12:35 PM

Examples of indirect taxes

https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Excise-Tax

Excise Tax

Excise taxes are taxes paid when purchases are made on a specific good, such as gasoline. Excise taxes are often included in the price of the product. There are also excise taxes on activities, such as on wagering or on highway usage by trucks. One of the major components of the excise program is motor fuel.
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Excise-Tax
Alcohol and tobacco taxes

http://www.ttb.gov/main_pages/schip-summary.shtml

Ares

23rd November 2015, 12:39 PM

monty

23rd November 2015, 02:24 PM

7th trump

23rd November 2015, 02:59 PM

I've been reading into trying to revoke your signed W-4 since it apparently is illegal for your employer to deny you being hired without giving them your Social Slave number and signing a W-4 if you don't want too. I'm not having much luck finding anything. But I'll need something to have an employer of 100,000+ people take me seriously without firing me.

Anyone have any documentation?

Ares if you are looking for official documentation from a government source you will not find any.
This is all hinged on you standing on your Constitutional Rights. The government has no obligation to show you what rights you have. That area is solely up to the individual himself. Its not a bad thing, but a blessing!
The first step I took to rid myself of the use of the SSN and the W4 was to write to the SSA. Once I had that letter from the horses mouth stating that participating in SS was completely voluntary I used it to show the employer.
I can show you step by step what I did if you like, but first before I go any further you need to write to the SSA inquiring your Rights and the voluntary nature of SS.
If you would write that up I can twink it for you to get the same response I did which was them admitting that SS is 100% voluntary.
What you are going to do here is educate the employer and do all the work for them so they dont feel like they might be liable for any taxes. Make them as comfortable as possible in that you are doing everything legal and legit.

The point I'm trying to make here is that you never want to go to the employer in such a way they will terminate you. What I did was make myself a desirable asset to the company by saving them tons of money by them not being liable for half of the SS from participating.

Are you in?

woodman

23rd November 2015, 03:07 PM

And that stems from the employer not fully understanding what the W4 is all about. Hence why I look at the fine print on the back of the W4 (Paperwork Reduction Act) to understand the purpose of the form.
All employers believe they pay "wages" and they must have a signed W4 on file for the employee. They believe what they pay to their employee as compensation are these taxable "wages".
Problem with this belief is that they don't understand that its not their decision for the employee's to sign a W4....its the employees decision not the participate in Social Security to NOT sign a W4.

The government cannot pass any laws that force participation to any program where there are mandatory imposed taxes...Social Security is one such program. This is why you sign a W4 instead of the government just taking the imposition.
There are many court cases citing this.

And the kicker is the employer is also responsible for half of each employees SS taxes to boot for a tax thats not their legal decision for an employee participate in and is completely voluntary!
These CPA's they hire to do their taxes dont have a clue and are just as worthless when it comes to tax laws. All they do is file the taxes for the company..............and anyone with a half a brain can do that on their own.
CPA"s are stupid educated brain dead morons only doing what the are taught.....the real brains and intelligence is the person who can figure it all out and stop the madness. CPA's need everyone to be as stupid as they are to keep their worthless job.

I would like to know of a way that I can keep my money instead of sending it to the IRS. Yes, the system is supposedly voluntary but from what I've seen, if one receives a check, instead of cash, there is no way to stop the Federal Mafia from taking their toll. They may let the occasional small-fry go but if they put you in their sights, they will take whatever they decide, through the crooked courts. I believe you said before that you pay zero income tax. I think that is a risky thing. I am all for it and I hope you can continue to pay zero, but from what I've seen, the deck is stacked against us all.

7th trump

23rd November 2015, 03:19 PM

I would like to know of a way that I can keep my money instead of sending it to the IRS. Yes, the system is supposedly voluntary but from what I've seen, if one receives a check, instead of cash, there is no way to stop the Federal Mafia from taking their toll. They may let the occasional small-fry go but if they put you in their sights, they will take whatever they decide, through the crooked courts. I believe you said before that you pay zero income tax. I think that is a risky thing. I am all for it and I hope you can continue to pay zero, but from what I've seen, the deck is stacked against us all.

Woodman I keep all my pay because I do not earn 3121(a) "wages" or 3401(a) "wages". If your employer is reporting income then that income is taxable. Only reportable income is taxable.
I'm perfectly legal and legit otherwise the employer is in for one hell of a law suit worth millions to me....untaxed millions at that.

Theres a lot you can learn from me and I have a lot to show you. I've been researching the tax laws now since around 1995 and the one thing all these so called tax guru's never looked into was the mechanism of reporting and how and why its reported. The key is "reporting".

Jewboo

23rd November 2015, 04:09 PM

Woodman I keep all my pay because I do not earn 3121(a) "wages" or 3401(a) "wages".

Theres a lot you can learn from me and I have a lot to show you. I've been researching the tax laws now since around 1995 and the one thing all these so called tax guru's never looked into was the mechanism of reporting and how and why its reported. The key is "reporting".

Woodman: Notice that 7th Trump magically dismisses whatever he writes in "parentheses" as not existing. Are you going to also magically dismiss the "fines" and "jail" imposed upon you by following 7th Trump's magical thinking?

http://www.alternet.org/files/story_images/prison_5.jpg
These "bars" don't exist when 7th Trump puts them in parentheses.

:rolleyes: tell the wife and kids you ain't really in "jail" for not "reporting" income

woodman

23rd November 2015, 05:00 PM

Woodman: Notice that 7th Trump magically dismisses whatever he writes in "parentheses" as not existing. Are you going to also magically dismiss the "fines" and "jail" imposed upon you by following 7th Trump's magical thinking?

http://www.alternet.org/files/story_images/prison_5.jpg
These "bars" don't exist when 7th Trump puts them in parentheses.

:rolleyes: tell the wife and kids you ain't really in "jail" for not "reporting" income

Yes, this is precisely my worry. I don't want to lose everything I have. Better to lose some than all. I am told that the Amish, who live all around this area, do not pay any income tax. The way they do this is by working only for cash. They are not part of the Social Security System either.

monty

23rd November 2015, 06:16 PM

monty

23rd November 2015, 06:21 PM

Yes, this is precisely my worry. I don't want to lose everything I have. Better to lose some than all. I am told that the Amish, who live all around this area, do not pay any income tax. The way they do this is by working only for cash. They are not part of the Social Security System either.

you might want to review this:

http://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf

monty

23rd November 2015, 06:29 PM

I've been reading into trying to revoke your signed W-4 since it apparently is illegal for your employer to deny you being hired without giving them your Social Slave number and signing a W-4 if you don't want too. I'm not having much luck finding anything. But I'll need something to have an employer of 100,000+ people take me seriously without firing me.

Anyone have any documentation?

http://sedm.org/LibertyU/WithngAndRptng.pdf

page 37

You can call the number a “Nontaxpayer Identification
Number” instead of a “Taxpayer Identification Number” if you
followed the procedures in
26 C.F.R.
§
301.6109
-
1
(1)(i), which
says:
“. . .A person may establish a different [NONTAXPAYER] status for the
number by providing proof of foreign status with the Internal Revenue
Service...Upon accepting an individual as a nonresident alien individual,
the Internal Revenue Service will assign this status to the individual’s
social security number. . .”

[

26 C.F.R.

§

301.6109

-

1

(1)(i)]

•

You can also satisfy all the above requirements by simply

attaching the following to your corrected information returns

and use STANDARD instead of altered IRS forms:

Tax Form Attachment

, Form #04.201

http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

Ares

23rd November 2015, 06:53 PM

Thanks Monty!!

Looks like they (sedm.org) walks you through submitting a W-8BEN which corrects a status.

7th Trump,

Yeah I'm in

7th trump

23rd November 2015, 06:55 PM

Woodman: Notice that 7th Trump magically dismisses whatever he writes in "parentheses" as not existing. Are you going to also magically dismiss the "fines" and "jail" imposed upon you by following 7th Trump's magical thinking?

http://www.alternet.org/files/story_images/prison_5.jpg
These "bars" don't exist when 7th Trump puts them in parentheses.

:rolleyes: tell the wife and kids you ain't really in "jail" for not "reporting" income

Sad is all you are Jewboo.
Just another chum thinking hes awake and courageous....but the reality of it all is Jewboo is ignorant to what will set him free.
Jewboo is scared and weak and wants everyone to be just like him so hes cozy and confident in his chains and everything is just..A-ok!

Way to go jewboo.....knew you couldnt muster enough courage to be a champion....just hide behind your picture pages and play with dolls.

7th trump

23rd November 2015, 06:57 PM

Thanks Monty!!

Looks like they (sedm.org) walks you through submitted a W-8BEN which corrects a status.

7th Trump,

Yeah I'm in

perfect.......I was hoping you would be. You'll something.

palani

23rd November 2015, 07:00 PM

Entities that are SUBJECT to 26 CFR use IRS forms.

7th trump

23rd November 2015, 08:41 PM

Entities that are SUBJECT to 26 CFR use IRS forms.

Anybody who participates in Social Security is subject to the income tax (at source).

IRS forms are used for many many types of constitutional taxes. "Entities" mean nothing and have no bearing.

Glass

24th November 2015, 01:02 AM

I think entities is supposed to mean types of corporation. There are quite a few types and some not are not obvious. Person is a type of corporation but I'm not sure what type. It's been described as a Franchise. It might be. I'm not sure but Starbucks might be a franchise. Are the stores independently owned? McDonalds is, but HQ owns some stores as well.

A person might be a grant of a franchise to do trade according to a system of trade - statutes. The statutes may adhere to some doctrines. Admiralty, private commercial law, lex mercatoria but not common law.

What does the form do? Does it cancel or remove or defer SS?... is it participation or liability that it deals with? I guess it's probably both. One begets the other.

palani

24th November 2015, 06:59 AM

Anybody who participates in Social Security is subject to the income tax (at source).
If you have income you are subject to income tax. Social security is a recent innovation (relatively speaking) but income tax was introduced in the U.S. during the (un)Civil War. It was brought over from England who started the practice in the early 1800's.

Point being ... you don't need a SSN to owe tax.

http://i66.tinypic.com/2a5dtas.jpg

IRS forms are used for many many types of constitutional taxes.
You are mistaking the IRS for TREASURY. Don't mistake the agent for the principal.

"Entities" mean nothing and have no bearing.
Articulating a right or accepting an obligation creates a legal entity. If you lived in a world with no rights or obligations you would find no entities. Entities are created. A corporation is a legal entity. A person is a legal entity. A declaration of citizenship is a legal entity. Applying for a benefit such as Social Security creates an entity.

Once you start creating these things you are hooked as if on a drug. You create probably 100 entities a day and you do so without realizing this fact.

monty

24th November 2015, 11:17 AM

UPDATE: Judge was a no-show

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/houston-judge-a-no-show-on-appointed-hearing-date/

Houston Judge a no-show on appointed hearing-date
NOVEMBER 24, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/houston-judge-a-no-show-on-appointed-hearing-date/)SUPREMECOURTCASE (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)LEAVE A COMMENT (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/houston-judge-a-no-show-on-appointed-hearing-date/#respond)The Houston Division case is the initial case and the one that Petitioner appealed to the Fifth Circuit and, thereafter, the Supreme Court.

When the Supreme Court declined to review the decision of the Fifth Circuit, who affirmed the judgment in the Houston Division, Petitioner returned to the Houston Court and filed a motion to vacate the original Judgment and Order (Houston Dkt. #82 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/2-houston-division-docket.pdf)), as void for multiple reasons.

The hearing date for the motion was set for September 30, 2015.

On September 29, 2015, the Houston Judge made a ruling and entered an Order (Houston Dkt. #83 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/2-houston-division-docket.pdf)) denying the motion.

A month later, on October 28, 2015, Petitioner filed in the Houston Division case, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate the Court’s May 23, 2014, Amended Final Judgment (Dkt. #53) and Order of Sale and Vacature (Dkt. #54) as Void for (a) Lack of Constitutional Authority that gives the Court the Capacity to Take Jurisdiction and Enter Judgments, Orders, and Decrees in Favor of the United States Arising from a Civil or Criminal Proceeding Regarding a Debt, in Harris County, Texas, and (b) Denial of Due Process of Law (the “October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate”) (hyperlinked below).

The contents of the October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate are substantially identical to those of Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, Lufkin Division Objection and Demand (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf)—in response to which the Lufkin Court and plaintiff disappeared and declined to participate any further.

The October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate was docketed and a hearing set for November 18, 2015 (Houston Dkt. #84 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/2-houston-division-docket.pdf)).

November 18, 2015, however, came and went with no word from the Houston Judge.

The Houston Court (as every other United States District Court in America) is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction with authority only in the District of Columbia (for proof of this fact, see Houston Division Record (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/2a-houston-division-record.pdf), Fifth Circuit Record (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/5a-fifth-circuit-appeal-record.pdf), Supreme Court Record (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/7a-supreme-court-record.pdf), or Lufkin Division Record (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/3a-lufkin-division-record.pdf)), masquerading as a judicial-branch Article III constitutional court of limited jurisdiction (of which, since no later than June 25, 1948, there are no more: see 28 U.S.C. 132 and parenthesized legislative history thereunder (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/132)).

In every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court in America, “United States” means a Federal Corporation (28 U.S.C. 3002(15) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002))—and the supreme Federal corporation, over all other Federal corporations and other Federal entities of any kind, is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation (inc. February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419).

Every United States District Court in America, such as the Houston Court, is a District of Columbia Municipal Corporation tribunal, expounding and enforcing municipal (Roman civil) law, beyond the boundaries fixed therefor by the Constitution at Article 4 § 3(2): “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”—such as the District of Columbia.

Neither Harris County, Texas (in the Houston Division case), nor Tyler County, Texas (in the Lufkin Division case), is situate within “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”

The only geographic area in which any United States District Court anywhere in America is authorized to hear and decide cases is the District of Columbia—and every such “court” is a kangaroo court[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/houston-judge-a-no-show-on-appointed-hearing-date/#_ftn1)operating under color[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/houston-judge-a-no-show-on-appointed-hearing-date/#_ftn2) of law, office, and authority, deceiving and extorting the American People, with no constitutional authority to be doing business in any county, parish , or borough in America.

When cornered, District of Columbia Municipal Corporation legislative-branch officers—e.g., Federal judges, magistrates, and DOJ officers—routinely fall back on the policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

This approach, however, will not work under these circumstances for all Federal officers.

Whereas, the Lufkin DOJ attorneys can disregard with impunity Petitioner’s Demand for the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and walk away from the case; the Lufkin Judge enjoys no such luxury: He cannot ignore his responsibility to attend to and conclude the case and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or (h)(3) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_12) or 41(b) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_41), without violating his oath of office; to wit:

“I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.” 5 U.S.C. 3331 Oath of office.

There is, however, a bigger situation:

The most important policy—over all others—in the Federal judicial system is to maintain the appearance of impartiality (not impartiality per se, only the appearance thereof);

No one in government has come forward with the constitutional authority that gives any United States District Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt (28 U.S.C. 3002(8) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002)), in any county, parish, or borough in America;

The reason no one in government has come forward is that there exists no such constitutional authority[3] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/houston-judge-a-no-show-on-appointed-hearing-date/#_ftn3);

It is not possible to have a fair proceeding in a kangaroo court;

Every United States District Court in America is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction, usurping exercise of jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area;

Every United States District Court in America is a kangaroo court;

The Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction can be concealed no longer; and

The appearance of impartiality is crumbling under the weight of fraud and treason to the Constitution.

The reason the Houston Judge failed to rule on Petitioner’s October 28, 2015, Houston Motion to Vacate (hyperlinked below) as appointed on November 18, 2015, in Houston Dkt. #84 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/2-houston-division-docket.pdf), is that anything he may say that actually addresses the issue set forth in the motion—either for or against Petitioner—will amount to a confession of fraud and treason to the Constitution.

But as with the Lufkin Judge, the Houston Judge’s oath of office requires that he make a ruling on Petitioner’s October 28, 2015, motion within a reasonable time—or be in violation thereof.

The Lufkin Division case is over in substance, DOJ attorneys having abandoned the case and the Lufkin Judge having violated his of oath of office (70 days of silence, despite the duty to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction within a reasonable time).

The clock is ticking in the Houston Division.

Having been defrauded and deprived of Petitioner’s real and personal property in the Houston Division case under color of law, office, and authority, by way of complicity among the Houston Judge, Fifth Circuit Judges, and Supreme Court Justices, Petitioner is active in rectifying matters and will report all developments on this webpage as they occur.
Houston Motion To Vacate, October 28, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/houston-motion-to-vacate-no-capacity-due-process-102815.pdf)
* * *
[U]Bonus:
Jeff Rense interviews John Trowbridge on RenseRadio.com (Nov. 16, 2015) (http://rense.gsradio.net:8080/rense/special/rense_111615_hr2.mp3)

Ares

24th November 2015, 11:27 AM

monty

24th November 2015, 11:44 AM

Awesome update. Although the corner he got them in there really is no way for them to remove themselves from without admitting to treason.

This is an interesting case which I will be monitoring for a while.

Madfranks or JohnQPublic would it be possible to sticky this thread so that it doesn't get buried?

This I feel is a landmark case and could be used against any federal district court.

I certainly have to agree. I think all anyone with a case in a federal court in any one of the fifty states needs to do is use this man's demand to show Constitutional authority and their case will stop dead in its tracks.

I imagine the feds are scrambling trying to come up with with another scheme to maintain thier control over the people.

boogietillyapuke

24th November 2015, 12:18 PM

The Fifth Circuit cuts straight to the chase:“Silence can ... be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. . .” U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1032 (5th Circuit, 1970).

monty

15th December 2015, 05:10 PM

Update Dec.15, 2015

The lesson they do not teach in law schools or high school civics classes: the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction

DECEMBER 15, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/)SUPREMECOURTCASE (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)LEAVE A COMMENT (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#respond)

Part 1: Article III federal courts versus United States District Courts

The Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf) creates the judicial power of the national government at Article 3 § 1 and delineates the character of the controversies to which the judicial power extends at Article 3 § 2(1); to wit, respectively and in pertinent part:

“Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. . . .

“Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States will be a party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In a judicial sense, “jurisdiction” (from the Latin jus right, dictio act of saying) means, essentially, the legal power, right, or authority of a court to hear and decide causes and pronounce the sentence of the law within a certain geographic area; to wit:

“forum . . . 2 a : a judicial body or assembly . . . b : the territorial jurisdiction of a court forum before personal jurisdiction may be exercised — National Law Journal” Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated: Springfield, Mass., 1996), p. 201.

“—Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed. . . .” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul. Minn., 1910) (hereinafter “Black’s 2nd”), p. 673.

The true distinction between courts is as to species of jurisdiction, i.e., either general or limited; to wit:

“General jurisdiction is that which extends to a great variety of matters. General jurisdiction in law and equity is jurisdiction of every kind that a court can possess, of the person, subject-matter, [and] territorial . . .

“. . . Limited jurisdiction (called, also, special and inferior) is that which extends only to certain specified causes.” [Emphasis in original.] John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.: 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 1761.

“—Limited jurisdiction. . . . The true distinction between courts is between such as possess a general and such as have only a special jurisdiction for a particular purpose . . .” Black’s 2nd, p. 673.

It is well settled that trial courts ordained and established by Congress under authority of Article III of the Constitution, supra, are courts of limited jurisdiction, with authority only over certain controversies; to wit:

“The character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are delineated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. . . .” Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd., v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982).

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006).

“[T]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States,411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 401; Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182, 319 U. S. 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).

“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 374.

“The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction . . .” Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830).

“[S]tate courts are courts of general jurisdiction . . . . By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 43 6 F.3d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 2006).

Whereas: Only courts with territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) can take cognizance of civil and criminal causes; and

Whereas: All Article III federal trial courts are courts of limited jurisdiction (certain controversies only),

Wherefore: No trial court ordained and established by Congress under Article III of the Constitution is authorized to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes.

Notwithstanding the above blackletter law,[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn1) Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure Section 3002 Definitions (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002) provides, in pertinent part:

“As used in this chapter:
“. . . (8) ‘Judgment’ means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt.”

Whereas: No inferior trial court ordained and established by Congress under authority of Article III of the Constitution is invested with territorial jurisdiction; and

Whereas: No Article III federal trial court has the territorial jurisdiction necessary to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising from a civil or criminal proceeding; and
Whereas: Every United States District Court (28 U.S.C. 132(a) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/132)) located throughout the Union takes cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enters judgments arising therefrom; and

Whereas: No Federal trial court can take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising therefrom unless authorized to do so by the Constitution; and

Whereas: Article III of the Constitution is devoid of such authority,

Wherefore: No United States District Court is an Article III court—and we must look elsewhere in the Constitution for the authority that gives United States District Courts the territorial jurisdiction necessary to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, as authorized by statute in 28 U.S.C. 3002(8).

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/

Glass

15th December 2015, 05:33 PM

“Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;

Because all activity in the US is under Admiralty and Maritime, this is how they do it. The extension of the 100 mile constitution free zone is an example of extending maritime reach inland. Highways are often classified as waterways which project inland and all "traffic" is considered to be maritime and subject to interdiction as per the rules of Admiralty.

monty

15th December 2015, 05:41 PM

Part 2,

Part 2: Treason to the Constitution

The only provision of the Constitution that grants Congress power to create inferior courts with territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments arising therefrom, is an implied authority, Article 4 § 3(2), also known as the territorial clause; to wit, in pertinent part:

“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .”

Whereas: As granted in Article 1 § 8(17) of the Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf) (infra), Congress have power of exclusive legislation (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (supra); to wit:

“Section 8. The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings;”; and

Whereas: The full extent of the “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (id. at 4 § 3(2)) today is the collective of:

the District of Columbia;

Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, Palmyra Atoll, Wake Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Midway Atoll, North Island – JACADS, Sand Island, Kingman Reef, and Navassa Island [2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn2); and

any other “Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings” ( at 1 § 8(17)); and

Whereas: All courts created by Congress under authority of Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf) are legislative Article IV territorial courts of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction); and

Whereas: Every United States District Court is authorized by statute (28 U.S.C. 3002(8)) to exercise general jurisdiction and take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt; and

Whereas: Every United States District Court is authorized at Article 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution to exercise territorial jurisdiction and “dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations [statutes] respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”; and

Whereas: Every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union—numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959—is situate without all “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (id.), and

Whereas: There is no constitutional authority for any United States District Court to exercise territorial jurisdiction and take cognizance of civil and criminal causes and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt anywhere within the exterior limits of the geographic area occupied by the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union; and

Whereas: Every United States District Court doing business within the exterior limits of the Union is a legislative-branch Article IV territorial court of general jurisdiction, under the exclusive control Congress, extending its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed therefor by the Constitution at Article 4 § 3(2) (“Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”), and usurping exercise of jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area (the Union), under color[3] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn3) of law, office, and authority, and therefore a kangaroo court[4] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn4); and

Whereas: “We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution,” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821),

Wherefore: Every single Congressman, Federal bench officer, and Department of Justice attorney is in violation of his oath of office and culpable for, among numerous other crimes and high crimes: fraud; misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance in public office; misprision of felony; misprision of treason; and treason to the Constitution.

Part 3: Legislative fraud on the part of Congress; connivance therewith on the part of Federal bench officers and Department of Justice attorneys

The only 26 U.S.C.7701(a)(10) “State”[5] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn5) of the 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) “United States”[6] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn6) whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code is the Title 26 U.S.C. State of District of Columbia.[7] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn7)

Notwithstanding the above statutory fact, bench officers in the Federal judiciary and attorneys in the Department of Justice treat virtually every American as a resident of the District of Columbia: liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code and subject to all other Federal rules and regulations.

Said Federal officers justify this by construing / interpreting any of an unknown number of “acts and statements” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.871-4)) arising in the course of normal and ordinary interaction between individual Americans and government agencies / programs, as evidence of “a definite intention to acquire residence in the [26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7701)] United States” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.871-4)), i.e., the District of Columbia.

Such “acts and statements” include evidence created through the application of one’s signature to a driver’s license application, voter registration form, tax return, application for Social Security benefits, IRS Form W-4, passport application, and any other of the myriad government forms one encounters in the course of his life—and require that the applicant certify that he is a citizen or resident of the (statutory) United States or resident of a (statutory) State.[8] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn8)

Americans who make such “acts and statements” are deemed to have made a general election (comprehensive choice) to be (1) treated as a resident of the District of Columbia under general legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013(g)(1) or (h)(1) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6013), (2) liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C. Chapters 1 Normal taxes and surtaxes and 24 Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages, and (3) subject to all legislation within the 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) “United States” (District of Columbia only), not just income-tax statutes; to wit:

“Quando lex est specialis, ratio autem generalis, generaliter lex est intelligenda. When the law is special, but its reason is general, the law is to be understood generally.” Bouvier’s, p. 2156.

We learn from the Supreme Court, however, that such “legislation” is legally fatally flawed, and therefore ultimately unenforceable—because no one can elect (choose)—or appear to elect—to be treated as a resident of a particular place for the purpose of taxation (or any other purpose) without also having a factual presence in that location; to wit:

“When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose of taxation. . . .” Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).

To acquire residence in a particular place one must do one of two things: (1) establish bodily presence as an inhabitant (by taking up housekeeping in a fixed and permanent abode), or (1) realize earnings (by way of permanency of occupation) from a source located therein.

Wherefore: It is clear that Congress have another master than the American People—and that every Federal bench officer and DOJ attorney is in connivance with Congress and complicit in the legislative fraud and treason to the Constitution

Part 4: Dealing with the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction

That the statutes of Congress may authorize United States Attorneys to bring suit in United States District Court is insufficient, in and of itself, to vest jurisdiction in any such court; to wit:

“So, we conclude, as we did in the prior case, that, although these suits may sometimes so present questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States that the Federal courts will have jurisdiction, yet the mere fact that a suit is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal courts.” Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900).

It is well settled that before a federal judge can rely on the authority of a statute for jurisdiction to hear and decide a particular cause, said judge must confirm that the Constitution has given him the capacity to take it; to wit:

“It remains rudimentary law that “[a]s regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. . . . To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.” The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1868) (emphasis added); accord, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Co., 486 U.S. 800 (http://openjurist.org/486/us/800), 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2179, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (http://openjurist.org/449/us/368), 379-380, 101 S.Ct. 669, 676-677, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (http://openjurist.org/260/us/226), 233-234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82-83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922); Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577-578, 586-587, 21 L.Ed. 914 (1874); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845); McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506, 3 L.Ed. 420 (1813). Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).

Bereft of lawful authority, United States District Courts located within the Union depend utterly upon the ability of their respective bench officers to prevaricate,[9] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn9) dissemble,[10] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn10) and sidestep issues that would destroy the charade of legitimacy and appearance of impartiality.

Until Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, Objection and Demand (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf) and September 30, 2015, Demand for Dismissal (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/demand-for-dismissal-filed-093015.pdf), Petitioner had never heard of a Department of Justice attorney failing to respond to a challenge of jurisdiction or a United States District Judge refusing to rule on a motion or abandoning an ongoing case (and failing to provide otherwise for its disposition).

But that is what happened in the Lufkin Division case (see October 28, 2015, post, infra).

Here is the reason:

Anything either DOJ attorney would have said, whether for or against Petitioner’s demand for the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority, would have amounted to admission of fraud or treason to the Constitution or proof of incompetence.

Whereas, DOJ attorneys can back out of a case without incident, this is not so for a United States District Judge; to wit:

“Judicis officium est opus diei in die suo perficere. It is the duty if a judge to finish the work of each day within that day.” Bouvier’s, p. 2140.
“Boni judicis est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite oritur, et interest republicæ ut sint fines litium. It is the duty of a good judge to prevent litigations, that suit may not grow out of suit, and it concerns the welfare of a state that an end be put to litigation.” Id. at 2127.

The Lufkin Judge has a duty not only to Petitioner, but to the American Republic—by way of his oath of office (5 U.S.C. 3331 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3331)), to“bear true faith and allegiance” (id (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3331).) to the Constitution and “well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office” (id (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3331).) of United States District Judge—and conclude the instant litigation:

“When it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach the merits. In such a situation the action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Melo v. U.S., 505 F.2d 1026.
Instead, the Lufkin Judge went silent.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (to whom Petitioner would appeal for resolution of the instant unresolved motion), explains in United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir., 1970), the significance of the Lufkin Judge’s silence:

“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.24

“. . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani,265 F.2d 408 (http://openjurist.org/265/f2d/408) (2d Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S. 918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3 L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f., Avery v. Clearly, 132 U.S. 604 (http://openjurist.org/132/us/604), 10 S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694 (http://openjurist.org/406/f2d/694), 698 (5th Cir. 1969); American Nat’l Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (http://openjurist.org/383/f2d/81) (5th Cir. 1967).”

Presently, there is a neglected unresolved motion on both the Lufkin and Houston Division Docket.

Notwithstanding the fraudulent statutory definitions of “State” throughout the United States Code, “We are bound to interpret the constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted,” Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).

Wherefore, no United States District Judge has constitutional authority to expound or enforce Federal statutes in Texas or any other of the “several States of the Union” (infra) against any American residing there or property located there; to wit:

“The several States [U]of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State[of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

“Judici officium suum excedenti non paretur. To a judge who exceeds his office (or jurisdiction) no obedience is due,” Bouvier’s, p. 2140, and, as demonstrated hereinabove and elsewhere in this webpage, every United States District Judge and Magistrate in every United States District Court within the Union, in connivance with Congress and conspiracy with officers of the Department of Justice, is exceeding his jurisdiction, beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution, at Article 4 § 3(2), for Federal trial courts of general jurisdiction, and perpetrating the Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction.

“Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam. He who uses his legal rights harms no one,” id. at 2157, and there is nothing prohibiting any other litigant from making the same demands as Petitioner, in any other Federal case, civil or criminal, anywhere in the Union.

No United States District Judge or Magistrate can reply responsively (meaningfully) to a demand for dismissal of a Federal case, civil or criminal, within the Union, for lack of constitutional authority that gives the particular United States District Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt, in the defendant’s particular county, parish, or borough, without also producing evidence of serious wrongdoing on his part.

Evidently, the Lufkin and Houston Judges have “taken the Fifth” sub silentio[11] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftn11) and refused to answer their respective unresolved motion on the ground that it may tend to incriminate them.

The Hoax of Federal Jurisdiction can be concealed no longer.

Petitioner is in the process of rectifying matters in these cases, and will report developments as they occur.

* * * *

[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref1) blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief, (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999) (hereinafter “Black’s 7th”), p. 163.

[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref2) U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, (1) “All OIA Jurisdictions,” and (2) “U.S. Territories under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Jurisdiction or Shared with Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS): (1) http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/index.cfm, (2) http://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/islandfactsheet2.cfm, respectively.

[3] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref3) COLOR. An appearance, semblance, or simulacrum, as distinguished from that which is real. A prima facie or apparent right. Hence a deceptive appearance ; a plausible, assumed exterior, concealing a lack of reality ; a guise or pretext. . . . Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891) (hereinafter “Black’s 1st”), p. 222.

[4] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref4) kangaroo court. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding. Black’s 7th, p. 359.

[5] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref5) The 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) States are the bodies politic of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and no other. Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-121315-for-posting-draft-2-1.pdf), pp. 8–14.

[6] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref6) The 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) United States is the collective of the geographic area occupied by the bodies politic of the six respective 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10) States, supra, fn. 5. Id (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-121315-for-posting-draft-2-1.pdf).

[7] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref7) Id (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-121315-for-posting-draft-2-1.pdf). at 15. (Continued)

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/

monty

15th December 2015, 05:53 PM

Definitions continued:

[8] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref8) In all Federal law, “State” is a statutory term and means, ultimately, the District of Columbia, id (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-121315-for-posting-draft-2-1.pdf).., which is why use of “State” is avoided in this webpage.

Unpunctuated, grammatically incorrect, two-capital-letter United States Postal Service (“U.S.P.S.”) designators for each of the putative 50 States (50 political subdivisions of the District of Columbia; id (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-121315-for-posting-draft-2-1.pdf). at 11), and ZIP Codes, are political—not geographical—identifiers.

ZIP Codes are assigned to United States Post Offices only, not geographic areas, Domestic Mail Manual (“DMM”) § 602-1.8.1 Purpose of ZIP Code, the purpose of which is to facilitate processing of mail within and between U.S.P.S. facilities only, id. at 708-10.1 and 2—not delivery of mail, id. at 602-1.8.1.

Whereas, a ZIP Code is not required in a sender’s return address, id. at 602-1.3(e)(2), a ZIP Code is a required element of a sender’s return domestic address, id. at 602-1.5.3—signifying that, the word “domestic” in DMM carries a duty and means District of Columbia, because such ZIP Code use, otherwise optional, is mandatory in the District of Columbia (all District of Columbia residents are subject to the absolute, exclusive legislative power of Congress and must obey all legislation within the District of Columbia, such as DMM, or risk subjection to a criminal charge and fine).

Use of a ZIP Code is voluntary, id. at 602-1.3(e)(2), confirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:

“We note that under section 122.32 of the U.S. Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual, the use of a zip code remains voluntary. See United States Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual § 122.32, at 55 (Mar. 1992). . . .” Joseph Peters v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 966 F.2d 1483, 296 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 22 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1123 (1992).

Carrier delivery of mail is free, DMM § 508-4.1.2 Purpose; postage pays for transmission of mail between U.S.P.S. facilities only, id. at 708-10.2 Application.

[9] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref9) pre-var′i-cate . . . v. . . . i. . . .To use ambiguous or evasive language for the purpose of deceiving or diverting attention; misrepresent by shape or turn of statement; give a wrong color to facts in speaking or answering; quibble; shuffle. . . . A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903), p.1410.

[10] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref10) dis-sem′ble . . . v. . . . i. . . . To put on false appearances; disguise the reality; represent a thing or things untruly. Id. at 531.

[11] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref11) SUB SILENTIO. Under silence ; without any notice being taken. . . . Black’s 1st, p. 1129.

Related

Sister Federal tax case: Petitioner demands Court’s constitutional authority; plaintiff and Court go silent; Petitioner demands immediate dismissal and costs, restitution, and damages of $1,841,451.45 (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/10/01/sister-case-petitioner-demands-the-courts-constitutional-authority-plaintiff-and-court-go-silent-petitioner-demands-immediate-dismissal-and-costs-restitution-and-damages-of-1841451-45/?relatedposts_hit=1&relatedposts_origin=521&relatedposts_position=0)

Sister Federal tax case:Judge and DOJ attorneys abandon case midstream, decline to participate any further (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/10/28/sister-federal-tax-case-judge-and-doj-attorneys-abandon-case-midstream-refuse-to-participate-any-further/)Reblogged by 1 person

Houston Judge a no-show on appointed hearing-date (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/houston-judge-a-no-show-on-appointed-hearing-date/)

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-lesson-they-do-not-teach-in-law-schools-or-high-school-civics-classes-the-hoax-of-federal-jurisdiction-2/#_ftnref8

Ares

15th December 2015, 08:23 PM

Thanks for the update Monty.

Definitely a very interesting case. Really enjoy watching this unfold and keeping notes as well as downloading documentation.

monty

15th December 2015, 09:36 PM

Thanks for the update Monty.

Definitely a very interesting case. Really enjoy watching this unfold and keeping notes as well as downloading documentation.

Likewise. I have a gut feeling he has them by the balls.

7th trump

16th December 2015, 05:16 AM

Likewise. I have a gut feeling he has them by the balls.

No he doesnt....its his ignorance of "HIS" voluntary actions that'll make him lose the case.

He volunteered his political presence into that particular jurisdiction venue. The definitions mean nothing in that sense. Besides the definitions define perfectly what he volunteered himself into.
He's playing semantics with the court like most people do who dont know what they are doing.
I bet none of you understand why they changed the definitions around the 1868 are..................has everything to do with the Civil War and who was free'd but wasn't accepted as "We the People" by none of the union states including the northern states.

They'll just pull the "ignorance of the law is no excuse" card..........and it is true.

Ares

16th December 2015, 05:48 AM

No he doesnt....its his ignorance of "HIS" voluntary actions that'll make him lose the case.

He volunteered his political presence into that particular jurisdiction venue. The definitions mean nothing in that sense. Besides the definitions define perfectly what he volunteered himself into.
He's playing semantics with the court like most people do who dont know what they are doing.
I bet none of you understand why they changed the definitions around the 1868 are..................has everything to do with the Civil War and who was free'd but wasn't accepted as "We the People" by none of the union states including the northern states.

They'll just pull the "ignorance of the law is no excuse" card..........and it is true.

If it was true the court would of asserted jurisdiction. Reading through his previous documentation on his site he was able to show through court cases that just because he has a signed W-4 does not mean that he is a U.S. citizen (one who actually resides in DC.) He was also able to show that the U.S. District courts have zero jurisdiction in states with matters of debt.

7th trump

16th December 2015, 07:18 AM

If it was true the court would of asserted jurisdiction. Reading through his previous documentation on his site he was able to show through court cases that just because he has a signed W-4 does not mean that he is a U.S. citizen (one who actually resides in DC.) He was also able to show that the U.S. District courts have zero jurisdiction in states with matters of debt.

Sure he can show these things but in the end he cant defend himself from his actions.
If he signed a W4 and contributing to SS hes legally a second class "US citizen".
The W4 is signed under penalty of perjury proclaiming federal US citizenship.....he signed it as such.
They convicted Pete Hendrickson using this tactic...they used his signed W4 to prove he was making 26usc 3401(a) "wages. They didn't have to explain why or how other than his signature on the W4 convicting him.
Social Security is the number 1 tool that puts anyone using the number to gain federal benefits in their jurisdiction. Some here will argue with me on this but all government forms cannot be processed unless theres a ssn.

You cannot be in the same jurisdiction as "We the People" and still take benefits under the federal government (another jurisdiction). Theres many court cases citing this.
If he tries to prove hes not and accepting federal benefits hes in violation of the US Constitution. And I wouldn't put it past the DC goons on trying to hang him on that to end that argument once and for all if he wins the argument in court.
So he wins his case...that doesn't mean the definitions are wrong. A lot of other people fall within the meaning of those definitions. Most americans want their federal benefits and so the definitions stand as written.
Lets say he wins his case. What makes you think they wont arrest him for fraud. If you stand on your rights and the law you better know how to use the law to defend yourself.
They'll use his momentum to convict him. And from what I've seen so far he hasn't proven himself that he's not a "US citizen". All I see is he's playing a dangerous court game of semantics over silly definitions all while standing in the jurisdiction he claims hes not in. In the end the definitions will not change anyway because theres people who cannot be anything else but "US citizens" and will remain in such jurisdiction under the definitions because they are "federal personnel" residing within one the 50 states which the federal government has every right to reach in and control....namely the negro. They are not to this day recognized as "We the People"...they are "US citizens" and cannot go any higher.
This is why the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 because they don't have the protections of the "Bill of Rights".
NOT AN INTELLIGENT PERSON. He needs to open his eyes wider to see the legal noose he's made for himself and hope he doesn't put his head in.
Always stay a few steps ahead of the game.
First of all......understand the game before making a move and that is what he hasn't figured out yet.

palani

16th December 2015, 07:30 AM

What is true is that when it comes to conviction you and only you are the one providing the evidence that convicts you. Far better to provide no evidence than to show how wordy and intelligent you are.

These guys know they are in the Land of Oz (they follow the YELLOW BRICK ROAD). They know YOU know they are in the Land of Oz. Any argument at all provides evidence that YOU are in the Land of Oz and thereby subject to the jurisdiction of OZ.

monty

16th December 2015, 07:49 AM

Sure he can show these things but in the end he cant defend himself from his actions.
If he signed a W4 and contributing to SS hes legally a second class "US citizen".
The W4 is signed under penalty of perjury proclaiming federal US citizenship.....he signed it as such.
They convicted Pete Hendrickson using this tactic...they used his signed W4 to prove he was making 26usc 3401(a) "wages. They didn't have to explain why or how other than his signature on the W4 convicting him.
Social Security is the number 1 tool that puts anyone using the number to gain federal benefits in their jurisdiction. Some here will argue with me on this but all government forms cannot be processed unless theres a ssn.

You cannot be in the same jurisdiction as "We the People" and still take benefits under the federal government (another jurisdiction). Theres many court cases citing this.
If he tries to prove hes not and accepting federal benefits hes in violation of the US Constitution. And I wouldn't put it past the DC goons on trying to hang him on that to end that argument once and for all if he wins the argument in court.
So he wins his case...that doesn't mean the definitions are wrong. A lot of other people fall within the meaning of those definitions. Most americans want their federal benefits and so the definitions stand as written.
Lets say he wins his case. What makes you think they wont arrest him for fraud. If you stand on your rights and the law you better know how to use the law to defend yourself.
They'll use his momentum to convict him. And from what I've seen so far he hasn't proven himself that he's not a "US citizen". All I see is he's playing a dangerous court game of semantics over silly definitions all while standing in the jurisdiction he claims hes not in.
NOT AN INTELLIGENT PERSON. He needs to open his eyes wider to see the legal noose he's made for himself and hope he doesn't put his head in.
Always stay a few steps ahead of the game.

His arguement is the US District courts are territorial courts, Article IV courts lacking Constitutional authority to take jurisdiction in the 50 geographical states. He has shown that to be the case. Congress has given these courts jurisdiction, general jurisdiction over federal crimes. The Congress lacks the Constitutional authority to grant jurisdiction in the union states. Congress lacks Constitutional authority to legislate in the union states. The Congress has usurped this power.

By the way, as far as intelligence, he was a National Merit Scholar. I rated in the 99th percentile in the USA on the National Merit Scholarship tests for 1960. That wasn't enough for me to qualify to be awarded a National Merit Scholarship. So he must have been near the 100th percentile to awarded the honor. That means 99 % of the high school seniors taking the National Merit Scholarship exams the year he graduated rated lower than he did.

Can you show us where, in the Constitution the US District courts have authority to take jurisdiction in any of the union states? I don't think you can and neither can these two federal judges.

7th trump

16th December 2015, 09:02 AM

His arguement is the US District courts are territorial courts, Article IV courts lacking Constitutional authority to take jurisdiction in the 50 geographical states. He has shown that to be the case. Congress has given these courts jurisdiction, general jurisdiction over federal crimes. The Congress lacks the Constitutional authority to grant jurisdiction in the union states. Congress lacks Constitutional authority to legislate in the union states. The Congress has usurped this power.

By the way, as far as intelligence, he was a National Merit Scholar. I rated in the 99th percentile in the USA on the National Merit Scholarship tests for 1960. That wasn't enough for me to qualify to be awarded a National Merit Scholarship. So he must have been near the 100th percentile to awarded the honor. That means 99 % of the high school seniors taking the National Merit Scholarship exams the year he graduated rated lower than he did.

Can you show us where, in the Constitution the US District courts have authority to take jurisdiction in any of the union states? I don't think you can and neither can these two federal judges.

You're not understanding that he's playing a semantic game.
The District courts have always been within the states from the gitgo. They hear arguments on the federal level. When you as a "US citizen" (federal personnel; see 5usc 552(a)(13)) fall within the that jurisdiction and/or argue a topic that's within that jurisdiction you will argue it in said jurisdictional court. State courts do not hear federal level arguments.
It is you that falls within their federal jurisdiction, not the argument that district courts falling within state jurisdiction....and the semantic argument hes trying to prove is he believes hes a state-citizen where district courts don't have jurisdiction. He doesn't know that under penalty of perjury of being a US citizen hes standing directly in federal jurisdiction.
You are not a state-citizen (We the People, having the full protections of the Bill of Rights) when contributing into the SS welfare program....you are federal "US citizen" (having privileges granted by the federal government in the form of Civil Rights). That's why a W4 is signed under penalty of perjury to being a US citizen. You have to pledge that jurisdiction to get those jurisdictional benefits. Its that way because the Constitution forbids the feds to mingle in "We the People" affairs.
Hope that helps but I'm not holding my breath!
Notice the difference between the two citizenships....its in the Rights you hold or don't hold.
Monty go to www.state-citizen.org to understand this.

monty

16th December 2015, 09:37 AM

monty

16th December 2015, 10:44 AM

Here Lowell Becraft opines on Constitutional jurisdiction. He seems to have reniged on future parts to his article.

http://www.newswithviews.com/Becraft/larry.htm
Larry Becraft -- Jurisdiction Questioned, Part 1
JURISDICTION QUESTIONED
PART 1
By Attorney Lowell (Larry) Becraft, Jr.
June 22, 2004
NewsWithViews.com

We suffer a plague of the acronymic alphabet agencies: DEA, FDA, FAA, FCC, SEC, FBI, TVA, IRS, BATF, ad nauseam. One may study the U.S. Constitution searching for the specific provision granting Congress authority over airplanes, telecommunications, securities as well as a wide variety of other matters and learn that Congress has apparently been denied authority over these subject matters.

This raises an extremely interesting question: where do we find the Constitutional authority for such agencies and the laws they administer?

By statute, all federal agencies must confine their activities to the jurisdiction delegated to them: see 5. U.S.C. §588. While this is a simply statutory command, there is an evident problem in that most federal agencies fail to publish any statements, either in the C.F.R. or some other source, which define their jurisdiction in clear and express terms.

The C.I.A. is one agency where it is easy to determine its jurisdiction because a statute has deprived it of any domestic jurisdiction; see Weissman v. C.I.A., 565 F.2d 692, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1977). However, to determine the jurisdiction of other agencies requires some study.

Perhaps the best way to determine the jurisdiction of any given federal agency is to examine various cases regarding the subject matter of that agency. For example, the United States Constitution does not provide that Congress has any authority concerning the fish and wildlife within this country and this has been previously litigated with obvious results. In McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394- 95 (1877), the Supreme Court held regarding the fish within the oceans:

"[T]he States own the tidewaters themselves and the fish in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while running." The title thus held is subject to the paramount right of navigation, the regulation of which, in respect to foreign and interstate commerce, has been granted to the United States. There has been, however, no such grant of power over the fisheries. These remain under the exclusive control of the state.....

http://gold-silver.us/forum/safari-reader://www.newswithviews.com/images/Article-Support-NWV.gif (http://www.newswithviews.com/DonateNWV.htm)
Like fish, the Constitution simply grants no authority to the federal government to control the wildlife within the states of this nation and this has been noted in several cases. A ready example of such a case is United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D.Ark. 1914), which concerned the issue of where the Migratory Bird Act of March, 1913, could apply.

Through this act, Congress sought to extend protection to migratory birds by limiting the hunting season and otherwise placing restrictions upon hunting of these birds. As is only natural, upon adoption of this act federal officials started enforcing it and here they had arrested Shauver in Arkansas for shooting migratory birds.

Shauver moved to dismiss the charges filed against him on the grounds that the act contravened the Tenth Amendment by invading the jurisdiction of the states upon a matter historically reserved for legislation by the states. In deciding that this act was unconstitutional, Judge Trieber noted that the common law provided that the states essentially owned the birds within their borders and state legislation was the sole source by which hunting could be controlled. In so concluding, he held:

"All the courts are authorized to do when the constitutionality of a legislative act is questioned is to determine whether Congress, under the Constitution as it is, possesses the power to enact the legislation in controversy; their power does not extend to the matter of expediency. If Congress has not the power, the duty of the court is to declare the act void. The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of migratory wild game in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act is unconstitutional."

Notwithstanding Judge Trieber's decision, enforcement of the act did not stop and it was thereafter enforced within Kansas, where another man arrested for killing migratory birds. In United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 293 (D.Kan. 1915), the issue of the Migratory Bird Act of 1913 was again before a different court and it, relying upon its own research of the law as well as the decision in Shauver, likewise concluded that this act was unconstitutional:

"[T]he exclusive title and power to control the taking and ultimate disposition of the wild game in this country resides in the states, to be parted with and exercised by the state for the common good of all the people of the state, as in its wisdom may seem best."

The above decisions have never been overruled and they stand today as valid authority for the proposition that Congress under the Constitution does not have any direct grant of power to regulate and control fish and wildlife within our country.

If this is the case, you might ask what is the Constitutional basis upon which the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service has been created and currently operates?

Part II and III, coming soon.

© 2004 Lowell Becraft - All Rights Reserved

E-Mails are used strictly for NWVs alerts, not for sale

7th trump

16th December 2015, 11:31 AM

You still haven't shown us where the Constitution gives the US District courts jurisdiction in the 50 union states. Yes they have statutory jurisdiction. I don't know wheter or not this man signed a W-4. He is a medical doctor in his own practice perhaps self employed. He did sign a 1040 because the judge ordered the DOJ attorney to bring a copy which the judge apparently used to cause Dr. Trowbridge to be a (statutory) US CITIZEN.

Whereas: “We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821),

“So, we conclude, as we did in the prior case, that, although these suits may sometimes so present questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States that the Federal courts will have jurisdiction, yet the mere fact that a suit is an adverse suit authorized by the statutes of Congress is not in and of itself sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal courts.” Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513 (1900).

“It remains rudimentary law that “[a]s regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. . . . To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.” The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1868) (emphasis added); accord, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Co., 486 U.S. 800 (http://openjurist.org/486/us/800), 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2179, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (http://openjurist.org/449/us/368), 379-380, 101 S.Ct. 669, 676-677, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (http://openjurist.org/260/us/226), 233-234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 82-83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922); Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, 577-578, 586-587, 21 L.Ed. 914 (1874); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845); McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504, 506, 3 L.Ed. 420 (1813). [Underline emphasis only added.] Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).

A 1040 huh?
Then yes hes a bonified under penalty of perjury "US citizen".
Employed or self employed.....both fall under the definition of "employment" as defined in the SS Act.

Just as the court ordered to use the doctors 1040 to prove jurisdiction.............hes a federal second class "US citizen". They know what exactly to use to prove this. I've been saying it the whole time about SS and taxes.

Constitution doesn't give jurisdiction but I haven't seen one district court on state land either. All these buildings are federal buildings on federal land from what I know.
Heres your issue............you believe the district court has illegal jurisdiction in the 50 states. They can and will hear federal issues relating to the district they cover. That doesn't mean they have jurisdiction over the land....they just have jurisdiction to hear federal level arguments covering that area.
Since this doctor is under a federal retirement and welfare program called Social Security and resides in a state he'll be going to that district court to cast his argument.
This isn't going to end well for him because he doesn't understand what he's arguing. And just because the judges are taking their time doesn't mean they are stumped. It took months for the court in Pete Hendricksons case and they convicted him using his signed W4.

monty

16th December 2015, 11:42 AM

monty

16th December 2015, 12:02 PM

A 1040 huh?
Then yes hes a bonified under penalty of perjury "US citizen".
Employed or self employed.....both fall under the definition of "employment" as defined in the SS Act.

Just as the court ordered to use the doctors 1040 to prove jurisdiction.............hes a federal second class "US citizen". They know what exactly to use to prove this. I've been saying it the whole time about SS and taxes.

Constitution doesn't give jurisdiction but I haven't seen one district court on state land either. All these buildings are federal buildings on federal land from what I know.
Heres your issue............you believe the district court has illegal jurisdiction in the 50 states. They can and will hear federal issues relating to the district they cover. That doesn't mean they have jurisdiction over the land....they just have jurisdiction to hear federal level arguments covering that area.
Since this doctor is under a federal retirement and welfare program called Social Security and resides in a state he'll be going to that district court to cast his argument.
This isn't going to end well for him because he doesn't understand what he's arguing. And just because the judges are taking their time doesn't mean they are stumped. It took months for the court in Pete Hendricksons case and they convicted him using his signed W4.

Here is his argument concerning the 1040 the judge ordered into evidence:

Also, the federal court may be on federal land, but the crime was not commited in the court.

Petitioner had the Houston Division case won following Petitioner’s initial March 19, 2014, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Houston Docket #18)—because there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner was a resident of the only statutory “State” of the statutory “United States” whose residents are liable to tax under Title 26 U.S.C.: the District of Columbia.

The judge stacked the deck against Petitioner by commanding sua sponte[4] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn4) the DOJ attorney to file in the record what the judge would use sub silentio[5] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn5) to justify pretending that he was authorized to treat Petitioner as a resident of the District of Columbia: one of Petitioner’s tax returns.

Courtesy of Congress, the filing of a tax return is one of an indefinite number of undefined “acts or statements” that purportedly prove “a definite intention to acquire residence in the [statutory] United States” (26 C.F.R. 1.871-4(c)(2)(iii) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.871-4)), i.e., the District of Columbia.

In combination with legally defective congressional legislation at 26 U.S.C. 6013(g) and (h) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6013), actors in government pretend that the filing of a tax return constitutes one’s voluntary election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia, and thereafter pretend that they are authorized to treat the filer as such without disclosing what they are doing.

The only flaw is that an alleged “definite intention to acquire residence” is insufficient legal ground in and of itself for someone to acquire or be granted residence or be treated by a government officer as a resident of a given place.

Under such logic, every non-American crossing the border into America without authorization could claim the right to be treated as a resident (Note: There is no substantial difference between being treated as a resident and being a resident).

Residence depends on facts and is established in one of two ways: through bodily presence as an inhabitant of, or realization of earnings in, a given place / geographic area.

The Supreme Court, whose opinions are not law per se, but have the effect of law, affirms that no one can elect (choose) to be treated as a resident of a particular place for the purpose of taxation (or any other purpose) without also having a factual presence in that location; to wit:

“When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose of taxation. . . .” Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com

monty

30th December 2015, 08:05 PM

UPDATE:
https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2015/12/30/criminal-complaint-filed-with-military-authorities-against-all-lufkin-federal-actors-2/

The Union is the collective of the 50 respective commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf), and the geographic area they occupy.

There is no provision of the Constitution that grants Congress power of territorial or personal legislation anywhere within the Union—only subject-matter legislation over certain things (Article 1 § 8(1-16) (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf)).

This means that Congress have no legislative power over property located anywhere within the Union or any American residing there, a limitation confirmed by the Supreme Court:

“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State [of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

Notwithstanding that there is no provision of Article III of the Constitution that authorizes Congress to ordain and establish any court with power of territorial or personal jurisdiction anywhere in the Union (only jurisdiction to hear or decide certain controversies, Article 3 § 2(1) (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf)): The United States District Courts created by Congress (28 U.S.C. 132(a) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/132)) and doing business throughout the Union are usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction over property located there and Americans residing there.

Wherefore, every Federal bench officer, including, without limitation, every Supreme Court justice, is culpable for:

criminal negligence of the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction, in respect of the legislative powers therein conferred upon Congress;

violation of their oath of office to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . [and] bear true faith and allegiance to the same” (5 U.S.C. 3331 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3331)); and

Treason to the Constitution; to wit:

“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821),

What separates Man from the beasts is the faculty of reason:

"Ratio est radius divini luminis. Reason is a ray of the divine light." Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891) (hereinafter “Black’s 1st”), p. 995.

"Ratio est formalis causa consuetudinis. Reason is the formal cause of custom." Id.

"Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex. Reason is the soul of law ; the reason of law being changed, the law is also changed." Id.

At implementation of the Constitution March 4, 1789, the soul of law in America was personal liberty under the common law; to wit:

“Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law.” William Blackstone and John Innes Clark Hare, cited in John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 1965 (s.v. “Liberty”).

“Due course of law,” supra, is synonymous with “due process of law” and means process according to the law of the land, i.e., the Constitution; interpreted according to the principles of the common law; to wit:
“Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . . ." Mr. Justice Matthews, delivering the opinion of the court in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).

“Due process of law . . . refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . .” Id. at 535.

On June 30, 1864 (see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-121315-for-posting-draft-2-1.pdf), pp. 4-14), Congress invoked the sovereignty of the American People to override their will as declared in the Constitution, and changed, beginning with the revenue act of that date, the reason of law in America, from personal liberty under the common law to civil liberty under municipal (Roman civil) law, i.e., rules and regulations commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong; to wit:

“Under the Roman law, civil liberty was the affirmance of a general restraint, while in our law it is the negation of a general restraint.” Ordronaux's Constitutional Legislation, quoted in Bouvier’s, p. 1965 (s.v. “Liberty”).

There is only one provision of the Constitution that expressly grants Congress power to make rules and regulations—Article 4 § 3(2), which provides, in pertinent part:

“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; . . .”

All “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id. (which is enumerated at Article 1 § 8(17) (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf) of the Constitution), is extraneous to the Union.

Congress have no authority to legislate rules and regulations (statutes) for the 50 commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, or the Americans who reside there—and in such geographic area the Department of Justice and United States District Courts are bereft of constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and execute or declare or enforce any such rule or regulation (statute) enacted by Congress.

The contents of this webpage reflect Petitioner’s efforts to dissolve unconstitutional, felonious, and treasonous attempts to impose Federal rules and regulations on Petitioner in order to justify seizure of Petitioner’s property.

“Est autem vis legem simulans. Violence may also put on the mask of law” (Black’s 1st, p. 433)—and Federal elements today, like an occupying army, usurp exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction and impose rules and regulations throughout the Union and deprive the Americans residing there of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, under municipal (Roman civil) law of the District of Columbia, in treason to the Constitution.

Notwithstanding the monstrousness of such organized outlawry, reason, not violence, is the answer.

It has taken all this time—roughly 100 years (since Federal actors first began enforcing provisions of the fraudulent Sixteenth and Eighteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution on Americans residing throughout the Union; see Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-revised-121315-for-posting-draft-2-1.pdf), p. 8)—for someone to divine the question that Federal aggressors are required by blackletter law (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf)[1] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://08B09061-4448-4B73-8091-682EA2079D0A/#_ftn1) to answer (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf), but cannot without also incriminating themselves for treason to the Constitution.

Petitioner’s objective is the exact estimation of effort that gets Federal actors to honor their oath of office and bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and cease usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction without “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)).

For the first time in their professional life, upon receipt of Petitioner’s September 14, 2015, objection to denial of due process of law and demand for the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf), the Federal judges, magistrates, law clerk, attorneys general of the United States, and DOJ attorneys involved in that case hewed to the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and ceased attempting to defraud Petitioner and deprive Petitioner of Petitioner’s property under color of law, office, and authority.

Despite this positive sign, however, said actors cannot be trusted to resign their office or refrain from committing the same crimes against other Americans less knowledgeable in such matters than Petitioner, and therefore must be brought under control.

Wherefore, in accordance with provisions of the Fourth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, and as provided in 18 U.S.C. 4 Misprision (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/4)[U][2] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://08B09061-4448-4B73-8091-682EA2079D0A/#_ftn2) of felony (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/4), Petitioner on December 30, 2015, filed by mail with certain of the only Federal authorities who might be worthy of trust—66 senior officers in military authority (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/66-senior-officers-in-military-authority.pdf)—an affidavit of information (criminal complaint), upon probable cause of misdemeanor, felony, and treason supported by oath and particularly describing the persons to be seized, against every Federal actor in the Lufkin Division case, and a second affidavit of information limited to the Lufkin Judges and Magistrate Judges only.

Petitioner also lodged each Affidavit of Information with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—and sent each Lufkin Federal defendant his own copy.

“Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy,” Bouvier’s, p. 2165—and every Federal Lufkin defendant is liable to Petitioner for damages for, among other things, denial of the constitutional right to due process of law—wherefore, Petitioner has remedies.

These criminal complaints are the first step on the path to obtaining remedy.

Affidavit of Information No. 1 – all Federal actors, Lufkin Division (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/affidavit-of-information-no-1-e28093-all-federal-actors-lufkin-division.pdf)

Affidavit of Information No. 2 – Lufkin Division judges only (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/affidavit-of-information-no-2-e28093-lufkin-division-judges-only.pdf)

* * * *

[1] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://08B09061-4448-4B73-8091-682EA2079D0A/#_ftnref1) blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A Garner, Editor in Chief, (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 163.

[2] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://08B09061-4448-4B73-8091-682EA2079D0A/#_ftnref2) mis-pri′sion, mis-prizh′un, n. . . . Law. . . . The concealment of a crime, especially of treason or felony. . . . A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903), p. 1133.

supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/) | December 30, 2015 at 22:07 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://7) | Categories: Uncategorized (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/) | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-aJ

7th trump

31st December 2015, 08:56 AM

monty

31st December 2015, 12:41 PM

Reads like a conspiracy website.....as usual.
And nothing, and I mean nothing, is going to come of it because the guy is a "US citizen" under Congressional policy.
His argument his no merit other than the court letting the cat out of the bag that "US citizens" are under federal policy and not legally a member of "The People".
The Constitution doesn't need to give authority for District courts to operate within state land when the courts are on federal land dealing with federal personnel and federal issues.
This is just an example of the stupidity of people.

The way I read these court cases it appears the Supreme Court does not share your opinion.

"Special provision is made in the constitution, for the cession of jurisdiction from the states over places where the federal government shall establish forts, or other military works. And it is only in these places, or in the territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction."
[New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836) (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=35&page=662)]

When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands. And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative: because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted. 7 ”
[Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 213, 221, 223 (1845) (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=44&page=213)]

“In another, not unrelated context, Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264 (1821), could well have been the explanation of the Rule of Necessity; he wrote that a court “must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.” Id., at 404 (emphasis added)

The several States [U]of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State[of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
The "crimes" were not committed in the Federal Courthouse.

monty

31st December 2015, 12:51 PM

And nothing, and I mean nothing, is going to come of it because the guy is a "US citizen" under Congressional policy.

Probably nothing will become of it because to do so would unravel the entire federal bureaucracy. Nobody in government will enforce it. I believe Trowbridge will have no further problems with the feds because to do so they would be incriminating themselves. The feds will continue to rape the uneducated.

To expect the US DOJ to act on its unconstitutional court system is beyond imagination. Ain't gonna happen.

7th trump

31st December 2015, 03:41 PM

Probably nothing will become of it because to do so would unravel the entire federal bureaucracy. Nobody in government will enforce it. I believe Trowbridge will have no further problems with the feds because to do so they would be incriminating themselves. The feds will continue to rape the uneducated.

To expect the US DOJ to act on its unconstitutional court system is beyond imagination. Ain't gonna happen.

Its not unconstitutional. You just dont want to see the truth and pander in believing its all a conspiracy.
There are no district courts operating outside it's jurisdiction.
The first district court was approved by the very first Congress and has been intact ever since and then nobody batted an eye about district courts.
They are all on allotted federal land within the boundaries of the union states.

Its you who has fallen within their jurisdiction. And that appears as though they are within the state and unconstitutional.

Ares

31st December 2015, 03:58 PM

Its not unconstitutional. You just dont want to see the truth and pander in believing its all a conspiracy.
There are no district courts operating outside it's jurisdiction.
The first district court was approved by the very first Congress and has been intact ever since and then nobody batted an eye about district courts.
They are all on allotted federal land within the boundaries of the union states.

Its you who has fallen within their jurisdiction. And that appears as though they are within the state and unconstitutional.

So where exactly does it say that District Courts have jurisdiction to try cases in matters of debt outside of the District of Columbia? This is the guys whole basis, that the post civil war congress made changes to the definition of words in order to redefine DC jurisdiction.

You cannot possibly with a straight face sit there and say that the 17th Amendment passed when there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution says states have the authority to give up their suffrage to the people turning a Republic into a Democracy. Or how there is mounds of evidence that supports the original 13th Amendment denying anyone with titles of nobility (BAR carrying attorney's) from being able to serve in Congress. All the evidence points that the original 13th Amendment passed, yet while there is also mounds of evidence that shows the 17th Amendment failed to pass, yet it was declared.

Why the fuck (and how the hell is this even lawful) that Delaware didn't even Ratify the 17th Amendment until 2010. (97 years later)
http://guides.lib.udel.edu/c.php?g=85632&p=548217

There isn't always a conspiracy everywhere, but there always seems to be one when power attempts subjugation of people are involved. If there wasn't we would not even be discussing this on this forum.

monty

31st December 2015, 04:05 PM

Its not unconstitutional. You just dont want to see the truth and pander in believing its all a conspiracy.
There are no district courts operating outside it's jurisdiction.
The first district court was approved by the very first Congress and has been intact ever since and then nobody batted an eye about district courts.
They are all on allotted federal land within the boundaries of the union states.

Its you who has fallen within their jurisdiction. And that appears as though they are within the state and unconstitutional.

The first district courts were admiralty courts hearing maritime cases. There have been several changes made to the federal court system by the Congress since the first district courts were created.

The Supreme Court says all Federal Courts are Article III courts, courts of limited jurisdiction not able to hear civil and criminal cases.

If you were to steal money from the Post Office or kill someone on Nellis Aire Force Base in the State of Nevada you would be tried in the Article IV District Court of general jurisdiction because that would be on property belonging to the United States where they do have general jurisdiction.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006)

T]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States,411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 401; Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182, 319 U. S. 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).

“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 374.

“The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction . . .” Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830).

“[S]tate courts are courts of general jurisdiction . . . . By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 43 6 F.3d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 2006).

monty

31st December 2015, 04:20 PM

Its not unconstitutional. You just dont want to see the truth and pander in believing its all a conspiracy.

The courts are not unconstitutional. The act of usurping the states jurisdiction is unconstitutional.

7th trump

31st December 2015, 04:27 PM

The way I read these court cases it appears the Supreme Court does not share your opinion.

"Special provision is made in the constitution, for the cession of jurisdiction from the states over places where the federal government shall establish forts, or other military works. And it is only in these places, or in the territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general jurisdiction."
[New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836) (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=35&page=662)]

When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands. And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative: because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted. 7 ”
[Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 213, 221, 223 (1845) (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=44&page=213)]

“In another, not unrelated context, Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264 (1821), could well have been the explanation of the Rule of Necessity; he wrote that a court “must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.” Id., at 404 (emphasis added)

The several States [U]of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State[of the Union] possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” [Underline emphasis added.] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
The "crimes" were not committed in the Federal Courthouse.

And these two court cases precede, in date, the Civil War. The Civil War brought out of it Congresses first ever subjects...."US citizens"...via the 14th amendment.
Shortly after the 14th, Congress gave its new subject citizens "rights" as not many of the "Bill of Rights" applied to these brand new subjects and therefore enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Do you see the separation between "The People" and "US citizens"?
Its in the rights you hold and possess.
Congress doesnt choose which rights you have....you do unless you are of colored skin. Then you have no choice in the matter.

Ever heard of "State citizens"?
Thats where the Bill of Rights applies....to those individuals.
A State citizen and "We the People" are one in the same.

Heres the thing with this idiot......hes applying court cases that cannot and do not apply to US citizens (which they proved he was with the 1040) in that context didnt exist until after the Civil War. And that last court case Pennoyer v. Neff applies to those who are not US citizens pre Civil War era and politics.
This idiot is picking and choosing what he whats to argue with and his picks dont even apply.....or is that you, Monty, supplying the three court cases? One of you is a completely ignorant of how whats going on.
The guy is an idiot douche with a so called high IQ???

monty

31st December 2015, 05:10 PM

And these two court cases precede, in date, the Civil War. The Civil War brought out of it Congresses first ever subjects...."US citizens"...via the 14th amendment.
Shortly after the 14th, Congress gave its new subject citizens "rights" as not many of the "Bill of Rights" applied to these brand new subjects and therefore enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Do you see the separation between "The People" and "US citizens"?
Its in the rights you hold and possess.
Congress doesnt choose which rights you have....you do unless you are of colored skin. Then you have no choice in the matter.

Ever heard of "State citizens"?
Thats where the Bill of Rights applies....to those individuals.
A State citizen and "We the People" are one in the same.

Heres the thing with this idiot......hes applying court cases that cannot and do not apply to US citizens (which they proved he was with the 1040) in that context didnt exist until after the Civil War. And that last court case Pennoyer v. Neff applies to those who are not US citizens pre Civil War era and politics.

This idiot is picking and choosing what he whats to argue with and his picks dont even apply.....or is that you, Monty, supplying the three court cases? One of you is a completely ignorant of how whats going on.

The guy is an idiot douche with a so called high IQ???

Maybe you reading comprehension isn't so great. Here are 4 cases all after the civil war. 3 of them since 1978.

Care to explain why the Lufkin Court bailed and took the 5th when they were about to sieze his hobby farm for part of his 3 million dallar debt?

Pennyoyer V. Neff (1878)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006)

T]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States,411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 401; Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182, 319 U. S. 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).

“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 374.
“The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction . . .” Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830).

“[S]tate courts are courts of general jurisdiction . . . . By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 43 6 F.3d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 2006).

monty

14th January 2016, 06:32 AM

Update Jan. 14
Petitioner files superseding Lufkin criminal complaint; demands payment of debt totaling $195,988,000

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/01/14/petitioner-files-superseding-lufkin-criminal-complaint-demands-payment-of-debt-totaling-195988000-2/

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/affidavit-of-information-pretended-lufkin-litigation-january-14-2016.pdf

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/demand-for-payment-january-14-2016.pdf

7th trump

14th January 2016, 07:22 AM

Maybe you reading comprehension isn't so great. Here are 4 cases all after the civil war. 3 of them since 1978.

Care to explain why the Lufkin Court bailed and took the 5th when they were about to sieze his hobby farm for part of his 3 million dallar debt?

Pennyoyer V. Neff (1878)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc., 457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006)

T]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. Palmore v. United States,411 U. S. 389, 411 U. S. 401; Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182, 319 U. S. 187; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 234; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).

“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 374.
“The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction . . .” Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L.Ed. 650 (1830).

“[S]tate courts are courts of general jurisdiction . . . . By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .” Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 43 6 F.3d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 2006).

I seriously ask you to click the link and read the whole thing.
Until you do you aren't going to understand why your beloved people holed up are going to lose and possible get themselves killed or hurt.

http://freedom-school.com/citizenship/richard-mcdonald-seminar-on-state-citizenship.html

monty

14th January 2016, 08:01 AM

I seriously ask you to click the link and read the whole thing.
Until you do you aren't going to understand why your beloved people holed up are going to lose and possible get themselves killed or hurt.

http://freedom-school.com/citizenship/richard-mcdonald-seminar-on-state-citizenship.html

I have read it.

Ares

14th January 2016, 08:23 AM

mick silver

14th January 2016, 08:44 AM

No white person born within the limits of the United States and subject to their jurisdiction, or born without those limits and subsequently naturalized under their laws, owes his status of citizenship to the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution.
Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal 43. You have to remember the 14th amendment is not law, it´s never been passed, not ratified. So when you claim you are a U.S. citizen, you claim that you´re a little green man from Mars with six heads; and that´s the way the court looks at you, a dummy that doesn´t know what he´s talking about.
And how did you become a U.S. citizen? When you got your social security number. What you have now is the original social security act of 1935. I´d like you to read the top paragraph, and tell me where that trust fund is that they´re talking about on television and radio. You hear them say, "give us your money, we´ll keep it in the trust fund". Read what it says: Wards of court. Infants and persons ofunsound mind ... Their rights must be guarded jealously ...
Black´s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition.
His [attorney] first duty is to the courts and the public, not to the client, and whenever the duties to his client conflict with those he owes as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the former must yield to the latter.
Corpus Juris Secundum, 1980 Edition. Clients are also called "wards of the court" in regard to their relationship with their attorneys.
Corpus Juris Secundum, 1980 Edition.

Nobody here looks like an imbecile or and infant to me, but you claim you are, and the courts recognize you as such. That´s why you have to have an attorney.
And when you became a U.S. citizen, you became a citizen of the United States government. Now read what the United States government is:

The United States government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state.
In re Merriam, 163 US 625.
Ninety-nine percent of the time when they say small ´s state, they´re referring to the common law republic country. A capital ´S´ State is a corporation. Large ´S" means corporation, fiction; small ´s´ means land mass, country.
Next is California Government Code section 242. Remember, as a U.S. citizen, you are a citizen of the District of Columbia. Is the District of Columbia a state of the Union? No. Now, you tell me under California law what you are, either (a) or (b):
Persons in the State not its citizens are either:

(a) Citizens of other States; or
(b) Aliens.

AN ACT To provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes.
It´s for revenue raising, and other purposes. There is no trust fund. Everything you give to the government is for revenue purposes. They do not have to pay you anything in Social Security. It´s a gratuity given by government. It can be abolished, and taken away tomorrow. That´s what the courts have ruled, many times.
And when you´ve got your social security number you said " I want some welfare, I want some workmen´s comp, I want, I want, I want ... and you have my power of attorney to regulate and control me. I´m a fictitious entity. I´m not a human being anymore."
When you do that, you give the federal government power of attorney.Then the government gives it to their courts. You become a ward of the court. So, read what a ward of the court is:

7th trump

14th January 2016, 08:50 AM

Awesome read, thanks 7thTrump.

Thank You....

7th trump

14th January 2016, 08:57 AM

I've been harping and harping about the Social Security Act and what it really did to those who went and applied for one.

I hope this goes far and wide because those up in Idaho are gonna lose when the feds decide they've had enough of this and go in with guns.
These guys are doing more harm than any good for the cause of returning the government back into what it once was.
They should do some R and R........."retreat and regroup", but this time use their heads and learn where they stand within the law and step out of it and into the jurisdiction where they can do something about it.

monty

14th January 2016, 08:58 AM

Awesome read, thanks 7thTrump.

Freedom School, Famguardian, 1215.org, barefoots world all are full of excellent information. I have been reading these sites for over 15 years. I am more confused now than when I started.

7th trump

14th January 2016, 10:09 AM

Freedom School, Famguardian, 1215.org, barefoots world all are full of excellent information. I have been reading these sites for over 15 years. I am more confused now than when I started.

Famguardian has more half truths than truths. I wouldn't go there...they are conspiracy minded.
1215.org is great in showing theres two citizenship.
But state-citizen.org (not up for some reason) has the best court cases to show how the two citizenships differentiate and what you can do to try and regain the Status of "WE the People".

Monty to stay unconfused you need to know the basics and that's knowing that "We the People" are state citizens while "US citizens" are federal citizens under the jurisdiction established by the 14th amendment.....the rest falls into place

palani

14th January 2016, 02:20 PM

Famguardian has more half truths than truths.

Yet you rely upon STATUTE law where you will find NO-TRUTH but much OBFUSCATION.

7th trump

14th January 2016, 08:21 PM

Yet you rely upon STATUTE law where you will find NO-TRUTH but much OBFUSCATION.

No I dont rely upon statute. I study the statute to understand its operation and jurisdiction.....aka how one falls within its authority.
Know your enemy to understand your enemy.

But then again we both understand this but you like to play games.

Imagine that....you, a conpiratist, protecting a site that full of conspiracy. Seems you have an eye for recognizing a site filled with bullshit and feel obligated to come to its aid!

palani

15th January 2016, 06:09 AM

No I dont rely upon statute.
you are out of your mind. You rely on SEMI-COLONS. If that isn't taking devotion to the nth level I don't know what is.

Imagine that....you, a conpiratist, protecting a site that full of conspiracy.
Famguardian? I suppose their information is better than some and not as good as others.

And I have no beef with conspiracies .. either pro or con. My approach is called REASON 'cause that is the basis for Law. Now you can find REASON in many places and yes there is occasionally even REASON to be found in statutes. Where I find REASON I have no problem with accepting Law based upon that REASON.

What you call conspiracies is nothing more than other people considering what they think are facts, looking for a REASON behind those facts and formulating theories. I don't do this because I have no facts to go on. All these people do to construct their favorite conspiracy is rely upon others observations (aka 'hearsay' or opinion). They have no facts. And then the action of REASONING requires LOGIC. You have provided sufficient clues that you do not know what LOGIC actually is.

In short your analysis fall far short of being accurate because I have seen mules that are more flexible.

7th trump

15th January 2016, 07:49 AM

you are out of your mind. You rely on SEMI-COLONS. If that isn't taking devotion to the nth level I don't know what is.

Famguardian? I suppose their information is better than some and not as good as others.

And I have no beef with conspiracies .. either pro or con. My approach is called REASON 'cause that is the basis for Law. Now you can find REASON in many places and yes there is occasionally even REASON to be found in statutes. Where I find REASON I have no problem with accepting Law based upon that REASON.

What you call conspiracies is nothing more than other people considering what they think are facts, looking for a REASON behind those facts and formulating theories. I don't do this because I have no facts to go on. All these people do to construct their favorite conspiracy is rely upon others observations (aka 'hearsay' or opinion). They have no facts. And then the action of REASONING requires LOGIC. You have provided sufficient clues that you do not know what LOGIC actually is.

In short your analysis fall far short of being accurate because I have seen mules that are more flexible.

Yep....you just giving justification to believing in conspiracies.
You'd make a great advisor to Hillary Clinton.

palani

15th January 2016, 08:37 AM

believing
Lack of facts means belief becomes a dominant factor.

I have no facts.

Neither do you have facts.

Your opinion matters (to you).

Your opinion matters not at all (to me).

You have no facts.

You have no reason.

You have no logic.

Perhaps you care to examine what you HAVE because you surely know what you have NOT.

7th trump

15th January 2016, 08:54 AM

Lack of facts means belief becomes a dominant factor.

I have no facts.

Neither do you have facts.

Your opinion matters (to you).

Your opinion matters not at all (to me).

You have no facts.

You have no reason.

You have no logic.

Perhaps you care to examine what you HAVE because you surely know what you have NOT.

Then perhaps you should look into each of your conspiracy fallacy tales and search for facts to see if the conspiracies you hold to your heart have any merit. If not then discard them instead of continuing to look for facts you will not and cannot find that would validate the merit of the conspiracy lie.
Theres a saying about being insane........something about doing the same thing over and over in hopes for a different outcome.
So why do you cling to fallacies you know have no facts (which you call evil) and pass them off as being legit?

palani

15th January 2016, 09:09 AM

why do you cling to fallacies you know have no facts People present fallacies all the time on this board (and others) based upon opinion and belief. This does not mean they are wrong but it also does not mean they are right. I try not to judge but see no reason not to present alternative 'views'.

(which you call evil) Etymology online quotes the source of the word symbol 'fact' as being of evil origin. Am I wrong in pointing out this? Or do you select the meaning of the words you use to gain some advantage?

and pass them off as being legit?
Is the difference between what you view as the 'real' world and the actual fantasy land you live in based upon some concept of what is 'legit' and what is not?

Ares

29th January 2016, 12:21 PM

Damages of $37,822,100 demanded of 31 Federal actors in the Houston case; criminal complaint filed with military

In the original Houston Division case, 31 Federal actors in the United States District Court, United States Department of Justice, and United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit taken collectively, committed over a thousand felonies while perpetrating the theft of Petitioner’s house in Montgomery County, Texas.

This is known as “Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity” (Texas Penal Code Sec. 71.02).

Presently, United States District Courts located throughout the Union purport to have territorial and personal jurisdiction, over property located and people residing there.

Success of such United States District Courts, in tandem with the United States Department of Justice, in defrauding and depriving the American People of life, liberty, and property, depends utterly on concealment of the fact that the Constitution authorizes Government to exercise territorial and personal jurisdiction only in geographic area in which Congress have power of territorial and personal legislation.

There is no provision of the Constitution that confers upon Congress the power of territorial or personal legislation anywhere within the Union.

Congress have power of territorial and personal legislation (two of the three aspects of exclusive legislation, the other being subject-matter) only as expressly provided in Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2) of the Constitution.

The geographic area in which the Constitution grants Congress power of territorial and personal legislation is “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Constitution, Article 4 § 3(2)), e.g., the District of Columbia and the territories.

There really is nothing more to the Federal con than that simple fact.

Government is usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction in extra-constitutional geographic area throughout the Union, and engaging in organized criminal activity in doing so.

Every such act is an instance of usurpation, constituting breach of oath of office and treason to the Constitution.[1]

Petitioner is in the process of effectuating remedy in the Houston Division case, for the unlawful taking of Petitioner’s home without constitutional authority (theft), and the below-hyperlinked instruments represent the first step toward that end.

The below-hyperlinked Affidavit of Information was filed with the same 65 senior officers in military authority as previous criminal complaints.

Letter to 65 senior officers in military authority, January 28, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/letter-to-65-senior-officers-in-military-authority-january-28-20161.pdf) (10.3 MB)

Affidavit of Information, Purported Houston Litigation, January 28, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/affidavit-of-information-purported-houston-litigation-january-28-20161.pdf)

Demand for Payment (of Damages), 31 Federal actors, January 28, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/demand-for-payment-of-damages-31-federal-actors-january-28-2016.pdf)

* * * *

[1] We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. . . . Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/

monty

17th February 2016, 09:27 PM

The magistrate judge took 11 pages to avoid addressing the real issue, the courts lack of constitutional authority.

Lufkin magistrate recommends the Court grant United States’ motion for summary judgment; Petitioner responds

FEBRUARY 17, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/02/17/lufkin-magistrate-recommends-the-court-grant-united-states-motion-for-summary-judgment-petitioner-responds-2/)SUPREMECOURTCASE (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)LEAVE A COMMENT (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/02/17/lufkin-magistrate-recommends-the-court-grant-united-states-motion-for-summary-judgment-petitioner-responds-2/#respond)

After five months of silence there is movement in the Lufkin Division.

A Lufkin Division actor has made a move to compensate for the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority to take territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and facilitate theft of Petitioner’s real property under color of authority.

Petitioner on September 14, 2015, demanded the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf)—and following the United States’ failure to respond thereto, on September 30, 2015, alleged lack of territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, and demanded dismissal of the case (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/demand-for-dismissal-filed-093015.pdf), to which demand the United States never filed an opposition.

Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, unanswered demands signify that the Lufkin Court has no territorial or personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, the United States is not entitled to summary judgment, and Petitioner is entitled to dismissal with prejudice of the case.

With no dismissal forthcoming, Petitioner on January 14, 2016, filed an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/affidavit-of-information-pretended-lufkin-litigation-january-14-2016.pdf) with the military and served the Lufkin Division actors with a copy, as well as a Verified Accounting of Offenses and Debt (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/verified-accounting-of-offenses-and-debt-january-14-2016.pdf) and a Demand for Payment (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/demand-for-payment-january-14-2016.pdf).

Whereupon, United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on January 26, 2016, entered a Report and Recommendation on Motion for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss (the “Report and Recommendation”), hyperlinked below, in which he cherry-picks from the record of the Lufkin Division case certain facts, which he presents as conclusive “proof” that the United States is entitled to summary judgment, and Petitioner’s real property—to the exclusion of all material facts and evidence in the same record from Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings, and the United States’ failure to respond thereto, that supersede and nullify those he uses as the basis of his recommendation.

Magistrate Giblin is applying the Government policy, “Never respond, confirm, or deny when confronted with a situation where anything you say will work against you,” and pretending that Petitioner never made the September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.

Magistrate Giblin is counting on his co-workers to go along with the ruse.
This convention has a name: culture of silence.

In an impartial judicial system such custom could never gain any footing.

Magistrate Giblin is gambling that the general appearance of his 11-page Report and Recommendation is so “official” and its contents so “thorough” and “authoritative” that the idea of verifying its conclusions and recommendation against the actual record of the case never crosses the reader’s mind.

“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.24

“. . . 24. See United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (http://openjurist.org/265/f2d/408) (2d Cir.), cert. den., 360 U.S. 918, 79 S.Ct. 1436, 3 L.Ed.2d 1534 (1959); c.f., Avery v. Clearly, 132 U.S. 604 (http://openjurist.org/132/us/604), 10 S.Ct. 220, 33 L.Ed. 469 (1890); Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694 (http://openjurist.org/406/f2d/694), 698 (5th Cir. 1969); American Nat’l Ins. Co., etc. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81 (http://openjurist.org/383/f2d/81) (5th Cir. 1967).” United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970).”

Ongoing silence on the part of the United States for the last five months, followed by the preposterous whitewash of the record by Magistrate Giblin, operates to confirm that Petitioner has correctly identified the ultimate Achilles’ heel of every de facto United States District Court throughout the Union: no constitutional authority to take territorial and personal jurisdiction.

Magistrate Giblin’s employer, plaintiff United States, is too terrified to reply to Petitioner’s demands and put anything in writing, lest it be used as evidence of a crime—hence the stratagem of the Report and Recommendation.

Magistrate Giblin’s “solution” to his employer’s jurisdictional problem is to ignore the evidence, falsify the record, and recommend that the Lufkin Judge “authorize” the taking of Petitioner’s home in Tyler County, Texas, without constitutional authority—among numerous other offenses, a felony of the first degree under the Texas Penal Code.
The Report and Recommendation is a desperation attempt to stave off the inevitable.

General ignorance of the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution is what has led to the disappearance of judicial-branch Article III constitutional courts and proliferation of legislative-branch Article IV territorial courts, called “United States District Courts” (28 U.S.C. 132(a) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/132)), of which the Lufkin Division court is one.

Anyone who can grasp pages 3–5 of Petitioner’s Objection to Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, hyperlinked below, will know more about constitutional jurisdiction than any law professor (or at least what he teaches and will admit to).

That Government has been so successful at defrauding and swindling other Americans of their wealth over the last century or so without constitutional authority, is no reason that Petitioner has to go along with the charade, bend to pretended authority, and consent to the theft of his home under pretext of a judicial proceeding.

“Extra territorium jus dicenti non paretur impune. One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory cannot be obeyed with impunity.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), p. 2134.

Lufkin Division actors who conspire to falsify the record, exercise jurisdiction out of their territory, and take Petitioner’s property without constitutional authority are whistling past the graveyard if they think they are going to do it with impunity.

Petitioner on February 16, 2016, filed the aforementioned Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) with Angelina County, Texas, District Attorney Art Baureiess, who has authority to charge and prosecute Lufkin Division actors for violations of the Texas Penal Code.

The more that Lufkin Division actors struggle, the messier it is going to get.

“Semper necessitas probandi incumbit et qui agit. The claimant is always bound to prove (the burden of proof lies on him).” Id. at2162.

“Qui tacet consentire videtur ubi tractatur de ejus commodo. A party who is silent is considered as assenting, when his advantage is debated.” Id. at 2158.

“De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio. The law is the same respecting things which do not appear and things which do not exist.” Id. at 2130.

“Idem est non probari et non esse ; non deficit jus sed probatio. What is not proved and what does not exist, are the same ; it is not a defect of the law, but of proof.” Id. at 2136.

“Actore non probante, reus absolvitur. If the plaintiff does not prove his case, the defendant is absolved.” Id. at 2124.

“Omnia præsumuntur legitime facta donec probetur in contrarium. All things are presumed to be done legitimately until the contrary is proved.” Id. at 2152.

“Quod per recordum probatum, non debet esse negatum. What is proved by the record, ought not to be denied.” Id. at 2159.

“Facta sunt potentiora verbis. Facts are more powerful than words.” Id. at 2134.

This situation is not going to go away and magically disappear just because Magistrate Giblin has decided to play make-believe with the record: Lufkin Division actors have no authority to take Petitioner’s home—and are liable to Petitioner in individual capacity if they do, for criminal offenses knowingly and willfully committed without the scope of their office or employment under color of authority.

Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/lufkin-magistrate_s-report-and-recommendation.pdf)

Petitioner’s Objection to Lufkin Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/petitioner_s-objection-to-lufkin-magistrate_s-report-and-recommendation.pdf)

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com

Glass

17th February 2016, 10:39 PM

Interesting. I heard a new to me term this week that I have been trying to find more information on.

The term is called Fraudulent Concealment and from what I heard, Texas is the place where this has been addressed by the courts. So far I haven't turned up a direct reference for it but basically if someone conceals something in order to obtain a gain or benefit it is Fraudulent Concealment.

The other thing that I was reminded of, and had not heard for maybe 15 years was the term "With clean hands". No party to a prosecution or claim in equity can succeed if they come to the matter with out clean hands. That means that they cannot conceal information or take action that detriments the other party because it means they are dishonest and the claim should be ejected.

Paraphrasing from memory. I'll be re listening over the next day or so, so am hoping I can add some more to that.

palani

18th February 2016, 04:34 AM

Interesting. I heard a new to me term ... called Fraudulent Concealment

Bouviers 1856 Dictionary:

CONCEALMENT, contracts. The unlawful suppression of any fact or circumstance, by one of the partis to a contract, from the other,which in justice ought to be made known. 1 Bro. Ch. R. 420; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, c. 3, §4, note (n); 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §207.

2. Fraud occurs when one person substantially misrepresents or conceals a material fact peculiarly within his own knowledge, in consequence of which a delusion exists; or uses a device naturally calculated to lull the suspicions of a careful man, and induce him to forego inquiry into a matter upon which the other party has information, although such information be not exclusively within his reach.

Fraud is a component of concealment. There is no legal construction 'fraudulent concealment' because all concealment is fraud.

Viewing all actions man to man as either contracts or wrongs, an offer to engage in physical combat in which one party pulls a concealed knife and the other pulls a concealed gun really means both parties are participating in fraud. Whichever party loses the other can be charged with a criminal act.

A concealed carry permit is a lot like an abortion. It permits the holder to engage in fraud to a certain extent. If he displays the weapon under improper circumstances society is going to put him in jail regardless of the permit.

Glass

18th February 2016, 05:58 AM

I agree, it is clearly part of the act of Fraud. I thought it was strange to hear coming from this person. They are very pedantic about what legal reference they provide. I got the impression they were using that specific term to try and explain how concealment forms an act of fraud.

With clean hands is a maxim AFAIK so worth looking into as well.

Your comments about concealed carry reminded me of something I read a week or so ago. It comes from the Washington Post and because of this and the content I was quite surprised.

English legal history and the right to carry arms

A few weeks ago, I joined several legal historians in filing an amicus brief (http://davekopel.org/Briefs/Wrenn-v-DC-Historians-amicus-brief.pdf) about the Second Amendment right to carry arms; the case is Wrenn v. District of Columbia, currently before the D.C. Circuit. The brief addressed English legal history, and also American legal history through the 19th century. Stanford history professor Priya Satia has written an article (http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/10/wrenn_v_d_c_gun_case_turns_on_english_laws_of_1328 _and_1689.html) in Slate, asserting that our description of English legal history is incorrect–that it is “incongruous” with “well-established history.” So let’s take a look at what the history really says.

In 1328, the government in England was near collapse. The previous year, King Edward II was had been deposed by an invasion led by his wife, Queen Isabella (a French Princess). Isabella and her consort Roger Mortimer took over the government. The monarchy’s ability to enforce the law was close to non-existent. As historian Anthony Verduyn explains, the primary concern was “the gentry…using armed force to defeat the course of justice.” For decades there had been a problem of “magnates maintaining criminals.” (The Politics of Law and Order during the Early Years of Edward III, 108 Eng. Hist. Rev. 842 (1993).) As numerous royal instructions to Sheriffs of the era indicate, these armed gangs prevented the monarch’s courts from functioning in many places, and attacked jurors who were traveling to perform jury service.

Besides that, as Verduyn writes, Isabella and Mortimer were fearful of being overthrown; with Parliament composed exclusively of aristocrats, Isabella and Mortimer did not want armed men coming to Parliament, nor traveling armed to meet the Queen. They favored a measure to “politically necessary to check dissent against the increasingly unpopular regime.” So in 1328, the Statute of Northampton was enacted. It provided:

Item, it is enacted, that no man great nor small, of what condition soever he be, except the king’s servants in his presence, and his ministers in executing of the king’s precepts, or of their office, and such as be in their company assisting them, and also [upon a cry made for arms to keep the peace, and the same in such places where such acts happen,] be so hardy to come before the King’s justices, or other of the King’s ministers doing their office, with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night or by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the King’s pleasure.

As the text of the Statute indicates, the first concern was the thwarting of government functions. The penalty of forfeiture of “armour” indicates a statute aimed primarily at the aristocracy; commoners could not afford a coat of chain mail.

Yet the statute could be read broadly. The “in no part elsewhere” could be interpreted as a comprehensive ban on carrying by anyone except for “the king’s ministers” and except for people in hot pursuit of fleeing criminals (the hue and cry). It seems impossible that the Statute could ever have been enforced with the literal rigor that Prof. Satia imagines. Separate from the duty to join a hue and cry (which presumably would not be an everyday event), there was the ordinary duty of persons in towns and villages to keep “watch and ward”–this is to serve in daytime and night-time patrols to confront and question any unfamiliar person who attempted to enter. On top of that, the Tudor monarchs of the 16th century mandated that all towns and villages maintain public target ranges. Parents were required to teach their children how to use arms, and various Sunday amusements were outlawed, in order to remove distractions from target practice. The target mandates at first were for long bows, and later for muskets.

Also, there was the very common practice of people carrying knives, as a necessary tool for everyday use in cutting food and other tasks–and necessarily available for self-defense in an emergency.

So we know that the Statute of Northampton was not interpreted literally. A literal reading would forbid what the law required: watch and ward, Flutrand arms training.

What did the law actually forbid? The only case on the subject seems to be Sir John Knight’s Case, from 1686. It was charged that Knight and three friends “did walk about the streets armed with guns, and that he went into church of St. Michael, in Bristol, in the time of divine service, with a gun, to terrify the King’s subjects.” In the prosecution’s theory of the case, Knight’s intent was “to terrify.”

The Chief Justice of the King’s Bench agreed with that legal standard. The Chief Justice observed that the law was nearly obsolete from disuse: “this statute be almost gone in desuetudinem.” In 1686, “now there be a general connivance to gentlemen to ride armed for their security.” Yet even though the Statute of Northampton was hardly ever enforced, “where the crime shall appear to be malo animo it will come within the act.” (Malo animo= with bad intent.)

Thus, carrying arms was lawful if done with good intent, and unlawful if done with bad intent. This standard was reflected in an influential book a few years later, which linked the rights of ancient Britons and modern Englishmen. (James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica 639 (London, W. Rawlins, S. Roycroft & H. Sawbridge 1694) (Statute of Northampton allows persons to carry arms “in their own defence against Illegal Violence.”).

The major criminal law treatise of the 18th century and for several decades of the 19th century was William Hawkins “Pleas of the Crown” (1716). It said that the Statute of Northampton applied “where a Man arms himself with dangerous and unusual Weapons, in such a Manner as will naturally cause a Terror to the People.”

So we have the standard that peaceable carry is lawful, and terrifying carry is unlawful. That is the standard which is advocated by the amicus brief which I joined, and which Professor Satia criticizes. She writes that:

The amicus brief by Kopel et al. paints a picture of widespread gun carrying incongruous with this well-established history. The authors invoke the 1686 acquittal of the gun-toting Sir John Knight as evidence that the 1328 statute was inconsistently applied, but Patrick J. Charles (http://www.amazon.com/dp/0786479310/?tag=slatmaga-20), the award-winning historian for Air Force Special Operations Command, has shown that Joyce Malcolm (one of the brief’s authors) created this finding “out of thin air (https://books.google.com/books?id=Fa9iAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA136&lpg=PA136&dq=john+knight+1328+northampton&source=bl&ots=bdMm_Yst0Q&sig=xm_Ba3gpthIr5xlPI_YZZedsnDY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAWoVChMI04_99bvRyAIVQ8BjCh3-kANZ#v=onepage&q=thin%20air&f=false).” In fact, Knight was acquitted because he was armed while cloaked with government authority. In an era of rapid urban growth, before state provision of police, the wealthy and noble fulfilled the role of informal police.
This is not an accurate description of our brief. First, we never claimed that the Statute of Northampton was “inconsistently applied.” Rather, we argued that the Statute “was interpreted” so as to apply only to carrying “in such a manner as would cause fear or terror in the populace.”

Second, our legal argument, as discussed above, was based on the case reports of the Chief Justice’s explication of the law, and on subsequent law books which restated the rule. The fact that the jury acquitted Knight was simply because the jury did not think that Knight had done what the prosecutor alleged: carrying arms “to terrify the King’s subjects.” A diary written by a contemporary, and published in 1857, recounted that when Knight was “tried by a jury of his own city, that knew him well, he was acquitted, not thinking he did it with any ill design.” (Narcissus Luttrell, “A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714″, vol. 1, p. 380 (1857).)

A few more paragraphs here @ the WP (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/31/wrenn-history/)

boogietillyapuke

18th February 2016, 07:58 AM

On path, on glide slope. Guy obviously stays on point like a laser beam. Asks the same questions over and over to which they can't answer without giving away the fraud, they have jurisdiction only because " they say so".

Obviously read Mark Stevens somewhere along the way.

monty

7th March 2016, 10:11 AM

Lufkin Division DOJ attorneys reappear after 174 days, falsify the record; Federal-jurisdiction Achilles’ heel confirmed

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/03/06/lufkin-division-doj-attorneys-reappear-after-174-days-falsify-the-record-federal-jurisdiction-achilles-heel-confirmed/

Cebu_4_2

7th March 2016, 05:54 PM

After almost six months of silence (since September 2, 2015), counsel for plaintiff United States file on February 23, 2016, a response (hyperlinked below) to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/petitioner_s-objection-to-lufkin-magistrate_s-report-and-recommendation.pdf) to the magistrate judge’s January 22, 2016, report and recommendation.
(https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/lufkin-magistrate_s-report-and-recommendation.pdf)
Petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation because it omitted mention of Petitioner’s unresolved September 14, 2015, challenge of the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority to exercise territorial and personal jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf), and September 30, 2015, demand for dismissal for lack of constitutional authority (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/demand-for-dismissal-filed-093015.pdf).

All United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States District Judges and Magistrate Judges work for the same for-profit corporate employer, the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, a.k.a. “United States” (28 U.S.C. 3002(15))—and the Lufkin Court is just another legislative-branch corporate debt-collection forum (28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure) masquerading as a judicial-branch Article III constitutional court.

Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations are fatal to this and every other Federal lawsuit within the Union.

United States’ solution to the contents of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, filings is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”
Like the magistrate’s report and recommendation, United States’ February 23, 2016, response is devoid of mention of Petitioner’s September 14 and 30, 2015, demands and allegations.

Three stages of truth
“Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In the first it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, in the third it is regarded as self-evident.”[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/03/06/lufkin-division-doj-attorneys-reappear-after-174-days-falsify-the-record-federal-jurisdiction-achilles-heel-confirmed/#_ftn1) Arthur Schopenhauer, 1818.

District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees have long since ceased ridiculing what Petitioner has to say.
They are too terrified of it to mention it.

By Schopenhauer’s standard, this matter is now at opposition-stage.

District of Columbia Municipal Corporation employees are opposing the contents of Petitioner’s filings by refusing to admit of their existence and attempting to denigrate the source thereof, i.e., Petitioner, with ad hominem attacks consisting of falsehoods that paint Petitioner as a lunatic, in the hope that such “official” statements will dissuade the reader from choosing to investigate the matter personally and reconcile the condemnations of Petitioner with the actual record of the case.
Such fabrications are easily invalidated because they have no basis in fact.

Beginning of the end of the Hoax of Federal Territorial and Personal Jurisdiction
Sorry, but that crack they see there in the dam, is not going to go away by pretending it does not exist.
Whatever happens in this case will only accelerate the inevitable.

The genie is out of the bottle.
And he is not going back in.
It is only a matter of time.

Too bad none of the principals in the San Bernardino-Apple iPhone case know the right question[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/03/06/lufkin-division-doj-attorneys-reappear-after-174-days-falsify-the-record-federal-jurisdiction-achilles-heel-confirmed/#_ftn2) to ask.
Notwithstanding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit a reply to United States’ February 23, 2016, response to Petitioner’s February 16, 2016, objection: Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(2) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_201) provides that the Lufkin Court must take judicial notice of certain facts if Petitioner requests it and supplies the necessary information—which Petitioner has done.

United States’ Response to Petitioner’s Objection to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, February 23, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/united-states_-response-to-petitioner_s-objection-to-magistrate_s-report-and-recommendation-february-23-2016.pdf)
Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 24, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/petitioner_s-request-that-the-lufkin-court-take-judicial-notice-february-24-2016.pdf)
Petitioner’s Request that the Lufkin Court take Judicial Notice, February 25, 2016
(https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/petitioner_s-request-that-the-lufkin-court-take-judicial-notice-february-25-2016.pdf)
* * * *
[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/03/06/lufkin-division-doj-attorneys-reappear-after-174-days-falsify-the-record-federal-jurisdiction-achilles-heel-confirmed/#_ftnref1) Arthur Schopenhauer, quoted in Robert I. Fitzhenry, The Harper Book of Quotations, 3rd ed. (HarperCollins Publishers: New York, 1993), p. 451, quoted in Garson O’Toole, PhD, Quote Investigator, “In a Time of Universal Deceit — Telling the Truth Is a Revolutionary Act,” www.quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/24/truth-revolutionary/ (http://www.quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/24/truth-revolutionary/).

[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/03/06/lufkin-division-doj-attorneys-reappear-after-174-days-falsify-the-record-federal-jurisdiction-achilles-heel-confirmed/#_ftnref2) “What is the constitutional authority that gives this Federal court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction over property located in San Bernardino County, California?”

monty

14th March 2016, 06:22 PM

Judge ruled against Trowbridge, denied all motions not ruled on case closed for appeal purposes.

http://losthorizons.com/MidEditionUpdate.htm#1c

Serendipitous Find
WHILE DOING SOME RESEARCH FOR YET ANOTHER ARTICLE on misunderstandings of jurisdictional aspects of the income tax, I came across a Supreme Court ruling from a couple of decades back that I'd never read before. Happily, it proves to contain very useful information that ought to help debunk another batch of infectious misunderstandings long-embedded in certain segments of the "tax honesty" community-- the "strawman", "everyone is presumed to be a corporation by the state", "income only means corporate profit" and "ALL CAPS" myths (all of which are intertwined with each other in one complex way or another).

I found this ruling cited in the opinion of the district court judge making an early partial judgment against John Trowbridge in what Trowbridge has called "The Lufkin Case" and which will be the subject of that upcoming article. (The final judgment (http://losthorizons.com/MidEditionUpdate/LufkinNonsense/3-03-16FinalJudgment.pdf) in the case was issued 11 days ago.)

While explaining why summary judgment was found (http://losthorizons.com/MidEditionUpdate/LufkinNonsense/9-10-15Order.pdf) in the government's favor in regard to two corporations apparently owned by the other Trowbridge, the judge points out that under the federal rules, any kind of artificial person MUST be represented by an attorney in order to have standing as either plaintiff or defendant. It is because this was not done that summary judgment was issued for the government against these two defendants, who effectively never showed up and offered no defense.

The case to which the judge cites is Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993), which makes the following observation:

"It has been the law for the better part of two centuries, for example, that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 829 (1824); see Turner v. American Bar Assn., 407 F. Supp. 451, 476 (ND Tex., 1975) (citing the "long line of cases" from 1824 to the present holding that a corporation may only be represented by licensed counsel), affirmance order sub nom. Taylor v. Montgomery, 539 F. 2d 715 (CA7 1976), and aff'd sub nom. Pilla v. American Bar Assn., 542 F. 2d 56 (CA8 1976)."Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/91-1188.ZO.html), 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/91-1188.ZO.html) (This is also a great case for making clear that "individual" means "natural person", by the way.)

A pretty straightforward debunk of the nonsensical assertion that everyone in a federal court is presumed to be a corporation (i.e., those captive to the "ALL-CAPS" nonsense-- long-since thoroughly-debunked here (http://www.losthorizons.com/tax/Misunderstandings/AllUpperCase.htm); the "tax only falls on corporate profits" nonsense-- long-since debunked here (http://www.losthorizons.com/comment/CorporateProfit.pdf); and the "strawman" nonsense-- long-since debunked here (http://www.losthorizons.com/tax/Misunderstandings/RegardingRedemptionGibberish.htm)). Those who have fallen prey to these various flavors of nonsense ought to take careful note.

Plainly, if any of this stuff which they have clung-to and striven to spread like a virus were true, every legal contest in which they acted pro se (which is pretty much all of them) or any in which they observed anyone acting pro se, would have ended with the same simple ruling issued against Trowbridge in this case-- that is, that the defendant lost by default for having never shown up, legally speaking.

Or, to put it another way, not one of these pro se litigants would have been allowed to proceed in prosecuting or defending their cases, if they were all being presumed to be corporations in order to be taxed, or to be dealt with by the government in any fashion, as the various nonsense theories argue. Every one of them coming into court "pro se" would be told they must have a licensed attorney represent them. Where they are defendants, the court would invariably appoint an attorney, and refuse to allow self-representation (making the "Faretta" ruling and doctrine an absurdity, of course, but at this point, who's counting...).

Of course, none of these things have ever happened (except where, as in this "Lufkin" case, actual corporations WERE involved, and were accordingly deemed to have offered no defense due to no attorney acting on their behalf, per this rule). So, anyone harboring (and promoting) these foolishnesses really need to just deep-six their erroneous notions and learn the real truth about the law (andespecially about the income tax (http://losthorizons.com/Documents/The16th.htm)).

The happy fact is, if every person pulled off into the woods by "strawman" or "ALL CAPS" gibberish, or any of the rest of the troll-spawned distractions pushed out into the "tax honesty" community (for exactly the purpose of sending folks off on wild goose chases so they become harmless to the real problem) were to stay on the real field of battle and get busy with the real fight, we would win in a month. .

Case 9:14-cv-00138-MHS-KFG Document 67 Filed 03/03/16 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 591

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS LUFKIN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
§
Plaintiff, §
VS. §§
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.,
§
BRIGHT FUTURE INVESTMENTS, INC.,
§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:14-CV-
1and IDEAL ABILITIES,

Defendants.

§§

This Final Judgment is entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 and the court’s Order Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, entered contemporaneously with this judgment.

It is ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff United States granting its motion for summary judgment against defendant Trowbridge. The United States' federal tax liens have attached to the Tyler County property, the Tyler County property belongs to Trowbridge and the United States may enforce its federal tax liens against such property and foreclose upon and sell the Tyler County Property using the sale proceeds to help satisfy the tax liabilities.

All relief not specifically granted herein is denied. All motions by either party not previously ruled on are DENIED. This case is CLOSED and this constitutes a final judgment for appeal purposes.

SIGNED this 3rd day of March, 2016.

FINAL JUDGMENT

file:///page1image7360 ____________________________________MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Ares

14th March 2016, 06:59 PM

I thought these were VERY interesting at that site Monty.

http://losthorizons.com/tax/taximages2/QZfed2012CoverLetter.jpg

http://losthorizons.com/tax/taximages2/QZfed2012.jpg

7th trump

14th March 2016, 07:17 PM

I thought these were VERY interesting at that site Monty.

http://losthorizons.com/tax/taximages2/QZfed2012CoverLetter.jpg

http://losthorizons.com/tax/taximages2/QZfed2012.jpg

Thats a hendrickson CtC return. Its now catching anyone using that method a 5,000.00 penalty. Hendrickson who developed that method lost his court case and went to prison....now I believe his wife is currently in prison over this method. Theres a few others who have been convicted and sent to prison.

palani

14th March 2016, 07:20 PM

Glass

14th March 2016, 07:24 PM

monty

14th March 2016, 07:28 PM

I thought these were VERY interesting at that site Monty.

I filed amended returns for 2005, 2006 & 2007 stating I wasn't engaged in a trade or business as defined by relevant US tax law. They refunded everthing I had paid in. They denied my 2004 amended return because I was 4 months outside their 3 year window per IRS regulations. They told me I could sue them since the statute of limitations is 6 years. From 2008 through 2014 I filed corrected 1099s and submitted them with the requisite transmittal form 1096 and a statement I was not engaged in a trade or business pefrorming the functions of a public office. I didn't have W-2s because I was self employed.

Ares

14th March 2016, 07:30 PM

Thats a hendrickson CtC return. Its now catching anyone using that method a 5,000.00 penalty. Hendrickson who developed that method lost his court case and went to prison....now I believe his wife is currently in prison over this method. Theres a few others who have been convicted and sent to prison.

I thought it sounded pretty similar to the method that you used. Which could be used as a good argument for revoking ones signed W-2.

I've also found a number of court cases ruling against such individuals:

An argument linked to the meaning of the words "includes" and "including" is the argument that for Federal income tax purposes, the term "employee" under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c) does not include a regular, private-sector employee. The courts have uniformly rejected this argument. The text of section 3401(c), which deals only with the employer's withholding requirements and not with the employee's requirement to report Internal Revenue Code section 61 compensation for personal services (whether called wages, salaries, or any other term), is as follows:

For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.[16]

In Sullivan v. United States, taxpayer Grant W. Sullivan argued that he had not received “wages” and was not an “employee” under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled against Sullivan, stating:

To the extent Sullivan argues that he received no “wages” in 1983 because he was not an “employee” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §3401(c), that contention is meritless. Section 3401(c), which relates to income tax withholding, indicates that the definition of “employee” includes government officers and employees, elected officials, and corporate officers. The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein.[17]

In United States v. Ferguson, taxpayer Joy Ferguson argued that she was not an “employee” under section 3401(c), and that she therefore could not have “wages.” The court ruled against her, stating:

The core of the dispute before the court is Ferguson's assertion that she was not an “employee” as defined by §3401(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore did not earn any "wages." [footnote omitted] As such, she argues that her Form 1040 and Form 4862 accurately reported her wages as zero. As noted by the government, Ferguson's interpretation of §3401(c) has been considered and rejected numerous times by many courts. This Court would agree with the overwhelming precedent on this issue, Ferguson's argument that she is not an employee as defined by §3401(c) is frivolous.[18]

In Luesse v. United States, taxpayer Chell C. Luesse of St. Louis Park, Minnesota, argued that he received no “wages” because he was not an “employee” under section 3401(c). The court ruled against Mr. Luesse.[19]

In Richey v. Stewart, the court stated:

Another familiar argument from Mr. Richey [the taxpayer] is that he is not an employee under the terms of the Internal Revenue Code, citing Section 3401(c), which states that the term “employee” includes government employees. What Mr. Richey misapprises in his reading of the statute is the inclusionary nature of the language. The Code does not exclude all other persons from taxation who are not government employees.[20]

In United States v. Charboneau, the court stated:

[ . . . ] Ms. Charboneau contends that the Code's definitions of "wage income" and "self employment income" only include income derived from individuals who work for the federal government, or whose work involves that of "the performance of the functions of a public office." Because Ms. Charboneau never worked for any federal or state government during the tax years in question, she claims that the IRS cannot make any tax assessments against her.

This nonsensical argument is belied by the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code itself. For example, 26 U.S.C. §3401 defines wages as "all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer...." 26 U.S.C. §3401(a) (emphasis added). The statute then goes on to define various exceptions to this broad definition of wages in certain categories of private employment, such as in the agricultural and domestic service fields, newspaper delivery, the clergy, and for wages incurred by individuals working for employers "other than the United States or an agency therof" within Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States. There is nothing in the statute limiting "wages" to solely publicly derived income. [footnotes omitted]

Ms. Charboneau, however, focuses on §3401(c), which states that:

the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.

26 U.S.C. §3401(c). Setting aside the last sentence of this provision, which clearly states that officers of private corporations are considered employees for purposes of determining wages, it is obvious that within the context of this statute that the word "includes" is a term of enlargement, not of limitation, and the reference to certain public officers and employees was not intended to exclude all others. See also Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 112-13 (1959) (concluding that similar provision in 26 U.S.C. §6331 dealing with levies on salaries and wages does not exclude wages of private citizens); Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813,815 ("[Section 3401(c)] does not purport to limit withholding to persons listed therein"); United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (the Internal Revenue Code definition of “employee” in 26 U.S.C. §3401 does not exclude privately employed wage earners);. In addition, 26 U.S.C. §7701, which provides the definitions of terms used throughout the Internal Revenue Code, states that the "terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. §7701(c).[21]

In McCoy v. United States, the court stated:

McCoy argues she should not have to pay taxes for 1996-98 because under Code Section 3401 she was not an “employee” which she contends is defined as an elected or appointed employee or official of the federal government. McCoy clearly misconstrues Section 3401(c). The definition of “employee” includes private-sector employees, employees of the federal government, as well as elected and appointed officials. The very language of the Code is inclusive, not limited to the examples of included persons.[22]

Joseph Alan Fennell's argument — that the compensation he received in exchange for "non-federally privileged private sector labor" was not taxable—was rejected by the United States Tax Court.[23] Fennell appealed his Tax Court loss, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that Fennell's challenges were "frivolous on the merits in any event."[24] Similarly, in United States v. Buras, the argument that the taxpayer can be subject to the federal income tax only if he benefits from a "privilege extended by a government agency" was ruled to be without merit.[25] See also Olson v. United States[26] and Nichols v. United States.[27]

A penalty of $1,000 under Internal Revenue Code section 6673 was imposed by the U.S. Tax Court on Patrick Michael Mooney for presenting frivolous arguments. The court rejected his argument that his wages earned from a private employer were not taxable. The court also rejected his argument that the term "employee" was limited to "someone performing the functions of a public office."[28]

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that an argument by Robert S. Morse that his income was not subject to federal taxation because it was derived from employment in the "private sector" was frivolous, and that Morse was liable for monetary sanctions, under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for making a frivolous argument.[29]

The argument that only certain types of taxpayers (such as only Federal government employees, corporations, nonresident aliens, residents of the District of Columbia, or residents of Federal territories) are subject to income tax and employment tax, and variations of this argument, have been officially identified as legally frivolous Federal tax return positions for purposes of the $5,000 frivolous tax return penalty imposed under Internal Revenue Code section 6702(a)

Does that mean it's because they did not revoke their signed W-2? Or they signed one to begin with and are trying to argue after the fact? I haven't looked into all of the cases yet as I just found them.

monty

14th March 2016, 07:31 PM

Ares

14th March 2016, 07:33 PM

I filed amended returns for 2005, 2006 & 2007 stating I wasn't engaged in a trade or business as defined by relevant US tax law. They refunded everthing I had paid in. They denied my 2004 amended return because I was 4 months outside their 3 year window per IRS regulations. They told me I could sue them since the statute of limitations is 6 years. From 2008 through 2014 I filed corrected 1099s and submitted them with the requisite transmittal form 1096 and a statement I was not engaged in a trade or business pefrorming the functions of a public office. I didn't have W-2s because I was self employed.

Yeah there's my crux, I have a signed W-2 with my "employer".

monty

14th March 2016, 07:37 PM

monty

14th March 2016, 07:42 PM

Yeah there's my crux, I have a signed W-2 with my "employer".

Tell him you want to cancel the W-4 and give him a signed W-8 BE. (Foreign to the UNITED STATES aka "District of Columbia).

Ares

14th March 2016, 07:46 PM

Tell him you want to cancel the W-4 and give him a signed W-8 BE. (Foreign to the UNITED STATES aka "District of Columbia).

Yeah, I'm still trying to get the balls to do that..... :)

I work for a multi-national tech company and get paid well doing it and don't want to risk being told "see ya"..

monty

14th March 2016, 07:51 PM

From Section 19 http://freedom-school.com/citizenship/investigation-into-the-meaning-of-the-term-united-states.html#16.%20%91U.S.%20residents%92%20and%20% 91state%20Citizens.%92

In the Montello case (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=221&page=452), above, the U.S. Supreme Court, puts its cachet to this view:
"...The court [the Supreme Court of the State] also considered that the word 'including' was used as a word of enlargement, the learned court being of opinion that such was its ordinary sense. With this we cannot concur. It is its exceptional sense, as the dictionaries and cases indicate. We may concede to 'and' the additive power attributed to it. It gives in connection with 'including' a quality to the grant of 110,000 acres which it would not have had,-the quality of selection from the saline lands of the state. And that such quality would not exist unless expressly conferred we do not understand is controverted. Indeed, it cannot be controverted...."

Some 80 court cases have chosen the restrictive meaning of ‘includes,’ etc., such as this one last example:

Includes is a word of limitation. Where a general term in Statute is followed by the word ‘including’ the primary import of specific words following quoted words is to indicate restriction rather than enlargement. (Powers ex rel Dovon v. Charron R.I., 135 A. 2nd829)

To elucidate more clearly the 1961 definition, above: ‘includes’ and ‘including’ shall not be deemed to include things not enumerated, unless they are in the same general class. For instance, ‘State,’ in 26 USC 7701 (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl?title=26&sec=7701)(10): "The term ‘State’ shall be construed to include the District of Columbia…" Here, "the District of Columbia," without any doubt, is not "in the same general class," category, or genus as Missouri or California—it is a federal "State." The District of Columbia has a totally different jurisdictional set up than a union state. It is under the absolute jurisdiction of the ‘U.S.,’ and the states are not. Only in the federal zone does the U.S. have jura summi imperii,right of supreme dominion, complete sovereignty.

monty

14th March 2016, 08:05 PM

I don't see how confirmation that a fiction must be represented in any debunks the strawman. It does appear to confirm it doesn't it? That there are different planes of jurisdiction. I think this person confuses diatribe with debunking.

But the conclusion appears to be correct. The party doesn't seem to have had the right standing for the outcome they wanted.

At any rate, the judge denied all the unanswered filings because of lack of standing forbthe two corporations. That still leaves the question of having constitutional jurisdiction unanswered. Do you suppose the appeals court will address that issue? That was a 3 million dollar error.

7th trump

14th March 2016, 08:27 PM

All I can tell you Monty is that social security "wages" (3121(a) "wages" are 3401(a) "wages" [box 1 on the W2].
So with this..............
To elucidate more clearly the 1961 definition, above: ‘includes’ and ‘including’ shall not be deemed to include things not enumerated 3401(a) "wages" does not leave out the enumerated Social Security earnings.
The code is pretty simple once you get the "wrongs" Hendrickson put in your mind from reading his CtC book.
3401(a) is pretty straight forward to are deemed 3401(a) "wages".
Here Monty I'll show you using 3401(a) that all of Social Security "wages" are included in the 3401(a) "wages" definition except what Social Security excludes from 3121(a) "wages".
What you are going to find out is this. What "wages" (its actually occupations) Social Security excludes for the purpose of crediting your SS account are excluded from the 3401(a) "wage" definition.
3401(a) will actually tell you if certain agricultural [3121(g)] earnings are to be considered as 3121(a) "wages" then these 3121(a) "wages" are to be included in the 3401(a) "wage" definition.

(a) WagesFor purposes of this chapter, the term “wages” means all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash[B]; except that such term shall not include remuneration paid—
(ok Monty from this point forward..all these are excluded from 3401(a) "wages")
(1) for active service performed in a month for which such employee is entitled to the benefits of section 112 (relating to certain combat zone compensation of members of the Armed Forces of the United States) to the extent remuneration for such service is excludable from gross income under such section; or
(2) for agricultural labor (as defined in section 3121(g)) unless the remuneration paid for such labor is wages (as defined in section 3121(a)

Do you understand what (2) here is telling you?
First off 3401(a)(2) is telling that 3121(g) agricultural labor (occupation) is not included as 3401(a) "wages"....however if such 3121(g) agri labor remuneration is defined (or elected as) as 3121(a) "wages" (Social Security wages; box 3 on the W2) then all bets are off and this agri labor earnings are now deemed as 3401(a) "wages" and thus taxable under the Section 1 imposition.

Hope this helps you Monty because the "employee" and "trade or business" definitions really have no bearing on if you earn 3121(a) "wages". And while I'm at it here SS disqualifies most government employees from participating in SS because they already have another government retirement plan they use...so you cant argue the government employee angle.

7th trump

14th March 2016, 08:32 PM

And no Monty I dont use any method....I simply dont participate in SS to generate any "wages".
Ever wondered why box 1 (3401) and box 3 (3121) are always the same amount?
Its because 3121 and 3401 are one in the same.
Dont believe me...check a W2...any W2 that has one source of "employment" income ( as in you work one W4 job all year long and its all straight up hourly wages).....I'll bet 1 silver ounce both are identical.

And you know what stops the IRS dead in their tracks?
This stops the IRS dead in their tracks:

3121(a)
(a) Old-age, survivors, and disability insurance

In addition to other taxes, there is hereby imposed on the income of every individual a tax equal to 6.2 percent of the wages (as defined in section 3121(a)) received by the individual with respect to employment (as defined in section 3121(b)) [1]

My wages arent defined as 3121(a) because I'm not employed as defined. The IRS tried, but didnt succeed because they couldnt get around the fact my earning werent SS "wages" that must be in respect to 3121(b) "employment".
I dont participate in SS and thus my earnings arent "wages".
And theres no law on any books that says you must participate. In fact there's a regulation that says SS is voluntary...and I know why.....its because they cant force you to give up your Bill of Rights.
When you sign a W4 you sign it under penalty of Perjury to being a "US citizen"...a second class citizen having only privileges, not Rights.
They tried but when I mentioned to them they were trying to block me from accessing the Bill of Rights by perjury of being a US citizen...they said OK this meeting is over. I said "I know it is".

Glass

14th March 2016, 08:33 PM

I didn't fell comfortable reading that guys material. I have heard about the Cracking the Code book but I thought that was written by someone else. I thought it was that Mary lady? Not even sure that name is right. How I kicked the butt of every government agency or something. Croft.

yes I would agree that employee / company officer status has little bearing on things. I've heard the story statutes only apply to government employees many times.

monty

14th March 2016, 08:36 PM

All I can tell you Monty is that social security "wages" (3121(a) "wages" [box 3 on the W2] are 3401(a) "wages" [box 1 on the W2].
So with this.............. 3401(a) "wages" does not leave out the enumerated Social Security earnings.
The code is pretty simple once you get the "wrongs" Hendrickson put in your mind from reading his CtC book.
3401(a) is pretty straight forward to are deemed 3401(a) "wages".
Here Monty I'll show you using 3401(a) that all of Social Security "wages" are included in the 3401(a) "wages" definition except what Social Security excludes from 3121(a) "wages".
What you are going to find out is this. What "wages" (its actually occupations) Social Security excludes for the purpose of crediting your SS account are excluded from the 3401(a) "wage" definition.
3401(a) will actually tell you if certain agricultural [3121(g)] earnings are to be considered as 3121(a) "wages" then these 3121(a) "wages" are to be included in the 3401(a) "wage" definition.

Do you understand what (2) here is telling you?
First off 3401(a)(2) is telling that 3121(g) agricultural labor (occupation) is not included as 3401(a) "wages"....however if such 3121(g) agri labor remuneration is defined (or elected as) as 3121(a) "wages" (Social Security wages; box 3 on the W2) then all bets are off and this agri labor earnings are now deemed as 3401(a) "wages" and thus taxable under the Section 1 imposition.

Hope this helps you Monty because the "employee" and "trade or business" definitions really have no bearing on if you earn 3121(a) "wages". And while I'm at it here SS disqualifies most government employees from participating in SS because they already have another government retirement plan they use...so you cant argue the government employee angle.

I have not signed a form W-4 since 2003. So I don't have any "wages". I don't sign W-9 forms.

I did however file Forms 1040 for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007,thinking I was required to. When I learned that W-4 and W-9 obligated me to pay Social Security I filed amended returns. They refunded my money.

edit: I still receive my Social Security pension.

monty

14th March 2016, 08:51 PM

And no Monty I dont use any method....I simply dont participate in SS to generate any "wages".
Ever wondered why box 1 (3401) and box 3 (3121) are always the same amount?
Its because 3121 and 3401 are one in the same.
Dont believe me...check a W2...any W2 that has one source of "employment" income ( as in you work one W4 job all year long and its all straight up hourly wages).....I'll bet 1 silver ounce both are identical.

And you know what stops the IRS dead in their tracks?
This stops the IRS dead in their tracks:

3121(a)
(a) Old-age, survivors, and disability insurance

My wages arent defined as 3121(a) because I'm not employed as defined. The IRS tried, but didnt succeed because they couldnt get around the fact my earning werent SS "wages" that must be in respect to 3121(b) "employment".
I dont participate in SS and thus my earnings arent "wages".
And theres no law on any books that says you must participate. In fact there's a regulation that says SS is voluntary...and I know why.....its because they cant force you to give up your Bill of Rights.
When you sign a W4 you sign it under penalty of Perjury to being a "US citizen"...a second class citizen having only privileges, not Rights.

See my post #134.

7th trump

14th March 2016, 08:54 PM

I have not signed a form W-4 since 2003. So I don't have any "wages". I don't sign W-9 forms.

I did however file Forms 1040 for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007,thinking I was required to. When I learned that W-4 and W-9 obligated me to pay Social Security I filed amended returns. They refunded my money.

edit: I still receive my Social Security pension.

They refunded your money because they didnt have any transmittal W3 info from the employer stating how much you contributed into SS. And those years you did file even though you didnt have a W4 active you weren't covered under SS like W4 people are.
The IRS will not fuck with you once you understand their game.

monty

14th March 2016, 08:58 PM

They refunded your money because they didnt have any transmittal W3 info from the employer stating how much you contributed into SS. And those years you did file even though you didnt have a W4 active you weren't covered under SS like W4 people are.
The IRS will not fuck with you once you understand their game.

I understand all of that. I don't receive "wages". My Social Security account show $0.00 contributions for every year since 2005.

7th trump

14th March 2016, 09:08 PM

I understand all of that. I don't receive "wages". My Social Security account show $0.00 contributions for every year since 2005.
Yeah I understand and they are probably giving you SS based on what you had already contributed into SS.

monty

14th March 2016, 09:15 PM

Yeah I understand and they are probably giving you SS based on what you had already contributed into SS.
Yes, they are paying me based on 1956 - 2004. I get about $1600 dollars a month

Cebu_4_2

15th March 2016, 02:20 AM

Yes, they are paying me based on 1956 - 2004. I get about $1600 dollars a month

Fuck I could live large on that now!

palani

15th March 2016, 04:48 AM

I've heard the story statutes only apply to government employees many times.
Citizenship is viewed as an unpaid office.

monty

15th March 2016, 06:29 AM

Fuck I could live large on that now!
I do. Like Ponce, I have no bills.

monty

18th March 2016, 12:43 PM

March 18 update.

New post on supremecourtcase
http://s0.wp.com/i/emails/blavatar.png

http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362de50d4411e213b250511fb285?s=50&d=identicon&r=G (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)
Lufkin Judge awards judgment to United States; Petitioner files for temporary restraining order in District of Columbia (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/03/18/lufkin-judge-awards-judgment-to-united-states-petitioner-files-for-temporary-restraining-order-in-district-of-columbia-2/)

by supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)

The Lufkin Judge on March 3, 2016, entered a memorandum order and final judgment (both hyperlinked below), denying Petitioner’s September 30, 2015, motion to dismiss with prejudice (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/demand-for-dismissal-filed-093015.pdf) and granting United States' Motion for Summary Judgment, April 24, 2015, motion for summary judgement (11.5 MB). (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/united-states-motion-for-summary-judgment-april-24-2015.pdf)

There is, however, an automatic stay of 14 days before any execution may issue on a judgment (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62(a) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_62)).

On March 16, 2016, the 13th day following entry of the aforesaid memorandum order and final judgment, Petitioner filed, as plaintiff, against United States of America, as defendant, in United States District Court for the District of Columbia Case No. 1:16-cv-00506 BAH, a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at equity (not law), under equity rules, in order obtain that court’s assistance in preventing an injustice to Petitioner.

In addition to the verified complaint, Petitioner also filed an application (motion) for a temporary restraining order and a memorandum in support of that application (each is hyperlinked below). A proposed temporary restraining order (for the judge to sign and issue) is attached to the memorandum in support.

To correct a technical error in the caption of the verified complaint, Petitioner on March 18, 2016, filed an Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (hyperlinked below).

Here is a brief introduction to the subject of equity:
“EQUITY. 1. In its broadest and most general signification, this term denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men,—the rule of doing to all others as we desire them to do to us ; or, as it is expressed by Justinian, “to live honestly, to harm nobody, to render to every man his due.” Inst. 1, 1, 3. It is therefore the synonym of natural right or justice. But in this sense its obligation is ethical rather than jural,[1] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftn1) and its discussion belongs to the sphere of morals. It is grounded in the precepts of the conscience, not in any sanction of positive law.

“2. In a more restricted sense, the word denotes equal and impartial justice as between two persons whose rights or claims are in conflict ; justice, that is, as ascertained by natural reason or ethical insight, but independent of the formulated body of law. This is not a technical meaning of the term, except insofar as courts which administer equity seek to discover it by the agencies above mentioned, or apply it beyond the strict lines of positive law. . . .” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891 (“Black’s 1st”), pp. 427–428.
“EQUITY. . . .

“. . . Rules and maxims. In the administration of the jurisdiction, there are certain rules and maxims which are of special significance.

“First. Equity having once had jurisdiction of a subject-matter because there was no remedy at law, or because the remedy is inadequate, does not lose the jurisdiction merely because the courts of law afterwards give the name or a similar relief.

“Second. Equity follows the law. This is true as a general maxim. Equity follows the law, except in relation to those matters which give a title to equitable relief because the rules of law would operate to sanction fraud or injustice in the particular case.

“Third. Between equal equities the law must prevail. . . .

“Fourth. Equality is equity . . .

“Fifth. He who seeks equity must do equity. A party cannot claim the interposition of the court for relief unless he will do what it is equitable should be done by him as a condition precedent to that relief. See the eleventh maxim, infra.

“Sixth. Equity considers that as done which ought to have been done. . . .

“Seventh. Equity will not permit a wrong without a remedy.

“Eighth. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.

“Ninth. Where equities are equal the first in time prevails—qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure.

“Tenth. Equity imputes an intention to perform an obligation.

“ Eleventh. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. . . .

“Twelfth. It is to the vigilant and not those who sleep upon their rights, that Equity leads assistance—vigilantibus et non dormientibus equitas subvenit.

“Thirteenth. Equity acts in personam[2] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftn2) and not in rem.[3] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftn3) As a result of this principle, jurisdiction of the person gives power to affect by the decree property outside the jurisdiction. . . .

“Fourteenth. Equity delights to do justice and not by halves.” [Emphasis in original.] John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914), pp. 1057, 1062–1063.

“. . . In America, the federal courts have equity powers under the constitution, where an adequate remedy at law does not exist. . . . The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the same as that of the former court of chancery in England, is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the states . . .

“In the administration of that jurisdiction the federal courts are not to ‘look only to the statutes of congress. The principles of equity exist independently of, and anterior to, all congressional legislation, and the statutes are either enunciations of those principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases ; U. S. v. Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 20 Sup. Ct. 282, 50 L. Ed. 499 . . .’” Id., pp. 1064–1065.

Two of the remedies available at equity are injunction and declaratory judgment:
“injunction (in-jəngk-shən), n. A court order commanding or preventing an action. ● To get an injunction a complainant must show that there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and that an irreparable injury will result unless the relief is granted. . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999) (“Black’s 7th”), p. 788.

“DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. A declaratory judgment is one which simply declares the rights of the parties, or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done.” “Black’s 1st, p. 340.

Petitioner initially seeks a type of injunction called an ex parte injunction or temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction.

“ex parte[4] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftn4) injunction. A preliminary injunction issued after the court has heard from only the moving party.” Black’s 7th, p. 788.

“RESTRAINING ORDER. An order in the nature of an injunction. . . . Black’s 1st, p. 1036.

“temporary restraining order. A court order preserving the status quo until a litigant’s application for a preliminary or permanent injunction can be heard. ● A temporary restraining order may sometimes be granted without notifying the opposing party in advance. — Abbr. TRO. — Often shortened to restraining order.” Id. at 1477.

“—Preliminary injunction. An injunction granted at the institution of a suit, to restrain the defendant from doing or continuing some act, the right to which is in dispute, and which may either be discharged or made perpetual, according to the result of the controversy, as soon as the rights of the parties are determined. . . .” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1910), p. 627.

“—Permanent injunction. One intended to remain in force until the final termination of the particular suit.” Id.

“—Perpetual injunction. . . . An injunction which finally disposes of the suit, and is indefinite in point in time.” Id.

As the reader will discover: The United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the only de jure[5] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftn5) United States District Court in North America and the only one with the jurisdiction necessary to decide the controversy set forth in the amended complaint; every other purported United States District Court is a de facto[6] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftn6) “court” which has no lawful existence under the Constitution.

As of this post, March 18, 2016, a file-stamped copy of court filings is not available.
The legal and equitable process involved in this action at equity is as follows:

Lufkin Court's Memorandum Order, March 3, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/lufkin-courts-memorandum-order-march-3-2016.pdf)
Lufkin Court's Final Judgment, March 3, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/lufkin-courts-final-judgment-march-3-2016.pdf)
Petitioner's Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, March 18, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/petitioners-amended-verified-complaint-for-declaratory-and-injunctive-relief-march-18-2016.pdf)
Petitioner's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/petitioners-application-for-a-temporary-restraining-order-march-16-2016.pdf)
Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 16, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/petitioners-memorandum-in-support-of-application-for-a-temporary-restraining-order-march-16-2016.pdf)

* * * *
[1] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftnref1) JURAL. Founded in law ; organized upon the basis of a fundamental law, and existing for the recognition and protection of rights. . . . Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 661.

[2] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftnref2) In personam (in pər-soh-nam), adj. [Latin “against a person”] Involving or determining the personal rights and interests of the parties. — Also termed personal. . . . Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999), p. 795.

[3] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftnref3) In rem (in rem), adj. [Latin “against a thing”] Involving or determining the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of personas generally with respect to that thing. — Also termed impersonal. . . . Id. at 797.

[4] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftnref4) ex parte [(eks pahr-tee)], adj. Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested <an ex parte hearing> <an ex parte injunction> . Black’s 7th, p. 597.

[5] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftnref5) DE JURE. Of right ; legitimate ; lawful. In this sense it is the contrary of de facto, (which see.) . . . Black’s 1st , p. 328.

[6] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://58129757-FF17-40D7-9D1E-04D56F207CCF/#_ftnref6) DE FACTO. In fact, in deed, actually. This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which exists actually and must be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is illegal or illegitimate. In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. . . Id. at 325.

supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/) | March 18, 2016 at 13:33 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://16) | Categories: Uncategorized (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/?cat=1) |

URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-hu

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monty

24th March 2016, 09:25 PM

https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/10981201/TROWBRIDGE_v_UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA

Dismissed with prejudice persuant to:28 U.S. Code § 1915 - Proceedings in forma pauperis

TROWBRIDGE v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

District Of Columbia District Court (https://www.pacermonitor.com/court/113/District_Of_Columbia)

Judge:
Beryl A Howell (https://www.pacermonitor.com/person/1251/beryl_a_howell)

Case #:
1:16-cv-00506

Nature of Suit
220 Real Property - Foreclosure

Cause
28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)

Case Filed:
Mar 16, 2016

Terminated:
Mar 22, 2016

Docket (https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/10981201/TROWBRIDGE_v_UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA#docket)
Parties (2) (https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/10981201/TROWBRIDGE_v_UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA#parties)

Docket as of: Thursday Mar 24, 2016 12:05 AM EDT

Tuesday, March 22, 2016

5

http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAMAAAA oLQ9TAAABqlBMVEX39/fk5OQdHR0kJCQ+Pj5ycnRzc3V1dXh/f4GBBQeBgYWIiI2Kio2LAQOMjI6oqKypqamqqqqrAgWsrKytra 2vr6+xsbGysri2tra3t7e6usC7u7u8vLy8vMK9vb2+vr6+vsa/v7/AwMDBwcHDw8vFxcXGxsbHx8fIyMjLy8vMzMzNzc3Ozs7Q0NDR0 dHS0tLTUlPTZWnT09PU1NTV1dXXGh3YtrnY2NjZ2dna2trbAQT bGh7bhIbb29vc29vc3NzdPDvd3d3e3t7fT07f39/g4ODhcHHh4eHiXmDi4uLjW1vj4uPk5OTk7fDlcXHljY/l5eXmj5Dm5ubnSEjnSUrn5+fomp3o29vo6OjpAQXpTE3pqqrp6 enp7fHqfXzqqqvqvL7q6urr09br6+vs7OztU1Pt7e3uAQTu7u7 v2tzv4uXv8PLw///x8fHy8vLz8/P09PT1AQT19fX29vb39/f6AQT7LzP7+/v+fYD/AQX/BQn/Bwv/DBD/DRL/Exj/Fhr/Gx//IiX/KCv/MjX/Nzr/ODv/PkD/QkX/SU3/VFf/YmT/a23/dXf/////j1paAAAAAnRSTlMAiJXwxioAAADlSURBVBjTY2BgYDAWExEWER YWFnVlgAB5FQVZKXF+bhcRWyCvoruzo72ttbnMmqvcRQAo0tPS WF9bXVkYKcRaXu4izMjQ1dRQV1NVmm7Fy8POxsGnz2DKCwWcQZ qq0hoyIEOVjbV0nQzsXM311S0kwAKuJo4Fzt4pAbY67mJgAR/LlHCHsIKMAONQYbBAqHtRXGxgfHGEZQxEICUxKSo6OiQ41SYXI pCX75WQmZ3ja2aYCBHI8vDPTw4NcLXUdoQIuPnl+rjbm+vpKhm BBRR7S9ISgzztzfXVjARBAnIszFDAxCIJAISLNHfGX7H0AAAAA ElFTkSuQmCC (https://www.pacermonitor.com/pricing)
order

.Order

Tue 11:58 AM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING this case, with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and QUASHING the summonses previously issued to the plaintiff. See Order for further details. The Clerk is directed to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell on March 22, 2016. (lcbah2)

Friday, March 18, 2016

4

http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAMAAAA oLQ9TAAABqlBMVEX39/fk5OQdHR0kJCQ+Pj5ycnRzc3V1dXh/f4GBBQeBgYWIiI2Kio2LAQOMjI6oqKypqamqqqqrAgWsrKytra 2vr6+xsbGysri2tra3t7e6usC7u7u8vLy8vMK9vb2+vr6+vsa/v7/AwMDBwcHDw8vFxcXGxsbHx8fIyMjLy8vMzMzNzc3Ozs7Q0NDR0 dHS0tLTUlPTZWnT09PU1NTV1dXXGh3YtrnY2NjZ2dna2trbAQT bGh7bhIbb29vc29vc3NzdPDvd3d3e3t7fT07f39/g4ODhcHHh4eHiXmDi4uLjW1vj4uPk5OTk7fDlcXHljY/l5eXmj5Dm5ubnSEjnSUrn5+fomp3o29vo6OjpAQXpTE3pqqrp6 enp7fHqfXzqqqvqvL7q6urr09br6+vs7OztU1Pt7e3uAQTu7u7 v2tzv4uXv8PLw///x8fHy8vLz8/P09PT1AQT19fX29vb39/f6AQT7LzP7+/v+fYD/AQX/BQn/Bwv/DBD/DRL/Exj/Fhr/Gx//IiX/KCv/MjX/Nzr/ODv/PkD/QkX/SU3/VFf/YmT/a23/dXf/////j1paAAAAAnRSTlMAiJXwxioAAADlSURBVBjTY2BgYDAWExEWER YWFnVlgAB5FQVZKXF+bhcRWyCvoruzo72ttbnMmqvcRQAo0tPS WF9bXVkYKcRaXu4izMjQ1dRQV1NVmm7Fy8POxsGnz2DKCwWcQZ qq0hoyIEOVjbV0nQzsXM311S0kwAKuJo4Fzt4pAbY67mJgAR/LlHCHsIKMAONQYbBAqHtRXGxgfHGEZQxEICUxKSo6OiQ41SYXI pCX75WQmZ3ja2aYCBHI8vDPTw4NcLXUdoQIuPnl+rjbm+vpKhm BBRR7S9ISgzztzfXVjARBAnIszFDAxCIJAISLNHfGX7H0AAAAA ElFTkSuQmCC (https://www.pacermonitor.com/pricing)
cmp

Amended Complaint

Fri 3:02 PM
AMENDED COMPLAINT against UNITED STATES OF AMERICA filed by JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.(zrdj)

Thursday, March 17, 2016

order

Order on Motion to Show Cause Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction Order on Motion for TRO

Thu 9:10 AM
MINUTE ORDER (paperless) DENYING the plaintiff's2 Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue. Signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell on March 17, 2016. (lcbah2)

Wednesday, March 16, 2016

3

http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAMAAAA oLQ9TAAABqlBMVEX39/fk5OQdHR0kJCQ+Pj5ycnRzc3V1dXh/f4GBBQeBgYWIiI2Kio2LAQOMjI6oqKypqamqqqqrAgWsrKytra 2vr6+xsbGysri2tra3t7e6usC7u7u8vLy8vMK9vb2+vr6+vsa/v7/AwMDBwcHDw8vFxcXGxsbHx8fIyMjLy8vMzMzNzc3Ozs7Q0NDR0 dHS0tLTUlPTZWnT09PU1NTV1dXXGh3YtrnY2NjZ2dna2trbAQT bGh7bhIbb29vc29vc3NzdPDvd3d3e3t7fT07f39/g4ODhcHHh4eHiXmDi4uLjW1vj4uPk5OTk7fDlcXHljY/l5eXmj5Dm5ubnSEjnSUrn5+fomp3o29vo6OjpAQXpTE3pqqrp6 enp7fHqfXzqqqvqvL7q6urr09br6+vs7OztU1Pt7e3uAQTu7u7 v2tzv4uXv8PLw///x8fHy8vLz8/P09PT1AQT19fX29vb39/f6AQT7LzP7+/v+fYD/AQX/BQn/Bwv/DBD/DRL/Exj/Fhr/Gx//IiX/KCv/MjX/Nzr/ODv/PkD/QkX/SU3/VFf/YmT/a23/dXf/////j1paAAAAAnRSTlMAiJXwxioAAADlSURBVBjTY2BgYDAWExEWER YWFnVlgAB5FQVZKXF+bhcRWyCvoruzo72ttbnMmqvcRQAo0tPS WF9bXVkYKcRaXu4izMjQ1dRQV1NVmm7Fy8POxsGnz2DKCwWcQZ qq0hoyIEOVjbV0nQzsXM311S0kwAKuJo4Fzt4pAbY67mJgAR/LlHCHsIKMAONQYbBAqHtRXGxgfHGEZQxEICUxKSo6OiQ41SYXI pCX75WQmZ3ja2aYCBHI8vDPTw4NcLXUdoQIuPnl+rjbm+vpKhm BBRR7S9ISgzztzfXVjARBAnIszFDAxCIJAISLNHfGX7H0AAAAA ElFTkSuQmCC (https://www.pacermonitor.com/pricing)
service

Summons Returned Executed as to U.S. Attorney General Summons Returned Executed as to US Attorney

Thu 11:00 AM
RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on United States Attorney General. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney General 3/16/2016., RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the United States Attorney. Date of Service Upon United States Attorney on 3/16/2016. ( Answer due for ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS by 5/15/2016.) (zrdj)

2

http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAMAAAA oLQ9TAAABqlBMVEX39/fk5OQdHR0kJCQ+Pj5ycnRzc3V1dXh/f4GBBQeBgYWIiI2Kio2LAQOMjI6oqKypqamqqqqrAgWsrKytra 2vr6+xsbGysri2tra3t7e6usC7u7u8vLy8vMK9vb2+vr6+vsa/v7/AwMDBwcHDw8vFxcXGxsbHx8fIyMjLy8vMzMzNzc3Ozs7Q0NDR0 dHS0tLTUlPTZWnT09PU1NTV1dXXGh3YtrnY2NjZ2dna2trbAQT bGh7bhIbb29vc29vc3NzdPDvd3d3e3t7fT07f39/g4ODhcHHh4eHiXmDi4uLjW1vj4uPk5OTk7fDlcXHljY/l5eXmj5Dm5ubnSEjnSUrn5+fomp3o29vo6OjpAQXpTE3pqqrp6 enp7fHqfXzqqqvqvL7q6urr09br6+vs7OztU1Pt7e3uAQTu7u7 v2tzv4uXv8PLw///x8fHy8vLz8/P09PT1AQT19fX29vb39/f6AQT7LzP7+/v+fYD/AQX/BQn/Bwv/DBD/DRL/Exj/Fhr/Gx//IiX/KCv/MjX/Nzr/ODv/PkD/QkX/SU3/VFf/YmT/a23/dXf/////j1paAAAAAnRSTlMAiJXwxioAAADlSURBVBjTY2BgYDAWExEWER YWFnVlgAB5FQVZKXF+bhcRWyCvoruzo72ttbnMmqvcRQAo0tPS WF9bXVkYKcRaXu4izMjQ1dRQV1NVmm7Fy8POxsGnz2DKCwWcQZ qq0hoyIEOVjbV0nQzsXM311S0kwAKuJo4Fzt4pAbY67mJgAR/LlHCHsIKMAONQYbBAqHtRXGxgfHGEZQxEICUxKSo6OiQ41SYXI pCX75WQmZ3ja2aYCBHI8vDPTw4NcLXUdoQIuPnl+rjbm+vpKhm BBRR7S9ISgzztzfXVjARBAnIszFDAxCIJAISLNHfGX7H0AAAAA ElFTkSuQmCC (https://www.pacermonitor.com/pricing)
motion

Temporary Restraining Order Show Cause Preliminary Injunction

Wed 3:50 PM
MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, MOTION for Order to Show Cause, MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR(jf)

Att: 1 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAMAAAA oLQ9TAAABqlBMVEX39/fk5OQdHR0kJCQ+Pj5ycnRzc3V1dXh/f4GBBQeBgYWIiI2Kio2LAQOMjI6oqKypqamqqqqrAgWsrKytra 2vr6+xsbGysri2tra3t7e6usC7u7u8vLy8vMK9vb2+vr6+vsa/v7/AwMDBwcHDw8vFxcXGxsbHx8fIyMjLy8vMzMzNzc3Ozs7Q0NDR0 dHS0tLTUlPTZWnT09PU1NTV1dXXGh3YtrnY2NjZ2dna2trbAQT bGh7bhIbb29vc29vc3NzdPDvd3d3e3t7fT07f39/g4ODhcHHh4eHiXmDi4uLjW1vj4uPk5OTk7fDlcXHljY/l5eXmj5Dm5ubnSEjnSUrn5+fomp3o29vo6OjpAQXpTE3pqqrp6 enp7fHqfXzqqqvqvL7q6urr09br6+vs7OztU1Pt7e3uAQTu7u7 v2tzv4uXv8PLw///x8fHy8vLz8/P09PT1AQT19fX29vb39/f6AQT7LzP7+/v+fYD/AQX/BQn/Bwv/DBD/DRL/Exj/Fhr/Gx//IiX/KCv/MjX/Nzr/ODv/PkD/QkX/SU3/VFf/YmT/a23/dXf/////j1paAAAAAnRSTlMAiJXwxioAAADlSURBVBjTY2BgYDAWExEWER YWFnVlgAB5FQVZKXF+bhcRWyCvoruzo72ttbnMmqvcRQAo0tPS WF9bXVkYKcRaXu4izMjQ1dRQV1NVmm7Fy8POxsGnz2DKCwWcQZ qq0hoyIEOVjbV0nQzsXM311S0kwAKuJo4Fzt4pAbY67mJgAR/LlHCHsIKMAONQYbBAqHtRXGxgfHGEZQxEICUxKSo6OiQ41SYXI pCX75WQmZ3ja2aYCBHI8vDPTw4NcLXUdoQIuPnl+rjbm+vpKhm BBRR7S9ISgzztzfXVjARBAnIszFDAxCIJAISLNHfGX7H0AAAAA ElFTkSuQmCC (https://www.pacermonitor.com/pricing) Exhibit,

Att: 2 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAMAAAA oLQ9TAAABqlBMVEX39/fk5OQdHR0kJCQ+Pj5ycnRzc3V1dXh/f4GBBQeBgYWIiI2Kio2LAQOMjI6oqKypqamqqqqrAgWsrKytra 2vr6+xsbGysri2tra3t7e6usC7u7u8vLy8vMK9vb2+vr6+vsa/v7/AwMDBwcHDw8vFxcXGxsbHx8fIyMjLy8vMzMzNzc3Ozs7Q0NDR0 dHS0tLTUlPTZWnT09PU1NTV1dXXGh3YtrnY2NjZ2dna2trbAQT bGh7bhIbb29vc29vc3NzdPDvd3d3e3t7fT07f39/g4ODhcHHh4eHiXmDi4uLjW1vj4uPk5OTk7fDlcXHljY/l5eXmj5Dm5ubnSEjnSUrn5+fomp3o29vo6OjpAQXpTE3pqqrp6 enp7fHqfXzqqqvqvL7q6urr09br6+vs7OztU1Pt7e3uAQTu7u7 v2tzv4uXv8PLw///x8fHy8vLz8/P09PT1AQT19fX29vb39/f6AQT7LzP7+/v+fYD/AQX/BQn/Bwv/DBD/DRL/Exj/Fhr/Gx//IiX/KCv/MjX/Nzr/ODv/PkD/QkX/SU3/VFf/YmT/a23/dXf/////j1paAAAAAnRSTlMAiJXwxioAAADlSURBVBjTY2BgYDAWExEWER YWFnVlgAB5FQVZKXF+bhcRWyCvoruzo72ttbnMmqvcRQAo0tPS WF9bXVkYKcRaXu4izMjQ1dRQV1NVmm7Fy8POxsGnz2DKCwWcQZ qq0hoyIEOVjbV0nQzsXM311S0kwAKuJo4Fzt4pAbY67mJgAR/LlHCHsIKMAONQYbBAqHtRXGxgfHGEZQxEICUxKSo6OiQ41SYXI pCX75WQmZ3ja2aYCBHI8vDPTw4NcLXUdoQIuPnl+rjbm+vpKhm BBRR7S9ISgzztzfXVjARBAnIszFDAxCIJAISLNHfGX7H0AAAAA ElFTkSuQmCC (https://www.pacermonitor.com/pricing) Text of Proposed Order

1

http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAMAAAA oLQ9TAAABqlBMVEX39/fk5OQdHR0kJCQ+Pj5ycnRzc3V1dXh/f4GBBQeBgYWIiI2Kio2LAQOMjI6oqKypqamqqqqrAgWsrKytra 2vr6+xsbGysri2tra3t7e6usC7u7u8vLy8vMK9vb2+vr6+vsa/v7/AwMDBwcHDw8vFxcXGxsbHx8fIyMjLy8vMzMzNzc3Ozs7Q0NDR0 dHS0tLTUlPTZWnT09PU1NTV1dXXGh3YtrnY2NjZ2dna2trbAQT bGh7bhIbb29vc29vc3NzdPDvd3d3e3t7fT07f39/g4ODhcHHh4eHiXmDi4uLjW1vj4uPk5OTk7fDlcXHljY/l5eXmj5Dm5ubnSEjnSUrn5+fomp3o29vo6OjpAQXpTE3pqqrp6 enp7fHqfXzqqqvqvL7q6urr09br6+vs7OztU1Pt7e3uAQTu7u7 v2tzv4uXv8PLw///x8fHy8vLz8/P09PT1AQT19fX29vb39/f6AQT7LzP7+/v+fYD/AQX/BQn/Bwv/DBD/DRL/Exj/Fhr/Gx//IiX/KCv/MjX/Nzr/ODv/PkD/QkX/SU3/VFf/YmT/a23/dXf/////j1paAAAAAnRSTlMAiJXwxioAAADlSURBVBjTY2BgYDAWExEWER YWFnVlgAB5FQVZKXF+bhcRWyCvoruzo72ttbnMmqvcRQAo0tPS WF9bXVkYKcRaXu4izMjQ1dRQV1NVmm7Fy8POxsGnz2DKCwWcQZ qq0hoyIEOVjbV0nQzsXM311S0kwAKuJo4Fzt4pAbY67mJgAR/LlHCHsIKMAONQYbBAqHtRXGxgfHGEZQxEICUxKSo6OiQ41SYXI pCX75WQmZ3ja2aYCBHI8vDPTw4NcLXUdoQIuPnl+rjbm+vpKhm BBRR7S9ISgzztzfXVjARBAnIszFDAxCIJAISLNHfGX7H0AAAAA ElFTkSuQmCC (https://www.pacermonitor.com/pricing)
cmp

Complaint

Wed 3:47 PM
COMPLAINT against UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ( Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 46160765559 (tel:46160765559)) filed by JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.(jf)

Att: 1 http://gold-silver.us/forum/image/png;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAMAAAA oLQ9TAAABqlBMVEX39/fk5OQdHR0kJCQ+Pj5ycnRzc3V1dXh/f4GBBQeBgYWIiI2Kio2LAQOMjI6oqKypqamqqqqrAgWsrKytra 2vr6+xsbGysri2tra3t7e6usC7u7u8vLy8vMK9vb2+vr6+vsa/v7/AwMDBwcHDw8vFxcXGxsbHx8fIyMjLy8vMzMzNzc3Ozs7Q0NDR0 dHS0tLTUlPTZWnT09PU1NTV1dXXGh3YtrnY2NjZ2dna2trbAQT bGh7bhIbb29vc29vc3NzdPDvd3d3e3t7fT07f39/g4ODhcHHh4eHiXmDi4uLjW1vj4uPk5OTk7fDlcXHljY/l5eXmj5Dm5ubnSEjnSUrn5+fomp3o29vo6OjpAQXpTE3pqqrp6 enp7fHqfXzqqqvqvL7q6urr09br6+vs7OztU1Pt7e3uAQTu7u7 v2tzv4uXv8PLw///x8fHy8vLz8/P09PT1AQT19fX29vb39/f6AQT7LzP7+/v+fYD/AQX/BQn/Bwv/DBD/DRL/Exj/Fhr/Gx//IiX/KCv/MjX/Nzr/ODv/PkD/QkX/SU3/VFf/YmT/a23/dXf/////j1paAAAAAnRSTlMAiJXwxioAAADlSURBVBjTY2BgYDAWExEWER YWFnVlgAB5FQVZKXF+bhcRWyCvoruzo72ttbnMmqvcRQAo0tPS WF9bXVkYKcRaXu4izMjQ1dRQV1NVmm7Fy8POxsGnz2DKCwWcQZ qq0hoyIEOVjbV0nQzsXM311S0kwAKuJo4Fzt4pAbY67mJgAR/LlHCHsIKMAONQYbBAqHtRXGxgfHGEZQxEICUxKSo6OiQ41SYXI pCX75WQmZ3ja2aYCBHI8vDPTw4NcLXUdoQIuPnl+rjbm+vpKhm BBRR7S9ISgzztzfXVjARBAnIszFDAxCIJAISLNHfGX7H0AAAAA ElFTkSuQmCC (https://www.pacermonitor.com/pricing) Civil Cover Sheet

service

Summons Issued as to AUSA,USAG

Wed 3:48 PM
SUMMONS (2) Issued as to UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General (jf)

monty

31st March 2016, 10:55 PM

New post on supremecourtcase

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http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2fcf362de50d4411e213b250511fb285?s=50&d=identicon&r=G (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)
DC Judge rubber-stamps Lufkin judgment; Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/04/01/dc-judge-rubber-stamps-lufkin-judgment-petitioner-sues-lufkin-judge-in-county-court-to-quiet-title/)

by supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)

Petitioner requested of United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, among other things, a temporary restraining order on enforcement of the Lufkin Judge’s final judgment and presented the following controversy for resolution: “Whether the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress or extends to Tyler County, Texas.”

The correct answer to this question signals the end of the legislative tribunals known as United States District Courts—except for the only three de jure United States District Courts in existence: District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

For Judge Howell to cop to the indisputable legislative fact that the territorial jurisdiction of United States District Courts is co-extensive with the territorial legislative power of Congress (Federal territory only) and does not extend into the Union, would be to invalidate the Lufkin Judge’s decision—but more importantly, would undo over 150 years of legislative-branch mischief and lead, ultimately, to the demise of the most elaborately constructed monolith of institutionalized crime in world history: the contemporary so-called Federal Government, i.e., the terrain of the District of Columbia,[1] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn1) i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation,[2] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn2) i.e., the “United States,”[3] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn3) located in the District of Columbia[4] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn4) and doing business as “United States™”[5] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn5) and “United States®.”[6] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn6)

A weighty burden for Ms. Howell to bear, we all can agree.

Another sobering influence on Judge Howell’s handling of Petitioner’s filing would be the fate of the last bench officer to rule against the nature of the private Federal Reserve,[7] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn7)Justice of the Peace Martin V. Mahoney in the Credit River Township Case,[8] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn8) Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968: Mahoney was poisoned thereafter and died of a complication, aspiration of vomitus, August 22, 1969, at the age of 54.[9] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn9)

Since 1969, no more such adverse judgments.

It is easy to see that the Honorable Beryl A. Howell had ample motivation to deny Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order, evade settling the controversy submitted by Petitioner, falsify the record, and dismiss Petitioner’s complaint (entries hyperlinked infra).

Judge Howell must have been concerned about Petitioner, however—because she tipped her hand and divulged the ultimate-but-frivolous[10] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn10) rationalization used by the Federal judiciary and attorneys of the United States Department of Justice to justify usurping exercise of territorial and personal jurisdiction throughout the Union in their joint efforts to exact what is called “income tax” from the American People; a theory best described as “subject-matter jurisdiction conveys territorial jurisdiction.”

Judge Howell propounds on page 4, paragraph 2 of her Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint (hyperlinked infra) by way of circumlocution and inference, that the constitutional authority that gives the Lufkin Court the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction in Tyler County, Texas, is Article 1 § 8(1).

If it were that simple, it seems the Lufkin Judge and Lufkin Magistrate would have said the same thing instead of going silent and stonewalling the matter for six months.
For the benefit of anyone who might be duped by such a patently absurd argument, let us identify the provisions of the Constitution relating to jurisdiction and the extent to which they obtain.

Jurisdiction 101

The American People on September 17, 1787, ordain and establish the Constitution and Congress on March 4, 1789, implement it.

The Constitution confers upon Congress certain powers of legislation in certain geographic areas.

Those powers of legislation give executive-branch and judicial-branch officers the capacity to take jurisdiction in those geographic areas and execute and declare, respectively, the laws enacted by Congress.

It is not too complicated.[11] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn11)

But the loyalty of congressmen goes to the highest bidder, and until arrival of the private Federal Reserve in 1913, the principals of its parent bank, the private Bank of England (inc. July 27 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://4), 1694; first government-sanctioned fractional-reserve-banking institution), beginning circa mid-19th century, dictate to Congress—and the nature of jurisdiction is cunningly perverted in form through stealth legislation and redefinition of a key common noun and proper noun in the Constitution, “State” and “United States,” so as to give each a constitutionally opposite statutory meaning.

The Federal Reserve Act (Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913) is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de Rothschild[12] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn12) (1842–1918), director of the private Bank of England.
The Federal Reserve Act is implemented by Baron Rothschild’s straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg,[13] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn13) a German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911 specifically for this purpose (the New York Times dubs Warburg “Father of the Federal Reserve”[14] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn14)).

Each of the 12 private regional Federal Reserve banks is a private joint-stock company instituted under aegis of the novel District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, inc. February 21, 1871 (fns. 1 and 2), and patterned by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after its parent bank, the private Bank of England.[15] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn15)

The elephant in the room

“A tax is a demand of sovereignty . . . State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall (U. S.) 278, 21 L. Ed. 146.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 3220.

The sovereign authority throughout the Union is the American People[16] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn16); the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress.[17] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn17)

The sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress, is providing legislation for the laying and collection of tax (income tax) without the territory over which they are sovereign, in geographic area occupied by another sovereign, the American People.

That Congress appears to be demanding income tax of the joint tenants in the sovereignty (the American People) residing throughout the Union means either that Congress is usurping exercise of territorial and personal legislation outside their territory or what we know as “income tax” is not actually a tax.

“A tax is not a debt . . . New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 27 Sup. Ct. 137, 51 L. Ed. 284 ; and has none of the incidents of a debt ; 21 Harv L. Rev. 283 ; technically it is not a debt . . .” Id.

All alleged Federal income tax liability is classified as debt, 28 U.S.C. 3002(3) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002), and all Federal income-tax cases, civil and criminal, are prosecuted under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure.

What is called “income tax” ultimately is not a tax per se but a commercial penalty for the use of private property of the Federal Reserve Bank known as Federal Reserve Notes[18] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn18)(“FRNs”).
The alleged income-tax liability generated from multiple transactions involving the same FRN (called velocity of money (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/velocity.asp)) will exceed the face value of the FRN after a few transactions.

“No tax is valid which is not laid for a public purpose ; Citizens’ S. & L. Ass’n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. Ed. 455, where it was said that there are limitations on the power of the three branches of government which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments—implied reservations of individual rights without which the social compact could not exist, and among these is that taxation must be for a public purpose ; such are (according to Cooley, Tax. 18) to preserve the public order ; to make compensation to public officers, etc. ; to erect, etc. public buildings ; to pay the expenses of legislation and of administering the laws, etc. ; also, to provide secular instruction ; Colley, Tax. 2d ed. 119–124 ; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 81, 26 L. Ed. 658 . . .” Id. at 3221.

No collection of what is called income tax goes toward a public purpose; all collections of income tax are used for a private purpose, i.e., to pay interest on the so-called national debt incurred by Congress and owed to the private Federal Reserve; to wit:

“Resistance to additional income taxes would be even more widespread if people were aware that . . . 100 percent of what is collected is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.

Banks do not pay income tax; to wit:

“Sec. 7. . . . Tax exemption. Federal reserve banks, including the capital stock and surplus therein, and the income derived therefrom shall be exempt from Federal, State, and local taxation, except taxes upon real estate.” Federal Reserve Act, H. R. 7837, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913.

All collections of income tax paid to the private Federal Reserve are retired from circulation the same way they are created by banks in the so-called loan process—by computer-keypad keystroke, in exchange for the borrower’s promise-to-pay; to wit:

“What they [banks] do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the borrowers’ transaction [checking or credit-card] accounts.” Modern Money Mechanics: A Workbook on Bank Reserves and Deposit Expansion, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1994, pp. 3–6.

“If it [a bank] makes loans, it will simply credit the checking accounts of the borrowers. . . . [N]ew money, in the form of additional checkable deposits, will be “created.” The Federal Reserve Today: Fed Funds Rate, Discount Rate, 11th ed., Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1994, p. 21.

“[M]oney exists simply as a bookkeeping entry at a bank . . .” The Story of Money, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009, p. 17.

“[W]hen a bank makes a loan, it simply adds to the borrower’s deposit account in the bank by the amount of the loan. This money is not taken from anyone else’s deposit; it was not previously paid in to the bank by anyone. It’s new money, created by the bank for the use of the borrower.” Robert B. Anderson, quoted in U.S. News & World Report, “How Much Will Your Dollar Buy – Interview with Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson,” August 31, 1959, pp. 68–69.

The purpose of income tax is to remove from circulation a substantial portion of the digits of credit “loaned” into circulation by banks by bookkeeping entry in the so-called loan process.
Unless a significant amount of the digits “loaned” into circulation by the banks are collected by the IRS in the form of FRNs from (1) payments of income tax, (2) seizure and sale of real and personal property, and (3) seizure of bank accounts and paychecks and thereafter gifted or bequeathed (31 U.S.C. 321(d)(1) and (2) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/321)) to a non-U.S. Government employee and proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve, i.e., the Secretary of the Treasury,[19] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn19) for transmittal to the private Federal Reserve as payments of interest on the national debt and thereupon retired from circulation, inflation skyrockets, prices go through the roof, and the fraudulent nature of the fractional-reserve banking system of the private Federal Reserve can be concealed no longer.[20] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://07050981-7B6F-47EB-8284-6B5589915048/#_ftn20)

Hence, the need to select and screen and vet and test and groom and own and control every single United States District Judge, Magistrate Judge, and Appeals Judge and Supreme Court Justice and United States Attorney and Assistant United States Attorney.

monty

31st March 2016, 11:00 PM

Only two kinds of taxes: direct or indirect

Article 1 § 8(1) of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;”

This division of taxation into two classes, i.e., (1) direct taxes, called taxes, and (2) indirect taxes, called duties, imposts and excises, is recognized throughout the Constitution, Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 24 S.Ct. 305, 48 L.Ed. 481.

“Taxes are classified as direct, which includes ‘those which are assessed upon the property, person, business, income, etc. of those who pay them ; and indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market price of the commodity.’ Cooley, Tax. 61. The latter includes duties, imposts and excises ; Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S. 557, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759 . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3220, s.v. “Tax.”

There is nothing wrong with direct taxes per se, so long as they are apportioned, i.e., divided and assigned in proportion, as provided in pertinent part of Article 1 § 2(3) of the Constitution; to wit:
“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . .”

Income tax, which is not apportioned, to any reasonable man is clearly a direct tax on supreme political authority in America, the American People (fn. 15), and therefore unconstitutional; yet today income tax is regarded by government as an excise, or indirect tax, without the need to be apportioned, and therefore constitutional.
The only way such absurdities can come to pass is by ownership and control of those making, declaring, and executing the law.

All the chaos arrived with the Federal Reserve Act.

Congress transmute Americans into corporately colored franchisees

The only Americans who allegedly are liable to income tax are called individuals (26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.1-1)).

The statutory term “individual” is defined at 5 U.S.C. 552a Records maintained on individuals (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a) as follows:
“(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—

“. . . (2) the term ‘individual’ means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;”

The phrase “citizen of the United States” means resident of the District of Columbia (seeMemorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-august-10-2015.pdf)).

The phrase “alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” means non-resident of the District of Columbia who appears to have made an election (choice) to be treated as a resident of the District of Columbia (Id. at 15–17, paragraphs 46–51 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-august-10-2015.pdf)).

The statutory so-called individual is an artificial person, a creature of the law in the nature of a corporation and, like a corporation, designated by a name written in ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS (style of writing a proper noun for which the rules of English grammar make no provision).[21] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://D1FEA5C8-97D2-475B-87CF-1E5ECE433E31/#_ftn21)

A corporation is a franchise; to wit:

“FRAN′CHISE, n. . . . A particular privilege or right granted by a prince or sovereign to an individual, or to a number of persons; as the right to be a body corporate with perpetual succession . . .” Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (S. Converse: New York, 1828), Vol. I, s.v. “Franchise.”
“FRANCHISE. . . . A franchise is privilege or immunity of a public nature, which cannot be exercised without legislative grant. To be a corporation is a franchise. The various powers conferred upon corporations are franchises.

“The word ‘franchise’ has various significations, both in a legal and popular sense. A corporation is itself a franchise belonging to the members of a corporation, and the corporation, itself a franchise, may hold other franchises. So, also, the different powers of a corporation, such as the right to hold and dispose of property, are its franchises. In a popular sense, the political rights of subjects and citizens are franchises, such as the right of suffrage, etc.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 515.
The right to receive Social Security retirement or survivor benefits and the right to vote for the president of the United States (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation) are political rights and franchises conferred by the sovereign authority in the District of Columbia, Congress, a.k.a. “Congress of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 3002(2), i.e., the Congress of a Federal corporation, id. at 3002(15), the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation.

Nature of so-called individual income tax

“The federal corporation tax act (August 5, 1909)provided that every corporation for profit . . . engaged in business in any state should be subject to pay annually a special excise tax with respect to carrying-on or doing business by such corporation . . . upon the entire net income . . . received by it from all sources. This act was held valid in Flint v. Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312 (followed in McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842), as being an impost or excise on the doing of business and not a direct tax.

“It was also there held that it complies with the provision for uniformity throughout the United States . . . and that the tax is properly measured by the entire income of the companies subject to it . . .

“. . . It [the corporation income tax] is an excise tax measured by the corporate income ; Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. —; imposed upon the doing of business and not upon the franchises or property of the corporation ; McCoach v R. Co., 228 U. S. 295, 33 Sup. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842. . . .” [Emphasis in original.] Bouvier’s, p. 3229.

The only kind of income tax that is not a direct tax but an indirect tax and excise on the income, from whatever source derived, of a franchisee, is what modernly is known as "income tax."

That the post-19th century Supreme Court has ruled that the personal income tax on American men and women is an excise is proof that Government treats of every American People as an ALL-CAPITAL LETTER franchise, i.e., an individual: artificial person and creature of the law in the nature of a corporation who, like all franchises, exists by privilege conferred by the state (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation).

All so-called State (District of Columbia) tax codes draw substantially (almost exclusively) from the Internal Revenue Code for their respective provisions and deal strictly with franchisees, i.e. individuals (citizens of the United States, 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(2) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a), i.e., residents of the District of Columbia, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 15, paragraphs 44–45 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-august-10-2015.pdf)) and corporations.

For example, the State of California Franchise Tax Board taxes only individuals and corporations who reside or are doing business in the District of Columbia.

The California Revenue and Taxation Code provides, in pertinent part, that California is neither a statutory State nor part of the statutory geographical United States but a foreign country thereto; to wit:
“17017. ‘United States,’ when used in a geographical sense, includes the states, the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.

"17018. 'State' includes the District of Columbia, and the possessions of the United States.
“17019. ‘Foreign country’ means any jurisdiction other than one embraced within the United States.”
For the meaning of the word “includes” in the above code citations, see Rule 6, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, of the rules of statutory construction, Memorandum of Law, August 10, 2015, p. 3, paragraph 6 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-august-10-2015.pdf).

The 16th Amendment provides for an excise tax on franchisees

The Sixteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of February 3, 1913, provides:
“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

The 16th Amendment provides that Congress shall have power to lay and collect an indirect tax, an excise, on incomes, from whatever source derived, of franchisees residing or doing business in one of the several statutory States of February 3, 1913: the District of Columbia, Porto Rico (changed to Puerto Rico in 1932) Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Midway Atoll, and the Panama Canal Zone and no other thing, id. (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-august-10-2015.pdf)at 8, paragraph 23 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/memorandum-of-law-august-10-2015.pdf).

M.O. of all Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys

Using the absurd and constitutionally opposite meaning of the definition of the novel statutory terms “State” and “United States” provided by Congress in the United States Code as complete justification: Every Federal bench officer and attorney of the United States Department of Justice follow the policy of “Never respond, confirm, or deny” when confronted with the actual-but-fraudulent definition and meaning of said statutory terms and, remaining silent, pretend by inference that such citations are nonsensical (“frivolous”) and that “State” and “United States” mean what essentially every non-insider believes they mean: the several commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, numbering 50 at present, the last of which being Hawaii, August 21, 1959.

Using their “secret clubhouse” knowledge of the actual statutory meaning of “State” and “United States,” they casually toss these terms around like any other American would, but silently weave a web of statutory deceit so incomprehensible to unwitting victims and so matter-of-fact to the perpetrator, to be able to justify, with confidence, that their prey will never be able to understand what is happening, much less convince anyone else of the injustice.

In the Lufkin Division Civil Action, Petitioner conceded everything except jurisdiction in Petitioner’s answer to the complaint at the outset of the proceedings; to wit:

“Defendant hereby confesses the truth of the facts recited in the instant Complaint and admits the apparent truth of Plaintiff’s allegations and right of action . . .” Defendant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s Amended Answer, Dkt. #10, p. 1.

From the beginning Petitioner has addressed only the issue of jurisdiction.

Every slur, allegation, and denigration of Petitioner by the Federal bench officers and DOJ attorneys is the Lufkin Division Civil Action is contrived and fabricated—but bystanders reading the words of these officers would not know this unless they were to do an exhaustive inspection of the record and realize that Petitioner never argues about anything or makes any claim—rather only recites the law, presents the facts, refers to the evidence, and demands proof of jurisdiction or constitutional authority—and that such snide remarks are falsehoods.

Institutionalized crime

Every writing filed by the DOJ attorneys or entered by the Lufkin Judge, Lufkin Magistrate, or District of Columbia Judge is devoid of mention of the following material facts and failures: (1) Petitioner’s demand for the Lufkin Court’s constitutional authority, (2) United States’ failure to produce such authority despite blackletter-law obligation to do so, (3) allegation of the Lufkin Court’s lack of constitutional authority in Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, or (4) United States’ failure to oppose said motion to dismiss.

The District of Columbia Judge, Beryl A. Howell, falsely declared that the Lufkin Judge “considered and rejected” the above material facts and material failures in his ruling against Petitioner—despite no evidence of either in the Lufkin Record; to wit:

“[T]he plaintiff’s [Petitioner John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s] Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1916 . . . . because the plaintiff’s present claim that the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Texas lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s real property was considered and rejected in the prior action between the parties, in which the defendant [United States] prevailed . . .” United States District Judge Beryl A. Howell’s Memorandum and Order of March 22, 2016, p. 3 (hyperlinked below).

People who lie as a way of life cannot be respected or trusted with anything; their word is like garbage.
Congress is the most despised class in America for good reason[22] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://D1FEA5C8-97D2-475B-87CF-1E5ECE433E31/#_ftn22)—and the Federal judiciary and United States Department of Justice, in connivance therewith, are populated almost exclusively by active or latent pathological liars and marauders.

The Houston and Lufkin Records prove it.
The nature of their job (debt collectors working to ensure the longevity of the fraudulent private Federal Reserve) requires it.

Statute law vs. commercial law

What is actually going on in the Lufkin Division Civil Action is not law per se but commerce.
It only appears to be a legal proceeding.

The Lufkin Court is a for-profit District of Columbia commercial debt-collection forum.
The real party of interest is the Department of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Treasury (non-U.S. Government employee, fn. 18) is the proxy / agent of the private Federal Reserve.

Commercial principles underlie everything that is happening in the Lufkin Division Civil Action.
Commerce and the common law afford more effective ways to deal with a Federal summons and complaint than the filing of an answer, but these remedies must be undertaken at the outset, without joining the action.

monty

31st March 2016, 11:08 PM

Petitioner sues Lufkin Judge in county court to quiet title

Counsel for the United States in the Lufkin Division Civil Action on March 14, 2016 (two and a half weeks prior to this post), filed United States’ Motion for Order of Sale and to Vacate Property (https://mega.nz/#!2oVyFLqC!cH_bnOBlJYmLVxpJWMKbQA-g1UChN3Bz5scYUAJAF2o), but the Lufkin Judge has yet to rule on it or even acknowledge that it has been filed.
Petitioner on March 28, 2016, sued the Lufkin Judge, Michael H. Schneider, in the District Court of Tyler County, Texas, to quiet the title to Petitioner’s real property in Tyler County, Texas, and on March 29, 2016, served Mr. Schneider with the summons and complaint therefor.

Mr. Schneider has till Monday (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://29) next following lapse of 20 days from date of service to answer the complaint (April 25, 2016 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://30)).

Documents from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and District Court of Tyler County, Texas, follow below.

District of Columbia Minute Order Denying Petitioner’s Request for a Temporary Restraining Order, March 17, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/district-of-columbia-minute-order-denying-petitioner_s-request-for-a-temporary-restraining-order-march-17-2016.pdf)

District of Columbia Memorandum Order Dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/district-of-columbia-memorandum-order-dismissing-petitioner_s-complaint.pdf)

Petitioner’s Complaint against Lufkin Judge to Quiet Title, March 28, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/petitioner_s-complaint-against-lufkin-judge-to-quiet-title-march-28-2016.pdf)

Return of Service of Process on Lufkin Judge, March 29, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/return-of-service-of-process-on-lufkin-judge-march-29-2016.pdf)

* * * *
[1] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref1) Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all that part of the territory of the United States included within the limits of the District of Columbia be, and the same is hereby, created into a government by the name of the “District of Columbia,” by which name it is hereby constituted a body-corporate for municipal purposes . . . “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871 [Go to “Turn to image” 419] (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=016/llsl016.db&recNum=2).

[2] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref2) Id.; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

[3] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref3) (15) “United States” means—
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States [a Federal corporation]; or

(C) an instrumentality of the United States [a Federal corporation]. 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Sec. 3002 Definitions (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002).

[4] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref4) (h) [Location of United States.]

The United States is located in the District of Columbia. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-307 Location of debtor (https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/9/9-307).

[5] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref5) “United States™ Census Bureau,” official logo of the Census Bureau, United States Department of Commerce, https://www.commerce.gov/us-census-bureau.

[6] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref6) “United States® Census 2010,” title of official hardcopy form used to collect 2010 census data; also logo of official online form, Form D-61 (1-15-2009): http://www.censusquestions.com/2010-us-census-form.pdf.

[7] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref7) The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

[8] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref8) First National Bank of Montgomery v. Jerome Daly, Township of Credit River, Minnesota, Martin V. Mahoney, Justice, Judgment and Decree, December 9, 1968: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/CreditRiver/1968-12-09judgmentanddecree.pdf (Minnesota State Law Library).

[9] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref9) Federal Reserve operatives have expended extraordinary effort to obliterate the effects of the Montgomery v. Daly case, but have failed to do so. For more details and a colorful account of the proceedings in the courtroom from a witness who was there that day, Minnesota Associate Justice of the Peace William Drexler, visit
http://www.constitutionalconcepts.org/creditriver.htm. (http://www.constitutionalconcepts.org/creditriver.htm)

[10] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref10) frivolous, adj. Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful <a frivolous claim>. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1891), p. 677.

[11] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref11) For a simple depiction of the legislative powers of Congress and the jurisdiction of the remainder of government, see this one-page tabular display: Extent of Federal and State Legislative Power and Federal and State Jurisdiction (https://mega.nz/#!uodwAbqI!QuEyvykU342TZYxAwHqghjPqY-_ZFtSmEYn3zuKsl1w).

[12] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref12) Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization: Staunton, Va., 1992), p. 102.

[13] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref13) Id. at 128.

[14] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref14) “According to Chernow [infra], Paul Warburg was the only person in America who understood how a central bank works. In 1912 and 1913, he drew up the basic plan for the Federal Reserve banking system, and he drafted the Federal Reserve Act. In December 1913 President Wilson signed the Act establishing the new central bank. If anyone can be called the father of the Federal Reserve Bank, the New York Times has rightly noted, it is Paul Warburg.” John Weir, Institute for Historical Review, “Powerful Jewish Family Profiled,” Review of Ron Chernow, The Warburgs: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of a Remarkable Jewish Family (Random House: New York, 1993), http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v15/v15n5p33_Weir.html.

[15] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref15) The private Bank of England (joint-stock company), prior to arrival of the private Federal Reserve indisputably the most powerful political force ever known, is nationalized March 1, 1946, shortly after a conference attended by representatives of 44 different governments in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, and the founding of the so-called International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later to be called the World Bank, both of which private banks became operational in the District of Columbia in 1958.

The change in character of the Bank of England in 1946 has no practical effect on the personal fortune and political power amassed by the principals thereof up to this time—who are the same principals of the private Federal Reserve.

An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own or control 96% of all media worldwide) reveals Rothschild control of the American economy via controlling interest in each of the private Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the remaining 11 regional private Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the private Federal Reserve’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and, by virtue of private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy; to wit:

“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).

“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.” AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A.

[16] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref16) Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but, in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. . . . Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
[T]here is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld. . . . Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884).

[17] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref17) Constitution, Articles 1 § 8(17) and 4 § 3(2).

[18] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref18) Federal Reserve Notes are not negotiable as they do not contain a promise-to-pay nor may title thereto be transferred by delivery or indorsement, essential properties of a negotiable instrument.

[19] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref19) The Secretary of the Treasury is the Governor of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (f.k.a. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), both of which are domiciled in the District of Columbia.

“No person shall be entitled to receive any salary or other compensation from the United States for services as a Governor, executive director, councilor, alternate, or associate [of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank]. 22 U.S.C. 286a(d)(1) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/286a)(Bretton Woods Agreements Act, P.L. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660, October 19, 1976; amended December 18, 2015) (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/amended-december-18-2015.pdf)).

“The second part of the amendments prohibits the . . . [Secretary of the Treasury] from receiving salary or other compensation from the U.S. Government. . . . The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury receives no compensation for representing the United States.” Senate Report No. 94-1148 of Oct. 1, 1976, re amendment of Bretton Woods Agreements Act, supra, re Sec. 2 of House Report 13955 [p. 8], p. 5942.

[20] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref20) There is no difference in the nature of the lending policy (fractional-reserve banking) of the private Federal Reserve and that of the Central Bank of Zimbabwe, only the degree to which it is practiced.

When the rate of inflation passed the quadrillions of percent in Zimbabwe in 2008 the government ceased tracking it (it ended up hitting 89.7 sextillion percent, 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000%, in November of that year).

For absolutely mind-blowing photos that show what can happen in a fractional-reserve banking system when the tax agency does not extort from the populace and retire from circulation a sufficient amount of digits in income tax to keep up with the rate of lending: http://www.financialjesus.com/financial-crisis/inflation-in-zimbabwe-pictures-2/.

“In February 2009 Zimbabwe was the only country in the world without debt. Nobody owed anyone anything. Following the abandonment of the Zimbabwe Dollar as the local currency all local debt was wiped out and the country started with a clean slate.” Alf Field, “Zimbabwe: A Fresh Start,” November 11, 2009, http://www.321gold.com/editorials/field/field111109.html.

[21] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref21) Generally the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS individual initially is created by the United States Social Security Administration upon assignment of a Social Security Account Number, but not all Americans have such a number. Any application for anything from a bank, corporation, or government agency, if granted, will be issued in the ALL-CAPITAL LETTERS NAME of the statutory individual, the corporately colored version of the full true name of the particular boy / girl / man / woman written in proper English.

[22] (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-msg-load://420240CE-8C68-4A47-BBE1-C3DABFBBDC6C/#_ftnref22) "Survey finds only Congress is thought of more poorly than financial institutions.
"In the annals of image problems, the banking industry ranks right up there — or rather down there — with Congress, with a high-profile survey ranking Bank of America Corp. at the bottom of the heap.

"Five years after the financial crisis, the Reputation Institute survey said that banking has a worse reputation than BigPharma, the media, oil companies and telecommunications firms — just slightly above Congress. . . ." Los Angeles Times, “Banks have worst industry image,” August 29, 2013, B3."

supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/) | April 1, 2016 at 00:08 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://61) | Categories: Uncategorized (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/) | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-iz

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monty

31st March 2016, 11:41 PM

http://s19.postimg.org/o9i1dgqqr/image.jpg
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-E5w6nQso5pM/T9TJ7nqzCLI/AAAAAAAABG8/q3O4AMzp4TM/s1600/BoundaryStones.jpg

Ellicott's team, minus Banneker, who left after the placement of the south stone, then began the formal survey by clearing twenty feet of land on both sides of each boundary line and placing other stones, made of Aquia Creek sandstone, at one-mile intervals. On each stone, the side facing the District of Columbia displayed the inscription "Jurisdiction of the United States" and a mile number. The opposite side said either "Virginia" or "Maryland," as appropriate. The third and fourth sides displayed the year in which the stone was placed (1791 for the 14 Virginia stones and 1792 for the 26 Maryland stones) and the magnetic compass variance at that place. Stones along the northwest Maryland boundary also displayed the number of miles they fell from NW4, the first stone placed in Maryland. Stones placed at intervals of more than a mile included that extra distance measured in poles.

http://www.boundarystones.org

Ares

1st April 2016, 07:06 AM

Will be interesting to see how that judge responds to being sued to quiet title. :)

palani

1st April 2016, 07:30 AM

Will be interesting to see how that judge responds to being sued to quiet title. :)

You can lead a judge to law but you can't make him void his own retirement plan.

Ares

1st April 2016, 07:33 AM

You can lead a judge to law but you can't make him void his own retirement plan.

You can't void it, but you can take a good portion of it away from him. :)

palani

1st April 2016, 08:27 AM

You can't void it, but you can take a good portion of it away from him. :)

Every payment you make into the court system builds his retirement plan.

Equity and law were merged in the 1950s, about the same time that code pleading went away and was replaced with notice pleading.

Now law is masculine while equity is female. All judicial actors must be bipolar as a result since (as a rule) the part of the universe occupied by the masculine can never be viewed by the feminine and vice versa.

One female judge was adamant about spectators not being covered (with a hat) and would instruct them to remove that instrument of disrespect. A defendant noticed that one spectator was not being asked to remove his hat and pointed that fact out. Her response "that is my husband".

monty

1st April 2016, 10:04 AM

http://s19.postimg.org/bagottmxv/image.jpg
You can lead a judge to law but you can't make him void his own retirement plan.

monty

10th April 2016, 07:05 PM

monty

14th September 2016, 08:18 PM

Update from Dr. Trowbridge . . . .

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Petitioner sues six Federal judges and 41 others to recover home stolen two years ago under color of authority (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2016/09/14/petitioner-sues-six-federal-judges-and-41-others-to-recover-home-stolen-two-years-ago-under-color-of-authority/)

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The subject of this post is a comprehensive suit at equity (see post of March 18, 2016, infra, for the principles of equity) for a constructive trust based on constructive fraud, filed with the 284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, August 11, 2016, and amended August 16, 2016.
The root word of “constructive” is construe (not construct):

“con׳strue . . . to determine the meaning of ; interpret ; explain, as to construe a foreign language (into English) ; to construe one’s conduct ; to construe a clause or a law.” A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (Funk & Wagnalls Company: New York, 1903) (hereinafter “Funk & Wagnalls”), p. 404.

“constructive, adj. Legally imputed; having an effect in law though not necessarily in fact. ● Courts usu. give something a constructive effect for equitable reasons <the court held that the shift supervisor had constructive knowledge of the machine’s failure even though he did not actually know until two days later>.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (West Group: St. Paul Minn., 1999), p. 309.

A constructive trust is not an actual trust per se but an equitable remedy imposed by the court to redress wrongs and prevent unjust enrichment resulting from, among other things, constructive fraud; to wit:
“constructive trust . . . a trust set up by a court to deal with property that has been acquired by fraud or by inequitable means; specifically : a trust so formed to distribute property where distribution and enjoyment under the original transaction was against the principles of equity.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated: Springfield, Mass., 2000), s.v. “Constructive trust.”

“Constructive fraud occurs when there is a breach of a legal or equitable duty that, irrespective of guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public interests . . . . An example of constructive, as opposed to actual, fraud involves the failure to disclose facts when there is a duty to make a disclosure. . . .” William V. Dorsaneo III, Texas Litigation Guide, Vol. 4, Ch. 55 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.: New York, 2016) (“Dorsaneo”), p. 55-5.

“The most important and common type of constructive fraud supporting the imposition of constructive trusts involves the breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship . . . . When an abuse of a confidential or fiduciary relationship is alleged, the burden of proof is on the fiduciary to establish the fairness of the transaction, that there was full disclosure of all facts and circumstances, and that there was good faith and the absence of pressure or influence on the part of the fiduciary . . . .” Id. at 55-8.

“Fiduciary relationships are those that, as a matter of law, are relationships of trust and confidence. . . .” Id. at 55-9.

Every judge is a fiduciary toward the public, of which Petitioner is a part; to wit:
“ ‘Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit -- and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.1985) -- includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. . . .’ ” McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 371–372 (1987), quoting Judge Posner in United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (1987).

United States District Judge Lynn Nettleton Hughes of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division had an equitable duty to disclose certain material facts and information to Petitioner, but failed to do so, even when expressly requested of him.
Further, Defendant Hughes failed to discharge / perform a certain legal duty imposed by law (this same legal duty applies in every Federal civil case in every Federal court throughout the Union), which resulted in Petitioner’s loss of, among other things, beneficial use of Petitioner’s real property (Petitioner’s home) for the last 27 months and permanent loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars in personal property (in law, called “personalty”).

“A constructive trust may be imposed on anyone who knowingly participates in another’s breach of a fiduciary duty or knowingly benefits from the breach. The remedy ‘reaches all those who are actually concerned in the fraud, all who directly and knowingly participate in its fruits, and all those who derive title from them voluntarily or with notice.’ ” Dorsaneo, p. 55-14.

There are 46 other Defendants who knowingly participated in Defendant Hughes’ breach of fiduciary duty, one of whom is JPMRRE, LLC, who acquired title to Petitioner’s home in Porter, Texas (the “Porter Property”)—not at a public auction as ordered by Defendant Hughes in his May 23, 2014, Order of Sale and Vacature, but privately and secretly and at less than 75 percent of its fair market value on date of sale, August 25, 2014.

Defendant JPMRRE, LLC is not entitled to retain the Porter Property; to wit:
“A third party who obtains property as a result of the defendant’s [Defendant Hughes’]fraud or other wrongdoing is not entitled to retain that property . . . . The key is whether the recipient is unjustly enriched. A bona fide purchaser for full value would not be unjustly enriched by being allowed to retain the property; instead, the constructive trust is imposed on the proceeds of the sale in the hands of the wrongdoer . . . . In contrast, those who benefit from another’s
wrongdoing and do not pay full value for the property may be forced to accept a constructive trust on the property they have received. . . .” Dorsaneo, p. 55-21.

Normal Federal solution: Remove case to Federal court

What normally happens in cases like this when someone sues the Federal government or a Federal officer in a state court, is that an officer of the United States Department of Justice simply gives notice to the state court that he is removing the case to a Federal court under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 or 1442 and thereafter opens a new case in the closest United States District Court.

Any application to remove this Texas case to a Federal court is unauthorized, fraudulent, and willful—because the only species of court to which the aforementioned statutes authorize removal—a limited-jurisdiction District Court of the United States—no longer exists, rendering lawful removal impossible.

Typically, Federal actors just bulldoze over anyone and everyone in their path to achieve their objective; in this instance, removal of the Texas case to a Federal court.

The commercial liability that accrues to each defendant personally / organizationally for unlawful removal of this case, however, is far more extreme than the few millions of dollars in damages owed as a consequence of Defendant Hughes’ constructive fraud and theft of Petitioner’s home under color of authority and the 46 other defendants’ participation therein.

The penalty for such removal is spelled out in Petitioner’s “Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace,” which appears at the top of Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition(hyperlinked below).
Petitioner on (a) August 11, 2016, filed the original petition; (b) August 15, 2016, a “Notice of Lis Pendens” (lis means controversy or dispute or suit at law or equity; pendensmeans pending) against Petitioner’s stolen home; and (c) August 16, 2016, an amended original petition.

The amended original petition was served on Defendants either by personal delivery or USPS Certified Mail, return receipt requested, beginning August 25, 2016.

In the process of conspiring criminally and committing theft of Petitioner’s home under color of authority, Defendants committed collectively between 10,000 and 15,000 felonies—each of which has a substantial monetary value and for which every Defendant, beginning as of his respective initial date of participation in the purported case employed to defraud Petitioner of his home, would be personally liable to Petitioner should any Defendant purport to remove said Montgomery County, Texas, case to a purported United States District Court without statutory or constitutional authority.

A description of the two files hyperlinked below:

“Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition, August 16, 2016 (18.6 MB)” (a) dissolves any confusion the reader may have developed over his life as to the exact nature of what he mistakenly believes is the United States, Department of the Treasury, Secretary of the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Internal Revenue Service, United States Department of Justice, Office of the Clerk of Court (of any Federal court), United States District Courts, United States Marshals Service, United States Courts of Appeals, United States Treasury, and Federal Reserve—intentionally manufactured by Congress (and actors within the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation and these organizations) over the last 152 years, in order to defraud Americans of their birthright and deprive them of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, (b) documents the constructive fraud of the trial-court judge, Defendant Lynn Nettleton Hughes, and connivance with Defendant Hughes on the part of the five circuit judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, (c) demonstrates that (i) no Defendant individual is bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, (ii) every United States District Court is a municipal court of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation; and (iii) other than Defendant United States of America, no Defendant organization is part of the organic general government of the de jure Republic of March 4, 1789, (d) itemizes the dollar-value of the constructive fraud and various types of damages resulting therefrom, and (e) demands judgment decreeing, among other things, a constructive trust on the Porter Property, with Defendant JPMRRE, LLC as constructive trustee for the benefit of Petitioner, and ordering Defendant JPMRRE, LLC to convey to Petitioner within 20 days free and clear of all encumbrances the entire interest held by Defendant JPMRRE, LLC in the Porter Property;

The “Notice of Lis Pendens, August 15, 2016,” filed four days after the original petition, one day before the amended original petition, in the Official Public Records of Montgomery County, Texas, against the Porter Property warns potential buyers that the title thereto presently held in the name of Defendant JPMRRE, LLC is in litigation and that, should someone purchase Defendant JPMRRE, LLC’s claim to the Porter Property, he is in danger of being bound by an adverse judgment.

Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition, August 16, 2016 (18.6 MB) * (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/plaintiffs-amended-original-petition-august-16-2016-18-6-mb.pdf)
Notice of Lis Pendens, August 15, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/notice-of-lis-pendens-august-15-2016.pdf)

* Note: This document has numerous references to the United States Statutes at Large. In this context, the phrase “at large” means “Not included within particular limitations; in general; for all; as, a Congressman at large” (Funk & Wagnalls, p. 1003, s.v. “Large”). For example, 104 Stat. 4935 means the 104th volume of the Statutes at Large, page 4935. Using the following link the reader can verify for himself the accuracy of any reference herein to the Statutes at Large: http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=4935# (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419). When the page comes up, simply insert the number of the desired volume and page in the appropriate box and click “Get Document” and that particular page of that particular volume of the Statutes at Large will appear. From there the reader can click to go to the next sequential page or prior page or insert new numbers and go to an entirely different volume or page.

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monty

14th September 2016, 10:38 PM

138 pages,

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/plaintiffs-amended-original-petition-august-16-2016-18-6-mb.pdf

Ares

15th September 2016, 07:32 PM

You beat me to it Monty. I keep an eye on his page and noticed there was an update. Good job keeping this thread going!!

monty

18th September 2016, 01:55 PM

Dr. Trowbridge has two pending cases againts judges and other government employees. Both were filed in the Texas state court system. The defendants, all federal employees, going against Trowbridge's warning have removed the cases to the federal US District Courts.

https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/11625813/Trowbridge,_Jr_v_Giblin

http://www.open-public-records.com/court/texas-19054099.htm

I questioned Dr. about the lack of action in the Giblin case and about the consequenses of the defendants ignoring his warnings in the Lew case.

The Dr.'s response:

Thanks for your kind observations — be not dismayed, you will see the story unfold in coming weeks — the Giblin
case has some special dimensions, which you will also see —
They do not yet sense that the end is near — something to celebrate not be disappointed about.
Stay the course!!!
Keep the faith!!!
Share with others the website!!!
JPT

monty

18th September 2016, 02:01 PM

Any application to remove this Texas case to a Federal court is unauthorized, fraudulent, and willful—because the only species of court to which the aforementioned statutes authorize removal—a limited-jurisdiction District Court of the United States—no longer exists, rendering lawful removal impossible.Typically, Federal actors just bulldoze over anyone and everyone in their path to achieve their objective; in this instance, removal of the Texas case to a Federal court.
The commercial liability that accrues to each defendant personally / organizationally for unlawful removal of this case, however, is far more extreme than the few millions of dollars in damages owed as a consequence of Defendant Hughes’ constructive fraud and theft of Petitioner’s home under color of authority and the 46 other defendants’ participation therein.
The penalty for such removal is spelled out in Petitioner’s “Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace,” which appears at the top of Plaintiff’s Amended Original Petition(hyperlinked below).

Plaintiff's Amended Original Petition. https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/plaintiffs-amended-original-petition-august-16-2016-18-6-mb.pdf

monty

18th September 2016, 02:09 PM

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monty

5th October 2016, 09:04 PM

There was a quite a bit of paper filed in Trowbridge, Jr v. Lew, et al today

http://www.open-public-records.com/court/texas-19054099.htm

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Response in Opposition to Motion]

Date Published:
October 05, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Response]

Date Published:
October 05, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Remand]

Date Published:
October 05, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Objections]

Date Published:
October 05, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Expedite]

Date Published:
September 28, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Affidavit]

Date Published:
September 28, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Other Notice]

Date Published:
September 27, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Dismiss]

Date Published:
September 21, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Notice of Appearance]

Date Published:
September 19, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Certificate of Interested Parties]

Date Published:
September 12, 2016

Court Name:
U.S. Civil Court Records for the Southern District of Texas

Case Number:
4:16-cv-02747

Party Name:
Trowbridge, Jr. v. Lew et al

Filing Type:
Civil [Notice of Removal]

Date Published:
September 12, 2016

crimethink

5th October 2016, 09:13 PM

"Federal jurisdiction" is very simple to understand:

army.mil + usmarshals.gov = government force over you

These idiotic paper filings would be amusing if not for being so pathetically sad.

monty

5th October 2016, 09:23 PM

"Federal jurisdiction" is very simple to understand:

army.mil + usmarshals.gov = government force over you

These idiotic paper filings would be amusing if not for being so pathetically sad.

We see more and more of it as time goes by. They jailed 77 year old Joe Robertson in Montana for building a reservoir on his private land with all,the necessary state permits. Supposedly some of the soil he excavated from the pond poluted the creek which eventually connects to the Platte River, the Missouri, and ultimately the Mississippi. The EPA CHARGED him with violating the clean water act.

In Trowbridge's case,he has had them stalemated for the last 2 years. They haven't figured out how to handle him yet. If they let him win it will unravel 150 years of federal convictions.

crimethink

5th October 2016, 09:26 PM

In Trowbridge's case,he has had them stalemated for the last 2 years. They haven't figured out how to handle him yet. If they let him win it will unravel 150 years of federal convictions.

The reason they haven't stomped on him yet is two-fold: 1) he isn't a real threat...yet; 2) the filing fees he has to pay as tribute are hefty. It's a good cash flow:

http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/page/FeeSchedule

monty

5th October 2016, 09:29 PM

The reason they haven't stomped on him yet is two-fold: 1) he isn't a real threat...yet; 2) the filing fees he has to pay as tribute are hefty.

Yes, he has had cases all the way to the Supreme Court and back, currently there are 4 on the docket in the Texas District. I imagine he has put a small fortune in their coffers.

crimethink

5th October 2016, 09:41 PM

Yes, he has had cases all the way to the Supreme Court and back, currently there are 4 on the docket in the Texas District. I imagine he has put a small fortune in their coffers.

The shyster in the black dress almost never sees these documents. A clerk stamps them, and they're put in a folder. A small percentage of the time the clerk will follow a "standing order" and issue some sort of "response," usually a form with check boxes.

The clerks probably a get good laugh from it all, paying good money while accomplishing absolutely nothing.

palani

6th October 2016, 07:10 AM

paying good money while accomplishing absolutely nothing.
Money is a fiction. When you pay 'the court' in fiction you should expect repayment in kind.

monty

10th October 2016, 08:19 AM

I think this fits this tread because Dr. Trowbridge is fighting the. same corruption in the courts as the Bundys et al.

Did the Congress create the legislative United States District Courts to bypass the constitutional separation of powers?

Was Congress reason for doing this, in their ever growing lust for more power over the states and people, to prosecute UNITED STATES CITIZENS for various federal crimes, income tax violations, gun law violations or in the Malheur Protest prosecute American cowboys for educating people about the constitution under the guise of "impeding federal officers?

I posted the following on Outpost to Freedom blog and the RangeFire hoping some legal types will weigh in with their assessments.

Besides the fact that Oregon did not cede jurisdiction there is another question.
Does the constitution grant the US District Court authority giving it the capacity to take jurisdiction in Harney County Oregon? Are thes administrative courts part of the DOJ in the executive branch?

USC Title 28 Chapter 5 (United States District Courts) Section 85 (Jurisdiction) lists the jurisdiction of the courts. Each listing is CIVIL.

Did the Congress effectively bypass the separation powers when it created these United States District Courts with the exception of the court in Hawaii and the District of Columbia? (USC Title 28 Chapter 5)?

Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Those limits are defined in Article III and do not include criminal and civil trials.

The Article IV district courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Nowhere in the constitution are they given authority to take jurisdiction in Oregon and Nevada.

I suspect the Congress created these courts specifically to bypass the separation of powers. Not being under the judicial branch, they fall under the DOJ in the administrative branch. That explains why no one gets a fair trial and the constitution cannot be discussed or ruled upon.

Further investigation will show their jurisdiction only extends to the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory and the insular possessions.

All “United States District Courts” are territorial and/or “legislative courts” that may only operate as administrative rather than Constitutional or Common Law courts. Nearly all of the courts in our federal system are “United States District Courts”. In fact, the only Constitutional or common law district courts in the country United States exist in Hawaii and the District of Columbia. This is confirmed by looking at the Notes under 28 U.S.C. §88, which says for the District of Columbia:
“It is consonant with the ruling of the Supreme Court in O’Donoghue v. United States, 1933, 53 S.Ct. 740, 289 U.S. 516, 77 L.Ed. 1356, that the (then called) Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia are constitutional courts of the United States, ordained and established under article III of the Constitution, Congress enacted that the Court of Appeals ”shall hereafter be known as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia”

The Notes section under 28 U.S.C. §91for Hawaii say the following:
“Section 9(a) of Pub. L. 86-3 provided that: ”The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii established by and existing under title 28 of the United States Code shall thence forth be a court of the United States with judicial power derived from article III, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States”
All district courts other than Hawaii and the District of Columbia are, by implication administrative courts, which means that they are territorial courts which may not rule on constitutional rights. Even courts that are Art. III can only exercise that power when the judges are also Article III judges, which few judges are. There is a great deal of confusion over this issue within the legal profession and few lawyers fully understand the implications of this distinction in our experience.

All of the territorial “United States District Courts” are listed in Title 28, Part I, Chapter 5. The notes at the beginning of this chapter indicate the following:
28 U.S. Code § 88 – District of Columbia
Current through Pub. L. 114-38. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)
US Code
Notes
Historical and Revision Notes
This section expressly makes the District of Columbia a judicial district of the United States.
Section 41 of this title also makes the District of Columbia a judicial circuit of the United States.
Section 11–305 of the District of Columbia Code, 1940 ed., provides that the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia shall possess the same powers and exercise the same jurisdiction as the district courts of the United States, and shall be deemed a court of the United States.

It is consonant with the ruling of the Supreme Court in O’Donoghue v. United States, 1933, 53 S.Ct. 740, 289 U.S. 516, 77 L.Ed. 1356, that the (then called) Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia are constitutional courts of the United States, ordained and established under article III of the Constitution, Congress enacted that the Court of Appeals “shall hereafter be known as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia” (Act of June 7, 1934, 48 Stat. 926); and also changed the name of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to “district court of the United States for the District of Columbia” (Act of June 25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1921). In Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 1927, 47 S.Ct. 557, 274 U.S. 145, 71 L.Ed. 972, the Supreme Court ruled:
“* * * The parallelism between the Supreme Court of the District [of Columbia] and the Court of Appeals of the District [of Columbia], on the one hand, and the district courts of the United States and the circuit courts of appeals, on the other, in the consideration and disposition of cases involving what among the States would be regarded as within Federal jurisdiction, is complete.” See also to the same effect Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Company v. United States, 1932, 52 S.Ct. 440, 285 U.S. 382, 76 L.Ed. 808.

28 U.S. Code § 91 – Hawaii
Current through Pub. L. 114-38. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)
US Code
Notes
Historical and Revision Notes
Court of the United States; District Judges
Pub. L. 86–3, § 9(a), Mar. 18, 1959, 73 Stat. 8, provided that:
“The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii established by and existing under title 28 of the United States Code shall thence forth be a court of the United States with judicial power derived from article III, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States: Provided, however, That the terms of office of the district judges for the district of Hawaii then in office shall terminate upon the effective date of this section and the President, pursuant to sections 133 and 134 of title 28, United States Code, as amended by this Act, shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, two district judges for the said district who shall hold office during good behavior.”
Section 9 of Pub. L. 86–3 provided in part that subsec. (a) of that section should be effective upon the admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union.

28 U.S. Code § 108 – Nevada
Current through Pub. L. 114-38. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)
US Code
Notes
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 174 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 94, 36 Stat. 1118; June 24, 1930, ch. 595, 46 Stat. 806; Nov. 15, 1945, ch. 482, 59 Stat. 582).
Changes in arrangement and phraseology were made.
Amendments
1990—Pub. L. 101–650 substituted “, Reno, Ely, and Lovelock” for “and Reno”.

28 U.S. Code § 117 – Oregon
Current through Pub. L. 114-38. (See Public Laws for the current Congress.)
US Code
Notes
Historical and Revision Notes
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 183 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 102, 36 Stat. 1122; Nov. 6, 1945, ch. 447, 59 Stat. 555).
Provisions relating to appointment and residence of deputies by the clerk and marshal, and maintenance of offices by said officers, were omitted as covered by sections 541 [see 561], 542 [see 561], and 751 of this title.
Changes in arrangement and phraseology were made.
Amendments
2000—Pub. L. 106–518 substituted “Eugene or Springfield” for “Eugene”.
1970—Pub. L. 91–272 provided for holding court at Coquille.
1950—Act Aug. 3, 1950, provided for holding court at Eugene.

Ares

10th October 2016, 08:45 AM

Bigjon

10th October 2016, 08:47 AM

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https://youtu.be/gILR8XKKkac

https://youtu.be/gILR8XKKkac

9. Grand Jury & Trial Jury Powers
https://youtu.be/bAFamSiagwU

https://youtu.be/bAFamSiagwU

10. Investments In The Future
https://youtu.be/DoZ01yH1OGs

https://youtu.be/DoZ01yH1OGs

11. Grand Jury & Jury Nullification
https://youtu.be/PB5adDmAKYo

https://youtu.be/PB5adDmAKYo

12. 16th Amendment - The Law That Never Was
https://youtu.be/grjmnkj7LT4

https://youtu.be/grjmnkj7LT4

7th trump

10th October 2016, 08:54 AM

Reading further into our nations history that is EXACTLY what Congress did. Article III and Article IV courts no longer exists. Any courts that exists now are strictly Administrative courts.

I believe that's why Marc Stevens has had some success in challenging jurisdiction in traffic and tax courts. The courts cannot prove it has jurisdiction because it does not have it as they are not Article III / IV courts.

But "US citizens", that's you Ares, being subjects to Congress's jurisdiction do not fall with the realm of "The People". So naturally they will fall in government administrative courts.
The government hasn't done anything wrong.....its you not understanding where you stand with the government.

And you have done this all yourself...to yourself!

Ares

10th October 2016, 08:57 AM

But "US citizens", that's you Ares, being subjects to Congress's jurisdiction do not fall with the realm of "The People". So naturally they will fall in government administrative courts.
The government hasn't done anything wrong.....its you not understanding where you stand with the government.

And you have done this all yourself...to yourself!

It was the government through acts of congress that removed the Article III and Article IV courts. You consider yourself of "We The People" but do yourself have access to an Article III court for redress of grievances?

monty

10th October 2016, 08:57 AM

Reading further into our nations history that is EXACTLY what Congress did. Article III and Article IV courts no longer exists. Any courts that exists now are strictly Administrative courts.

I believe that's why Marc Stevens has had some success in challenging jurisdiction in traffic and tax courts. The courts cannot prove it has jurisdiction because it does not have it as they are not Article III / IV courts.

Following these federal cases and looking at some of their statutes has lead me to conclude these courts have to be under the executive branch because the were not created under the Article III judicial section of the constitution. I believe that in itself would strenghten the argument their jurisdiction would be limited to the federal enclaves, District of Columbia etc., and the administrative bureaucracies and agencies of the United States. About the same time Congress created these courts they passed the adminstrative procedures act abdicating their authority to these federal agencies.

monty

16th January 2017, 04:15 PM

Dr. Trowbridge has added a long awaited update to his continuing battle

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com

Fatal defect in every federal case since March 1, 1991; all such decisions and judgments void

JANUARY 16, 2017 (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/01/16/fatal-defect-in-every-federal-case-since-march-1-1991-all-such-decisions-and-judgments-void/)SUPREMECOURTCASE (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)

As shown herein below with conclusive evidence, the above headline is not an exaggeration but an accurate assessment of the situation.

“The judicial Power of the United States”
That certain constitution ordained and established September 17, 1787, and implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the “Constitution”), at Art. III, § 1 provides, in pertinent part, that “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” and at § 2, cl. 1 thereof the limited types of cases and controversies to which the judicial power shall extend.

The Constitution at Art. VI, cl. 3 provides in pertinent part for the prevention of arbitrary exercise or abuse of “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., by way of requirement that all justices and judges of the United States be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution; to wit:
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; . . .”

Justices and Judges’ Oath of Office
In respect of the above requirement of Art. VI, cl. 3 of the Constitution, Congress on September 24, 1789, in “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,” 1 Stat. 73 (the “Judiciary Act”), at 76 supply the oath or affirmation (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=1&page=76#) needed for federal justices and judges to be authorized to exercise the judicial power of the United States; to wit:
“Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

Congress 159 years later on June 25, 1948, at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, 62 Stat. 907 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=62&page=907#), amend the language of the preamble to the oath provided in Section 8 of the Judiciary Act and, cosmetically, the text of said oath; to wit:
“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office : ‘I, _____ _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as _____ according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

For the next 42+ years justices and judges of the United States who take the 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907, oath are “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution,” Judiciary Act at 76 (just like all other federal jurists who came before them), and therefore authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, and discharge and perform the duties of their respective offices.

Congress Alter Materially the Oath of Justices and Judges
Congress on December 1, 1990, however, in Public Law 101–650, at section 404 thereof, 104 Stat. 5124 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=5124#)—effective 90 days later, March 1, 1991 (104 Stat. 5124 at § 407)—alter materially by way of amendment, the oath at 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907, so as to relieve all justices and judges of the United States of any duty of fidelity to the Constitution; to wit:
“Sec. 404. Amendment to Oath of Justices and Judges.
“Section 453 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking out ‘according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to’ and inserting ‘under’”. Pub. L. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5124, December 1, 1990.

Upon amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, 104 Stat. 5124 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=5124#), provides:
“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’

“(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 907; Pub. L. 101–650, title IV, § 404, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5124.)”
Because there is no provision of the Constitution that requires a justice or judge of the United States to discharge or perform any duties, there are no duties under the Constitution incumbent upon any such justice or judge to discharge or perform; meaning: Mention of the Constitution in the 1990 amended oath, 28 U.S.C. § 453, 104 Stat. 5124, supra, is superfluous and may be omitted from said oath without changing its meaning.

To prevent the fracturing of the federal judicial system were one set of justices and judges to discharge and perform their respective duties agreeably to the Constitution and the other not: Between December 1, 1990, and February 28, 1991, all sitting and newly commissioned justices and judges of the United States take the new oath of office, 104 Stat. 5124, leaving, on March 1, 1991, no justice or judge of the United States bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution—only the laws of the United States, i.e., the statutes of Congress.

“The emperor has no clothes”
The 1990 oath, 104 Stat. 5124 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=5124#), severs the connection between the federal judiciary and the Constitution; meaning: As of March 1, 1991, officers of the federal judiciary have no obligation to discharge or perform the duties of their respective offices “agreeably to the Constitution” (62 Stat. 907), and the former judicial-branch officersare now legislative-branch officers under the exclusive control of Congress.

“Plus peccat auctor quam actor. The instigator of a crime is worse than he who perpetrates it” (John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 2153)—and the instigators of the takeover of the federal courts of limited jurisdiction by municipal judges masquerading as Article III judges and usurping exercise of general jurisdiction throughout the Union, are the Members of Congress.

The jurisdiction of federal courts of limited jurisdiction and the original (de jure) Department of Justice, 16 Stat. 162 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=162#), is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress; to wit:
“Those who framed the constitution [sic], intended to establish a government complete for its own purposes, supreme within its sphere, and capable of acting by its own proper powers. They intended it to consist of three co-ordinate branches, legislative, executive, and judicial. In the construction of such a government, it is an obvious maxim, ‘that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the Legislature.’ [Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. Rep. 414] The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive with the legislative power. . . . [The Federalist, No. 80; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. Rep. 384]” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824).

Because Congress enjoy only limited legislative power (subject-matter legislative power only) throughout the Union, the federal courts and Department of Justice are authorized to exercise only limited jurisdiction (subject-matter jurisdiction only) throughout the Union; to wit:
“As we have repeatedly said: ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . .’” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 611 U. S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted)).

The above is why Petitioner is so persistent: Justices and judges ensconced in federal courts of limited jurisdiction are usurping exercise of territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) and entering judgment against, directing the disposition of, and committing theft under color of authority of, Petitioner’s property in Montgomery and Tyler County, Texas—geographic area in which Texas possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over property located there; to wit:
“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

Notwithstanding that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Rasul, supra, they are populated by municipal judges of the so-called “United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002), “a Federal corporation,” id (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002)., by the name of District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, who are usurping exercise of general jurisdiction in Montgomery and Tyler County, Texas, and elsewhere throughout the Union.

Justices and judges of the United States have used their position of trust to betray their creators, the American People, by overriding their will as declared at Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, that all judicial officers of the United States shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, and thereby legislating the Constitution out of the legal process; to wit:
“The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared.” Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).

Bearing of the 1990 Oath on Every Federal Case since March 1, 1991
Whereas, as of March 1, 1991, no federal justice or judge is bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution: As of that date, every justice and judge of the United States is barred by Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution from exercising “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, or entering a decision or judgment in any federal court case.

There being no constitutional authority for any Supreme Court decision or civil or criminal judgment in any federal court: Every such decision or judgment since March 1, 1991, is void.

Due Process of Law and Void Judgments
The essence of due process of law is constitutional authority; to wit:
“Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . . . “. . . Due process of law in the latter [the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution] refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed and interpreted according to the principles of the common law. . . .” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).

Any justice or judge of the United States who enters a decision or judgment in a federal case without the authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1—and this includes every Supreme Court decision and United States District Court judgment since March 1, 1991—does so without the authority of the Constitution and thereby denies the litigants due process of law and manufactures a void judgment.

A void judgment is an utter nullity, of no legal force or effect, and anyone who is concerned with the execution of a void judgment is considered in law as a trespasser; to wit:
“A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which . . . lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment . . . can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally . . .” Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).

“Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide any question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgments, until reversed, are regarded as binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They constitute no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers.” Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 329 (1828).

“A judgment is void if the court that rendered it . . . acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (http://www.leagle.com/cite/660%20F.2d%20291) (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1256, 71 L.Ed.2d 447 (1982); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (http://www.leagle.com/cite/502%20F.2d%20834) (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S.Ct. 516, 42 L.Ed.2d 309 (1975). Mere error does not render the judgment void unless the error is of constitutional dimension. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (http://www.leagle.com/cite/661%20F.2d%20655) (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, sub nom Simer v. United States, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982).” Klugh v. United States, 620 F.Supp. 892 (1985).

“We believe that a judgment, whether in a civil or criminal case, reached without due process of law is without jurisdiction and void . . . because the United States is forbidden by the fundamental law to take either life, liberty or property without due process of law, and its courts are included in this prohibition. . . .” Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 57, 94 L.Ed. 494 (1949).

“[I]f a ‘judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgment.’ United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip. from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55 F.3d 1311 (http://www.leagle.com/cite/55%20F.3d%201311), 1317 (7th Cir.1995). A judgment is void and should be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) if ‘the court that rendered the judgment acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’ Id. at 1316 (citations omitted) . . .” Price v. Wyeth Holdings Corp., 505 F.3d 624 (7th Cir., 2007).

“[D]enying a motion to vacate a void judgment is a per se abuse of discretion.” Burrell v. Henderson, et al, 434 F.3d, 826, 831 (6th Cir., 2006).

Ironically, the above post-March 1, 1991, judgments addressing the subject of void judgments, are themselves void for failure of the judge entering his respective judgment to bind himself by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, as required by the Constitution at Art. III, § 1, a denial of due process of law.

Update on Three Cases Since Previous Post, September 14, 2016

Action at equity: Petitioner sues 46 government-type defendants (trespassers) and one civilian defendant in a Texas court to recover Petitioner’s home stolen under color of authority by way of a previous void judgment in a federal court

Petitioner on August 11, 2016, files Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/plaintiffs-amended-original-petition-august-16-2016-18-6-mb1.pdf) in an action at equity in 284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, Case No. 16-08-09232 (tel:16-08-09232), for a constructive trust based on constructive fraud in a previous void judgment, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-0027 (the “Houston Action at Law”), which defendant United States of America on September 12, 2016, removes and files as United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-2747 (the “Houston Action at Equity”); the court on December 5, 2016, enters judgment against Petitioner (the plaintiff).

This was a high-intensity pre-trial proceeding, with 70 substantial docket entries over an 84-day span, which, combined with Petitioner’s two other ongoing federal cases, prevented Petitioner from being able to post anything until now.

Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace
Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/plaintiffs-amended-original-petition-august-16-2016-18-6-mb1.pdf) on pages iii–iv gives an extra-judicial (commercial) Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace to every actor concerned with the execution of the void judgment in the Houston Action at Law, as to the penalties should said case be removed to federal court and Petitioner be denied due process of law or foreclosed from adequate remedy.

Petitioner has been denied due process of law.

Irrespective of whether Petitioner realizes adequate remedy in this case or not: Every actor concerned with the void judgment in the Houston Action at Law (before, during, or after), which now also comprehends every actor involved in the Houston Action at Equity void judgment, is a trespasser and personally liable to Petitioner.
Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/plaintiffs-amended-original-petition-august-16-2016-18-6-mb1.pdf) evidently set off numerous alarms—because the deputy clerks, USDOJ attorneys, and judge, in concert, pulled every dirty (contrary to law or good morals) trick in the book to try to defeat Petitioner.

Any reader who tries to digest the docket or record (hyperlinked below) of this case, however, may have trouble understanding because there is contradictory data throughout, and seemingly two different proceedings underway—one prosecuted by Petitioner with factual contentions supported by conclusive evidence, and another being “defended” by counsel for defendants with factual contentions and denials of Petitioner’s allegations and claims, but with no or immaterial evidentiary support; a situation exacerbated by wholesale confusion in the docket intentionally manufactured by the deputy clerks, evidently in the hope of befuddling Petitioner (and anyone else who tries to make sense of things) and preventing Petitioner from keeping track of counsel for defendants’ multiple filings and possibly failing to respond timely to one or more and thereby losing by default.

The deputy clerks routinely and deliberately (a) so-misnamed filings or excluded part or all of the titles thereof, that Petitioner had to file in the record requests for the deputy clerks to correct the titles of docket entries, (b) withheld entering filings on the docket for days at a time (to give counsel for defendants an advantage), (c) split up a key filing into two separate docket numbers, 36 and 37, (d) entered items on the docket out of sequence, and (e) refused to enter on the docket seven of Petitioner’s filings, requiring that Petitioner file special requests of the clerk to enter on the docket the filings previously received.

Counsel for defendant United States (“a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15)) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002) and United States of America (a sovereign republic, Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf))—the same attorney—filed a Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_12) motion to have the case dismissed with prejudice, but failed to present evidence that proved a single one of his allegations or claims, and likewise failed to disprove a single allegation or claim in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/plaintiffs-amended-original-petition-august-16-2016-18-6-mb1.pdf).

Petitioner from time to time established on the record with evidence, certain facts and failures of defendants, and thereafter counsel for defendant United States and United States of America (same attorney) would file a document asserting other facts contradicting those established by Petitioner with evidence and treat of said failures as though they had never happened, but for which assertions said counsel provided no evidence in support.

For example, if a government-type defendant fails to answer or otherwise respond to a petition / complaint as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., within the statutory 60-day period, said defendant is in default and foreclosed from participating in the proceeding.

When Petitioner in Docket Nos. 36 and 37 (filing split up by deputy clerks for no reason) filed the return of service (process server’s certificate of service of summons and complaint on a defendant) for 44 defendants, establishing that 41 government-type defendants had failed to answer or otherwise respond to Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition within 60 days of service and were in default, counsel for defendant United States of America—with no evidentiary support—thereafter filed in Docket Nos. 41, 42, and 58, a purported notice of “entry of appearance and joinder” in the case for the same 41 defendants, a procedural impossibility.

Counsel for defendant United States and United States of America and the attorney representing the one civilian defendant collectively committed hundreds of violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for which, in any other case, they would have been subjected to an immediate order-to-show-cause hearing as to why they should not be sanctioned for such egregious acts.

Because everything in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition is true and supported with conclusive evidence, counsel for defendants could only present immaterial arguments and evidence propounding the supremacy of the Federal corporation known as the “United States” (28 U.S.C. § 3002(15)), falsely representing that it is the same thing as the sovereign republic of the United States of America (Constitution), and touting the “immunity” of all its corporate employees (judges of the United States, USDOJ attorneys, etc.) and private-sector workers of the Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service.

The record of the Houston Action at Equity is hyperlinked below, but Petitioner admonishes the reader that there is no meaningful knowledge to be gained from reading it; the filings of counsel for defendants are crafted to deceive; everything Petitioner has to say is presented in coherent form, supported by evidence, in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/plaintiffs-amended-original-petition-august-16-2016-18-6-mb1.pdf).

The M.O. of United States Department of Justice attorneys is to ignore material facts and evidence presented by an adversary that work against their objective, and fabricate another scenario, irrespective of lack of evidence of facts and their failures to respond, that supports their position, which their co-worker municipal tag-team partner, the judge, then uses to paint a negative picture of the adversary and enter judgment against him.

False denigrations of a particular litigant by one judge are then repeated at every opportunity by subsequent judges and United States Department of Justice attorneys who happen to come in contact with the same litigant, building up by repetition a “history” of negative reports against the litigant which an innocent reader would be inclined to take as factual and conclusive.

“The judge doth protest too much, methinks”
Continued below . . .

monty

16th January 2017, 04:27 PM

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com

continued from above

“The judge doth protest too much, methinks”
“Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam. He who uses his legal rights harms no one.” Bouvier’s, p. 2157.
In this instance, the judge’s Final Judgment and Preclusion Order (Docket No. 70) paints an extremely nasty picture of Petitioner—evidently for having the audacity to exercise Petitioner’s right to property and report organized criminal activity among judges of the United States and officers of the United States Department of Justice—and purports to enjoin Petitioner from ever taking up the subject matter of the Houston Action at Law again in any other court, state or federal—unless, of course, Petitioner wants to file an appeal with the same appeal judges who conspired with another judge in the same courthouse in the Houston Action at Law and stole Petitioner’s home under color of authority, all of whom are defendants in this suit!

The judge in the Houston Action at Equity evidently apparently is terrified of taking the rap for letting Petitioner expose the ultimate Achilles’ heel of the organized criminal activity of justices and judges of the United States and attorneys of the United States Department of Justice (no authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 3) and hopes to silence Petitioner with his Final Judgment and Preclusion Order (Docket No. 70).

Bottom line: The judge is a municipal judge of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, “a Federal corporation, ” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), doing business as “United States,” id., and under the exclusive control of Congress and knowingly and willfully usurping exercise of general jurisdiction outside his territory (the District of Columbia) and culpable for treason to the Constitution; to wit:
“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given [by the Constitution], than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. . . .” Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821).

The Final Judgment and Preclusion Order is a void judgment.
Knowing that his Final Judgment and Preclusion Order is a void judgment, that Petitioner is authorized by law to move to have it vacated, and that it is an abuse of discretion for him to refuse to vacate a void judgment upon motion: The judge sought to prevent Petitioner from filing a motion to vacate the Final Judgment and Preclusion Order as void by ordering the clerk on page 7 of the Final Judgment and Preclusion Order (Docket No. 70), to return to Petitioner, unfiled, any further motions received from Petitioner.

In respect of the judge’s usurpation, by way of the Final Judgment and Preclusion Order, of “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, Petitioner on January 10, 2017, filed with the Montgomery County District Attorney and January 11, 2017, with the Harris County District Attorney, an Affidavit of Information: Criminal Complaint for Public Notice Filing, the subject of which is said judge.

Petitioner then on January 12, 2017, sent a note to the deputy clerk requesting delivery to said judge of a copy of the filed Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) and the original of Petitioner’s “Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment and Preclusion Order (Dkt. #70) as Void for Ewing Werlein, Jr.’s Lack of Authority to exercise the Judicial Power of the United States or enter Judgment in this Case,” hyperlinked infra.

Docket, Houston Action at Equity (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/docket-houston-action-at-equity.pdf)

Record, Houston Action at Equity (97 MB) (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/record-houston-action-at-equity-122-mb.pdf)

Note to Deputy Clerk, copy of Criminal Complaint (January 10, 2017), and Motion to Vacate Final Judgment and Preclusion Order as Void (January 12, 2017) (3 MB) (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/note-to-deputy-clerk-criminal-complaint-january-10-2017-and-motion-to-vacate-final-judgment-and-preclusion-order-as-void-january-12-2017.pdf)

Action at law: Plaintiff United States of America sues Petitioner in Lufkin action at law to foreclose tax liens against Petitioner’s property in Tyler County, Texas

Plaintiff United States of America on July 1, 2014 (two and a half years ago), files an action at law against Petitioner in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Lufkin Division Civil Action No. 9:14-CV-138 (the “Lufkin Action at Law”) to foreclose on federal tax liens against Petitioner’s ranch in Tyler County, Texas; judge rules against Petitioner March 3, 2016.

When Petitioner (the defendant in this particular case) on September 15, 2015, demands the provision of the Constitution that gives plaintiff United States of America to capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgments, orders, and decrees in favor of the United States arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt in the geographic area occupied by the body politic of Tyler County, Texas (where Petitioner’s real property is located and Petitioner is a resident), counsel for plaintiff United States of America go silent (see post of October 28, 2015, infra) and remain so for the duration of the case, which ends March 3, 2016, five and half months thereafter.

Following entry of final judgment against Petitioner (the defendant), United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on April 21, 2016, enters his “Order of Sale and to Vacate Property (April 21, 2016) (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/order-of-sale-and-to-vacate-property-april-21-2016.pdf)”; whereupon Petitioner on June 13, 2016, serves Petitioner’s extra-judicial (commercial) Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace on Keith F. Giblin and the other two federal judges and two United States Department of Justice attorneys involved in the Lufkin Action at Law.

After seven months of silence since his original Order of Sale and to Vacate Property, United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on November 28, 2016, enters his “Amended Order of Sale and to Vacate Property (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/amended-order-of-sale-and-to-vacate-property-november-28-2016.pdf).”
Petitioner’s ranch apparently is for sale at this writing—but Petitioner on January 13, 2017, files Petitioner’s “Motion to Vacate the Final Judgment (Dkt. #67-1) as Void for Michael H. Schneider’s Lack of Authority to Exercise the Judicial Power of the United States or Enter Judgment in this Case,” hyperlinked infra.

Motion to Vacate Final Judgment as Void (January 13, 2017) (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/motion-to-vacate-final-judgment-as-void-january-13-2017.pdf)

Action at equity: Petitioner sues Lufkin Division judge who enters “Order of Sale and to Vacate Property” in Tyler County, Texas court to quiet title

Shortly after United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on April 21, 2016, enters his Order of Sale and to Vacate Property in the above Lufkin Action at Law, Petitioner on May 12, 2016, files an action at equity in 88th District Court of Tyler County, Texas, Case No. 23,967, against United States Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin, to quiet title to the real property that is the object of the Order of Sale and to Vacate Property in the Lufkin Action at Law, and defendant Keith F. Giblin on June 6, 2016, removes and files said case as United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Lufkin Division Civil Action No. 9:16-cv-00086 (the “Lufkin Action at Equity”).

With almost nothing happening for the last seven months, Petitioner on January 13, 2017, files in the Lufkin Action at Equity “Plaintiff’s Objection to this Proceeding for Marcia A. Crone’s Lack of Authority to Exercise the Judicial Power of the United States or Enter Judgment in this Case; and Motion to Remand,” hyperlinked infra.

Docket, Lufkin Action at Equity (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/docket-lufkin-action-at-equity.pdf)

Record, Lufkin Action at Equity (13 MB) (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/record-lufkin-action-at-equity-13-mb.pdf)

Objection to Proceeding and Motion to Remand (January 13, 2017) (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/objection-to-proceeding-and-motion-to-remand-january-12-2017.pdf)
—

Conclusion
The judicial system of the United States is populated by justices and judges who despise or would prefer to eliminate the Constitution from their brand of jurisprudence (municipal law); e.g.:
“‘I see absolutely no value to a judge of spending decades, years, months, weeks, day, hours, minutes, or seconds studying the Constitution, the history of its enactment, its amendments, and its implementation (across the centuries — well, just a little more than two centuries, and of course less for many of the amendments),’ he wrote. . . .” The Washington Times, quoting United States Circuit Judge Richard Posner in “Judge Richard Posner: ‘No value’ in studying the U.S. Constitution,” June 27, 2016,

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/27/richard-posner-no-value-in-studying-us-constitutio/ (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/27/richard-posner-no-value-in-studying-us-constitutio/) (accessed August 4, 2016).

The reason Judge Posner can get away with such apparently treasonous remarks about the Constitution without risking impeachment is that he neither is bound by oath or affirmation to support it nor has any duties under it to discharge or perform nor has any duty to preserve, protect, support, or defend it—only to carry out the duties assigned to him by his for-profit corporate employer, the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002), doing business as “United States,” id (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002)., and managed by the Congress of the (corporate) “United States.”

Anyone who has taken an oath or affirmation to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution,” Texas Constitution, Article 16, Section 1, or “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic,” 5 U.S.C. § 3331, has a duty to protect and defend the Constitution against domestic enemies who, not being bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, usurp exercise of “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, in a federal court of limited jurisdiction.

Irrespective of the myriad other discrepancies with justices and judges of the United States documented by Petitioner in the above-referenced cases over the last 35 months, the most fundamental of all is the lack of authority of any such justice or judge to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., or enter a decision or judgment in any case in any federal court of limited jurisdiction for failure to have bound himself by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, as required by Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

The task before the American People is to demand and bring about restoration of an exclusively republican, not municipal, form of government throughout the Union, where Texas and every other member thereof is free from usurpation of exercise of territorial or personal jurisdiction within its territory by municipal justices or judges of the United States or officers of the United States Department of Justice, as contemplated by the Framers and established at Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Bigjon

17th January 2017, 01:43 AM

monty

17th January 2017, 04:42 AM

If it's not time to form a militia and take control of these miscreant scoundrels called judges, it is time to form our own common law courts under our own jural society.

It is apparent that the law they're using is the law of the Jolly Roger and they are pirates.

You are not alone in your thinking. By using obscure treaties and judges not bound to the constitution agencies like EPA, ETC. enforce their regulation throughout the land where their constitutional jurisdiction is limited.

The task before the American People is to demand and bring about restoration of an exclusively republican, not municipal, form of government throughout the Union, where Texas and every other member thereof is free from usurpation of exercise of territorial or personal jurisdiction within its territory by municipal justices or judges of the United States or officers of the United States Department of Justice, as contemplated by the Framers and established at Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Ares

17th January 2017, 05:53 AM

The task before the American People is to demand and bring about restoration of an exclusively republican, not municipal, form of government throughout the Union, where Texas and every other member thereof is free from usurpation of exercise of territorial or personal jurisdiction within its territory by municipal justices or judges of the United States or officers of the United States Department of Justice, as contemplated by the Framers and established at Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.

The problem is that the government itself is a corporation. The only way it stops being run like a corporation is to dispose of the corporation and go back to a Public law (instead of public policy) type of government. The only way that's going to happen is either it collapses under it's own weight, or violent revolution.

monty

17th January 2017, 06:35 AM

The problem is that the government itself is a corporation. The only way it stops being run like a corporation is to dispose of the corporation and go back to a Public law (instead of public policy) type of government. The only way that's going to happen is either it collapses under it's own weight, or violent revolution.

created by Congress

“Plus peccat auctor quam actor. The instigator of a crime is worse than he who perpetrates it” (John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 2153)—and the instigators of the takeover of the federal courts of limited jurisdiction by municipal judges masquerading as Article III judges and usurping exercise of general jurisdiction throughout the Union, are the Members of Congress. John Parks Trowbridge Jr. 1/16/2017

I suspect the first of the two options "collapses under its own weight" is most likely.

Ares

17th January 2017, 07:04 AM

created by Congress

John Parks Trowbridge Jr. 1/16/2017
[/FONT][/COLOR]
I suspect the first of the two options "collapses under its own weight" is most likely.

Agreed, no one has the stomach for Revolution. Even if there were one, the sheep are so mindlessly stupid that we would end up with a pure Democracy instead of Republic.

Bigjon

18th January 2017, 06:20 AM

Dear Dr. Trowbridge….. (https://mainerepublicemailalert.com/2017/01/18/dear-dr-trowbridge/)

Posted on January 18, 2017 (https://mainerepublicemailalert.com/2017/01/18/dear-dr-trowbridge/)by David Robinson (https://mainerepublicemailalert.com/author/drobin88/)
https://mainerepublicemailalert.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/12405-judge2banna.png?w=640
Judge Anna von Reitz

Dear Dr. Trowbridge…..
The Final Straw from Dr. John Parks Trowbridge: https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/)

I want all of my readers to read this updated posting from Dr. Trowbridge. For the past three years, he has been dueling with the so-called “federal courts” which are indeed nothing more than corporate municipal courts and are not vested with any authority related to us, our states, or our judicial powers.

Dr. Trowbridge has exposed the seedy underbelly of the “UNITED STATES” incorporated, which is nothing but a private, for-profit, mostly foreign-owned governmental services corporation operated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on our shores, and he has also exposed the treasonous “Oath Tampering” of its Board of Directors, masquerading as members of a legitimate and lawfully organized “Congress” in 1991.

Indeed, John Parks Trowbridge has fought the good fight.

The one aspect of this circumstance which he has not taken into consideration is that all their actions against him and against other Americans depend upon falsification of public records (Birth Certificates) enabling these Grifters to “presume” that we are all “voluntarily submitting” to their municipal jurisdiction and that we are not owed the guarantees of the actual Constitution as a result.

We are not now and the vast majority of us have never been either “United States Citizens” (Territorial Citizens) nor “citizens of the United States” (Municipal CITIZENS)—but our names have been “registered” as such and we have been falsely held under the legal presumptions that apply in that foreign international jurisdiction as a result.

Unable to change or overcome our actual Constitution, the treasonous corporate vermin have instead connived to mischaracterize each one of us and to falsely claim that we have knowingly and willingly volunteered to serve as “citizens” in their “democracy” instead of living as non-citizen American state nationals in the republic we are owed.

And that fundamental fraud is what underlies all that Dr. Trowbridge and many other honest Americans have detected and experienced. These dishonest “courts” are not offering to try John Parks Trowbridge, but a corporate franchise ACCOUNT named after him: JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE or a bankrupt public utility franchise ACCOUNT also named after him: JOHN P. TROWBRIDGE by the perpetrators of this vast, convoluted scheme.

Congressional Record: June 13, 1967, pp. 15641-15646—— “A “citizen of the United States” is a civilly dead entity operating as a co-trustee and co-beneficiary of the PCT (Public Charitable Trust set up for the welfare of freed plantation slaves in the wake of the Civil War), the private constructive, cestui que vie trust of US Inc. under the 14th Amendment, which upholds the debt of the USA and US Inc. in Section 4.

There— once and for all — in plain English— is what a “citizen of the United States” is: a dead legal fiction entity presumed to be operating as a recipient of federal corporation welfare benefits in exchange for guaranteeing (underwriting and acting as a surety for) the debts of both the USA, Inc. and the US, Inc.

There, too, is the explanation of how you are being enslaved and “presumed upon” by these vermin. As a “citizen of the United States” you are on the hook for paying their debts and presumed to be operating a public trust franchise, a Cestui Que Vie constructive trust named after you under the JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE ACCOUNT or to be a bankrupt public transmitting utility franchise operating under the JOHN P. TROWBRIDGE ACCOUNT.

These criminals are getting away with these frauds and deceits and operating these “courts” as private debt collection agencies in behalf of the creditors of “JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE” (benefiting the US, Inc.) and “JOHN P.TROWBRIDGE” (which isn’t even a legal name for lack of specificity, benefiting the USA, Inc.) under color of law.

This has been going on for 150 years, ever since the close of the so-called “American Civil War” which was never declared and which was never ended by any peace treaty and which is, therefore, nothing but an illegal and illicit commercial mercenary action on our shores.

They have usurped upon our rightful jurisdiction—-the land and the undelegated portion of international jurisdiction, too—and promoted global enslavement and false indebtedness–via the pernicious practice of registering people as “things”—- Cestui Que Vie trusts and bankrupt public transmitting utility franchises—without the victim’s knowledge or consent. They seize upon us when we are babies in our cradles, force our Mothers to sign undisclosed contracts, and register our given names as franchises of corporations indebted to them.

And, because there is no law against enslaving a corporate fiction or robbing a corporate fiction or falsely arresting a corporate fiction, they have made very merry on our shores, operating this con game and substituting their private corporation for the public government we are owed.

Doctor Trowbridge, you are wasting your time making arguments “in Law” against vermin operating “at law”. In their fraudulent system of things, JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE has already consented to their municipal jurisdiction and submitted his body, soul, and any other assets he may have or earn to serve their benefit and not his own. In their fraudulent system of things, JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE has owed an insurmountable debt from the day of his birth—which is not the day you were born, but the date your given name was registered (filed) as property belonging to them and offered for the benefit of their creditors. In their fraudulent, foreign system of things, JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE is — by definition — a criminal, already convicted, and all that is left for them to discuss is how much he owes their masters and how long they may put him in jail.

And now, without further adieu, may we all agree that the Pope and the British Monarch and the Lord Mayor of London, all of whom have acted in Gross International Breach of Trust with respect to the America people since 1822, are to be recognized as criminals for creating and promoting and using and abusing this system of fraud and mischaracterization and operating it throughout the world? That they are to be universally condemned for the practice of preying upon helpless babies and alleging false and self-interested contracts against them and their parents?

Yes.

Dear Doctor Trowbridge, I could weep for the beauty of your logic and your research, because except for the erudition of the ignorant concerning what should be honored by any honest court— I know it is beyond hope to expect these private bill collection agencies being run as courts under color of law to respond to your complaint.

Even among the Bar Association Members bright enough to understand what you are saying, there isn’t the courage or the honor or the strength of character necessary for these men and women to denounce what has gone on here. To do so would be to admit their own guilt and without the power to guarantee their safety, you cannot expect them to yield. At most, you may expect a private settlement and the dismissal of any charges held against you, the return of your house, and a quick sideways scuttle like cockroaches fleeing the light.

And that, I think, is not your object, Sir. I think that you, like me, are determined to see the correction of this entire system of things and that nothing but an end to business as usual for these con artists will do.

Bigjon

18th January 2017, 06:25 AM

We can see clearly now the price of being a US Citizen
bigjon

BarnacleBob (http://www.goldismoney2.com/members/barnaclebob.13327/),Yesterday at 5:47 PM
Over there:
LMAO.... "Traffic Court"!

What is TRAFFIC?

Commerce; trade; dealings in merchandise (http://thelawdictionary.org/merchandise/), bills, money, and the like. See Iu re Insurance Co. (D. C.) 96 Fed. 757; Levine v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 647. 34 S. W. 960; Feople v. Hamilton, 17 Misc. Rep. 11, 39 N. Y. Supp. 531; Merriam v. Langdon, 10 Conn. 471. (Blacks Law Dictionary)

http://thelawdictionary.org/traffic/

From the article:

"I asked her whether this was a criminal action or a civil action. She replied, “It’s hard to explain it in those terms.” I asked whether she intended to proceed under criminal procedural rules or in civil procedure. We would proceed under the “rules of criminal procedure,” she answered because this is a criminal case. I asked when I could expect to be charged, indicted, or have a probable cause determination. She replied that none of those events would occur because this is “a civil action.” So I could expect to be served with a complaint? No, no. As she had already explained, we would proceed under the criminal rules.

In short, municipal officials and their private contractors have at their disposal the powers of both criminal and civil law and are excused from the due process duties of both criminal and civil law. "

She replied, “It’s hard to explain it in those terms.”

"TRAFFIC COURT IS A PRIVATE CIVIL COMMERCIAL COURT!" Traffic is commerce!

This was an ad hoc summary proceeding in the PRIVATE "civil" jurisdiction of law merchant (lex merchatoria). “It’s hard to explain it in those terms.” Damn right it is, cause once you understand "law merchant" you can defend yourself.

Law Merchant is a private civil equity proceeding. The civil law of equity does not include criminal penalties, law merchant does! Thats the tip-off, when they say its a "civil proceeding that carries criminal penalties" you automatically KNOW your in a private law merchant ad hoc summary proceeding. Secondly, law merchant operates outside of the constitutions & constitutional protections, hence "due process" doesnt apply in law merchant! Most traffic laws & courts lack due process in toto.Thats the second indicator that your not in a judicial power court, but a private civil action. Thirdly these are not judicial criminal proceedings as there is never a court reporter on the record... same as any civil proceeding! Fourthly, in a judicial criminal proceeding the state must prove your guilty of a crime, in law merchant the defendant is presumed to be in dishonor (guilty) and must prove being innocent of dishonor.

These private civil courts blend & bend the rules of both civil & criminal procedure to keep the law merchant hidden from view. In most jurisdictions these private commercial proceedings use "Roberts Rules of Order" to conduct the fleecing.

In U.S. polity & law, law merchant has two names, 1. Public Policy & 2. The Uniform Commercial Code.

Below is a wonderful primer that explains the scam...

"The Dispatch of Merchants"

http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Articles/DispatchOfMerchants.htm#INTRODUCTION (http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Articles/DispatchOfMerchants.htm#INTRODUCTION)

==================

Take for instance "roadside confiscations" of cash & other goods... a complete lack of due process and its all committed under the civil law of law merchant. Your trafficking in traffic in a commercial vehicle, only commercial vehicles require a state title, registration & tags, your also carrying a commercial driver license (all dl's are various classes of commercial operators license) when your instantly detained and when the officer discovers $5000 in cash on the front seat he confiscates it as a civil forfeiture from your commercial vehicle. He created an instant "private" civil claim on the cash... If you want it back you must sue his CLAIM in his private civil court using his rules. Good luck! Its all perpetuated using law merchant.... Almost ALL state & federal statutes are commercial... and their scope has been traditionally been aimed at regulating a special & specific, not general class of commercial subjects, objects or activities... However, using law merchant the legislatures & their agents have been able to expand their reach into all areas of activities. All they need do is create a private civil case against the victim in commerce.... and the word TRAFFIC is key.

What is TRAFFIC?

Commerce; trade; dealings in merchandise (http://thelawdictionary.org/merchandise/), bills, money, and the like.

Do deal in merchandise, bills, money & the like? Of course you do... you buy groceries, gasoline, electricity, & clothing, etc. (dealing in merchandise) and you pay for these items with bills (debt) or money (coins) and the like (bank accounts, checks, money orders, credit cards, credit, etc.). In the perverted eyes of the law, YOU ARE A MERCHANT! And merchants & their activities are the object & subject of civil commerce and the private civil jurisdiction of law merchant. And BTW, thats exactly what the yellow fringed flag represents, law merchant!

“We may have democracy or we may have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both.” –Louis Brandeis (https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/030015867X/ref=as_li_qf_sp_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=wakitime09-20&camp=1789&creative=9325&linkCode=as2&creativeASIN=030015867X&linkId=33cb1c52fbb02fd5893226044e08fc42), Former Supreme Court Justice

"Sovereignty is an entire thing — to divide, is — to destroy it." --John C. Calhoun

BarnacleBob (http://www.goldismoney2.com/members/barnaclebob.13327/), Yesterday at 11:11 PM (http://www.goldismoney2.com/threads/that-time-i-turned-a-routine-traffic-ticket-into-the-constitutional-trial-of-the-century.131781/#post-1141180)

Glass

18th January 2017, 06:44 AM

When you read our local Traffic Laws and the Traffic Code, it has a definition of Traffic. The movement of goods or persons for a fee. Doesn't get more plain than that.

I'm sure I've got a book on Lex Mercatoria somewhere... can't seem to put my hands on it. Will look for it tomorrow at my workplace. The Practice and Jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty is also a good read.

Google has a book called "Consuentudo vel Lex Mercatoria" or the Ancient Law Merchant divided in to 3 parts according to the Essential Parts of Traffick. Necessary for all Statesmen, Judges and Magistrates.

Free Trade agreements like NAFTA are extensions of the concept of Staples or designated ports where by the Law of Merchants applies and particular codification applies. They might use an existing codification as a template such as UNIDROIT or Roman Canonical rules.

Somewhere on here is the post about the Highway and how certain centres or depots are setup. I can't find the post but it should be read in conjunction with this information as they are these Staple ports....inland but connected by highways - inland water ways.

palani

18th January 2017, 06:55 AM

Agreed, no one has the stomach for Revolution. Even if there were one, the sheep are so mindlessly stupid that we would end up with a pure Democracy instead of Republic.

They aren't sheep. They are asleep and dreaming. Nobody wants to awaken a deep dreamer or a sleep walker. They tend to do violent things because they think they are still in the dream. Then you face the problem of those who are half awake. They make irrational decisions because they don't completely have a grasp on reality.

For perspective it would appear that the libs and democrats are in rem sleep mode. The republicans are in half awake mode and know something is wrong but still believe they can be half awake and can make a difference to the world of the ones still sleeping.

If you are fully awake you agree with everyone and survive.

If the deep sleepers cannot exist without Obamacare maybe it would be best to keep it just for them. This could be used to identify those who believe in insurance and those who are responsible.

Ares

18th January 2017, 07:47 AM

Congressional Record: June 13, 1967, pp. 15641-15646—— “A “citizen of the United States” is a civilly dead entity operating as a co-trustee and co-beneficiary of the PCT (Public Charitable Trust set up for the welfare of freed plantation slaves in the wake of the Civil War), the private constructive, cestui que vie trust of US Inc. under the 14th Amendment, which upholds the debt of the USA and US Inc. in Section 4.

Quoted for substance...

Glass

19th January 2017, 10:29 PM

Quoted for substance...

whats the substance?

monty

19th January 2017, 10:44 PM

The Supreme Court Justices have taken both oaths.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/oath/oathsofthecurrentcourt2009.aspx

monty

20th January 2017, 06:26 AM

Ares

20th January 2017, 06:57 AM

That quoted statement may be true and is a result of the 14th amendment, but does not appear anywhere in the constutionality of the 14th amendment argument in the Congressional Record pages 15641 - 15646 of June 13, 1967.

http://www.14th-amendment.com/Historical_Documents/Congressional_Record/June_13_1967/Non_Ratification_14th_Amendment.pdf

I have also found "quoted" US Supreme Court decisons on the internet turn out to be false when you read the actual decisions.

Did you read through the full document? Searching for keywords doesn't work with scanned documents. Try it for yourself, I've tried on 2 different platforms with 4 different PDF readers and I can't even search for words that are clearly in the document. Amendment, record, etc. If I get the time this weekend I'll try to read through the full document and see if that quote is in there.

monty

20th January 2017, 07:17 AM

Did you read through the full document? Searching for keywords doesn't work with scanned documents. Try it for yourself, I've tried on 2 different platforms with 4 different PDF readers and I can't even search for words that are clearly in the document. Amendment, record, etc. If I get the time this weekend I'll try to read through the full document and see if that quote is in there.

Yes. I reread it again this morning to see if I had missed it. There is a better copy here

http://www.rayservers.com/images/Cong_Record_June_13_1967_with_vol_cover_7_pages.pd f

Ares

20th January 2017, 07:22 AM

Yes. I reread it again this morning to see if I had missed it. There is a better copy here

http://www.rayservers.com/images/Cong_Record_June_13_1967_with_vol_cover_7_pages.pd f

Much better copy. Thank you!!!!

Glass

20th January 2017, 07:25 AM

I also read it yesterday and did not find the quote. I read it a second time to make sure I didn't miss it before posting my question.

I read this version: http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/14amrec/14amrec.pdf

The record is of a debate conducted about the legality of the passing of the 14th amendment but not the content or purpose of it. It isn't actually the place of the Congress to debate the purpose or function of an amendment to the constitution, or any element of it for that matter, only that the procedure proscribed by it is followed and that any part of the constitution as written and ratified, is upheld by those in sworn office.

Ares

20th January 2017, 07:56 AM

monty

20th January 2017, 08:15 AM

I read part of it, and the congressman makes a good point about the Southern states being excluded from the ratification process so the amendment should of never passed.

About the only point he missed is that Oregon recinded their ratification after it was discovered two of their legislators that voted for ratification had been elected by fraud. The recision was after the Secretary of State had declared the amendment had been ratified.

Bigjon

20th January 2017, 08:39 AM

Ares

20th January 2017, 08:48 AM

About the only point he missed is that Oregon recinded their ratification after it was discovered two of their legislators that voted for ratification had been elected by fraud. The recision was after the Secretary of State had declared the amendment had been ratified.

The 14th Amendment was basically declared as it clearly did not have the majority to do it. Same with the 17th Amendment. All states are guaranteed equal suffrage, so if any of them refused the amendment is void and there were 5 states (if I remember correctly) who did not ratify the 17th Amendment.

monty

20th January 2017, 08:52 AM

That is true. I think it was a man named Bill Benson who checked the archives in all the states to verify that.

monty

20th January 2017, 08:54 AM

Email from Dr. Trowbridge:

Re: Oaths of Office Taken by the Current Court

Keep watching my website — MORE coming shortly and SHARE widely, so theword gets out!!!!

Thanks!~

John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
Liberty Above All
The End of the Hoax of Federal Usurpation: www.supremecourtcase.wordpress.com (http://www.supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/)

monty

20th January 2017, 09:05 AM

The 14th Amendment was basically declared as it clearly did not have the majority to do it. Same with the 17th Amendment. All states are guaranteed equal suffrage, so if any of them refused the amendment is void and there were 5 states (if I remember correctly) who did not ratify the 17th Amendment.

http://www.wnd.com/2005/02/28776/

“Take time to deliberate; but when the time for action arrives, stop thinking and go in.
– President Andrew Jackson

The courage and wisdom of those who birthed this Republic was nothing short of a magnificent event in the history of the world. When creating the federal government, it was imperative that the colonies (later called states) and the people be represented fairly. The method decided upon was the people would vote for their voice – a representative to serve in the House of Representatives.

The states of the Union would each have an equal number of U.S. Senators (fixed at two), appointed by their state legislature to represent the interests of the state. Should that U.S. senator fail in their job, the legislature would recall them and appoint a new one. The decision to have the states appoint their U.S. senators was very calculated.

All of that changed with the fraudulent ratification of the 17th Amendment. U.S. senators would now be elected. The states lost their suffrage rights, they no longer had any representation in Washington, D.C., and the federal machine has walked all over them since.

This issue is one of the most important problems facing this nation today, yet few know anything about it. Last summer, I prepared a working paper for Rep. Henry McElroy of the New Hampshire state Legislature on the history of this amendment and why it is imperative the states step forward and force a constitutional showdown (http://www.devvy.com/pdf/McElroy_Working_Paper.pdf). For those who might knee jerk this would cause constitutional chaos, I can’t highly recommend enough Judge Andrew Napolitano’s excellent book,
“Constitutional Chaos (http://superstore.wnd.com/store/item.asp?ITEM_ID=1633).” We’re already in constitutional chaos and the situation will only continue to deteriorate without immediate action.

The 17th Amendment was never properly ratified. I have seen the proof with my own eyes at the National Archives and from the documents obtained by Bill Benson (http://www.thelawthatneverwas.com/) from all 48 state legislatures in his work, “Proof the 17th Amendment Was Not Ratified.” I also collected court certified documents on this from the bowels of the California State Archives. They are incontrovertible and prove without question that Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, on May 31, 1913, knowingly and willfully issued a memo declaring the 17th Amendment ratified even though he knew the required number of states did not ratify it.

The courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court (http://home.hiwaay.net/%7Ebecraft/Sixteenth.htm) have been very specific on the rigid requirements for ratification. There can be no mistake fraud was committed and that every U.S. senator since 1913 sits in office under a law that does not exist. U.S. senators ratify treaties, confirm federal judges, U.S. Supreme Court justices and hold impeachment trials. Legally, our participation in the United Nations, every destructive trade treaty, i.e., NAFTA, GATT, Roe v. Wade and any other legislative acts committed by U.S. senators these past 92 years are invalid.

The courts refuse to touch this issue because they don’t have the backbone. While several states have introduced resolutions to nix the 17th Amendment (introduced by patriotic representatives and killed by Republicans in every instance), realistically, there’s no question this current crop of Congress will never do the right thing. Therefore, it is up to the people and the states of the Union.

The people must get the proof and begin a systematic assault (non violent, of course) on their state legislatures to appoint two U.S. senators to represent them and send them to Washington, D.C. This will force the issue into a court of law where it should have gone decades ago.

Please feel free to use the working paper I prepared for Rep. McElroy for your state rep and senator. They will soon realize that it is to their utmost advantage to press this issue and for the sake of our Republic, this challenge must be made to restore the balance between the states and the people. America is not a democracy of mob rule, but that’s exactly what has happened with the election of U.S. senators.

Without question this is a Herculean task, but it can be done. If you know your state representative or state senator will play politics and ignore this fraud, then run for their seat (http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=42379). We only need one state legislature to find the courage to stand up to this lie and make their move. Make a commitment to oust any state legislator or senator who refuses to undertake this fight. We must replace these bad employees with ones who will get the job done or America is going down.

The destiny of this Republic lies in the hands of we the people. There are millions of active Americans in 28,000 citizens groups. It’s time to focus on specific issues killing our beloved nation – invasion by illegals, unconstitutional cabinets, unconstitutional spending – get organized and throw out the same old career politicians at every level of government and get true constitutionalists elected who will have the guts to get this Republic back on course. I leave by asking you this: Are we a nation of laws or lies? We cannot be both and survive.

Read more at http://www.wnd.com/2005/02/28776/#bIuq3jwUKEwlJQBA.99

Bigjon

20th January 2017, 09:58 AM

That is true. I think it was a man named Bill Benson who checked the archives in all the states to verify that.

I exchanged emails with Bill Benson and found out he was a Dane. I chided him for mispelling his name as a proper Dane uses "sen" instead of "son". Now all good Scandinavians know we have to keep these name spellings straight so we know who to believe. Benson = Norsk, Bensen = Dansk, Bensson = Svensk.

I believe he and Red Beckman went around the country tracking down the 16th amendment.

Ares

20th January 2017, 10:58 AM

monty

20th January 2017, 11:04 AM

monty

21st January 2017, 05:17 AM

Yep, Anna seems to post a lot of stuff that can't be found in the online record.

I have read that in order to really read the real record one has to go to one of these regional law library's, where they have all the books from the time they were first published. Sort of like once published they don't disappear. Unless someone replaces the book with a new one.

From: avannavon@gmail.com

Re: United States Citizen - dead entity

There are multiple Congressional Records-- Congressional Record of the United States Congress and United States Congressional Record and Congressional Record of the United States of America in Congress Assembled and so on. Keep looking and you will find it.

Glass

21st January 2017, 05:47 AM

she can't just provide the link?

the only references I can find are references to her stuff and people who have filed court documents referencing her statement but no actual congressional citation.

Ares

21st January 2017, 06:29 AM

monty

21st January 2017, 08:00 AM

I would respond back, that's not what I asked for. I'm telling you your citation is inaccurate. You made the citation, and the citation does not exist in the source you specified.

I was just thinking that and insist that she provide me a link to one of the other records she claims exist.

In the meantime I have found several web pages with the following, but no identity of the author:

On December 6, 1865, the 14th Amendment was proclaimed as ratified (even though it never properly was, see below). The 14th Amendment, which is private Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical Trust Law, constitutes a constructive, cestui que trust, a public charitable trust (PCT) that was expressly designed to bring every corporate franchise artificial person called a "citizen of the United States" into an inseparable merging with the government until the two are united (with power held by the government, not the people). A cestui que trust is fundamentally different from a regular trust, which is express [clear, definite, explicit] in nature and consists of a contractual indenture involving three (3) parties: Grantor (Creator or Trustor), Trustee, and Beneficiaries. In an express trust, legal ownership is transferred by written contract between Grantor and Trustee in which the Grantor surrenders ownership of property to the legal person, the Trust, to be managed by the Trustee on behalf of those who are to benefit from the arrangement, the Beneficiaries. A cestui que trust, on the other hand, differs from an express trust in several crucial ways:

a. It is not formed by express contract, i.e. overt agreement expressed in writing, but by legal construction, i.e. fiat.

b. A cestui que trust has no Grantor, but, being a constructive trust created by operation of law, i.e. by make-believe, has only co-trustees and co-beneficiaries. The co-trustees are the parties with the duties for managing property for the "public good," i.e. for the benefit of those designated as co-beneficiaries.

palani

21st January 2017, 09:18 AM

You make your own record.

Face it. There are lots of dead people out there and they really wrote a lot. They acted when they shouldn't have and didn't act when they should have. Are you bound by any of them?

How to make a record? LEGAL NOTICE. http://gold-silver.us/forum/showthread.php?63041-A-Legal-Notice&highlight=LEGAL+NOTICE

That entire thread is about people making their record.

How do you make your record with respect to the XIV amendment? https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsllink.html

Go to volume 15 .. page 223 ... and read ch 249.. It is a short act but requires some interpretation. It concerns the rights of American citizens in foreign states. What most don't comprehend is that the foreign states they are permitting expatriation from are only states that they create as they cannot actually speak for other foreign states. The next day they enter the XIV amendment on their record and have created a foreign state expressly for you to get the h...e... double toothpicks out of.

Just cite this act in a public notice and give a notary address for responses to be directed to. Record same at the county level.

Now the State department will tell you that you must expatriate at some U.S. consulate in some foreign country and that this is the ONLY way to expatriate. They could be right but there is no need to expatriate from something that never existed and unless you have some document from a U.S. judge stating that your status is set in stone you make your notice NUNC PRO TUNC then what never was did not ever exist.

p.s. The system is more afraid of due process from YOU than you should be concerned of due process from THEM.

All of the dirty tricks that have been used against you may be used by you. I wouldn't recommend this against people who have done you no harm but are fair game against people who mean you nothing BUT harm.

Bigjon

21st January 2017, 02:23 PM

From: avannavon@gmail.com

Re: United States Citizen - dead entity

There are multiple Congressional Records-- Congressional Record of the United States Congress and United States Congressional Record and Congressional Record of the United States of America in Congress Assembled and so on. Keep looking and you will find it.

When we look at what the lieyers have done is it any wonder that they don't want us to know. Everything they do is a lie. They write laws in code meant to deceive us, where it sounds acceptable when interpreted in its English grammar context, but when translated using their code it means something quite different.

So, to me the idea that the record has been scrubbed or buried should be no surprise to us. As that is the record they have left us, one of deceit and treachery.

Bigjon

22nd January 2017, 11:32 PM

I exchanged emails with Bill Benson and found out he was a Dane. I chided him for mispelling his name as a proper Dane uses "sen" instead of "son". Now all good Scandinavians know we have to keep these name spellings straight so we know who to believe. Benson = Norsk, Bensen = Dansk, Bensson = Svensk.

I believe he and Red Beckman went around the country tracking down the 16th amendment.

The edit button went awol, so here I am replying to my little bit of Norwegian trivia.
The current crop of Norwegians all use bokmal which is Danish and spell their names like the Danes. Fathers name with "sen" added or the patronymic name system.

All good Norwegians who came to America in the 18 hundreds had been under Danish rule and no self-respecting Norwegian wanted to be misidentified as being a Dane so they used "son". That is the version my mother taught me.

I'll reply here instead of adding this off topic item below:

The only people who use old Norse today are the Icelanders and the Faroe islands and they use "son".

I would guess that mom's explanation did not take into account that the western Norwegians were still probably using Norsk instead of the Danish derived bokmal.

Swedes have alway used the possessive s or PAPA'sson.

Neuro

23rd January 2017, 02:03 AM

The edit button went awol, so here I am replying to my little bit of Norwegian trivia.
The current crop of Norwegians all use bokmal which is Danish and spell their names like the Danes. Fathers name with "sen" added or the patronymic name system.

All good Norwegians who came to America in the 18 hundreds had been under Danish rule and no self-respecting Norwegian wanted to by misidentified as being a Dane so they used "son". That is the version my mother taught me.

Ben is not a Scandinavian name though. Benson is probably British in origin, as you have the British cigarette brand Benson & Hedges. He or his ancestors may have Americanized the old Danish surname like Berndtsen or Bendtsen into Benson.

Norway was in union with Sweden during most of the 1800's btw... So sorry to say your mothers version wasn't completely correct. However could be that Norway de facto was more independent during the Swedish union than during Danish rule, that people preferred to abandon the old Danish spellings of surnames, the slave names. ;)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_between_Sweden_and_Norway

Funny how Sweden was awarded Norway from Denmark in 1814, because Sweden had been on the sides of Britain-Russia during the Napoleonic wars. While Denmark-Norway was on Napoleons side. Especially since the new King of Sweden was the French General Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, who actually bought the crown of Sweden in 1814 with warloot from the Napoleonic wars where he made his fortune. That guy was the Lucky Larry Silverstein of his time I suppose. If he had stayed with Napoleon and France until Waterloo, he would have probably lost everything. Still this usurpers family has the throne of Sweden.

Interesting stuff. I didn't know of these circumstances regarding the creation of Swedish Norwegian union.

monty

23rd January 2017, 04:26 AM

Stacy B posted a video where she discusses the Las Vegas Review Journal appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court, Ammon Bundy writes a book "The Road to Burns" and our email exchange and her opinions re Dr. Trowbridge's latest blog post. She begins the discussion about Dr. Trowbridge at the 30 minute mark.

http://youtu.be/354QUwfpj_w

https://youtu.be/354QUwfpj_w

Bigjon

23rd January 2017, 04:27 PM

Ben is not a Scandinavian name though. Benson is probably British in origin, as you have the British cigarette brand Benson & Hedges. He or his ancestors may have Americanized the old Danish surname like Berndtsen or Bendtsen into Benson.

Norway was in union with Sweden during most of the 1800's btw... So sorry to say your mothers version wasn't completely correct. However could be that Norway de facto was more independent during the Swedish union than during Danish rule, that people preferred to abandon the old Danish spellings of surnames, the slave names. ;)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_between_Sweden_and_Norway

Funny how Sweden was awarded Norway from Denmark in 1814, because Sweden had been on the sides of Britain-Russia during the Napoleonic wars. While Denmark-Norway was on Napoleons side. Especially since the new King of Sweden was the French General Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, who actually bought the crown of Sweden in 1814 with warloot from the Napoleonic wars where he made his fortune. That guy was the Lucky Larry Silverstein of his time I suppose. If he had stayed with Napoleon and France until Waterloo, he would have probably lost everything. Still this usurpers family has the throne of Sweden.

Interesting stuff. I didn't know of these circumstances regarding the creation of Swedish Norwegian union.

Well I went and researched this a little bit and now believe my mom's version to be spot on.
Denmark controlled Norway for roughly 300 years preceding Norway being given as a prize of war to Sweden in 1814. 300 years of precedent in how Norwegians spelled their names trumps any Swedish influence.

Your remark about your King really makes sense to me as in looking around on the net I came across pictures of the Swedish Royal family and I remember thinking that the King did not look at all like a Nordic person.

Neuro

23rd January 2017, 04:40 PM

Well I went and researched this a little bit and now believe my mom's version to be spot on.
Denmark controlled Norway for roughly 300 years preceding Norway being given as a prize of war to Sweden in 1814. 300 years of precedent in how Norwegians spelled their names trumps any Swedish influence.
It doesn't make sense they would wait until they reached the shores of USA, before they changed their Danish spelled surnames. When they could have done it during the 50 years they were in union with Sweden. Surely the Swedes would not mind if the Norwegians abandoned their Danish sounding family names...

monty

29th January 2017, 09:17 PM

Update from Dr. Trowbridge, previous post contained errors,

New post on supremecourtcase

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Errors in previous post and Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition of August 16, 2016 (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/01/29/errors-in-previous-post-and-petitioners-amended-original-petition-of-august-16-2016/)

by supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)

The post of January 16, 2017, and Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition (posted September 14, 2016) contain certain errors.

Error in previous post of January 16, 2017
That Congress in the Act of December 1, 1990, Public Law 101–650, at section 404 thereof, 104 Stat. 5124 alter materially by way of amendment the oath of office at 28 U.S.C. § 453, 62 Stat. 907 and relieve justices and judges of the United States of any duty of fidelity to the Constitution.

The amended oath of December 1, 1990, at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States had no material effect on the activities of justices or judges of the United States and should not have been the subject of a post.

Errors in Petitioner’s Amended Original Petition
That none of the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States Department of Justice, United States Marshals Service, Department of the Treasury, or Internal Revenue Service are bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.

Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit take the oath at 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/453) and bind themselves by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.

Officers of United States Department of Justice and United States Marshals Service bind themselves by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution by what is called the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit (https://www.opm.gov/forms/pdf_fill/sf61.pdf), such as that taken by the current Attorney General of the United States, Loretta Elizabeth Lynch (https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/ag_lynch_appointment_affidavit/download).

The Secretary of the Treasury’s webpage (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/About-Treasury/Pages/officials.aspx) says the Secretary of the Treasury takes the oath of office provided therein. The oath is identical in substance to the 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3331)Oath of office, but not identical in form. Said webpage cites no source authority for said oath.

President Barrack Obama’s Executive Order of August 12, 2016, entitled “Providing an Order of Succession within the Department of the Treasury (https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/12/executive-order-providing-order-succession-within-department-treasury),” specifies that Under Secretaries of the Treasury, Deputy Under Secretaries of the Treasury, and Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury shall have taken an oath, but omits to identify which particular oath.

Though not mandated by act of Congress, it is believed that the oath taken by Under Secretaries of the Treasury and such others of the Department of the Treasury is the same oath as that taken by the Secretary of the Treasury (no source authority cited).

Internal Revenue Manual 6.300.1.4 (11-06-2009) Appointment Documents, Determinations, and Entitlements (https://www.irs.gov/irm/part6/irm_06-300-001.html#d0e55) provides, in pertinent part of subsection 1: “OPM’s GPPA, Chapter 3, Subchapter 4, and the Job Aid specifies the required appointment documents. . . .”

The United States Office of Personnel Management’s “The Guide to Processing Personnel Actions,” Chapter 3, Subchapter 4, section 4-3, subsection c (https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/personnel-documentation/processing-personnel-actions/gppa03.pdf), implies that Internal Revenue Service employees take the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit (https://www.opm.gov/forms/pdf_fill/sf61.pdf)part A Oath of Office; to wit:
“As part of the entry-on-duty process, the employee takes the oath of office. The Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit, contains the oath of office (part A) required by 5 U.S.C. 3331 . . ."

Motions withdrawn and amended

Petitioner has withdrawn the three motions hyperlinked in the previous post of January 16, 2017, and replaced two of them with an amended version and filed with the Harris and Montgomery County, Texas, District Attorneys an Amended Affidavit of Information: Criminal Complaint for Public Notice Filing.

There are no errors in the amended versions.

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monty

11th February 2017, 04:07 PM

Dr. Trowbridge's update February 11, 2017

New post on supremecourtcase

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The “Great Mystery” solved: seminal act of congressional, executive, and judicial fraud and treason (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/02/11/the-great-mystery-solved-seminal-act-of-congressional-executive-and-judicial-fraud-and-treason/)

by supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)

This post reveals the ultimate reason why, when Petitioner on September 14, 2015, in the Lufkin action at law demanded the constitutional authority that gives the court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgment against Petitioner’s real property in Tyler County, Texas (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf), the United States attorney went silent on the subject and remained so for the duration of the case (which ended five and half months later), the magistrate gave his adverse recommendation, and the court accepted the recommendation and entered judgment against Petitioner by pretending that Petitioner had never made such demand, thereby concealing by way of deliberate omission from court process the United States attorney’s failure to respond to said demand or prove jurisdiction (despite burden to do so) or oppose Petitioner’s subsequent motion to dismiss (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/demand-for-dismissal-filed-093015.pdf).

This post also gives a remedy for the situation it reveals, as well as an application thereof in a new case filed against Petitioner for failure to produce books and records for an IRS summons.

Legislative power determines executive and judicial jurisdiction
The executive and judicial power of the new government implemented by the Constitution March 4, 1789, is co-extensive with the legislative power established by that instrument; officers of the executive and judicial branches have jurisdiction to the same extent that Congress have legislative power in a particular geographic area; to wit:
“It [the judicial power] is indeed commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive powers of the General Government . . .” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793).
“[I]t is an obvious maxim, ‘that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the Legislature.’ The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive with the legislative power. . . .” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, 808 (1824).

The Constitution confers upon Congress either limited or exclusive (general) legislative power, depending upon the geographic area; to wit:
“It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one, limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia. . . .” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821).

Three kinds of legislative power and executive or judicial jurisdiction
“Jurisdiction” is synonymous with “authority” and means, essentially, the geographic area in which a particular officer is authorized by law to discharge or perform his duties.
There are three and only three kinds of legislative power and executive or judicial jurisdiction:

Territorial (over cases arising or those residing in a particular geographic area);

Personal (over someone’s rights); and

Subject-matter (over the nature of the case or type of relief sought).

Unilateral authority to exercise all three types of legislative power or executive or judicial jurisdiction in a particular geographic area is called “power of exclusive legislation” or “general jurisdiction”; anything less is called “limited legislative power” or “limited jurisdiction.”
The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular provision of the Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf), and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains, consists of:

power of subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas, over the subjects enumerated at Art, I, 8, cl. 1-16;

power of subject-matter and personal legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas and, in certain instances, residents thereof, over the types of cases and controversies enumerated at Art. III, 2;

power of personal legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas, over anyone accused of a criminal offense cognizable under authority of the government established by the Constitution March 4, 1789, at Art. III, 2;

power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of Columbia at Art, I, 8, cl. 17; and

constructive (inferred) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV, 3, cl. 2 in the form of “Rules and Regulations,” id., “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.

Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union.

This means executive and judicial officers of the United States have no territorial jurisdiction anywhere in the Union.

“Territorial jurisdiction” is defined as follows:
“—Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1910), p. 673.

Were Congress to be authorized to exercise territorial legislative power over the Union they would have absolute exclusive legislative control over the entire country and there would be no need for any Union-member legislature or the Constitution in its present form.

Blackletter law[1] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn1) confirms that no executive or judicial officer of the United States has territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing anywhere in the Union; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic].” Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).

“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to . . . regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

“[95 U.S. 723] [T]he exercise of this jurisdiction [over those domiciled within its limits] in no manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State within which it is situated. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464.”

“Every State,” Pennoyer, supra, possesses supreme and “exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty,” id., over property located and Americans residing within its borders, and there is no provision of the Constitution that gives Congress power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union or any executive or judicial officer of the United States the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction or direct the disposition of any property located or American residing there.

The “Great Mystery”
The “Great Mystery,” then, is how certain officers of the United States can—with a straight face and no hesitation, even when directly challenged—knowingly and willfully repudiate the provisions of the Constitution relating to the legislative power of Congress and the commensurate jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers of that certain government established by the Constitution March 4, 1789, and usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing within the Union.

Such officers include the attorney general of the United States, assistant attorneys general of the United States, United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, United States marshals and deputy marshals, and other officers of the United States Department of Justice, Supreme Court justices, United States circuit judges, United States district judges, and United States magistrate judges, as well as personnel of the Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service.

A primary example of such usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction within the Union by officers of the United States is the United States district judge in the Houston action at law ordering (a) Petitioner to vacate the premises of Petitioner’s home in Montgomery County, Texas, under threat of application of deadly force by the United States marshal, and (b) seizure and sale of said real property.

Other examples of usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction within the Union by executive or judicial officers of the United States, as facilitated by congressional legislation, against property located or Americans residing there, are:

IRS summonses
Lawsuits for failure to respond to an IRS summons
Judicial orders to show cause why defendant should not be compelled to obey an IRS summons
Judicial orders to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt for failure to produce books and records in response to an IRS summons
Judicial reduction of tax liens to judgment for purposes of foreclosure on real property
IRS summons hearings and audits
IRS seizure of funds in bank accounts by levy
IRS seizure / garnishment of wages by levy
Executive seizure of real or personal property
Judicial or executive enforcement of the USA PATRIOT ACT
Judicial or executive enforcement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)
Judicial or executive enforcement of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (e.g., orders issued by Department of Homeland Security personnel to travelers at airports for non-immigration or non-customs reasons; detention of such travelers)
Judicial or executive enforcement of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
Judicial or executive enforcement of among others, the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Eighteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution

Principal part of executive and judicial jurisdiction
“Cujusque rei potissima pars principium est. The principal part of everything is the beginning.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s”), p. 2130.
The beginning of our tripartite system of government is the Constitution, ordained and established by the People September 17, 1787, and implemented March 4, 1789, where Articles I, II, and III thereof establish, respectively, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

The beginning of the authority for any elected official or officer of the United States to exercise the legislative, executive, or judicial power of the United States is Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, which provides:
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”

The beginning of all congressional legislation is Section 1 of Statute I, Chapter I, “An Act to regulate the Time and Manner of administering certain Oaths,” 1 Stat. 23, June 1, 1789 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=1&page=23), which provides the oath of office for the president of the Senate and all members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added):
“Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and [House of] [sic] Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth article of the Constitution of the United States, shall be administered in the form following, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.’ The said oath or affirmation shall be administered within three days of the passing of this act . . .”

The beginning of authority for executive and judicial officers of the United States to exercise the executive or judicial power of the United States is Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 24 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=1&page=24); which provides (Underline emphasis added):
“Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That all officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed under the authority of the United States, shall, before they act in their respective offices, take the same oath or affirmation [as provided in Section 1], which shall be administered by the person or persons who shall be authorized by law to administer to such officers their respective oaths of office ; and such officers shall incur the same penalties, in case of failure, as shall be imposed by law in case of failure in taking their respective oaths of office.

Seminal act of congressional treason to the Constitution and American People
“The rich rules over the poor, and the borrower is the servant of the lender.” Proverbs 22:7.
Congress always has had other loyalties, bought and paid for by the highest bidder—in 1789 the Rothschild-run private Bank of England, world’s first state-sanctioned fractional-reserve “lender”[2] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn2) and future parent bank[3] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn3) of today’s Rothschild-run[4] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn4)private Federal Reserve,[5] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn5) sole “lender” (creditor) to today’s financially insatiable “borrower,” Congress.

Notwithstanding the clarity of Sections 1 and 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, supra, as to the oath of office to be taken by all executive and judicial “officers appointed, or hereafter to be appointed under the authority of the United States,” supra, 1 Stat. 24, Congress 12 weeks later in “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,” Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, September 24, 1789 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=1&page=73) (the “Judiciary Act”), repudiate the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, at 76 in Section 8 thereof (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=1&page=76) and create a special oath or affirmation exclusively for judicial officers of the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added):
“Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That the justices of the Supreme Court, and the district judges, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation, to wit : ‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, a do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”

The above oath, taken by the original Supreme Court justices and district judges differs materially from the oath mandated at Section 1 of the Act of June 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 23, supra, and taken by the president of the Senate (vice president of the United States) and every member of the Senate and House of Representatives, in that it contains a religious test; to wit: “So help me God.”

Irrespective of how noble or virtuous said organic oath or affirmation for judicial officers may seem, said oath or affirmation and the ordinary act of Congress providing it are repugnant to Article VI, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, as such species of oath or affirmation is expressly prohibited by the provisions of said article and clause, supra, and therefore, for purposes of accession to “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, void; to wit:
“It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . .
“. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.
“. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).

Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution tells us that “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”

The religious test required as a qualification to the office of justice of the Supreme Court or district judge in the oath or affirmation at Section 8 of the Judiciary Act taken by every such judicial officer means that no such justice or judge is authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, anywhere within the Union for failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

Every oath or affirmation taken by every justice or judge of the United States since September 24, 1789, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, circuit judge of the United States, United States district judge, or United States magistrate judge, the most modern of which is 28 U.S.C. § 453 Oath of justices and judges of the United States, December 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5124 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/453), which provides (Underline emphasis added.):
“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

Whereas, any oath or affirmation that has a religious test as a qualification to any judicial office under the United States operates as an automatic bar to accession to authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, there has never been a justice or judge of the United States in the history of the Republic authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., for universal failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.[6] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn6)

No judge of the United States has taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution and no such judge has any business sitting on the bench of any United States district court anywhere in the Union—and each and every judge who does is a rogue judge.

Continnued . . . . . .

monty

11th February 2017, 04:23 PM

Dr. Trowbridge's update continued. . .

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com

Three species of court and judge
United States attorneys and district and magistrate judges and Supreme Court justices are constantly chirping about how federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; to wit:
“As we have repeatedly said: ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . .’” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 611 U. S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted)).

However true said statement may be, federal courts of limited jurisdiction are devoid of federal judges per se—because those who haunt the corridors and chambers of the federal courts of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union are not federal judges per se but judges of a different species.

It is essential that the reader understand the actual meaning of the word “federal”; to wit:
“fed′er-al . . . Of or pertaining to, or founded upon and organized by, a compact or act or union between separate sovereign states . . .” A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 667.

In the case of the Republic, the compact is the Constitution and the “separate sovereign states” the members of the Union.[7] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn7)

As shown below, all official use of the term “federal judge” is specious and intended to deceive—because no such judge has ever existed.

The three kinds of courts brought into existence by Congress, and their respective judges, are:

Federal: courts of limited jurisdiction ordained and established by Congress under express authority Article III 1 of the Constitution, and federal judges authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., in such courts throughout the Union for having taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution—of which there has never been any such judge in American history.

Territorial: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and territorial judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e. United States territories and enclaves; between the Judiciary Act (September 24, 1789) and sometime after incorporation of the District of Columbia, 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419) (February 21, 1871).

Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419), and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15) (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=4935), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and omit to define “United States” in a geographical sense—and today every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judge usurping exercise of general jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation throughout the Union with no authority to do so.

Bereft of authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, every justice of the Supreme Court and every United States district judge and magistrate judge is under the exclusive control of the legislative power (Congress), who manages the activities of such justices and judges by way of the laws of the “United States” (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation), i.e., municipal law of the District of Columbia known as, among others, the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations.

“Legal” tyranny
What distinguishes the Constitution from all other sovereign instruments of creation in the community of nations is the doctrine of separation of powers manifested in the tripartite system of government established by Articles I, II, and III thereof; to wit:
“separation of powers. The division of governmental authority into three branches of government — legislative, executive, and judicial — each with specified duties on which neither of the other branches can encroach; the constitutional doctrine of checks and balances by which the people are protected against tyranny.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1999) (hereinafter “Black’s”), pp. 1369-1370.

The political opposite of tyranny is liberty; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“LIBERTY (Lat. liber, free; libertas, freedom, liberty). Freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing, and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from without.

“Civil liberty . . . . Under the Roman law, civil liberty was the affirmance of a general restraint, while in our law it is the negation of a general restraint . . .

“Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they judge most consistent with their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men. . . .

“Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law
. . . .” Bouvier’s, pp. 1964-1965.
* The essence of due course of law—also known as due process of law and the law of the land—is constitutional authority; to wit:
“Due process of law . . . refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed . . .” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 3 Sup. Ct. 111, 292 (1884).

The primary purpose of separation of powers in government is the preservation of liberty; to wit (Underline emphasis added in all citations.):
“The framers of our political system had a full appreciation of the necessity of keeping separate and distinct the primary departments of the government. Mr. Hamilton, in the seventy-eighth number of the Federalist, says that he agrees with the maxim of Montesquieu, that ‘there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’” Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).

“This Court [Supreme Court] consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty. See, e. g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 (http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/487/654.html#685)-696 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S., at 725 (http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/478/714.html#725). Madison, in writing about the principle of separated powers, said: ‘No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.’ The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).’” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).

“[488 U.S. 380-381] Madison, defending the Constitution against charges that it established insufficiently separate Branches, addressed the point directly. Separation of powers, he wrote, ‘d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,’ but rather ‘that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.’ The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S., at 442 (http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/433/425.html#442), n. 5. . . .”

“[488 U.S. 394] [W]e recognize the continuing vitality of Montesquieu’s admonition: “‘Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul,’” The Federalist No. 47, p. 326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison), quoting Montesquieu . . .”

“[A]fter stating that the judiciary is the weakest of the three departments of the government, and that though oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, he [Hamilton, in Federalist 78] says: ‘The general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and the executive. For I agree that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments . . .” McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 180-181 (1891).

Absent the faculty of liberty, as derived from Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution by way of institution of separation of the powers of government, there would be no substantial difference between the tyrannical sovereignty of Great Britain from which the American People originally freed themselves beginning in 1776, and the new government in America, with Congress as collective monarch and the People its subjects; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“It will be sufficient to observe briefly that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That system considers the Prince as the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a court of justice or elsewhere. . . . The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the Prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.

“Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or State sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here, it rests with the people. . . .” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793).

The judicial power’s jurisdictional equal: the executive power
We know that the judicial power is commensurate or co-extensive with the legislative power; the same is true for “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

Section 4 of Statute I, Chapter I cited supra, 1 Stat. 24, June 1, 1789, requires that all executive officers of the United States take the oath or affirmation provided in Section 1 thereof prior to exercising “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution, supra, and Section 4 of the Act of June 1, 1789, supra, as to the requirement to be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution free of a religious test, the organic act establishing the first “attorney-general for the United States,” 1 Stat. 93 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=1&page=93), i.e., the Judiciary Act, requires only that said executive officer be “sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office,” id. (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=1&page=93); no mention of the Constitution.

Today’s attorney general of the United States, Jeff Sessions, and every other officer of the United States Department of Justice takes what is known as the Standard Form 61, Appointment Affidavit part A Oath of Office (https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/ag_lynch_appointment_affidavit/download), which provides (Underline emphasis added.):
“I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.”

Every officer of the United States Department of Justice who takes the above oath of office self-disqualifies himself from acceding to “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1—and now we have our answer as to why in the Lufkin action at law the United States attorney goes silent when Petitioner on September 14, 2015, demands the provision of the Constitution that gives the Court the capacity to take jurisdiction and enter judgment against property in Tyler County, Texas, and the magistrate and district judge pretend in their court process and judgment that Petitioner never asked the question: None are authorized to exercise “The executive Power,” id., or “The judicial Power of the United States,” id. at Art. III, § 1 anywhere within the Union for failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

Every executive and judicial officer of the United States in the history of the Republic is a legislative-branch officer under the absolute exclusive legislative control of Congress, a political alien to the executive or judicial power, and bereft of authority without the boundaries of federal territory.

Beginning with the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, the People have been denied the “unalienable Rights,” The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, Preamble, of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” id., and deprived of life, liberty, and property[8] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn8) without due process of law by legislative-branch super-factotums ensconced in the so-called United States Department of Justice and district courts—courts where the power of judging is joined with that of legislating and executing and there is no separation of powers and there is no due process of law.

This means that in addition to the bulleted examples of usurpation of territorial jurisdiction cited supra, there is no authority for any such executive or judicial officer to exercise any form of jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, that every such act constitutes usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction and is an act of tyranny, and that the entire legal system is a fraud and hoax, with every United States district court a kangaroo court; to wit:
“kangaroo court.
1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . .
2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible.
3. A sham legal proceeding.” Black’s, p. 359.

It also means that every single Supreme Court decision and district court judgment since September 24, 1789, is void for every participating executive and judicial officer’s failure to have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms with the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution and every such officer’s culpability for betrayal of public trust, usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction within the Union, and treason to the Constitution; to wit:
“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).

New lawsuit to enforce IRS summons; Petitioner’s response
In June of 2016 a certain IRS revenue agent issued and personally served on Petitioner an administrative summons, Internal Revenue Manual 25.5.6.3.1.1 (https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-005-006.html#d0e209), deceitfully entitled “Summons,” tacitly representing to be authorized to exercise “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, take territorial jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas, and issue the summons against Petitioner.

Petitioner responded with a “Notice and Warning of Commercial Grace” and heard nothing back for seven months when, on January 24, 2017, the same revenue agent personally served on Petitioner a petition instituted by the United States attorney in the local United States district court in behalf of the revenue agent and Internal Revenue Service, and accompanying Order to Show Cause, signed by the judge, as to why Petitioner “should not be ordered to comply with the Internal Revenue Service summons. (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/a-petition-instituted-by-the-united-states-attorney-in-the-local-united-states-district-court.pdf)”

Notwithstanding that said petition only contemplates the need for an order for Petitioner to produce the documents described in the summons, which would be determined at the hearing, the Order to Show Cause nevertheless asserts its own preemptive order for Petitioner to bring to the hearing the documents enumerated in the IRS summons.

The judge wants Petitioner to suffer the object of the lawsuit—production of books and records—prior to having a fair hearing and determining the need for such an order, confirmation that there is no due process of law in any United States district court; to wit:
“due process. The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.” Black’s, p. 516.

Also, the docket in the previous case, the Houston action at equity, now includes a new reference to the current IRS summons case, noting “Related Case: 4:16-mc-02878” (the IRS summons case)—which is unusual because that case was closed two months ago (December 5, 2016) and the subject matter of the two cases is unrelated; to wit: The previous case is an action at equity concerning a prior void judgment; the new case is about failure to respond to an IRS summons.

Wherefore, it is reasonable to presume that the judge in the new summons case is prejudiced against Petitioner, likely for steps taken by Petitioner against his co-worker, the judge in the said Houston action at equity—where Petitioner sued 47 defendants, the judge ruled against Petitioner, and Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the judge and then amended it (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/and-then-amended-it-upon-resolution-of-the-e2809cgreat-mysterye2809d.pdf) (upon resolution of the “Great Mystery”)—and would be happy to be able to hold Petitioner in contempt and have Petitioner arrested and incarcerated and who knows what else.

In Petitioner’s response to the IRS summons petition, which incorporates the fruits of resolution of the “Great Mystery,” supra, Petitioner on February 8, 2017, sent to the court for filing February 9, 2017, and counsel for petitioner United States of America (and constructive petitioner Internal Revenue Service) a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/a-rule-12b6-motion-to-dismiss-for-failure-to-state-a-claim-upon-which-relief-can-be-granted.pdf).

A Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_12) must be heard and decided before proceeding any further (Rule 12(i) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_12)).

Petitioner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion demonstrates that (a) the subject revenue agent has no authority to exercise “The executive Power,” Constitution, Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, or take territorial jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas, or issue said summons against Petitioner, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b) the summons is a legal nullity, thereby depriving the United States attorney of any evidence of any fact upon which a claim for relief could be granted.

Continued . . . . . . .

monty

11th February 2017, 04:34 PM

Dr. Trowbridge's February 11, 2017 update continued . . . .

https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com

The actual situation
As of September 24, 1789, the People have been denied the “unalienable Rights,” The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, Preamble, of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” id., and deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law by legislative-branch super-factotum executive and judicial officers—in courts where the power of judging is joined with that of legislating and executing and there is no separation of powers and the unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property are a fantasy—the essence of tyranny.

The raison d’être of the actors perpetrating the above organized treasonous conspiracy is the longevity of their sole “lender” (creditor), the Rothschild private Federal Reserve (seefns. 3-5)—for without wholesale extortion and retirement from circulation of a substantial amount of electronic digits in the paychecks and bank accounts of ordinary Americans the fraud of the banking system reveals itself through rampant inflation and higher and higher prices with no commensurate rise in wages.

Although Petitioner and those helping him, as well as the American People, are forced to cope in a legal context with the fraud and treason of those trusted with the custody of the law and its execution by the Framers and those who ratified the Constitution, the ultimate situation is not of a legal nature but rather political—a potential state of affairs for which the Founding Fathers presciently provided; to wit:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. . . . That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” Id.

Same family of bankers pulling the strings today as in 1776
“[T]he policies of the monarch are always those of his creditors.” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1261.

The ultimate source of the policies of today’s stealth congressional, executive, and judicial tyranny is the same usurious family of fractional-reserve bankers and exclusive creditors to borrower-servant King George III: Rothschild.

Sen. Robert Latham Owen (D-Okla.), former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and Senate sponsor of the Glass-Owen Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, tries to make amends for supporting the Federal Reserve and on January 24, 1939, places into the Congressional Record the following historical account of Benjamin Franklin’s visit to England and events shortly thereafter (Benjamin Franklin’s words underlined); to wit:
“Benjamin Franklin, on being asked in Great Britain how he accounted for the prosperous condition of the Colonies, said:
“‘That is simple. It is only because in the Colonies we issue our own money. It is called colonial scrip[9] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn9), and we issue it in the proper proportion to the demand of trade and industry.’

“It was not very long until this information was brought to the Rothschilds’ bank, and they saw that here was a nation that was ready to be exploited; here was a nation that had been setting up an example that they could issue their own money in place of the money coming through the banks. So the Rothschild Bank caused a bill to be introduced in the English Parliament which provided that no colony of England could issue their own money. They had to use English money. Consequently the Colonies were compelled to discard their scrip and mortgage themselves to the Bank of England in order to get money. For the first time in the history . . . our money began to be based on debt.

“Benjamin Franklin stated that in 1 year from that date the streets of the Colonies were filled with the unemployed, because when England exchanged with them, she gave the Colonies only half as many units of payment in borrowed money from the Rothschild Bank as they had in scrip. In other words, their circulating medium was reduced 50 percent, and everyone became unemployed. The poor houses became filled, according to Benjamin Franklin's own statement. . . .
“He said that this was the original cause of the Revolutionary War. In his own language:
“‘The Colonies would gladly have borne the little tax on tea and other matter had it not been that England took away from the Colonies their money, which created unemployment and dissatisfaction.’” Benjamin Franklin, quoted in John R. Elsom, Lightning over the Treasury Building (Boston: Forum Press, 1941), pp. 29-30, quoted in Robert Latham Owen, National Economy and the Banking System of the United States: An Exposition of the Principles of Modern Monetary Science in their Relation to the National Economy and the Banking System of the United States, Senate Document No. 23, January 24, 1939, 76th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 98-99.

It took only about one percent of the American Colonists to defeat the Bank of England-financed British army and navy and 30,000 paid killers (Hessian mercenaries) and break free of Rothschild policies enforced by King George III.

There are today not near so many Rothschild quislings[[10] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn10)], grunts, or white-collar mercenaries in the District of Columbia or scattered around the Union (and globe).

PDF version (sans hyperlinks) of today’s post (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/pdf-version-of-todays-post.pdf)
______________________
[1] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref1) “blackletter law. One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled. ● The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very bold and black. — Also termed hornbook law.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul Minn.: West Group, 1999), p. 163.

[2] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref2) “[T]he Bank [of England] had the power to issue [i.e., create from thin-air and loan into circulation its own promissory] notes.

“It issued [created from thin-air and loaned] these [promissory notes] to an amount equal to the sum [of gold] advanced [loaned] to the Government [thereby doubling its wealth as to the value of the loan, every time it made a loan of gold to the government]. . . .” A. Andréadès, History of the Bank of England 1640 to 1903, Fourth Edition (Reprint), Christabel Meredith, Translator (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 85.

“It [Bank of England] coined, in short, its own credit into paper money.” Thorold Rogers, The First Nine Years of the Bank of England (Oxford, 1887), p. 9, quoted in Andréadès, supra, p. 82.

[3] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref3) The Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, is the creation of Baron Alfred Charles de Rothschild (1842–1918), director of the Bank of England (Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, Second Edition, 1992 Election Edition (Staunton, Va.: Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization, 1992), p. 102), implemented via his straw author, Paul Moritz Warburg (id. at 128), a German banker and Rothschild confederate awarded United States citizenship in 1911 specifically for this purpose; later dubbed “Father of the Federal Reserve” by the New York Times. The private Federal Reserve, incorporated under aegis of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, is modeled by its architect, Baron Rothschild, after the private Bank of England.

[4] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref4) An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own 96% of all media worldwide) reveals unilateral Rothschild control of the American economy (via controlling interest in each of the New York Fed’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the other 11 regional Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the Fed’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and Congress’ employer, the U.S. Government, and, by virtue of the Fed’s private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy); to wit, in pertinent part:
“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).

“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.” AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009,
http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A.

[5] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref5) “Federal Reserve Banks . . . are not federal instrumentalities . . . but are independent, privately owned and locally controlled corporations.” Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.1982).

“The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly. . . .” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

[6] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref6) It will come as a shock for every officer of the uniformed services who has taken the oath at 5 U.S.C. § 3331 to learn that he or she and his or her compatriots are serving something other than the Republic or “their country”: the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation (infra, under “Three species of court and judge”).

[7] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref7) These facts are acknowledged by Congress in but a single obscure provision of Title 28 U.S.C., which admits of members of the Union as actual countries; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“§ 297 Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states
“(a) The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may assign any circuit, district, magistrate, or territorial judge of a court of the Ninth Circuit, with the consent of the judge so assigned, to serve temporarily as a judge of any duly constituted court of the freely associated compact states whenever an official duly authorized by the laws of the respective compact state requests such assignment and such assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the respective court.

“(b) The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses, including transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts any amount received pursuant to this subsection.”

[8] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref8) “Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. . . .” Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872).

[9] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref9) “scrip. . . . [U. S.] paper currency of a denomination less than a dollar: not now issued.”A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 1606.

[10] (http://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref10) “quisling , , , noun . . . a traitorous national who aids the invader of his country and often serves as chief agent or puppet governor.” Webster’s New Third International Dictionary, Unabridged (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1993), s.v. “Quisling.”

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monty

13th February 2017, 08:28 AM

The previous post of Dr. John Parks Trowbridge Jr.'s most recent blog entry is quite long, probably many wont read it. It can be distilled down to a few sentences.

First, the Constitution has not given the United States Congress or her courts TERRITORIAL jurisdiction in any of the states of the Union.

Per John Parks Trowbridge Jr.

Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation anywhere in the Union.This means executive and judicial officers of the United States have no territiorial jurisdiction anywhere in the Union.
“Territorial jurisdiction” is defined as follows:
“—Territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction considered as limited to cases arising or persons residing within a defined territory, as a county, a judicial district, etc. The authority of any court is limited by the boundaries thus fixed.” Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1910), p. 673.

His objection and demand brought the US District Courts for the Eastern District of Texas to a screeching halt

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf

His motion to dismiss provides remedy

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/demand-for-dismissal-filed-093015.pdf

Doctor Trowbridge quotes case law and provides legal definitions to validate his writings.

Then he continues on to explain how these imposters in black robes can lie with a straight face when they usurp jurisdiction.

In a nutshell, the oath of office contain a religious test which is repugnant to Article VI Oaths Clause, No religious tests. Any judicial officer taking the oath is an imposter becuase the oath is repugnant to the Constitution.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_Religious_Test_Clause
No Religious Test Clause

The No Religious Test Clause of the United States Constitution (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Constitution) is a clause (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependent_clause) within Article VI (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Six_of_the_United_States_Constitution), Section 3. By its plain terms, no federal office holder or employee can be required to adhere to or accept any particular religion (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion) or doctrine (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctrine) as a prerequisite to holding a federal office or a federal government (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_government_of_the_United_States) job. It immediately follows a clause (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_clause) requiring all federal and state (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._state) officers to take an oath (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oath) or affirmation (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirmation_in_law) to support the Constitution. This clause contains the only explicit reference to religion in the original seven articles of the U.S. Constitution.
The ban on religious tests contained in this clause protects only federal office holders and employees. It does not apply to the states, many of which imposed religious tests at the time of the nation's founding. State tests limited public offices to Christians or, in some states, only to Protestants. The national government, on the other hand, could not impose any religious test whatsoever. National offices would be open to everyone. No federal official has ever been subjected to a formal religious test for holding office.[1] (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_Religious_Test_Clause#cite_note-1)
This clause is cited by advocates of separation of church and state (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_church_and_state) as an example of the "original intent (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Originalism)" of the Framers of the Constitution (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Founding_Fathers_of_the_United_States) to avoid any entanglement between church and state, or involving the government (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government) in any way as a determiner of religious beliefs or practices. This is significant because this clause represents the words of the original Framers, even prior to the Establishment Clause (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Establishment_Clause) of the First Amendment (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution) .

Since Sept. 24, 1789 the oath has contained a religious test. The oath is invalid because it is repugnant to the Constituion. The justices and judges can usurp jurisdiction and feel no guilt because their oath of office means nothing. This is the "GREAT MYSTERY" Dr. Trowbridge has exposed. Dr. Trowbridge contends no federal officer, including the judiciary is legitimate and cannot represent the government of the United States of America in an official capacity.

He further points out they are operating under the municipal law of Washington DC.

The complete details of this massive fraud are in his post.

Ares

13th February 2017, 08:33 AM

The previous post of Dr. John Parks Trowbridge Jr.'s most recent blog entry is quite long, probably many wont read it. It can be distilled down to a few sentences.

First, the Constitution has not given the United States Congress or her courts TERRITORIAL jurisdiction in any of the states of the Union.

Per John Parks Trowbridge Jr.

His objection and demand brought the US District Courts for the Eastern District of Texas to a screeching halt

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/filed-dkt-58-objection-and-demand-091415.pdf

His motion to dismiss provides remedy

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/demand-for-dismissal-filed-093015.pdf

Doctor Trowbridge quotes case law and provides legal definitions to validate his writings.

Then he continues on to explain how these imposters in black robes can lie with a straight face when they usurp jurisdiction.

In a nutshell, the oath of office contain a religious test which is repugnant to Article VI Oaths Clause, No religious tests. Any judicial officer taking the oath is an imposter becuase the oath is repugnant to the Constitution.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_Religious_Test_Clause
No Religious Test Clause

The No Religious Test Clause of the United States Constitution (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Constitution) is a clause (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependent_clause) within Article VI (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Six_of_the_United_States_Constitution), Section 3. By its plain terms, no federal office holder or employee can be required to adhere to or accept any particular religion (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion) or doctrine (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctrine) as a prerequisite to holding a federal office or a federal government (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_government_of_the_United_States) job. It immediately follows a clause (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_clause) requiring all federal and state (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._state) officers to take an oath (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oath) or affirmation (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirmation_in_law) to support the Constitution. This clause contains the only explicit reference to religion in the original seven articles of the U.S. Constitution.
The ban on religious tests contained in this clause protects only federal office holders and employees. It does not apply to the states, many of which imposed religious tests at the time of the nation's founding. State tests limited public offices to Christians or, in some states, only to Protestants. The national government, on the other hand, could not impose any religious test whatsoever. National offices would be open to everyone. No federal official has ever been subjected to a formal religious test for holding office.[1] (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_Religious_Test_Clause#cite_note-1)
This clause is cited by advocates of separation of church and state (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_church_and_state) as an example of the "original intent (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Originalism)" of the Framers of the Constitution (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Founding_Fathers_of_the_United_States) to avoid any entanglement between church and state, or involving the government (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government) in any way as a determiner of religious beliefs or practices. This is significant because this clause represents the words of the original Framers, even prior to the Establishment Clause (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Establishment_Clause) of the First Amendment (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution) .

Since Sept. 24, 1789 the oath has contained a religious test. The oath is invalid because it is repugnant to the Constituion. The justices and judges can usurp jurisdiction and feel no guilt because their oath of office means nothing. This is the "GREAT MYSTERY" Dr. Trowbridge has exposed. Dr. Trowbridge contends no federal officer, including the judiciary is legitimate and cannot represent the government of the United States of America in an official capacity.

He further points out they are operating under the municipal law of Washington DC.

The complete details of this massive fraud are in his post.

Thanks for summarizing. He keeps digging down the rabbit hole, he's going to eventually come up to why we are where we are... Civil War, and the reconstruction act.

monty

15th February 2017, 09:06 AM

The recent actions in the Trowbridge v Lew Et Al and new cases filed can be read here. They are pdf fotos, not embedable.

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/a-petition-instituted-by-the-united-states-attorney-in-the-local-united-states-district-court.pdf

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/and-then-amended-it-upon-resolution-of-the-e2809cgreat-mysterye2809d.pdf

monty

15th February 2017, 09:14 AM

Edit: Because the oath of office for the federal officers contains a religious test and is repugnant to Article VI Sec. 3 the federal judges and justices cannot hold the judicial power of the Article III judicial branch of government.

Also, all the agencies of the administrative branch are usurping jurisdiction under the municipal government of Washington DC as explained below.

Exertped from the recent blog post:

It is essential that the reader understand the actual meaning of the word “federal”; to wit:
“fed′er–al . . . Of or pertaining to, or founded upon and organized by, a compact or act or union between separate sovereign states . . .” A Standard Dictionary of the English Language, Isaac K. Funk, Editor in Chief (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903), p. 667.

In the case of the Republic, the compact is the Constitution and the “separate sovereign states” the members of the Union.[7] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftn7) (Footnote 7 is posted below)

As shown below, all official use of the term “federal judge” is specious and intended to deceive—because no such judge has ever existed.

The three kinds of courts brought into existence by Congress, and their respective judges, are:

Federal: courts of limited jurisdiction ordained and established by Congress under express authority Article III 1 of the Constitution, and federal judges authorized to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” id., in such courts throughout the Union for having taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution—of which there has never been any such judge in American history.

Territorial: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of the territorial clause of the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, and territorial judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction in “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e. United States territories and enclaves; between the Judiciary Act (September 24, 1789) and sometime after incorporation of the District of Columbia, 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419) (February 21, 1871).

Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419), and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15) (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=4935), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and omit to define “United States” in a geographical sense—and today every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judge usurping exercise of general jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation throughout the Union with no authority to do so.

Bereft of authority to exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1, every justice of the Supreme Court and every United States district judge and magistrate judge is under the exclusive control of the legislative power (Congress), who manages the activities of such justices and judges by way of the laws of the “United States” (District of Columbia Municipal Corporation),i.e., municipal law of the District of Columbia known as, among others, the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations.)

Footnote 7:
[7] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/#_ftnref7) These facts are acknowledged by Congress in but a single obscure provision of Title 28 U.S.C., which admits of members of the Union as actual countries; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“§ 297 Assignment of judges to courts of the freely associated compact states

“(a) The Chief Justice or the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may assign any circuit, district, magistrate, or territorial judge of a court of the Ninth Circuit, with the consent of the judge so assigned, to serve temporarily as a judge of any duly constituted court of the freely associated compact states whenever an official duly authorized by the laws of the respective compact state requests such assignment and such assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the respective court.

“(b) The Congress consents to the acceptance and retention by any judge so authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a) of all necessary travel expenses, including transportation, and of subsistence, or of a reasonable per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence. The judge shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts any amount received pursuant to this subsection.”

Bigjon

15th February 2017, 10:02 AM

monty

15th February 2017, 10:11 AM

This is unconstitutional, as it sets up a separate state within a state. They had no charter to do this.

Yes, but isn't most of what they do unconstitutional? Until the public becomes aware this isn't going to change.

If states and counties weren't "greenmailed" with federal grant dollars it might be possible to get local legislatures and law enforcement to run them out of the states.

Glass

15th February 2017, 08:03 PM

Its a "parallel universe".

And people aren't given a choice because slave traders keep entering the first universe and coercing everyone into the parallel universe or kidnapping those that don't want to go / cross over.

And the key to it's function is political parties and politics. Neither of these are government but people mistake them as government. The Democrats are not Government, nor are the Republicans. They are politics who have convinced people to hand over their right to of control of government to them. They all have superior allegiances than to the constitution and other institutions of government, or to the people. They then tell the government (trustee) what to do, and basically what they tell it is designed to benefit them and theirs at the cost of you and yours.

People need to realize that the political parties are all owned by someone.... they are not simply friendship groups. Someone owns them.

Until politics is removed from the process/situation the problems will persist. For this to happen, the people need to evolve into mature responsible people prepared to take on this responsibility themselves. I fear we still have a long way to go.... and we seem to be going backwards.

palani

16th February 2017, 07:18 AM

This is unconstitutional, as it sets up a separate state within a state. They had no charter to do this.
Unfortunately (as well as by plan) this is a result of the XIV amendment which creates a national government. Prior to this the US of A was merely a federation of independent countries. Each of these independent countries under the federation had a capital city with territory attached. The laws these state citizens complied with were all municipal laws of the capital city. The purpose of the federation was to control the interaction between signatory countries.

In much the same way the U.N. has established PRIVATE international law between their member countries. The reason their international law is PRIVATE is that originally international law in general was intended to define the relations between CHRISTIAN countries.

Anytime you have a nation you have a capital city and the laws of that municipality apply to the territory attached.

palani

16th February 2017, 07:23 AM

People need to realize that the political parties are all owned by someone.... they are not simply friendship groups. Someone owns them.
Attributes of parties are all the same. They come with funny hats, horns to blow, party favors and frequently booze, sex and outrageous behavior. Political parties share these features with any other class of party (wedding,birthday, anniversary).

monty

16th February 2017, 10:06 AM

Municipal: courts of general jurisdiction created by Congress under implied authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution following incorporation of the District of Columbia February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419), and municipal judges authorized to exercise general jurisdiction within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia; Congress on November 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4935, Congress in 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176, § 3002(15) (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=104&page=4935), in Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (under which all civil or criminal proceedings are conducted), define “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” id., the object of which definition and meaning is the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, and omit to define “United States” in a geographical sense—and today every United States district and magistrate judge in every district court of limited jurisdiction throughout the Union is a District of Columbia municipal judgeusurping exercise of general jurisdiction and declaring municipal law of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation throughout the Union with no authority to do so.

The Washington DC US District Court judge also said her jurisdiction and the Texas Court jurisdiction comes from Congress power to tax, Article I Sec. 8. Cl. 1. She didn't say her that her court was created by implied Article I Sec. 8 Cl. 17 authority, but I believe she backs up Dr. Trowbridge's allegation. The Article I Sec. 8 Cl. 1 taxing power does not explain the Oregon and Nevada courts claiming criminal jurisdiction. The Clause 17 municipal court does cover it. Congressmen's allegiance to the Rothchild's banks since their first central bank in the 18th century is the direct cause.

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/district-of-columbia-memorandum-order-dismissing-petitioner_s-complaint.pdf

https://s19.postimg.org/8gfe4bw9v/IMG_1499.png

https://rasica.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/woodrow-wilson-regret4.jpg

monty

11th March 2017, 05:57 PM

The United States deposited $100,000.00 into the Court Registy (CRIS) for One of their cases against Trowbridge. That must be their reward for entering a judgement against him

https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/5421119/UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA_v_Trowbridge,_Jr_et_al

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Trowbridge, Jr. et al

Texas Eastern District Court (https://www.pacermonitor.com/court/178/Texas_Eastern)

Judge:
Ron Clark (https://www.pacermonitor.com/person/812/ron_clark)

Referred:
Zack Hawthorn (https://www.pacermonitor.com/person/1893/zack_hawthorn)

Case #:
9:14-cv-00138

Nature of Suit
870 Federal Tax Suits - Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant)

Cause
26:7401 IRS: Tax Liability

Case Filed:
Jul 07, 2014

Terminated:
Mar 03, 2016

Docket (https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/5421119/UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA_v_Trowbridge,_Jr_et_al#do cket)
Parties (5) (https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/5421119/UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA_v_Trowbridge,_Jr_et_al#pa rties)

Docket last updated: 03/10/2017 11:59 PM CST

Friday, March 03, 2017

misc
Registry Funds Received
Fri 3:24 PM
Registry Funds Received from UNITED STATES OF AMERICA in the amount of $100,000.00, Receipt 6-34668 (mjc, )

https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!msg/lawmen/YM7F8zxOwm0/oDe7hGVvMsAJ

Court Registry Investment System, how courts earn interest on investements

Glass

11th March 2017, 06:42 PM

While your comment is correct, it's the banking system that the courts are, its setting off Big Ben Bells ringing for me.

I think Winston Shrout might have covered this. I don't have my notes here with me but I feel confident he might have covered this. He did a bunch of presentations. I would probably look at his Shenowa? seminar. Not sure if that is the right spelling but it should be obvious if you can find a list of his videos.

It maybe that you can do an Accept for Value on the court paperwork and cash out that account. I'm not sure if I have my wires crossed about this specific account but Winston certainly went over an A4V process to do with court documents..... and the "clerk" paid out on the paperwork.

Either that or the Agency is extremely confident they will be warehousing the goods in the very near future.

crimethink

11th March 2017, 06:57 PM

The United States deposited $100,000.00 into the Court Registy (CRIS) for One of their cases against Trowbridge. That must be their reward for entering a judgement against him

I have a PACER account, so I logged in to take a look. Interesting. The document in question is Document 85, and, of course, is not available. Just a simple line entry.

Glass

11th March 2017, 07:03 PM

I have a PACER account, so I logged in to take a look. Interesting. The document in question is Document 85, and, of course, is not available. Just a simple line entry.

I wonder is it an indemnity bond for an upcoming prosecution? I'm asking generically about Document 85. Is there a US Code describing what a Doc 85's purpose is?

monty

11th March 2017, 07:05 PM

I wonder is it an indemnity bond for an upcoming prosecution? I'm asking generically about Document 85. Is there a US Code describing what a Doc 85's purpose is?

Document 85 is the sequence number of the documents filed in this case.

monty

23rd March 2017, 08:21 AM

Re: Updates?

oh yes, likely for many months ….. I have not yet begun to fight!
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
Liberty Above All
The End of the Hoax of Federal Usurpation: www.supremecourtcase.wordpress.com (http://www.supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/)

dr.john.parks.trowbridge.jr

monty

14th April 2017, 01:25 PM

April 14, 2017 Update to SupremeCourtCase.WordPress.com from Dr. Trowbridge

New post on supremecourtcase
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Houston IRS summons case exposes linchpin of judicial-authority scam; Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment update (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/04/14/houston-irs-summons-case-exposes-linchpin-of-judicial-authority-scam-lufkin-motion-to-vacate-final-judgment-update/)

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Houston IRS summons case
In response to a petition for an order to enforce an IRS summons (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/a-petition-instituted-by-the-united-states-attorney-in-the-local-united-states-district-court.pdf), Petitioner on February 9, 2017, filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/a-rule-12b6-motion-to-dismiss-for-failure-to-state-a-claim-upon-which-relief-can-be-granted.pdf).

In opposition thereto, counsel for IRS on March 8, 2017, filed his IRS response to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/irs-response-to-the-rule-12b6-motion-to-dismiss.pdf).

Although he could not provide a legal explanation as to why, the judge at the March 27, 2017, hearing denied said Rule 12(b)(6) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_12) motion to dismiss (transcript of hearing should be available soon and will be hyperlinked here).

Thereafter, Petitioner on April 5, 2017, filed the following three separate documents:

(1) Response to Petition (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/response-to-petition.pdf),

(2) Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/motion-dismiss-by-reason-of-coram-non-judice.pdf), and

(3) Motion to Withdraw Tag-end Order of Order to Show Cause (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/motion-to-withdraw-tag-end-order-of-order-to-show-cause.pdf).

As the reader will discover in the three aforementioned filings, particularly in the Motion Dismiss by Reason of Coram Non Judice (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/motion-dismiss-by-reason-of-coram-non-judice.pdf), the linchpin of the judicial-authority scam is the special statutory definition of “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts, and used sub silentio (under silence; without any notice) by every executive and judicial officer.

Whereas, the “United States” of the Constitution is the collective of the several commonwealths united by and under authority thereof and admitted into the Union; the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure in every civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court rather is “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002).

The organic “United States” of the Constitution has no relation to the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15).

Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf) expressly prohibits a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust (elected office) under the United States (of the Constitution).
Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer requires a religious test (“So help me God.”) as a qualification to each respective office (whether elected or appointed), none are officers under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the statutory “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.

The supreme Federal corporation, incorporated February 21, 1871, under authority of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution, is a municipal corporation: the District of Columbia (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419).

Because of their oath of office and the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” all executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the District of Columbia.

Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of the Constitution, have the capacity to take limited jurisdiction (personal and subject-matter jurisdiction) all over the Union (Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1–16 (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf)).

The problem is there are no such executive or judicial officers and never have beenbecause, in accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the oath of office taken by every one of them disqualifies him from holding an office under the “United States” of the Constitution.

Executive and judicial officers under the “United States” of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) have the capacity to take general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction), but only in the District of Columbia (16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419)).

All of today’s executive and judicial officers are municipal officers under the Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 3002(15) “United States” (the District of Columbia) impersonating federal officers under the “United States” of the Constitution—and rely on mass ignorance of the meaning of the fraudulent statutory definition of “United States” to justify usurpation of exercise of general jurisdiction outside their territory (the District of Columbia).
The most egregious usurpation is that of exercise of territorial jurisdiction over property located or Americans residing within the Union—something about which we hear every day in the news for which there is no constitutional authority.

The three short, above-numbered and -hyperlinked filings in the Houston IRS summons case lay out the judicial-authority scam in simple terms.

Although counsel for IRS has no obligation to file a reply to the Response to Petition, the court-ordered deadline to do so expired April 10, 2017.

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
Ten and a half months after the March 3, 2016, final judgment in the Lufkin action at law against Petitioner’s ranch, Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a motion to vacate said final judgment as void for the judge's failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/motion-to-vacate-said-final-judgment-as-void-for-the-judge_s-failure-to-take-an-oath-or-affirmation-that-conforms-to-article-vi-clause-3-of-the-constitution.pdf).

No judge who fails to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 accedes to any office under the “United States” of the Constitution or “The judicial Power of the United States,” Constitution, Art. III, § 1.
Out of legal ammo and nowhere to hide, counsel for plaintiff on February 6, 2017, filed his response in opposition to Petitioner's motion to vacate the final judgment (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/response-in-opposition-to-petitioner_s-motion-to-vacate-the-final-judgment.pdf), making various ridiculous / frivolous arguments and factual contentions, with no evidentiary support, for which Petitioner, on February 22, 2017, in Petitioner's reply to counsel for plaintiff's response in opposition (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/petitioner_s-reply-to-counsel-for-plaintiff_s-response-in-opposition.pdf), recommended that said counsel be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)(1)-(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Petitioner’s motion granted.

The magistrate judge in charge of the Lufkin case has remained silent since receiving Petitioner’s February 22, 2017, reply to plaintiff’s February 6, 2017, response to Petitioner’s January 23, 2017, motion to vacate the final judgment as void over seven weeks ago.

• Revision to previous post
Near the top of the previous post of February 11, 2017, there were two sets of bulleted items: the first a set of three bullets and the second a set of five

The second set of five bulleted items has been reduced to three as follows:
“The totality of the limited or exclusive legislative power conferred upon Congress by a particular provision of the Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf), and the respective geographic area in which such power obtains, consists of:

“power of personal and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union and upon the high seas at Art, I, § 8, cl. 1-16;

“power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation over (what will be) the District of Columbia at Art, I, § 8, cl. 17; and

“constructive (implied) power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation at Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 in the form of “Rules and Regulations,” id., “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” id., i.e., federal territories and enclaves.

“Please note that the Constitution confers upon Congress no power of territorial legislation over person or property anywhere in the Union.”

supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/) | April 14, 2017 at 15:07 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://15) | Categories: Uncategorized (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/?cat=1) | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-qr

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monty

9th May 2017, 11:04 PM

Dr. Trowbridge's latest update, DOJ attorney floundering, judges silent . .

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DOJ attorney in Houston IRS summons case floundering; Lufkin court silent on motion to vacate final judgment (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/05/09/doj-attorney-in-houston-irs-summons-case-floundering-lufkin-court-silent-on-motion-to-vacate-final-judgment/)by supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)

Petitioner has frozen United States Department of Justice attorneys and United States district and magistrate judges in their tracks numerous times.
When cornered and beaten at their own game, their general policy is “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”
The United States attorney has failed to prove jurisdiction in any of Petitioner’s nine related cases (defendant in three, plaintiff in six) despite the legal duty to do so upon Petitioner’s challenge thereof; to wit:
“Generally, a plaintiff's allegations of jurisdiction are sufficient, but when they are questioned, as in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1936, 298 U.S. 178 (http://openjurist.org/298/us/178), 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135; Welsh v. American Surety Co., 5 Cir. 1951, 186 F.2d 16 (http://openjuristorg/186/f2d/16); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra Sec. 1363 at 653. . . .” Rosemound Sand and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416 (1972).
“The above cited decisions [six Supreme Court cases] and authorities cited therein conclusively establish the rule that if the issue is presented in any way the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon him who invokes it. . . .” Town of Lantana, Fla. v. Hopper, 102 F2d 188 (5th Cir.1989).
Whereas, United States Department of Justice attorneys are too terrified of exposure for fraud to tangle with Petitioner on the question of jurisdiction using actual evidence, they rely on their tag-team partners, United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges, to do the dirty work for them.
District, magistrate, and circuit judges, however, do not have the luxury of ignoring Petitioner; they must deal with unresolved motions and bring a case to a conclusion.
The MO. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the United States and cherry-pick and present immaterial facts which appear to support their position.
This is called lying by omission.
It is also constructive fraud.
It is the same reason no legal professional will execute an affidavit sworn to as true, correct, and complete; only a so-called declaration, which is sworn to only as “true and correct” (in some instances only “based on information and belief”).
This approach allows attorneys and judges to present a false picture of things without risking a charge of perjury; they simply leave out whatever works against them.
Since the United States district and magistrate judges control all the trial courts and the United States circuit judges the appeals courts, they figure no one is going to be able to penetrate their little coven or hold them accountable for the consequences of what they omitted to say.
This may be true legally, once things are in the court, but it is not true commercially, before matters arrive at a lawsuit.
Only municipal judges in United States district courts
Courtesy of a corrupt Congress, who fraudulently defined “United States” to mean “a Federal corporation,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002), i.e., the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, all municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges rely for their existence exclusively on linguistic confusion and cognitive dissonance among the victims of the scheme, the American People, “joint tenants in the sovereignty, Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), to perpetrate their fraud.
In civil actions, the primary job of attorneys of the United States Department of Justice is to get past the demand-letter stage (a common-law requirement before invoking the assistance of the court) and file suit and get the matter into the hands of a municipal co-worker, a United States (District of Columbia) district judge.
Once the United States (District of Columbia) attorney has done that, he can count on the United States (District of Columbia) district judge to usurp exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) and adopt and prosecute the cause sua sponte (of his own will), essentially guaranteeing the outcome; unless, of course, the case is too high-profile and the facts too clear and judgment for the United States (District of Columbia) would work against the appearance of impartiality and operate to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
The main outpoint in this and every other action at law in every United States (District of Columbia) district court in which the United States is plaintiff, is that the district judge takes territorial jurisdiction (an aspect of general jurisdiction) over the defendant and the defendant’s property—a measure which is not authorized by any provision of the Constitution and amounting to usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
Municipal judges (every justice and judge of the United States is a District of Columbia municipal bench officer) have authority to exercise general jurisdiction, but only in the District of Columbia.
Today’s municipal district, magistrate, and circuit judges have extended their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of their corporate existence, 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419), to the exterior limits of the District of Columbia, into the Union.
As shown in most of Petitioner’s filings and particularly in the recent ones in the Houston IRS summons case hyperlinked below, they are all District of Columbia municipal judges impersonating Article III constitutional judges.
The foregoing is verifiable in the record of any of the recent nine cases in which Petitioner is involved.
A municipal (not federal per se) debt collection operation
What we know as the executive and judicial branches are a collective corporate commercial debt-collection operation of the District of Columbia (“United States”), operating under color of law and masquerading as the de jure executive and judicial branches established by the Constitution; to wit: Every so-called civil or criminal proceeding in every United States District Court is administered under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/part-VI/chapter-176).
The jurisdiction of executive and judicial officers is co-extensive with the legislative powers of Congress (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435, (1793), Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat, 738, 808 (1824)): If judicial officers do not have jurisdiction in a particular geographic area, such as the Union, the same is true for executive officers—and no United States attorney has presented evidence of constitutional authority despite being challenged for the same in every one of the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved.
The remedy to the situation is commercial (not legal per se): by dealing with matters prior to the filing of a suit, before a District of Columbia municipal judge gets involved, by holding the District of Columbia Department of Justice municipal attorney personally accountable for knowing and willful usurpation of exercise of jurisdiction outside his territory (District of Columbia) under color of authority—a criminal offense for which he has no immunity and is personally liable.
Upon receipt of a demand letter from a United States (District of Columbia) attorney, by presenting him with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace requiring proof of jurisdiction and presenting evidence that he has no jurisdiction anywhere in the Union, if the he proceeds with a lawsuit without first presenting constitutional authority to take jurisdiction and do so (impossibility), he acts on his own.
Thereafter, the next step is the filing with competent authority in the particular county / borough / parish in which one is a resident or one’s property is located or the court is located or the District of Columbia or more than one of the foregoing, of an Affidavit of Information (criminal complaint) sworn to as true, correct, and complete before two or three witnesses (do not use a notary public), swearing as to the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney and attaching documentary evidence when appropriate.
Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority, the next step is to do a verified accounting of the criminal offenses sworn to in the Affidavit of Information and invoice him for the commercial value thereof, due and payable in 15 days from the date the invoice is sent.
After 20 days of mailing (five days grace for payment to arrive if mailed on the fifteenth day), if the United States attorney has not discharged his debt to you, the next step is a commercial lien in the amount of unpaid debt, filed with (a) the county recorder against any real property held in his name, and (b) the Secretary of State of the particular Union member where the county is situate, against his name.
You can also do it in the District of Columbia or with the Secretary of State of any Union member where the United States attorney debtor is considered a resident.
Such liens are passive claims which can be sold to professional debt collectors—accompanied by indisputable documentary evidence of the entire commercial exchange with the United States attorney—at a discount. The commercial paperwork can even lead to a lawsuit against him by the debt collector.
Houston IRS summons case
Petitioner’s below two Replies (third document in each of Set 1 and Set 2) are the most recent filings and demonstrate the judge’s lack of jurisdiction in simple terms.
Set 1:

Motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/motion-to-dismiss-by-reason-of-coram-non-judice2.pdf) (in the presence of a person not a judge)
Counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to dismiss (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/counsel-for-irs_s-response-in-opposition-to-motion-to-dismiss1.pdf)
Reply to counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to dismiss (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/reply-to-counsel-for-irs_s-response-in-opposition-to-motion-to-dismiss1.pdf)

Set 2:

Motion to withdraw tag-end order in order to show cause (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/motion-to-withdraw-tag-end-order-in-order-to-show-cause2.pdf)
Counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/counsel-for-irs_s-response-in-opposition-to-motion-to-withdraw-tag-end-order1.pdf)
Reply to counsel for IRS's response in opposition to motion to withdraw tag-end order (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/reply-to-counsel-for-irs_s-response-in-opposition-to-motion-to-withdraw-tag-end-order1.pdf)

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/supplemental-motion-to-vacate-the-final-judgment-as-void.pdf) for the judge’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.
The United States on February 6, 2017, filed United States' opposition to Petitioner's supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/united-states_-opposition-to-petitioner_s-supplemental-motion-to-vacate-the-final-judgment-as-void1.pdf).
Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed a reply to United States' opposition to Petitioner's supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/reply-to-united-states_-opposition-to-petitioner_s-supplemental-motion-to-vacate-the-final-judgment-as-void.pdf).
Petitioner filed the original motion 106 days ago, the above reply 76 days ago; the judge remains silent.

supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/) | May 9, 2017 at 18:53 | Categories: Uncategorized (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/) | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-sq

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Ares

10th May 2017, 06:05 AM

Wow, I'm impressed. He just found a way to hold them PERSONALLY and financially accountable.

Every such criminal act sworn to in the Affidavit of Information has a monetary (commercial) value—and, having warned the United States attorney beforehand in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace of everything you intend to do if he proceeds against you without constitutional authority

monty

10th May 2017, 02:57 PM

Wow, I'm impressed. He just found a way to hold them PERSONALLY and financially accountable.

Yes, he did. He has also filed affidavits of criminal complaint against some of them in additiin to the UCC-1 liens he filed on them. A woman in Las Vegas forwarded this information to Ryan Bundy's legal assistand and to Ammon Bundy's para-legal.

monty

28th May 2017, 03:41 PM

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Hearing set in Houston IRS summons case; Lufkin judge confirms it is time to abolish the current form of government (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/05/28/hearing-set-in-houston-irs-summons-case-lufkin-judge-confirms-it-is-time-to-abolish-the-current-form-of-government/)

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Houston IRS summons case
There are two pending motions in the Houston IRS summons case, a motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/motion-to-dismiss-by-reason-of-coram-non-judice2.pdf) (before a person not a judge), and a motion to withdraw the unwarranted order included in the order to show cause (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/motion-to-withdraw-tag-end-order-in-order-to-show-cause2.pdf).

A hearing is set for May 30, 2017 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://0): Notice Setting Hearing (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/notice-setting-hearing.pdf).

Lufkin motion to vacate final judgment as void
The judge who entered final judgment in the Lufkin case March 3, 2016, Michael H. Schneider, retired seven months later, October 1, 2016, and Ron Clark took over.

Petitioner on January 23, 2017, filed a supplemental motion to vacate the final judgment as void for Michael H. Schneider’s failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the provisions of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/supplemental-motion-to-vacate-the-final-judgment-as-void.pdf).

The government responded February 6, 2017, with its opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/united-states_-opposition-to-petitioner_s-supplemental-motion-to-vacate-the-final-judgment-as-void1.pdf).

Petitioner on February 22, 2017, filed Petitioner’s reply to the government’s opposition to Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/reply-to-united-states_-opposition-to-petitioner_s-supplemental-motion-to-vacate-the-final-judgment-as-void.pdf).
Ron Clark on May 4, 2017, denied Petitioner’s motion to vacate (Clark’s denial hyperlinked below).

Nature of the situation that necessitated Petitioner’s motion to vacate
Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf) expressly prohibits the requirement of a religious test as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”

The oath mandated by Congress in Section 453 of Title 28 of the United States Code (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/453) and taken by Michael H. Schneider, however, requires a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge; to wit (Underline emphasis added.):
“§ 453. Oaths of justices and judges
“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ____ ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’”

In accordance with Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the religious test (“So help me God.”) required of the former judge in the Lufkin case, Michael H. Schneider, as a qualification to the office of district judge, bars Michael H. Schneider from assuming or holding any office under the United States.

But Michael H. Schneider (and every other district, magistrate, and circuit judge and Supreme Court justice) keeps rolling along—in blatant repudiation of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

How do they justify this?
Congress create another kind of “United States” for use in the courts
The reason all the aforementioned judicial officers willfully repudiate and disregard Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution is that they are using a different “United States” created by Congress exclusively for use in the courts and withholding from the American People that they are pretending that the new statutory “United States” displaces / supersedes the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

All civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States are administered in accordance with Chapter 176 of Title 28 of the United States Code.

For purposes of all civil and criminal proceedings in all district courts of the United States, Congress have decreed in subsection 15 of Section 3002 of Chapter 176 of Title 28 U.S.C. (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/3002) that “United States” means “a Federal corporation”; to wit:
“§ 3002. Definitions
“As used in this chapter:
“. . . (15) ‘United States’ means—
“(A) a Federal corporation;

“(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of [a Federal corporation] the United States; or

“(C) an instrumentality of [a Federal corporation] the United States.”
This means that every appearance of “United States” in anything to do with any civil or criminal proceeding in any district court means “a Federal corporation.”

That the 28 U.S.C. § 453 oath of office requires a religious test as a qualification to every judicial office means that no taker of said oath may assume or hold any judicial office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution—but said religious test, however, does not preclude a taker from holding a judicial office under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15).

Every contemporary judge is an officer of the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., a Federal corporation.

Every such judge throughout the Union is also impersonating a judicial officer of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Fraud and treason to the Constitution
This, of course, is wholesale fraud and treason to the Constitution on the part of Congress and connivance therewith on the part of every Supreme Court justice and district, magistrate, and circuit judge of the purported 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”—because no government official or officer is authorized to construe “United States” to mean anything other than what it means in the Constitution; to wit:
“A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time. . . .

“Chief Justice Taney, in Dread Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426, said that, while the Constitution remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption; that it is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.

“And in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-449, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, this court quoted these words with approval, and said:
“‘The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it met when adopted, it means now. . . .’” Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-450 (1934).

The purported legislative act of Congress that says “United States” means “a Federal corporation,” i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 3002, is a hoax and bogus and void; to wit:
“It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . .

“. . . Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that [U]an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.

“. . . If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-178 (1803).

A municipal (not federal / constitutional) judicial system and government
The 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States” also includes an agency, department, commission, board, instrumentality, or other entity of a Federal corporation.

The only Federal corporation that possesses agencies, departments, commissions, boards, instrumentalities, and other entities is the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/05/28/hearing-set-in-houston-irs-summons-case-lufkin-judge-confirms-it-is-time-to-abolish-the-current-form-of-government/#_ftn1)
The District of Columbia Municipal Corporation, 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419), was created by Congress under authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution—but that is where the relationship between said corporation and the Constitution begins and ends, as the selfsame provision confers upon Congress power of exclusive (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) legislation within (what will be) the District of Columbia, and therefore carte blanche to legislate whatever they want for that municipal corporation within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia.
The problem is, district, magistrate, and circuit judges of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation are extending their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter of said Municipal Corporation’s existence at 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419), i.e., the District of Columbia, and usurping exercise of jurisdiction throughout the Union.

Courts constituted by Congress under authority of Article, I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the Constitution are courts of limited jurisdiction, exercising only personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, with no power of territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the Union; such jurisdiction being the exclusive domain of each respective member of the Union; to wit:
"[[U]W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic]. Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).

“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).

As can be verified at any news outlet, however, the judges of today’s “United States” district courts usurp exercise of territorial jurisdiction over person and property throughout the Union on a daily basis.

There is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes any such act—and every one of Petitioner’s demands for constitutional authority in the nine cases in which Petitioner has been involved over the last three and a half years has been met with silence.

Because the oath of office of every executive and judicial officer and Member of Congress requires the same religious test, “So help me God,” as a qualification to his respective office or public trust, none are authorized to assume or hold such office or public trust under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only the purported statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), i.e., the Federal corporation by the name of District of Columbia.

By reason of the oath of office mandated by Congress for justices and judges at 28 U.S.C. § 453 and the repugnancy of the religious test therein to Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, no such justice or judge is an officer under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, only a municipal officer under the statutory “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), the Federal corporation by the name District of Columbia.

Whereas, there is nothing inherently wrong with a judicial officer of the District of Columbia Municipal Corporation exercising general (territorial, personal, and subject-matter) jurisdiction within his territory (the District of Columbia), everything is wrong with such officer usurping exercise of general jurisdiction anywhere else, in places like Tyler County, Texas.

How the Lufkin judge disposed of Petitioner’s motion to vacate
The substance of Petitioner’s supplemental motion to vacate is laid out above.
As mentioned in the previous post (May 9, 2017), the M.O. of United States district, magistrate, and circuit judges when it comes to Petitioner’s proofs of lack of jurisdiction and the United States attorney’s inability / failure to prove jurisdiction, is to ignore all material facts and failures fatal to the cause of the "United States" (District of Columbia) and make false allegations and cherry-pick immaterial facts which will support the "United States'" (District of Columbia's) position.

True to form, Ron Clark ignored all facts and failures relating to the religious test required of Michael H. Schneider as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution and on May 4, 2017, repudiated the meaning of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) definition of “United States,” and entered his Memorandum Opinion and Order (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/memorandum-opinion-and-order.pdf) denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate.

Most of the content of Ron Clark’s Memorandum Opinion and Order is a regurgitation of immaterial facts; the ruling is based on allegation for which there is no evidentiary support.
The only portion that relates directly to the substance of Petitioner’s motion is in the second paragraph on page two, where Clark alleges that Petitioner argues that (a) the phrase “So help me God” violates the religious-test provision of Article VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution, and (b) the oath is not valid and the final judgment therefore void.

Inspection of Petitioner’s motion to vacate shows that Petitioner never used any form of the word “violate” in respect of the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider in its relation to Article VI, Clause3 of the Constitution or stated that the oath was not valid.

Rather, that the subject oath of office is insufficient as authority for Michael H. Schneider to assume or hold an office under the organic “United States” of the Constitution, accede to “The judicial Power of the [organic] United States,” Constitution, Art. III, §1, or exercise the limited jurisdiction of an Article III court anywhere in the Union.

As stated in Petitioner’s motion and reply, the oath of office taken by Michael H. Schneider is benign and wholly valid for a territorial or municipal judge, but insufficient for a federal / constitutional judge by reason of requirement of a religious test as a qualification to the office of district judge under the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Having falsely attributed to Petitioner the aforesaid arguments fabricated by himself, Ron Clark then summarily dismissed Petitioner’s motion by slyly destructively declaring that “His arguments are meritless and not relevant to the judgment.”

Institutionalized piracy
The behavior exhibited by Ron Clark is systemic among all executive and judicial officers of what most people falsely believe are the executive and judicial branches of the government of the organic “United States” of the Constitution.

Because of the religious test required in the oath of office for every executive and judicial officer and the fraudulent “United States” of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) for which they all work and to which they are all beholden for a paycheck, all aforesaid officers are municipal employees ensconced in the legislative branch under the exclusive control of Congress and there is no de jure executive or judicial branch of the government as contemplated in the Constitution, no separation of powers, and no due process of law or remedy in any so-called United States district court anywhere in the Union.

All challenges of authority / jurisdiction are stonewalled via application of their general policy “Never respond, confirm, or deny.”

They are usurpers.

They are incorrigible

And the current municipal form of government is destructive of the unalienable rights of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”

This is why the only civilized short-term remedy for such institutionalized piracy is pre-judicial, i.e., commercial, under common-law rules, as outlined in the previous post, i.e., before matters arrive in the courts.

The American People are “joint tenants in the sovereignty,” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793), and the Founding Fathers long ago provided them with the long-term remedy in the Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776: Abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a federal / constitutional form of government, with separation of powers, as contemplated by the Framers and established in the Constitution.

[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/05/28/hearing-set-in-houston-irs-summons-case-lufkin-judge-confirms-it-is-time-to-abolish-the-current-form-of-government/#_ftnref1) “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/) | May 28, 2017 at 11:32 | Categories: Uncategorized (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/) |

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Bigjon

29th May 2017, 10:29 AM

I thought I posted about this guy on this thread, but I can't find it now.
He is using this commercial lien process to silence our unlawful lieyers.

https://johnhenryhill.wordpress.com/about/

DONUTS, THE CUSTOMS-IMMIGRATION SERVICE (CIS), AND COMMERCIAL LIENS

January 31, 2015 · by JohnHenryHill (https://johnhenryhill.wordpress.com/author/johnhenryhill/) · in Original Articles (https://johnhenryhill.wordpress.com/category/original-articles/) · Leave a comment (https://johnhenryhill.wordpress.com/2015/01/31/donuts-the-customs-immigration-service-cis-and-commercial-liens-2/#respond)

Donuts, the Customs-Immigration Service (CIS), and Commercial Liens
(My First Two Serious Adverse Encounters with DHS-CIS)
by John-Henry Hill, M.D.
August 11, 2014; Reposted January 30, 2015
Maxim of Law: “An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth.”

First incident:
My first very serious adverse encounter with DHS-CIS started with a JOKE. I admit it: I joke around a LOT !!! It is just my nature. Prior to 2008 I had never had any serious problems re-entering the U.S. – only the occasional luggage searches and brief interrogations. Then on December 28, 2008 the first very serious incident occurred at Boston’s Logan Airport (on return flights from Odessa, Ukraine via Kiev and Amsterdam) I was waiting in line for the “passport check” (usually called “Passport Control” in most other countries), where they ask all manner of stupid questions. Several flights from abroad must have arrived within a short space of time, so the immense room was jammed full of travelers

(certainly in excess of a thousand) slowly shuffling along through a maze of those winding, roped off lines so often seen in large airports. As is my custom, I spoke with some people waiting in line nearby, wondering aloud if we would receive a piece of cheese as a reward after successfully navigating through this maze. I waited and waited and waited. Finally, there was only ONE guy left in front of me. He answered the custom officer’s questions dutifully, but then they began chatting about where the BEST DONUTS could be found in Kittery, Maine. (I used to vacation at a friend’s summer home in Kittery, so I was rather amused at first.) But their conversation went on and on… about the Kittery Trading Post … the old-fashioned candy shop, etc.

Finally it was my turn. The CIS officer looked at my passport, then asked the usual “Where ya been…etc.” questions. I answered his initial questions very politely, but then just couldn’t resist adding, “And yes, I have been to Kittery, but I don’t eat donuts.”

https://johnhenryhill.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/donuts__happy_cop_w_donuts____cartoon.jpg?w=276&h=251 (https://johnhenryhill.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/donuts__happy_cop_w_donuts____cartoon.jpg)

Out came his red felt pen – something I would fear seeing in the future. He wrote something on my “customs declaration form”, then told me to move on. Downstairs at the baggage claim, I retrieved my luggage, then spotted 2 armed officers briskly walking toward me. They told me I had to go with them; and I was escorted by them and 2 other armed officers into an interview room.

To make a long story short, I was questioned, threatened with arrest, insulted with extremely vulgar accusations (e.g., being a child rapist, child pornographer, drug dealer, etc.), insisted that I was “mentally disturbed” and might have me committed to a psychiatric hospital, and screamed at for over 6 hours by 4 armed men in this tiny room. My baggage, computer, mobile phone and everything else were torn apart and examined. Citing my “right to remain silent” guaranteed by the 5th Amendment to the Constitution,

I was repeatedly told that I was “officially NOT in the U.S. and therefore had NO rights”! I responded that if we were not in the U.S., then they had NO authority to detain me, search me and my belongings, or question me. I refused to answer any of their questions and repeatedly demanded to phone my lawyer. Finally, after 6 hours they let me go. I was extremely angry, but also exhausted by the incident. At that time my primary concern was simply getting home.

Second incident:
One night in July 7, 2009 the second very serious incident occurred. I again arrived at Logan Airport in Boston, MA from Kiev, Ukraine (via Paris’ CDG airport) after having visited my fiancée of 3 years and her son to celebrate my birthday. (We try to celebrate all of our birthdays together.)

At Passport Control, I answered every question the Customs officers asked of me, including the reasons for my visit. When he asked how much money I had with me, I answered that I did not know the exact amount, since it was in currencies of several different countries, but it was “most certainly not even close to the $10,000 limit”. (Only a very limited number of places in the Ukraine take credit cards.

Except for major tourist businesses, it is essentially a cash-based society; and by law all cash transactions must take place using the Ukrainian currency. In major shopping malls, restaurants and even supermarkets,

ATM’s and currency-exchange booths are abundantly located to convert credit/debit cards and foreign currencies into Ukrainian currency. On this trip ALL of my transactions were in cash – U.S. dollars, Ukrainian UAH and Euros. Further, as any frequent traveler knows, one ALWAYS loses money in any currency exchange, especially converting a foreign currency back into U.S. dollars. Therefore, it makes far more sense simply too keep the foreign currency for later use.) In any event, the Customs officer brusquely told me to give him a specific amount in dollars, to which I replied that I could give him only an estimate of about $2,000-3,000. He marked my Customs Declaration form with a red felt pen and told me to proceed.

Downstairs after claiming my checked bag, I looked over to the second Customs check line. A Customs officer RAN over to me (literally ran!), told me I had been “randomly selected” and escorted me to another Customs officer for inspection of me and my baggage. We remained at regular inspection station, with its X-ray scanner, where everyone’s baggage is examined, thus avoiding the dreaded “interview room”

– I was interrogated by 2 CIS officers in front of other arriving passengers.

Not wanting to be there all night, I answered every RELEVANT question asked by the 2 CIS officers, while 4 other armed CIS officers surrounded us. (But I refused to answer all irrelevant questions.) Why did I travel to the Ukraine so often? How could I afford it? Why go there for only 6 days this trip? After inspecting some old flight “tickets” still in my briefcase, why did I travel sometimes to only Kiev and other times to Odessa? I explained that on this trip my fiancée and I had met in Kiev due to time constraints: it would save me 2 days of travel time (i.e., sitting around in airports), plus allow us to look around Kiev.

The inspection of my bags was also very thorough, including removal of the linings of luggage. Computer CD’s containing photos of the trip, 2 computer games, 2 English-Russian language CD’s by Rosetta Stone, and a few music CD’s were taken and examined, as were my cell phone and camera. (I repeatedly explained that, since my fiancée had taken her computer with her, I chose not to take mine.) Every item in my possession was repeatedly examined. I was questioned in detail about 2 English-Russian dictionaries. Had I traveled to Russia? I finally convinced them that most Ukrainians spoke Russian rather than Ukrainian; that Ukraine had been part of the old Soviet Union and for centuries before that, a part of Russia; that Russian and Ukrainian languages were quite different; and my fiancée spoke only Russian and some English (and only her son spoke Ukrainian fluently from his schooling). The 2 Customs officers were demanding, but polite.

After approximately 5 hours, the 4 armed CIS officers left the scene. I was allowed pack my bags and leave. As I began walking away the primary Customs officer wished me a “Happy Birthday”. The second Customs officer then asked me in a surprised tone, “Is it your birthday?” I said, “Yes, that is why I went over there. I told you folks that several times.

But I was ‘randomly chosen’, right?” The second officer then said to the first officer [exact quote], “We did this to him on his BIRTHDAY? What BULLSHIT ! !” I turned around, smiled and waved “good-bye” to them, then walked out.

I filed a formal complaint through my lawyer with Janet Napolitano (then Secretary of Homeland Security), DHS-CIS, and finally with DHS-TRIP, but their replies were total bullshit. He suggested we sue DHS, but warned that it would be a very expensive and lengthy process with little hope of success.

Instead, I chose another tactic. I wrote and mailed sworn affidavits detailing the events and infringements on my rights (my “claims”) to each of the six (6) men involved in their private capacity; NOT as agents or officers of the DHS-CIS. Not one of the six men answered with any type of rebuttal – which is precisely what I had hoped for. At various time intervals over the next 3 months I mailed them additional documents, again receiving no responses. By these actions I had created commercial liens on all the assets of each of the six men in the amount of $40 million U.S. dollars per man – a total of $240 million.

The entire process took about three (3) months, and approximately 30 hours of research, writing, going to the post office, etc. In essence, I had “frozen” all of their assets (e.g., houses, cars, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, other investments and whatever) for the next 99 years; so they could neither sell them nor use them as collateral for any loans.

I next registered these commercial liens with the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), which legally converted each of these 6 commercial liens into “negotiable instruments” (similar to a bond or stock) which I could sell to anyone – even to a Wall Street investment bank. Had I then created a legal Trust, then placed these liens into that Trust, the 99 year expiration date would have been extended to “forever” – that is, NO expiration date.

(I could have instituted legal proceedings for the seizure (“levy”) of their assets, but that is a complex and difficult process that I would leave to someone else with the time and money.) The harassment continued on my returns to U.S. airports for few months, but was much milder until it suddenly stopped completely. All of their attempts to void these liens through the courts were unsuccessful. I finally lifted the liens about 3 years after the original incidents, but only after receiving written apologies from all 6 men (CIS officers), their supervisors and the Director of DHS-CIS.

It was about then that I decided that the U.S. was NO LONGER the same country in which I was born and raised. And I knew it would only get worse! So a few months later in 2009 I left America permanently. I was already permanently living outside the U.S. when the liens were voided by me.
From what I have read about events in the U.S. since then, it sounds like my decision was warranted.

And it all started with a JOKE. Go figure …

True story!
P.S. By the way, I still do NOT like donuts!
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Bigjon

29th May 2017, 10:29 AM

NOTES:

1.) The first question readers might ask, aside from whether this story is total bullshit, is how I recall the details of these events after 8 years. First, anticipating my lawyer’s wishes, the day after the first incident I wrote down everything I could recall about the incident in the airport the preceding evening and night. I then presented to my lawyer, who had it typed up as an affidavit, signed by me and two witnesses and then notarized by him – which he then filed in his office records.

On a subsequent flights back into the U.S., I made audio recordings (the recorder easy visible in my shirt pocket) of all my conversations with CIS personnel until I had exited the airport.

These recordings were then typed up into affidavits, duly signed, witnessed and notarized. These documents provided the detailed information we used in my in my formal complaints to Janet Napolitano, CIS, DHA and finally DHS-TRIP.

I still possess copies of those affidavits and transcripts of the audio recordings, as well as the formal complaints sent to the above federal officials and agencies. These documents were meant to be used by my lawyer in filing a civil suit. It was not until later when I was researching and creating the commercial liens that I discovered how essential they were to me, especially if the 6 men responded with affidavits of rebuttal. Under the ancient maximum of law,

“Claims made without accountability are void.” (In order to have any credibility, the claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims proved to be false. In fact, in the Common Law and Commercial Law (as opposed to statutory law as legislated acts), the more one places himself at risk in any claim, the greater the presumption that his claim is truthful.) In other words, should these 6 men be able to refute my claims by their sworn affidavits, backed up by affidavits from other witnesses and such evidence as airport audio and/or video tapes, I would be financially “screwed” for life.

2.) About the “Commercial Lien Process”
The process of initiating a commercial lien begins with writing an affidavit of truth, signed under oath, in which you (the “affiant”) make a “claim” by stating the facts of an incident(s) and describe how you were injured (your charges) by the actions of another man or woman (the “accused”). The commercial lien process requires NO court action or judge’s approval.

In fact, the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) is a totally private contract matter. CAP is a pre-common law process. It is also referred to as a “commercial law process,” not to be confused with the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and other statutes, rules and regulations. It is a pre-common law process because until there is a disagreement, there is no dispute. All that is being done is the establishment of claims and obligations.

The purpose of the CAP is to make claims and determine if the accused agrees or not. If the Accused does not contest the claims, there is no dispute to be adjudicated; thus the appropriate damages are consensually agreed-upon. Thus it is pre-judicial. It may also be completely non-judicial if it is properly (composed of unrebuttable truth) and successfully implemented.

The Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) places the full power of justice back in the hands of the common man. It cannot be overstated that the whole Commercial Affidavit Process is not dependent on the court system. It functions quite well on its own OUTSIDE the current legal system.

Although the government court system MAY have an essential part to play once the Commercial Affidavit has been served AND ANSWERED (rebutted point-by-point in a sworn affidavit by the accused), that government court system is not and cannot be invoked until the charges in the affidavit have been answered by sworn affidavit with a point-by-point rebuttal. A disagreement could arise only from such a rebuttal by the accused. Until that point, THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT TO ADJUDICATE. Thus, it remains a totally private matter. A failure to rebut via affidavit is acquiescence: a contractual agreement that the affiant’s original affidavit was truthful and has been accepted by the accused as a contract under Commercial Law. The subsequent failure by the accused to answer the affiant’s claims for damages then leads to a “default judgment” for the affiant – as far the law is concerned, the matter is settled and can NOT be revisited by either the affiant or the accused.. It is a private contract which neither party has disputed within a timely manner; and, without any dispute, the courts have no jurisdiction of any kind.

In short, if the accused issues no affidavit of rebuttal, he agrees with the affiant’s affidavit (acquiescence – even by silence), and the affiant wins automatically. If the accused fails to respond within a stated time period (let’s say 14 days) to the affiant’s sworn Affidavit of truth by means of his own sworn affidavit in which he rebuts each of the affiant’s claims point-by-point, then the accused has in law agreed with the affiant’s claims by default and is liable for the damages claimed by the affiant. Maxim of Law: “An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth in Law.” Therefore, by the accused NOT rebutting point-by-point in his own sworn affidavit each claim of the affiant, under the ancient Laws of Commerce the accused has ALREADY agreed that the affiant’s claims are the truth. At that point, the NO court can intervene, since there is NO disagreement to adjudicate.

Applicable MAXIMS of law are:
A man may not with impunity infringe upon another man’s rights.
A matter must be expressed to be resolved.
Truth is expressed in the form of an affidavit.

(This is the reason that under the Common Law in America and guaranteed by the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, NO arrest or search warrant can be issued unless a signed affidavit sworn as the truth under oath (a contract), along with some objective evidence of a crime (“probable cause”) is submitted to a court, after which a judge, also acting under oath, may issue the warrant with his signature. As agents of the government, both the police officer and the judge are protected from civil suits by “limited commercial immunity” granted by statutes and thereby relieved of “full and unlimited commercial liability” by the commercial bonds purchased on their behalf by the government.
However, this limited immunity is valid only as long as they did not exceed the powers of office lawfully granted to them.)

4th Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

An affidavit must be rebutted point-for-point.
An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth.
“He, who does not object, consents.”
Truth stands supreme.
Claims made without accountability are void. (The claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims proved to be false.)

“In law none is credited unless he is sworn. All the facts must, when established by witnesses, be under oath or affirmation.”
“There is no stronger bond between men than an oath.”
“They are perjured, who, preserving the words of an oath,deceive the ears of those who receive it.”
“An oath is a contract in law.”
“An unrebutted affidavit stands as the truth in Law.”
While the battle continues, he who first leaves the field or refuses to contend loses by default. (The man who quits first loses; the last-man-standing wins.)
and most importantly

All are equal under the Law. (judges, police, etc. as MEN have NO extra rights)
Like the police, these six CIS officers (as federal agents) are granted by U.S. statutes “limited immunity” from civil suits in government, public courts when “in performance of their official duties”. What most police and, obviously these six men, failed to realize is that the Commercial Affidavit Process is a pre-judicial process; it is a private contract between men in their private capacities under “complete and unlimited commercial liability” by all parties involved – NOT in their capacities as officers of government with “limited immunity”. It depends on NO statutes and does NOT involve any court. In a “nutshell”, I made a “claim” by written, sworn affidavits against each of these 6 men in their private capacities in which I detailed the harm caused to me by them and the damages (reparations) I sought from each man to “make me whole”. I offered them a CONTRACT via sworn affidavit and by NOT responding to my “offer to contract” they fell into “dishonor” AND thereby unwittingly accepted my contract AND agreed to all the claims within my affidavit as the truth in law.
It needs to be thoroughly understood that because it is driven by SWORN TRUTH, the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) is outside the jurisdiction of any equity court. It is a private contract matter. Should an attempt be made by anyone, including a judge or anyone else, to involve an equity court it would result in a trespass against the Affiant’s rights. Consequently, those interfering individuals who were unlawfully trying to insert themselves into the controversy, could easily be added as additional “lien debtors” to the 6 commercial liens and their assets “frozen” as well – simply by adding their names and a brief description of their interference on the back of each lien .

An equity court has no jurisdiction whatsoever, for the CAP is strictly a non-judicial or pre-judicial process between individuals and is private.
It should also be emphasized that this process is not to be undertaken lightly. Under the maxim “Claims made without accountability are void.” (The claimant must put himself at risk by assuming full and unlimited commercial liability for any claims),

I have taken a great risk should my claims be proved false.
One should NOT hire an attorney (whose primary duty is to the court, since he is an “officer of the court”.)
By NOT hiring an attorney, you avoid becoming a “client” (by definition, a “ward of the court” by reason of “mental incompetence”),
The commercial lien, which is authorized both by the Common Law and by Title 15 of the United States Code (USC); and is similar to the lien the IRS uses to take Americans’ homes, cars, savings, etc. However, instead of depending on Title 15 (which would grant the government courts some jurisdiction over the case), one should base your commercial lien process solely upon the Common Law of negotiable instruments (a.k.a. Commercial Law or Law of Commerce).
And since NO attorney is allowed to speak in a Common Law court (except as a witness with direct, personal knowledge of events), the hiring of an attorney would be a waste of money. (It is completely unrelated to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.))

Since CAP is strictly a non-judicial or pre-judicial process between individuals and is PRIVATE, it’s almost impossible to remove a commercial lien without the approval of the individual claimant who filed the lien. Although a commercial lien can be challenged by a Common Law court or by a 7th Amendment trial by jury in a court operating under the Common Law (a true “court of record”, meaning statutes and regulations do NOT apply), it does not require a court process or a court judgment for its establishment, validity, or execution. Therefore, the courts can NOT simply extinguish this lien on their own discretion (or on motion from the lien debtors) without the voluntary approval of the person who filed the lien.

(7th Amendment: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”)

Traditionally, these liens can only be removed by (1) the voluntary decision of the person who filed the lien, (2) by the decision of a constitutional Common Law trial by jury (a true “Court of Record”), or (3) by waiting 99 or 100 years. Since the Common Law has been smothered in the U.S.A., almost all judges are essentially powerless to overcome the commercial liens since they have no knowledge of the procedures of a Common Law court (a true “court of record”). Further, in a Common Law court the “judge” can act ONLY as an administrator of the proceedings; he can NOT act as the “tribunal” under any circumstances. ONLY the “tribunal” (the plaintiff/affiant or the 12-man jury, if requested by the accused) can issue any orders, issue contempt citations, render verdicts, or make any other decisions for the court. If the “judge” exceeds his authority as the administrator (for example, by issuing any order or rendering a verdict, the “tribunal” may void that order or verdict by simply issuing an order voiding the judge’s order. If the judge persists in such actions, the tribunal may issue a “contempt of court” order against him and order his arrest and/or a fine. And anyone (such a police officer, the “judge”, court bailiff, sheriff or anyone else who obstructs the “contempt of court” order can be added as one of the “accused” on the commercial lien – and even prosecuted in a Common Law court.

Now, it was extremely unlikely that I would ever collect the $40 million judgment (to which they had agreed simply by their non-responses to my initial affidavits) from each of these six men. However, simply by filing these liens with a county clerk’s office, registering these liens with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and by placing notices to the public in a few newspapers (and keeping evidence of these such public notices), I had converted these 6 liens into “negotiable instruments” (like stocks or bonds) which I then could have sold for cash to anyone, including investment companies (as on Wall Street), banks, insurance companies, and so on

What would have happened if I had sold the six commercial liens to an investment bank, insurance company or whatever? Since the commercial liens (registered with the SEC) were $20 million per man, the total amounted to $240 million. Now, if I approached a broker from an investment bank and asked him to sell these liens on my behalf, he would certainly NOT quote me a price of $240 million. Because of the high risk involved regarding the eventual recovery of this $240 million, he would likely offer between 1-3 percent maximum of the nominal value, that is, between $2.4 million and $7.2 million maximum in cash. (And since it was an award or reparation for damages – “to make one whole” – that money paid to me would NOT be subject to taxes.)
That is a LOT of money! That investor might then re-sell the liens for a greater amount OR, more likely, use it as collateral for loans which with to make other investments, thereby leveraging this $240 million commercial lien (as it very common among large investment banks today, at a 20 to 1 ratio) into $4,800 million (i.e., $4.8 billion). Because of this fact, it would be more lucrative for any investment bank NOT to go to court in an attempt to levy the $240 million from these six men! (Now you know why the investment bankers on Wall Street are so filthy rich!)

Thus, the personal assets of the six men would remain “frozen” for the next 99 years. Now, had I been the vindictive type and actually sought to have someone make a REAL attempt to collect the $240 million from the six men, among my options would be to donate the liens to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Since the IRS is forbidden by U.S statutes from “hypothecating” such liens and, as we all know, is famous (or infamous) for its ability and experience in seizing the assets of people, it certainly would have attempted to seize all the assets of these six men. And had these six men attempted to stop such seizures using the courts, under Commercial Law and U.S. statutes, the men had ALREADY agreed to and admitted that they owed the $240 million. Case closed. Assets seized.

+++++++++++++++ END +++++++++++++++

3.) Sources of information:
There are numerous articles and books, many available for free on the Internet, explaining the Commercial Affidavit Process (CAP) and Commercial Lien Process. As a non-attorney, that is how I taught myself the theory and procedures; and used so many sources that I will mention only a few. I did NOT use an attorney.

See my essay below on this blog below titled, “COMMERCIAL LIENS: The MOST POTENT WEAPON by Alfred Adask et al 1995 (https://johnhenryhill.wordpress.com/wp-admin/post.php?post=1702&action=edit)”

Another good article comes from BILL THORTON (of www.1215.org ) – perhaps the BEST web site regarding the Common Law: (http://www.1215.org/)
COMMERCIAL_LIEN__Application_of_COMMERCIAL_LAW___B ILL_THORNTON_1215-org (https://johnhenryhill.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/commercial_lien__application_of_commercial_law___b ill_thornton_1215-org.doc)

There are also numerous VIDEOS posted on various Internet web sites, including on YouTube.com. Many of these videos are not very informative and/or simply incorrect. Perhaps the best VIDEO explaining the mechanics of the Commercial Lien Process (as applicable in Britain, although the process in America is almost identical) is “Commercial Maritime Liens” by Simon (aka, “El Spaniardo” or “WhiteRabbitTrust”). I could only locate this video as reposted by “John Smith” using the title, “Commercial Liens The Most Potent Commercial Weapon”, so I presume El Spaniardo’s previous postings were deleted. The video is currently available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJnEDT3jsI8

Another source of information on Commercial Liens (as well as the Common Law in general) are the video interviews of Karl Lentz, specifically “Karl Lentz 59 – Commercial lien process vs. common law process”available at:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3h8T5WQwS0M However, I have found Mr. Lentz rather vague and far less organized in his presentations than El Spaniardo (aka, Simon and WhiteRabbitTrust)

+++++++++++++++++++++ End of Essay +++++++++++++++++++++

Ares

29th May 2017, 12:10 PM

That's a very powerful weapon to use against them. I'll have to research that more to know how to respond if they dispute my affidavit.

monty

29th May 2017, 05:11 PM

They were all gung-ho for commercial law. Maybe the day is coming it will bite them in the ass.

monty

29th May 2017, 05:12 PM

That's a very powerful weapon to use against them. I'll have to research that more to know how to respond if they dispute my affidavit.
quoted for truth.

monty

7th June 2017, 08:19 PM

Update June 7, USDOJ dismises Houston IRS summons case, IRS issues new summons, petitioner responds commercially

New post on supremecourtcase
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USDOJ dismisses Houston IRS summons case; IRS agent issues new summons; Petitioner responds commercially (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/06/07/usdoj-dismisses-houston-irs-summons-case-irs-agent-issues-new-summons-petitioner-responds-commercially/)

by supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)

The previous post (May 28, 2017) mentions a hearing in the Houston IRS summons case scheduled for May 30, 2017, to hear Petitioner’s motion to dismiss by reason of coram non judice (before a person not a judge), and motion to withdraw the unwarranted order included in the order to show cause.

At the hearing on May 30, 2017, the judge immediately announced that the United States Department of Justice attorney for the IRS had, that very morning, submitted a motion to dismiss and that the motion was granted and the case dismissed.

The United States Department of Justice attorney's motion to dismiss (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/the-united-states-department-of-justice-attorney_s-motion-to-dismiss.pdf), only half a page in length, states that the reason for the dismissal is that the original IRS summons listed “John B. Trowbridge” as the target of the investigation and that the actual target is “John Parks Trowbridge” [sic] even though the Social Security Account Number included in the summons is that of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.’s.

In such governmental legal matters, errors in the name typically are glossed over if the intended party appears; to wit:
“Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis, et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis. The presence of the body cures the error in the name ; the truth of the name cures an error in the description.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914), p. 2154.

A possible explanation is that neither the source of the summons, the Internal Revenue Service, nor its parent organization, the Department of the Treasury, are part of the government that filed the lawsuit.

The Department of the Treasury is a private organization, independent of government, 41 Stat. 654 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=41&page=654#); to wit: Neither the senior executive of the Department of the Treasury or Internal Revenue Service (the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respectively) is required by law to take an oath of office (meaning they are non-governmental, private-sector workers) and the sole beneficiary of all their collections of income tax[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/06/07/usdoj-dismisses-houston-irs-summons-case-irs-agent-issues-new-summons-petitioner-responds-commercially/#_ftn1) is a private bank, the Federal Reserve.[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/06/07/usdoj-dismisses-houston-irs-summons-case-irs-agent-issues-new-summons-petitioner-responds-commercially/#_ftn2)

The IRS revenue agent who issued the summons that resulted in the lawsuit was present at the hearing and, following dismissal of the case, presented Petitioner with a new IRS administrative summons, dated that day, May 30, 2017 (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/a-new-irs-administrative-summons-dated-that-day-may-30-2017.pdf), for an examination 15 days later, on June 14, 2017 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://5).
The United States Department of Justice attorney (who had just dismissed the case) informed Petitioner that he would be attending the June 14, 2017 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://6), examination personally.

Dismissal of the case and issuance and presentment of the new IRS summons means there is no court case and the entire cycle starts over from scratch.

Remedy
The previous post shows why there is no due process of law or remedy in any United States district court anywhere in the Union and that the immediate remedy[3] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/06/07/usdoj-dismisses-houston-irs-summons-case-irs-agent-issues-new-summons-petitioner-responds-commercially/#_ftn3) is not a legal one per se but commercial, under common-law rules, before the court gets involved.

In response to the new summons, Petitioner on June 5, 2017, sent the IRS revenue agent, IRS group manager, and Secretary of the Treasury a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/demand-notice-and-warning-of-commercial-grace.pdf), and the United States Department of Justice attorney a courtesy copy thereof.

The Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace is four pages in length and self-explanatory; it is intended to resolve things without the need for a lawsuit.

That is not to say, however, that things will not end up in the courts again.

Attorneys of the United States Department of Justice and United States district and magistrate judges are concerned in the face of Petitioner’s demands for a constitutional authority (because there is none) and scrambling to protect the secrets of the cabal—but recipients of the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace may be inclined to move on to the next “customer” rather than seek the court’s assistance in enforcing the new summons, and thereby avoid non-judicial enforcement of the penalties in the Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/demand-notice-and-warning-of-commercial-grace.pdf) against them personally.

This type of response is proper for any type of situation where an officer of the U.S. Government seeks to take territorial jurisdiction over person or property and enforce some statute against a Union-member resident or his property—because there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes it.

The Constitution (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf) confers upon Congress only power of personal (regarding certain criminal offenses only) and subject-matter legislation throughout the Union at Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1-16; thus, these provisions of the Constitution give executive and judicial officers the capacity to take only personal and subject-matter jurisdictionthroughout the Union, in respect of the statutes enacted by Congress regarding those things.

The Constitution grants Congress no power of territorial legislation over person or property anywhere in the Union, thus depriving executive and judicial officers of the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction over person or property anywhere in the Union.

An IRS summons issued against a resident of any member of the Union and the lawsuit filed to enforce it are examples of usurpation of exercise of territorial jurisdiction against person and property by United States Department of Justice personnel and district and magistrate judges of the United States—because there is no provision of the Constitution that authorizes it.
* * * *
[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/06/07/usdoj-dismisses-houston-irs-summons-case-irs-agent-issues-new-summons-petitioner-responds-commercially/#_ftnref1) “100 percent of what is collected [in income tax] is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President,” dated and approved January 12 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://9) and 15, 1984, p. 3.

[2] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/06/07/usdoj-dismisses-houston-irs-summons-case-irs-agent-issues-new-summons-petitioner-responds-commercially/#_ftnref2) “The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly.” Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.

[3] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/06/07/usdoj-dismisses-houston-irs-summons-case-irs-agent-issues-new-summons-petitioner-responds-commercially/#_ftnref3) The long-term remedy is to abolish the current municipal form of government and institute a federal / constitutional form of government as provided in the Constitution.

supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/) | June 7, 2017 at 21:48 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://12) | Categories: Uncategorized (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/) | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-tZ

Comment (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/06/07/usdoj-dismisses-houston-irs-summons-case-irs-agent-issues-new-summons-petitioner-responds-commercially/#respond)
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monty

27th July 2017, 01:24 PM

Judge Anna realizes what the Truman era Congress and Presidency did when the reorganized the federal government. They combined the judiciary and the legislative branches of government. This was completed by the new 1991 oath of office.

Edit: I believe the actual change was in 1948 when the Congress rewrote Title 28 of the USC and made the US District Courts administrative courts of Congress. The new oath binds the federal officers to federal statutory law and not to the Constitution. It lets the crooks sleep better at night knowing the didn't swear an oath to uphold the Constitution.

The Great Fraud of Today, Part One: Corruption of the Federal Judiciary (https://mainerepublicemailalert.com/2017/07/02/the-great-fraud-of-today-part-one-corruption-of-the-federal-judiciary/)

Posted on July 2, 2017 (https://mainerepublicemailalert.com/2017/07/02/the-great-fraud-of-today-part-one-corruption-of-the-federal-judiciary/)by David Robinson (https://mainerepublicemailalert.com/author/drobin88/)

https://mainerepublicemailalert.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/12405-judge2banna.png?w=640
Judge Anna von Reitz

We’ve uncovered the Great Fraud of the so-called American Civil War, which was never a war but an illegal commercial mercenary action on our shores. We’ve dissected the Great Fraud of the 1930’s executed by FDR and his minions. And now, we need to face the Great Fraud of Today even as it is taking place.

The past few days have been rocked by disclosure after disclosure. Smoking guns abound. The extent of the travesty is now becoming clear — and along with it, the identities of those responsible and the nature of the current reality.

Out of Texas, we have the Lufkin Case, where the subversion of our federal judicial system has been unearthed. In 1991 the Congress entered a change in the Judicial Oath, altering the Oath required by the corporate Constitution in a subtle but devastating way which served to remove the judicial officers from the judicial branch of our government and place them solely under the control of the municipal legislative branch of government— that is, under the rule of the members of Congress acting as the oligarchic municipal government of the District of Columbia.

The new Oath of Office they imposed on the judicial officers may be seen at Volume 104 United States Statutes-at-Large Page 5124, otherwise shown as 104 Stat. 5124.

The new Oath of Office is very sly in that it appears to be a simple clean-up deletion of unnecessary verbiage in the old Oath of Office, but on closer examination it is clear that there are no “duties” assigned to member of the judiciary by the Constitution and as a result, this change in the Oath of Office releases the judicial officers from the obligation to “act agreeably” –that is, in conformance to the Constitution and leaves them subject only to the legislative acts of the Congress. This, in turn, removed the judicial officers from the judicial branch of government and placed them squarely and only under the auspices of the legislative branch.

Read that— since 1991, there has been no three-branched federal government. The judicial and legislative branches have been merged and the judicial has been made subservient to the legislative. Moreover, the municipal government of the United States has been acting in open treason against the actual Constitution since 1991, and absolutely no decisions undertaken by these federal judicial officers since then have been in compliance with the actual Constitution. They are all null and void for cause.

This has made the widespread personage committed against the American states and people possible and profitable. The Congress has been running the entire federal judiciary, which includes the “federated” — incorporated States of States and the STATES OF STATES courts — as an unconstitutional legislative enforcement racket.

Our agreement with the “federal” government, which is nothing more than a for-hire governmental services corporation, very clearly states what we are owed and also very clearly sets up the structure of the government and also very clearly limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts and also very clearly requires an Oath of Office in support of the Constitution and also very clearly limits the reach of the municipal United States government to the ten miles square of Washington, DC and which also limits the territorial United States controlled by Congress to actual federal properties, such as arsenals and military installations.

So how have they run rampant like this and pretended, as in the Lufkin case, to have jurisdiction never granted to them over people and property in places like Tyler County, Texas?

It’s simple. They unlawfully seized upon your copyright to your own name, registered it as properly belonging to their corporation, stole your identity as a living American, and pretended that you were either a Territorial Foreign Situs Trust or a Municipal ESTATE trust belonging to their corporations. If you convert a man into a thing, you can do as you please to him—at least until he realizes what you have done.

In this way, they pretended to control you and own your assets, and therefore, also assumed the right to subject you to their in-house court system and their foreign statutory law.

Make no mistake, the authors of the bill changing the judicial Oath of Office committed treason against the actual United States and our actual Constitution and the evidence of this is clear upon the public record. What remains to be seen is if these snakes will self-correct or require a garden hoe to set things straight.

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monty

22nd August 2017, 08:03 PM

Dr. Trowbridge August 22 update

New post on supremecourtcase

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Second IRS summons suit; Petitioner moves to dismiss; USDOJ goes silent; Petitioner moves for summary judgment (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/08/22/second-irs-summons-suit-petitioner-moves-to-dismiss-usdoj-goes-silent-petitioner-moves-for-summary-judgment/)

by supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/)

When the United States Department of Justice attorney at the May 30, 2017, hearing voluntarily dismissed the previous IRS summons case for an error in the name used in the IRS summons and USDOJ petition to enforce IRS summons, the IRS agent who issued that IRS summons was also in the courtroom at the time and served on Petitioner a second IRS summons (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/second-irs-summons.pdf) with the name corrected.

Petitioner on June 5, 2017, responded commercially to the new IRS summons with a Demand, Notice, and Warning of Commercial Grace (https://supremecourtcasefiles.wordpress.com/2017/06/demand-notice-and-warning-of-commercial-grace.pdf)to the IRS agent, IRS Group Manager, and Secretary of the Treasury and a courtesy copy to the USDOJ attorney who handled the aforementioned case.

Following Petitioner’s failure to appear at the time and place appointed in the IRS summons the same USDOJ attorney filed in the court and on June 26, 2017, served on Petitioner a fresh petition to enforce the new IRS summons and an Order to Show Cause from the Court (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/fresh-petition-to-enforce-the-new-irs-summons-and-an-order-to-show-cause-from-the-court.pdf) with a hearing date set for July 17, 2017.

Petitioner on July 17 (the hearing date) filed in the court a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/federal-rules-of-civil-procedure-12b6-motion-to-dismiss-for-failure-to-state-a-claim-upon-which-relief-can-be-granted.pdf), with an attached affidavit in support, and mailed a copy to the USDOJ attorney, but declined to attend the hearing.

At the July 17 hearing the judge set another hearing for August 8 and, evidently, ordered the U.S. Marshal to serve Petitioner with notice of the new hearing date.

Petitioner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss documents for the first time how executive and judicial officers of the “modern” (statutory / non-constitutional) “United States” justify extending their jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by the charter[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/08/22/second-irs-summons-suit-petitioner-moves-to-dismiss-usdoj-goes-silent-petitioner-moves-for-summary-judgment/#_ftn1) of their corporate employer’s existence to the District of Columbia, and usurping exercise of general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) throughout the Union and around the globe.

Petitioner on August 3 (five days before the calendared hearing) received a phone call from the judge’s assistant inquiring of Petitioner if it would be OK to reschedule the hearing for a month later, to September 7. (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://8)

Petitioner responded that Petitioner would be out of town on September 7 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://9); whereupon the judge’s assistant suggested September 13 (http://gold-silver.us/forum/x-apple-data-detectors://10) and Petitioner accepted the offer.

Because Petitioner received from the USDOJ attorney representing the IRS, no response in opposition to Petitioner’s July 17, 2017, Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Petitioner yesterday, August 21, 2017, filed in the court a 2 ½–page motion for entry of summary judgment (https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/motion-for-entry-of-summary-judgment.pdf)—to which summary judgment Petitioner is entitled as a matter of law, and mailed a copy to the USDOJ attorney.

_____________________________________
[1] (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/2017/08/22/second-irs-summons-suit-petitioner-moves-to-dismiss-usdoj-goes-silent-petitioner-moves-for-summary-judgment/#_ftnref1) “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419 (http://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=16&page=419#), February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (retroactive to December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

supremecourtcase (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/author/supremecourtcase/) | August 22, 2017 at 18:51 | Categories: Uncategorized (https://supremecourtcase.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/) | URL: http://wp.me/p6epB3-ul

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monty

22nd August 2017, 08:40 PM

Dr. Trowbridge's 20 page memorandum accompanying the motion to dismiss July 2017 explains how the courts usurp jurisdiction by claiming you are a United States Citizen

https://supremecourtcase.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/federal-rules-of-civil-procedure-12b6-motion-to-dismiss-for-failure-to-state-a-claim-upon-which-relief-can-be-granted.pdf

monty

23rd August 2017, 06:24 PM

Trowbridges Motion for summary judgement

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Ares

29th September 2017, 05:31 PM

Judge denies motion, orders enforcement of IRS summons; Petitioner moves for relief from Order, as Order is void

At the September 13, 2017, hearing of Petitioner’s July 17, 2017, motion to dismiss, the United States Department of Justice attorney opened with the usual perversion of the facts and falsification of the record after finding himself in checkmate.

The Internal Revenue Service’s case depends 100 percent on the presumption that Petitioner is a 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(1) “person,” but presents no evidence of said presumption (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”[1]).

Rather than copping to failure and inability to produce such evidence upon challenge by Petitioner, said USDOJ attorney, as is typical, pretended Petitioner never raised the issue and went off on a tangent, accusing Petitioner of arguing that Petitioner was not a person—which Petitioner did not do.

The USDOJ attorney’s tag-team partner, the judge, then began accusing Petitioner of arguing things which Petitioner never did (nor are reflected in the record of the case) and asking for case citations in support of the false arguments he falsely attributed to Petitioner.

Thereafter, the judge entered his Order Compelling Compliance with Summons.

As the transcript of the September 13, 2017, hearing and record of the case evince, the court is a kangaroo court:

“kangaroo court. 1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p, 359.

There literally is nothing about what people believe is the federal judicial system throughout the Union that is legitimate; when exposed for fraud or treason, executive and judicial officers thereof pretend nothing was said, ignore material facts and failures harmful to their objective, and instead attribute to those proving the fraud and treason, events which said officers fabricate from whole cloth and never happened and of which there is no evidence.

This is possible—and their M.O.—only because they enjoy a monopoly over what appears to be the judicial system of the national government of the Republic but in actuality is the judicial system of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation,[2] usurping exercise of jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by its corporate charter, 16 Stat. 419, to the District of Columbia.

Achilles’ heel of executive and judicial officers of the United States

Except for the “President of the United States of America” (Constitution, Article II, Section 1), the Achilles’ heel of every other executive and judicial officer of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States” (“a Federal corporation” by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) is that none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.

The oath of office of the “President of the United States of America” (Constitution, Article II, Section 1) is the only such oath or affirmation that is provided by the Constitution (see Article II, Section 8 thereof) and therefore not subject to alteration by Congress.

This is a critical defect for all other executive and judicial officers—as none have acceded to, or are authorized to exercise, the executive or judicial power of that certain “United States” of the Constitution (wherein “United States” is a proper noun and not a contrived statutory term with an opposite constitutional meaning) anywhere in the Union.

This is just more proof that all courts of the “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) throughout the Union are kangaroo courts.

The same deficiency is true for all Senators and Representatives of Congress—as none have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to the requirements of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution or acceded to the legislative power conferred in Article I of the Constitution.

Republican versus municipal form of government

Said congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the statutory “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have betrayed the trust vested in them by the American People and foisted on each member of the Union by way of stealth legislation, a municipal form of government and denied each such member of the Union a republican form of government as guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.

The transition from a republican to a municipal form of government was:

commenced June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 223, 306 (see 182), when Congress, with malice aforethought, transmuted the word “state” into a statutory term with a constitutionally opposite meaning that comprehends only the District of Columbia and the territories and excludes every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union;
secured when Congress on June 16, 1866, proposed, 14 Stat. 358, and on July 9, 1868, ratified the political Trojan horse known as the Fourteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, whose primary purpose was to create an artificial class of Americans, municipal citizen-residents of the new “State” of the new “United States,” i.e., the District of Columbia, called “citizens of the United States”;
augmented when Congress on February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419, incorporated the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation;
facilitated by Congress’ creation August 14, 1935, of the Social Security retirement program (and Ponzi scheme) to provide justification for construing all participants thereof to be a resident, for legal purposes, of the District of Columbia (see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(13)); and
completed upon transmutation of every definition of the statutory terms “state,” “State,” and “United States” in all American law to include and mean the District of Columbia (a municipal corporation) and exclude every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union.
During and following the above and other related events, among numerous other things:

Government began treating of the supreme political power and sovereign authority in the Republic, the American People, also known as the “join tenants in the sovereignty” (Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793)), as political subjects of Congress and so-called persons with rights and duties;
The focus shifted away from unalienable rights, which every man holds inherently and are guaranteed in the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, to civil rights, which are bestowed by Congress on the new “citizens of the United States” and alleged subjects of Congress, the American People; and
Government began requiring a permission, in the form of a license (because of the fraudulent statutory definitions of “state,” “State,” and “United States” in all American law, every license in America—even the driver’s license—is the requirement of the payment of a certain sum by an alleged “person” for the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling for the general purpose of producing a reliable source of revenue within the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation), to exercise the unalienable and constitutional right to liberty and property and the inseparable right to contract derived therefrom.
The entire modern legal apparatus throughout the Union and the entire United States Code is municipal law of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation—with alleged political subjects and persons with rights and duties.

The only provision of the Constitution to which the current oath of office of Congressmen and executive and judicial officers of the “United States” (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) have a duty to honor is Art. I, § 8, cl. 17—all shows of apparent fidelity to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is time to abolish the current municipal form of government which has been implanted in every member of the Union and establish in each a republican form of government as intended by the Framers and guaranteed in the Constitution.

Courts of the “United States”: Enforcers of municipal law

The situation with the courts (and United States Department of Justice) is that they refuse to follow or adhere to the definition or meaning of their own fraudulent statutory terms—meaning there is no basis for agreement and therefore no due process of law or remedy, and the situation, ultimately, is not a legal one per se but a political in nature, a predicament succinctly encapsulated in the following maxims of law:

“A verbis legis non est recedendum. From the words of the law there should be no departure.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd rev. (8th ed.), rev. by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914), p. 2154.

“Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum. It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain.” Id. at 2145.

“Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum. Where the law is uncertain, there is no law.” Id. at 2165.

Notwithstanding that petitioner is facing “A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible” (see “kangaroo court,” supra): There being no other immediate remedy for the instant situation, Petitioner on September 25, 2017, filed Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(4) Motion for Relief from Order—as the said Order is void for the issuer’s (the judge’s) lack of constitutional authority to discharge or perform the duties of a judge anywhere in the Union, in places like Texas, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to all provisions of Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution.

The contents of said motion are backed up with citations from Supreme Court cases and are conclusive and devastating and have direct application in every civil or criminal proceeding throughout the Union in every court of the 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) “United States”: “a Federal corporation” by the name of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.

[1] “This court has never treated a presumption as any form of evidence. See, e.g., A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1037 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[A] presumption is not evidence.”); see also Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193, 80 L.Ed. 229 (1935) (“[A presumption] cannot acquire the attribute of evidence in the claimant’s favor.”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 171, 58 S.Ct. 500, 503, 82 L.Ed. 726 (1938) (“[A] presumption is not evidence and may not be given weight as evidence.”). Although a decision of this court, Jensen v. Brown, 19 F.3d 1413, 1415 (Fed.Cir.1994), dealing with presumptions in VA law is cited for the contrary proposition, the Jensen court did not so decide.” Routen v. West, 142 F.3d. 1434, 1439 C.A.Fed. (1998).

[2] “An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” ch. 180, sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . . 1873–’74 (in force as of December 1, 1873), sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia Code (1940)).

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